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ABSTRACT 
The present study reconstructs psychological, linguistic and ontological aspects of Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s philosophy in the light of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Brentano used 
intentionality as a psychological term to denote the ‘mental’ as opposed to the ‘natural’. 
Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that 
‘there are things that do not exist’. The chapters that discuss Ṣadrā’s philosophy reflect 
the two aspects with an investigation for the production process of intentional objects and 
an investigation of the status of these objects in ontology. The main aim of the research 
is to give an internalist and monist account for the nature of intentionality demonstrating 
an alternative approach to the concepts of existence and the soul. 
Ontologically, there is only one reality (existence) and nothing is left outside it. 
Accordingly, intentional objects are mental beings that are at a lower level of existence 
(wujūd ẓillī). The principles behind the monist ontology are: first, the gradational 
ontology (tashkīk) that all things are determined beings (mutamayyiz) and they are 
manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (mutashakkik), and, 
second, the simplicity principle (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) in which existence is a simple reality 
that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. 
Accordingly intentional objects are a level of existence, and share same reality. 
Epistemologically, all knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as 
internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being 
an accidental preparatory tool and faculties for the soul. Perception is always completed 
with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The 
soul is not the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes 
substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then not a container of 
forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last point is 
that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (knowledge) indeed is the very 
existence of the human soul. In this explanation, the soul is neither material nor 
immaterial per se: the soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more 
delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul’s journey is made possible with the 
preparatory role of the processes of perception. Intentionality is soul’s action of creating 
mental forms. The products are identical to soul since soul and knowledge are identical. 
Consequently, intentional objects are dependent on the soul in their presence and creation.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Yesterday upon the stair 
I met a man who wasn’t there 
He wasn’t there again today 
How I wish he’d go away 
Antigonish 
1.1 WHY? 
This thesis is a reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in the light of Brentano’s 
theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote 
the ‘mental’ as opposed to the ‘natural’. Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an 
ontological commitment to assenting that ‘there are things that do not exist’. Thus 
naturalists, in denying the independent notion of the mental, needed to engage with 
intentionality. Later still, Russell and in particular Roderick Chisholm introduced the term 
‘intentionality’ into the analytical tradition and effected a linguistic turn with respect to 
its analysis.  
This new linguistic-ontological part of the problem is discussed by philosophers from 
Russell onwards. Even today, we find similar discussions related to intentionality through 
propositional attitudes. Intentionality is related to many areas of philosophy including 
mind, existence, and language.1 In its classical definition, it is ‘aboutness for mental 
states’, and ‘reference to an object’ or ‘direction to an object’, and it refers to the way in 
which things are thought to be in the mind. Different accounts with different positions on 
intentionality can be related, and the scope of the related topics can cover most 
philosophical territory from ontology to sets of belief and predicting human actions.2 
When Brentano presents intentionality, he also makes it a possible problematic issue for 
history of philosophy. Intentionality is not original, he claims; rather, it is a re-statement 
of ancient and medieval concepts such as Aristotle’s inexistence and Aquinas’ inner 
                                                          
1 Jacob, Pierre, "Intentionality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/intentionality/>. 
2 As Dennett does in his Intentional Stance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 
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word. So the scope of a research on intentionality potentially includes disciplines as large 
as ontology, epistemology, semantics, philosophy of language and mind.  
This study will limit the scope of intentionality to Brentano’s definition of it as the 
aboutness of mental states. I will apply the question to a seventeenth century philosopher, 
Mullā Ṣadrā. Intentionality in its simplified sense concerns the relation of the human mind 
and the extra-mental world. As a result of this interaction, human beings have a mental 
world filled with mental objects that might or might not be the same as the extra-mental 
objects to which they are oriented. So my quest for finding Ṣadrā’s intentionality will be 
through his definition of human interaction with the world, and how he explains the 
production of mental objects together with their ontological status in his ontology. 
Accordingly, my research is about Brentano’s intentionality as aboutness as applied to 
Ṣadrā’s psychology, epistemology and ontology as a question of mental existence.  
This question is important for a number of reasons. Methodologically, application of a 
contemporary question (e.g. intentionality) to a philosopher from the past and from a 
different tradition (e.g. Mullā Ṣadrā) is important. This brings with it both risks and 
opportunities. Major risks are to fall into the traps of anachronism, or being unable to 
bridge ideas between different traditions of thought as these traditions are allegedly 
incommensurable. Yet the opportunity is once these risks are overcome, that we can have 
the opportunity to communicate between texts from different timelines, and different 
theoretical frames. With this communication, new vocabulary and viewpoints can be 
discovered. Secondly, the more comprehensive approach and less parsimonious 
vocabulary of the medieval philosophy is a linguistic opportunity to work with extended 
vocabulary. Although the comprehensive language is an opportunity, one can claim this 
of many medieval philosophers. However, my choice of applying the intentionality 
question to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is not at random. When scholars consider Ṣadrā, he 
is typically viewed as one of the late medieval thinkers known for his synthesis of 
philosophy, illuminationist tradition and theoretical Sufism (Nasr, S. Hossein, 1978, pp. 
21-5; Rizvi, Sajjad, 20093; Kalin, Ibrahim, 2010, xiv). In this late period synthesis of 
Ṣadrā, an extended vocabulary of the synthesis brought from the different traditions, and 
the comprehensive language of the medieval philosophy, are combined. 
Moreover, Ṣadrā’s philosophy provides a fresh approach to philosophical questions 
closely related to intentionality due to his unique approach to ‘existence’ and ‘soul’. His 
                                                          
3Rizvi, Sajjad,  "Mulla Sadra", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mulla-sadra/> 
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ontology and psychology not only provide a broader approach to intentionality, but also 
come with unique answers to what intentionality is and what the nature of an intentional 
object is. His understanding of existence involves mental phenomena which emerge as a 
different ontological answer to that of Russell and Meinong as well as being different 
from Avicenna and Suhrawardī. Moreover, his idea of the creative nature of the human 
soul brings in an innovative explanation of how intentionality works. This is unique to 
him. His account is built on a dynamic and non-essentialist understanding of the human. 
Thus, some of the most unique principles in his philosophy are related to the question of 
intentionality and these connections can provide us with new viewpoints to intentionality. 
Ṣadrā’s most original contributions (being substantial motion, gradational ontology 
(tashkīk), and his unique definition of the soul) are closely related to my question. Even 
more importantly, his different stance offers the opportunity to escape the dichotomy of 
material/immaterial and brings out an alternative to essentialist philosophies. The source 
of my interest in the topic is related to these points as well. 
My interest in intentionality started with an essay on Quine’s famous “On What There 
Is”. After my first research on Islamic philosophy and Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontology, this was 
my second Master’s degree and I was trying to understand the different language of 
analytical philosophy. In comparison to Mullā Ṣadrā’s approach to existence, Quine’s 
attitude was strikingly parsimonious. Eventually, this study evolved from that initial 
curiosity as to whether the intentionality problem could be applied to Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
philosophy. The quest behind this research is, then, whether a more comprehensive 
understanding of existence can function as a base for a new approach to intentionality. In 
the main chapters I will discuss Ṣadrā’s philosophy in detail. However, before that, I want 
to provide a brief summary of contemporary discussions on intentionality in this 
introduction in order to explore possible alternatives to basic approaches to intentionality.   
Modern discussions of intentionality start with Brentano’s introduction of the term. He 
claims that  
[e]very mental phenomenon is characterized by [....] intentional (or mental) 
inexistence of an object, [....] reference to a content, direction towards an 
object, [...] or immanent objectivity [...] (PES, (tr.s) Rancurello, Terrell and 
McAlister, 1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25) 
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This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No 
physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. Three basic claims can be extracted 
through these sentences (Jacob, Pierre, 2010)4:  
1. It is constitutive of the phenomenon of intentionality that mental states are 
directed towards things different from themselves.  
2. Objects that mind is directed towards are characterised by intentional inexistence.  
3. Intentionality is the mark of the mental: all and only mental states exhibit 
intentionality. 
Here we gather the three ingredients about intentionality: cognitive content, a possible 
relation to the extra-mental world, and mental phenomenon. These ingredients can be 
mirrored to medieval discussions as the question of the soul and its faculties, and objects 
of knowledge processes. In a more refined formula, the two claims are that intentionality 
is ‘non-physical’ and that intentionality defines what is mental. I will follow only a 
restricted version of the intentionality question. At the centre of my research are the 
human being and his/her capacities. 
After Brentano, the contemporary discussions on intentionality diverge into two different 
approaches of the analytical and the phenomenological. Consequently, the gap between 
the terminologies of intentionality becomes larger as time goes on. The phenomenological 
discussions are continued by Brentano’s students. For analytical philosophy, the problem 
is introduced to analytical philosophers by Chisholm. 
Chisholm introduced Brentano’s intentionality with a positive and new approach. In this 
new approach, he continued Brentano’s claim that intentionality is not reducible to 
descriptions of behaviour or any non-intentional vocabulary. He, however, redefined the 
problem with a linguistic approach and intentionality is presented in the form of belief-
sentences (Chisholm, 1957, pp.168 ff.). This philosophy of language approach transforms 
the problem of intentionality into a problem of intensionality. This is related to the 
dominant tendency at his time which gives explanations to all philosophical problems in 
the context of a problem of language. The philosophical approach in this era is commonly 
called the linguistic turn, a term made famous by Rorty and borrowed from Gustav 
Bergmann (Rorty, 1993, p. 337). Chisholm introduced the three criteria in order to 
distinguish intentional idioms: failure of existential commitment, failure of truth 
                                                          
4 Jacob, Pierre, "Intentionality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/intentionality/>. 
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functionality, and failure of co-existive expressions salva veritate (Kaukua, Jari, 2007, p. 
36).5 ‘Diogenes looked for an honest man’ is intentional by the first criterion. ‘James 
believes there are tigers in India’ is intentional by the second. And with the last one, it 
can be said that certain cognitive sentences - sentences using ‘know,’ ‘see,’ ‘perceive,’ 
and the like are intentional (Chisholm, 1957, pp. 170, 171). These criteria continued to 
be in use for applications of intentionality to medieval psychology (cf. Kaukua, 2007). 
The problem in its ontological context for analytical philosophers is very often understood 
as a problem about intentional inexistence, and this is basically discussed around the 
concept of non-existence. One example is the question: how can we talk about things that 
do not exist? Moreover, in the context of psychology it is filled with the realist claim of 
a realm of consciousness which is different from the physical world. Both claims with 
their immaterialist implications, threatened the dominant naturalistic intuition in the 
analytical tradition. As a result, many philosophers tried to explain intentionality with 
descriptions which are compatible with physical explanations. This is made either with 
eliminativist or reductionist methods. Quine carried on Chisholm’s linguistic approach 
by focusing more on the ontological implications of the intentionality thesis. Quine sees 
no benefit in the intentionality thesis other than a pragmatic necessity and rejects the 
mental:  
One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of 
intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as 
showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of 
intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the second. To accept intentional usage 
at face value is, we saw, to postulate translation relations as somehow objectively 
valid though indeterminate in principle relative to the totality of speech dispositions. 
Such postulation promises little gain in scientific insight if there is no better ground 
for it than that the supposed translation relations are presupposed by the vernacular 
of semantics and intention (Quine, 1960, p. 220). 
In Dennett’s taxonomy of intentionality, Quine’s rejection of inner processes and 
intentionality is representing the eliminative view. Churchlands, Davidson, Haugeland, 
Millikan, Rorty, Stalnaker, Sellars, Douglas Hofstadter, Marvin Minsky are listed 
alongside Quine in their approach to intentionality. On the rival end, Dennett lists 
                                                          
5 For these criteria see: Roderick Chisholm, 1957, pp. 168 ff; Asher Moore, 1960, “Chisholm on 
Intentionality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 248-254; Victor Caston, 
1998, “Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 58, 
no. 2, pp. 249-298; Jesse L Yoder, 1987, “Chisholm's criteria of intentionality”, Philosophia, vol. 17, no. 
3, pp. 297-305. 
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intentional realists who take the problem of intentionality more seriously such as Fodor, 
Kripke, Dretske and Burge (Dennett, 1998, p. 345). My position in the mentioned context 
is that of a realist that intentionality is to be regarded as a real phenomenon and not to be 
explained in eliminative or reductionist terms. Another reason for my choice of Mullā 
Ṣadrā is that his philosophy is open to such a realist stance.  
In the chapter on ontology, I characterize the realist and anti-realist camps with the 
addition of Meinong to the list. Differing from the dominant tendency in the analytical 
tradition, Meinong followed through the ontological implications of Brentano’s thesis. 
He applied Mally’s indifference (between the being and so-being) principle to this 
problem and defended an ontology of objects. So in the fifth chapter, Quine-Russell and 
Meinong are examined as two opposite ends to the ontological question. Yet both believe 
that a parsimonious ontology is important. Ṣadrā is important at this very point. His 
monism and his simplicity principle for existence - which bases existence at the centre of 
multiplicity and unity - is still successful in not making the cosmos ontologically crowded 
and yet posing a realist account of intentional objects. The realist analytical philosophers 
dealt with the problem in other ways though. 
One of the strategies in order to deal with intentionality within the realist camp has been 
defining two types of intentionality, as derived and intrinsic intentionality. Intrinsic 
intentionality is a state that is really existent in the mind or the brain of the agent. Visual 
experience and beliefs are intrinsic. A written text, on the other hand, has derived 
intentionality. The meaning of the text can be shifted from one meaning to another, as it 
is the conventions that determine the meaning (Searle, 2002, p. 78; Manson, 2003, pp. 
140 ff.). So in addition to realist and anti-realist accounts, we are introduced to dualist 
and monist approaches to intentionality. According to one, there are two types of 
intentionality as derived and intrinsic, and according to the monist, there is only one. 
Haugeland approaches the topic through a regress argument. All intentionality will 
necessarily be derived from another and due to the regress problem; some intentionality 
is necessarily ‘original’.  
Derivative intentionality, like an image in a photocopy, must derive 
eventually from something that is not similarly derivative; that is, at least 
some intentionality must be original (non-derivative) (Haugeland, 1998, p. 
129). 
I find the differentiation between intrinsic and derivative intentionality related to the 
medieval distinction between mental existence, and, the levels of writing and speech. So 
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the classification of derived and intrinsic can be applied to the difference between mental 
and linguistic entities by the claim that the latter is secondary to the former. This does not 
necessarily imply that classical discussions are dualist in the sense discussed above 
though. My claim in the fourth chapter will be that both levels still share the same reality 
and manifest the same nature of being mental.  
In another causal approach which is realist, intentionality is accepted to be intrinsic but 
explained only due to its function. The subject matter in their research is the function of 
intentionality rather than the nature of intentional states. Putnam, Fodor, Lycan and Kim 
can be considered among these philosophers. With the cognitive revolution an 
explanation is demanded as well as a functional definition of the mental. Cognitive 
scientists and computational explanations saw machines and human beings in a similar 
manner, and thought that they both contain things about the world. 
A different version of functionalism is representationalist theory. This gives an externally 
based theory of mind, in which phenomenal characters are in the form of representational 
content (Tye, 1995, Dretske, 1995). It can be claimed that the most popular medieval 
theories of mind resemble representationalism. The idea of finding representations of 
extra-mental things in mind in the form of imprints in mind (āthār) can be found in 
Avicenna’s texts (Avicenna, ʿIbāra, ed. Madkur, 1405, pp. 1-3) or in the shape of similar 
images (similitudes) to their extra-mental model can be found in Aquinas’ theory (Pasnau, 
Robert, 1997, p. 13). Goldberg, for example claims a further point by assuming continuity 
between Aristotle’s psychology and modern functionalism. He thinks that Putnam is 
influenced by Aristotle (Goldberg, 2004, pp. 48-63). Unless an interpretation provides a 
comprehensive and coherent reading of a philosopher, I think categorizations of past 
philosophers as defenders of contemporary theories can be misleading. On the other hand, 
innovative interpretations of great dead philosophers which engage their texts with 
modern issues are opportunities to arrive at new viewpoints to both old and modern 
philosophical questions.  
Some philosophers tried to solve the consciousness problem with a ‘divide and conquer’ 
strategy.6 According to these philosophers, consciousness is one thing, being ‘mental’ is 
another. The functionalist explanations suffice for the mental but not for consciousness. 
They introduce ‘mental-state consciousness’ as an additional property to mental-ness. In 
one approach, the additional property is gained when one has higher order thoughts. 
                                                          
6 For Searle’s criticism of these ‘divide and conquer’ tactics, see Neil C. Manson (2003) 
“Consciousness”, pp. 137-139. 
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Others, who are opposed to the HOT, offer ‘first-order’ representational accounts. In both 
the higher-order and first-order representational theories, intentionality is independent of 
consciousness (Manson, 2003, pp135-140). To sum up, in higher order theories (HOT), 
consciousness is not intrinsic to mental states. 
The ‘divide and conquer’ move is related to my thesis, as I too separated the 
intentionality-related discussions from issues about consciousness. Similar to HOT 
theorists, I think that intentionality can be evaluated with this move and even if 
consciousness is claimed to be part of a theory of intentionality, the notion of 
consciousness can be attached later. My motive for this choice is purely pragmatic, as my 
goal is framing the discussion on intentionality with the bare essentials of the concept.  
A difficult case against my choice of separation is Brentano when he claims 
consciousness as essential to mental phenomena: 
We have seen that no mental phenomenon exists which is not, in the sense 
indicated above, consciousness of an object. However, another question 
arises, namely, whether there are any mental phenomena which are not 
objects of consciousness. All mental phenomena are states of consciousness 
(PES, (tr.s) Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, 1874, p. 79). 
Searle has a similar stance. His philosophy is an interesting case among analytical 
philosophers: he is a realist about mental phenomena, anti-reductionist, and anti-dualist 
and at the same time remains to be a physicalist. At the centre of his unique stance is 
consciousness. As consciousness brings out mental phenomena with emphasis to first 
person perspective and privileged access of this perspective, he remains anti reductionist. 
He tries to achieve this combination by defining intentionality with a speech act theory 
and introducing notion of aspectual shape.7 First, he claims that a mental state is 
intentional only if it is at least potentially conscious (Searle, 1992, pp.59ff.). He objected 
to HOT mainly because these followed a ‘divide-conquer’ strategy (Searle, 1991, p. 47)8: 
                                                          
7 Searle remained within the context of the naturalistic project and claimed that a subjective and anti-
reductionist explanation of intentionality is achievable. This approach appears to be a more complex and 
tangled version of reductionism. He rejects the idea of any form of dualism and thinks that eventually and 
fundamentally consciousness is supposed to be understood in physical terms and its non-reducibility is 
not to be taken as a second property which is distinct and over and above the neurobiological base 
(Searle, 2002 (b), pp. 60 ff.). He tries to keep the physicalist nature of his theory with a causal principle in 
which consciousness is closely related to its neurobiological base. 
8 “In recent decades, the connection between consciousness and intentionality is being gradually lost in 
theoretical writings in linguistics, cognitive science, and philosophy. There has been an effort of varying 
degrees of explicitness to try to separate the issues concerning intentionality from those concerning 
consciousness. I think the underlying and perhaps unconscious motivation for this urge to separate 
intentionality from consciousness, even among people who do not share the ideology of the behaviourist-
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“There are not two types of states, consciousness and qualia. There is just consciousness, 
which is a series of qualitative states” (Searle, 1997, p. 9). 
As a speech act, he defines intentional content with two reference points: illocutionary 
force and propositional content. The first determines whether asserting, promising, or 
ordering is taking place. The latter determine the sort of relationship to the world and the 
truth value of the speech act (Mcintyre, 1984, p. 469). In terms of ‘aspectual shape’, when 
I, for example, think of something I always think about it in some particular way. Searle 
calls this particular way ‘aspectual shape’ (Searle, 1991, p.51). What differentiates 
Searle’s aspectual shape from ordinary representation and his intentionality from 
reductionist approaches is that it is not possible to translate them to explanations of a third 
person perspective.  
In addition to the approaches of Brentano and Searle, the move of separation is made also 
difficult by features of the Sadrian philosophy: Self-knowledge and consciousness are 
important for Sadrian epistemology. Despite all these reasons, a thorough evaluation of 
consciousness and self-knowledge remains to be too ambitious for the limits of this 
research. And due to constraints imposed by time, consciousness and self-knowledge will 
not be made part of the discussion in this research. The Sadrian account of the production 
process of objects of knowledge is as important and explanatory as the notion of self-
knowledge. Indeed, an important insight into his understanding of the self and self-
knowledge is established through the exploration of this production process. In this sense, 
it can be claimed that the process of perception is primary to the discussions on self-
knowledge. Now one last group needs to be talked about inside analytical tradition which 
is indirectly related to this thesis.  
In a number of cases the dominant naturalistic nature of most analytic philosophers has 
been criticized with a charge of reduction, and as listed above some philosophers tried to 
produce alternative realist and anti-reductionist theories. These realist readings still kept 
the concern of compatibility with the naturalistic project at their core. One of the recent 
trends led by Chalmers, for example, combines functionalism and naturalism with 
dualism. Different from all these, a group of philosophers searched for a fundamentally 
monist explanation. They tried to do this by redefining matter. The slogan behind these 
theories is “nothing can give what it does not possess”. In the case of the ‘mental’, when 
                                                          
materialist tradition, is that we do not know how to explain consciousness, and we would like to get a 
theory of intentionality which will not be discredited by the fact that we do not have a theory of 
consciousness” (Searle, 1991, p. 48). 
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the inner world of the human is accepted to be real, there then occurs a problem. How can 
matter be able to produce the complex consciousness? For this production, matter needs 
to contain (at least in a primitive form) some form of mentality. One can trace behind 
these monist, emergentist and panpsychist explanations the need to have intrinsic 
explanations of the mental that go beyond the structural accounts given by science (and 
expressed in functionalist theories). This is an extreme physicalism that leaves nothing 
outside of matter. According to Galen Strawson, physics has a restricted area of 
explanatory power but the physical is wider and yet full of unexplained realities. 
Consciousness is one of them (Strawson, Galen 2008, p. 21): “For every concrete 
phenomenon in the universe is physical, according to materialists. So all mental 
phenomena, including experiential phenomena, are physical phenomena, according to 
materialists: just as all cows are animals” (Strawson, Galen, 2008, p.21).  
Both panpsychism and emergentism are built on strong materialist intuitions and share a 
similar explanatory base. However, notorious panpsychist Strawson is not happy with 
emergentist theories because they cannot explain experiential emergence from the wholly 
non-experiential because these phenomena are not comparable to the experiential 
(Strawson, 2008, pp. 60 ff.). The analogy of P-phenomena (physical features such as 
shape-size-mass-charge-etc.) is not adequate for experiential phenomena (Strawson, 
2008, p. 62). According to the second group who claim that experiential phenomenon is 
proto-experiential, wholly non-experientiality “at the very least [turns into being] 
somehow intrinsically suited to constituting experiential” (Strawson, 2008, p. 68). There 
are two possible interpretations of ‘proto-experiential’: first “not actually experiential but 
just what is needed for experience” and second “already intrinsically experiential, 
although very different, qualitatively, from the experience whose realizing ground we are 
supposing it be” (Strawson, 2008, p. 68).  
Strawson rejects both of these replies and sees them as having the same value. The main 
argument against is that only experiential phenomena can emerge from experiential 
phenomena (as implied by the principle “nothing can give what it does not possess”). 
Accordingly, he is left with one choice. The physical ultimates of consciousness must be 
experiential and intrinsically experience involving. So real materialism must give up the 
non-experiential and accept micropsychism.9 This is a big step towards panpsychism. And 
this step allows Strawson to claim real materialism to entail panpsychism.  
                                                          
9 It must be remembered that micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, as “some ultimates” are regarded to 
be experiential.  
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The monist theories10 are important because of their different approach to what matter is. 
For example, the emergence theory assumes some kind of leap between material and 
mental. And for the panpsychist approach, consciousness is present at every level of 
matter as well as at the level of consciousness (micropsychism). Emergentist and 
panpsychist notions of consciousness bear resemblance to Ṣadrā’s idea of soul which 
starts as a material body and with substantial motion turns into conscious mind. 
Panpsychism also resembles his idea of matter which is conscious at all levels, since 
everything exists as manifestations of one single reality: existence. However, I think 
claims of parallelism require a more comprehensive research on both traditions; so I 
prefer to avoid the claim that Ṣadrā is emergentist or panpsychist. The difference is mainly 
due to theological differences because Ṣadrā talks with a theocentric and internalist 
intuition, whereas the others have the naturalist stance as their focus. Also Ṣadrā would 
deny that his philosophy is materialist. ‘Existence’ is the central term in his monist 
philosophy which is defined as a single reality that is manifested at different levels and 
intensities. Matter is one of the lowest of these levels. Yet, the methodological similarity 
of monism and the similarity of accounting for the mental with consciousness embedded 
in this reality is what make both these approaches valuable and equally unique. In general, 
I would like to avoid labelling Ṣadrā with one of these approaches. However, some 
contemporary scholars agree with me in terms of the resemblance between the theories 
and make further claims. Khatami, for example, considers Ṣadrā’s psychology to be 
emergentist (Khatami, 2004). Emergentism is built on the idea that a leap from matter to 
consciousness is possible. Differentiation of the matter and consciousness is an essential 
part of this approach. This is not Ṣadrā’s case. For him, it is intrinsic to every existent 
(including material existents) that they possess some level of consciousness. Considering 
this, if Ṣadrā is to be associated with any contemporary theories, it would be either proto-
psychism or panpsychism. 
So far I discussed intentionality as it is evaluated in the contemporary philosophy of mind. 
The camps are shaped first, by their realism about intentional phenomena and then the 
way they deal with this phenomena as eliminationists, reductionists, physicalists, dualists 
and monists. In my discussion I will start with a realist intuition. I also found similarities 
between monist theories and Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Next, comes the ontological setting of 
the research. 
                                                          
10 Especially Strawson’s panpsychism is important for it allows the idea of consciousness at the level of 
matter (micropsychism). 
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In this research, the setting of the ontological problem of intentional objects is Russellian 
and Quinean at many points. This is mainly because I think the contrast between 
minimalist accounts and comprehensive accounts will make it easier for us to see the 
differences, advantages, and disadvantages of each theory in a simpler manner. 
Brentano’s own stance in ontological discussions is not constructive. Whilst early 
Brentano benefited from Aristotelian categories, he later committed to reism.11 The early 
phase is shaped with a more liberal ontology while in his reist phase, he first restricted 
the realm of irrealia12 and later reduced them to “things”. Thus the ontological 
commitment in intentional relations is shifted to things rather than abstract things: when 
redness is object of thought, for example, it meant that “some colored things are red”.13 
In terms of intentional objects the two extremes I chose for this kind of representation 
have been Quine-Russell versus Mullā Ṣadrā. Moreover, Mullā Ṣadrā’s internalist 
tendencies in his understanding of the human and epistemological processes made me 
think this contrast can be pursued further in related discussions of materiality and 
immateriality of epistemological processes. Thus, behind some of the discussions about 
the immateriality of the human self and products of its actions, I have a similar goal to 
emphasize the difference of Mullā Ṣadrā’s approach. I shall separate monist theories from 
other analytical theories though. As explained above, there is more than a superficial 
similarity between Ṣadrā and monist theories in contrast to other materialist theories. To 
sum up, in this research, the naturalist project has inspired some of the set up for 
discussions on immateriality of epistemological processes, and together with them there 
will also be occasional reference to Chisholm and his criteria for intentionality.  
The discussion on nonexistence, existence and intentional objects together with 
existential import are more central discussions in analytical philosophy for this research 
and there will be more frequent use of them. The influence of the analytical setting can 
be observed further when I discuss linguistic issues about existence. On the one hand, I 
present the issue of the language of existence in the context of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z 
                                                          
11 The term reism is first used by Kotarbinski to refer to the claim that only things exist (Woleński, 1966, 
p.355).  
12 Irrealia such as: intentional objects, immanent objects, existence and nonexistence, modalities, 
universals, and contents of judgements (Woleński, Jan, "Reism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/reism/>) 
13  For details about Brentano’s reism see: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Barry Smith (2004) “Brentano’s 
Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism” in (ed.) Dale Jacquette, The Cambridge Companion to 
Brentano (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 197—220; Wolenski, Jan (1996) “Reism in the 
Brentanist Tradition” in (ed.s) Liliana Albertazzi, Libardi Massimo & Roberto Poli, The School of Franz 
Brentano (Leiden: Kluwer), pp.357-75. 
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and Organon (Categories and De Interpretatione to be more specific) and I use Ṣadrā’s 
concept of tashkīk (gradational ontology) as the solution. Accordingly with the principle 
of tashkīk, existence is a simple reality that is the source of unity and multiplicity through 
degrees and intensities. On the other hand, I make use of Frege-Russell’s ambiguity 
problem and discussions on existential import. An interesting aspect of similarity is that 
both Sadrian and Russellian philosophical theories of existence are applicable to a 
language-based discussion. One inquiry that attracts attention to the semantical nature of 
Sadrian ontology is Sajjad Rizvi’s Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics in which the principle 
of tashkīk (modulation/gradational ontology) is placed centre stage.  
Brentano’s followers on the phenomenological side of philosophy developed different 
viewpoints to intentionality. Unlike the linguistic, reductionist, functionalist, teleological, 
and eliminative approaches in analytical philosophy, for phenomenological discussions 
experience, the first person perspective and consciousness, have been the predominant 
concepts. My initial intuition at the beginning of this research was to include discussions 
on self-knowledge and consciousness, and accordingly discuss phenomenological 
approaches.14 Later a potential problem occurred to me that the scope of my thesis would 
then be too broad. As a result, I decided to restrict the intentionality question by 
Brentano’s presentation and formularization. A detailed and insightful research on the 
phenomenological understanding of intentionality and consciousness in comparison to 
medieval and especially Neoplatonic traditions such as Mullā Ṣadrā’s seemed to me to be 
productive.  
Aristotle and medieval philosophers seem to have influenced Brentano to an important 
degree and another curious case is the specified reading that Brentano applies to the 
history of the discussions on intentionality. The idea of intentionality in relation to 
medieval and ancient theories of self, soul, consciousness and epistemology might be 
studied as an independent research topic with further historical and textual tools as well. 
                                                          
14 This is also due to a similarity between phenomenology and Ṣadrā’s philosophy in both of which the 
notions of consciousness and self-knowledge play fundamental roles. Self-knowledge is most important 
for direct knowledge. However, most discussion of mental existence belongs to a different category of 
knowledge which is indirect knowledge. The fundamentality of self-knowledge for intentionality has been 
argued for and against by various philosophers. Despite coming from different backgrounds, Searle, 
Kaukua and Black all argue for the centrality of self-knowledge for intentionality. It should be 
automatically accepted that many Neoplatonists are in this category too as they base any kind of 
knowledge on self-knowledge and moreover on the knowledge of the one. One exception is Dan Zahavi. 
Despite his phenomenologist tendency, Zahavi treats self-knowledge and consiousness as two different 
philosophical questions and does not agree with the centrality claims of self-knowledge for intentionality. 
See Kaukua (2007); Black (2011); Searle (1991); Manson (2003); Zahavi (2006); Williford (2006).  
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Such a study is beyond the methodology and scope of this current investigation. I used 
the short historiography that Brentano gives for intentionality in order to tailor the concept 
of intentionality in the thesis. And that brief presentation will appear in the historiography 
chapter. 
Returning to the subject of intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā, although this research owes its 
topic to the modern discussions on intentionality and its essential link to the modern 
discussions, the usage of them will be considerably limited. As well as the mapping of 
the modern discussions, from time to time I will also try to explore other medieval and 
ancient philosophers on ontology, epistemology and soul such as Aristotle, Suhrawardī, 
Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, and Avicenna and so on. The aim of these comparatively short 
explorations will be to understand Mullā Ṣadrā better in his historical context. To make 
the scope of this research clearer, I make no claims of exploring what Ṣadrā’s original 
idea of intentionality is. Moreover, I do not claim that Ṣadrā has a theory of intentionality. 
My reconstruction of his theories is not built on an assumptive state based on the question 
“How would Ṣadrā explain this were he asked about the question of intentionality?” It is 
not a comparison of Brentano with Ṣadrā as well. As a result, there will not be detailed 
evaluation of Brentano’s own philosophy and comparisons between him and Ṣadrā. To 
sum up, the study is not a discovery of the original Ṣadrā or re-construction of Ṣadrā’s 
original idea of intentionality. It is a reconstruction of Ṣadrā’s ideas around the question 
of intentionality. With this reconstruction both Ṣadrā and the question of intentionality 
are reconstructed, tailored and should be accepted in advance as being distorted.15 
On the other hand, putting together claims from various parts of Sadrian philosophy 
picked specifically to reconstruct a problem of intentionality is one of the contributions 
of the current research. In their isolated versions, Sadrian ontological and epistemological 
discussions are already accessible in contemporary and early modern scholarship. In this 
regard, I benefitted largely from the scholarship on distinction of essence and existence 
by Izutsu, Nasr, Kalin and Pourjavady. The presentation on Sadrian epistemology and 
logic is closely related to Rizvi, Kalin and Lameer’s discussions, yet with significant 
refinements. I focused on the dynamic nature and primacy of existence as the foremost 
two claims in Sadrian philosophy. And accordingly, I did not follow some standard 
readings on his ontology or semantics of existence and also on similitudes that centralize 
the world of similitudes in Sadrian philosophy. In that, I might be thought to follow 
                                                          
15 Distortion is used by other researchers to express the change in reconstructions such as van-Ketel 
(1991, p. 61ff) and Rorty (1984, pp. 14 ff)  
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through initial suspicions reflected in Fazlurrahman’s text on the tension between monism 
and pluralism in Ṣadrā’s thought (Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 39ff). The nuances between my 
presentation and these will be discussed as the chapters and relevant topics emerge. 
Despite my dependence on the contemporary scholarship on these issues, I created the 
essential structure according to Ṣadrā’s own writings. 
Thus, this reconstruction will contribute to the limited literature on Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of 
intentionality and the current body of work on his notion of mental existence.  
A further note is that this study will also be a contribution to the history of sense theories. 
Less scholarly work has been done on his sense theories. Generally the focus of most 
studies had been his ideas on vision and the faculty of imagination. However, my focus 
is upon the general structure of his explanation of knowledge processes especially when 
the source of the data is inevitably extra-mental. In addition to this, I try to show how his 
psychology, epistemology, and ideas of language and logic are constructed around his 
idea of wujūd. When combined with the question of intentionality, Ṣadrā’s monist attitude 
contributes to the discipline with an extended idea of existence that makes objects of 
mental states share existence. I try to show how comprehensive his ontology and his idea 
of existence are with the section on ontology and mental existence. The presentation of 
Ṣadrā’s idea of wujūd focuses on the dynamic nature of existence and as a result, my 
evaluation about his notion of existence, his ideas on similitudes, homonymy of being 
and nature of proposition show nuances from classical discussions. I hope this will open 
space for more attempts to read and interpret Ṣadrā’s philosophy from various innovative 
perspectives.  
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1.2 SOURCES AND PREVIOUS STUDIES 
In this research, my main source will be Mullā Ṣadrā’s own works. With his ontology and 
psychology in focus, the main sources in order to understand Ṣadrā are his magnum opus 
Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqliyya al-arba‘a (Asfār), his short book for his 
ontological approach Kitāb al-mashāʿir (Mashāʿir), and for his understanding on soul 
and mental existence, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya fī manāhij al-sulūkiyya (Shawāhid) 
together with al-Masāʾil al-qudsiyya fī al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya (MQ ) which has one of 
the largest discussions on mental existence. Other shorter treatises will be referred to 
besides these main books, for example for his logical views his Risāla fī al-taṣawwur wa 
al-taṣdīq (RTT) and al-Tanqīḥ fī al-manṭiq (Tanqīḥ); for the identity thesis Risāla fī 
ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-māʿqūl (RIAA); and for his ideas on the relation of human to the 
world, Iksīr al-ʿārifīn (Iksīr), Mīzāj, and Ittiṣāf al-māhiyya bi al-wujūd. 
One advantage of studying Ṣadrā is that his works on existence, knowledge and the soul 
are available in critical editions in Arabic. Moreover, it is promising that the translations 
into English have been increasing in recent years.16 On the other hand, the number of the 
translations is still not sufficient for a scholar to work on Ṣadrā solely with these English 
texts. Moreover, translations are often found to be confusing and inaccessible for those 
interested in philosophy.   
In terms of Ṣadrā’s notion of intentionality, I could find only one article in English 
(Gholam Reza Aʾwani, 2003). Aʿwani follows both Brentano and Husserl’s definitions 
of intentionality (as aboutness as well as an act and directedness) and traces it back to 
concepts of “meaning” and “concept” in Islamic philosophical texts. He focuses on first 
and second intentions in Ṣadrā’s writing and his presentation of mental existence. This 
informative article, despite its short discussions on Ṣadrā, focuses more on the Husserlian 
                                                          
16 (1964), Kitāb al-mashāʿir, tr. as Livre des pénétrations métaphysiques by H. Corbin (Tehran: L’Institut 
Franco-Iranien); (1981), al-Ḥikma al-ʿArshiyya, tr. as The Wisdom of the Throne by James W. Morris 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press); (1986), Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, tr. as Le livre de la 
sagesse orientale by H. Corbin with the glosses of Mullā Ṣadrā (Paris: Fayard), pp. 439-669.;(2000a), 
Risāla al-ḥashr, tr. as Se rendre immortel by C. Jambet (Paris: Fata Morgana); (2000b), Risāla fī ḥudūth 
al-ʿālam, tr. as Die Abhandlung über die Entstehung by S. Bagher Talgharizadeh (Berlin: Klaus 
Schwarz); (2003), Iksir al-ʿārifīn, tr. as The Elixir of the Gnostics by W. Chittick (Provo, Utah: Brigham 
Young University Press); (2004), Khalq al-aʿmāl, tr. T. Kirmani as The Manner of the Creation of 
Actions (Tehran: SIPRIn); (2006), Risāla fī al-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq, tr. J. Lameer as Conception and 
Belief in Ṣadr al-Din Shīrāzī (Tehran: Iranian Academy of Philosophy); (2007), al-Ḥikmat al-ʿarshiyya, 
trs. A. Yousef & P. Moulinet as Le Livre de la sagesse du trône (Paris: Bouraq); (2008), Kasr asnam al-
jāhiliyya, trs. M. Dasht Bozorgi & F. Asadi Amjad as Breaking the Idols of Ignorance (London: ICAS 
Press); (2008), al- Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqliyya al-arbaʿa, vols. 8 & 9, tr. L. Peerwani as 
Spiritual Psychology: The Fourth Intellectual Journey (London: ICAS Press). Rizvi, Sajjad, "Mullā 
Ṣadrā", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mulla-Ṣadrā/>. 
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discussions than the Brentanian definition of intentionality. Aʾwani’s take on the 
intentionality question is different from my approach in this research as well. The main 
difference in the article to my approach is that Aʾwani centralizes the ideas of self-
knowledge and knowledge by presence in his search for intentionality. The centralization 
of self-knowledge reminds one of Jari Kaukua’s approach to Avicenna’s intentionality. I 
do not centralize self-knowledge in my search for intentionality. This is not because self-
awareness is not important for Ṣadrā. But I think his idea of self-knowledge should be 
studied comprehensively as an independent research topic. Another reason is that not 
centralizing the question of self-knowledge opens up opportunities for seeing different 
aspects of Ṣadrā’s philosophy. In this way, I have the flexibility to apply contemporary 
philosophical questions to his idea of the soul. Other works for understanding Ṣadrā and 
intentionality can be found as journal articles or chapters in compilations on his ontology, 
psychology, and epistemology.  
One article that is closely related to my research in this sense is on mental existence by 
Marcotte.17 Marcotte traces the problematization of mental existence back to Rāzī and 
Ṭūsī and gives a special place to Ṣadrā in this history. His importance accordingly is due 
to the importance of mental existence for the primacy of being (aṣālat al-wujūd). As a 
result, Ṣadrā devotes much space to the discussions of mental existence as well as proofs 
of it. Marcotte focuses on the proofs mentioned in MQ and briefly summarizes proofs 
given in Shawāhid and Asfār. I agree with her that MQ gives a more complete discussion 
on mental existence than his other writings. As Marcotte points out, some of Ṣadrā’s 
proofs in Shawāhid, Asfār and MQ can be found in Rāzī and Ṭūsī’s works as well. 
Marcotte thinks Ṣadrā’s teleological proof is one of his innovations as well as providing 
a further insight into mental existence. Ṣadrā, according to the author, is mainly concerned 
with ontological issues rather than epistemological ones. Consequently, we do not find 
an elaborate discussion on the correspondence problem of the mental existents (Marcotte, 
2011, p.155-6). I discuss in the fifth chapter how what makes his discussion of mental 
existence unique can be found only when Ṣadrā’s philosophy is considered as a whole, 
and that the innovation is hidden in his notions of soul and existence.  
Another relevant article is “How is it possible to see “ghouls” in the desert?” In this 
article, Bonmariage explores hallucinations and illusions and mistakes in sense 
perception as well as the judgements regarding them by focusing on the relevant section 
                                                          
17 Marcotte (2011) “al-Masāil al-Qudsiyya and Mullā Ṣadrā’s Proofs of Mental Existence”, Journal of 
Islamic Studies, 22 v. 2, pp. 153-182. 
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in Sharh ʿUsul al-Kāfī which is more related to the transmitted sciences rather than 
metaphysical issues. The article shows that the holist nature of the Sadrian project which 
embraces Islamic sciences as well as mysticism and philosophy, requires an attention to 
Ṣadrā’s seemingly non-philosophical books as well. This is because they too constitute 
an important source for understanding his philosophical ideas. In a short section in the 
fourth chapter, I draw upon his Tafsīr, for example. Bonmariage presents a taxonomy of 
the explanations about dreams and visions in relation to the faculty of vision given by 
Ṣadrā. This is given in two parts, one seen when the agent is awake and the other when 
they are dreaming. This article along with Yahya Michot (1985), Deborah L. Black (1997) 
and Jari Kaukua (2007, p.136 ff.) is one of the few written works on medieval Islamic 
ideas on fictional beings. 18 The common interest of these three texts is “Avicenna’s letter 
on the disappearance of the vain intelligible forms after death”.  
Another relevant publication for my research is Perception According to Mullā Ṣadrā 
edited by Safavi (2002). This book has a collection of well-written articles that analyse 
different aspects of Ṣadrā’s notion of perception from psychology to epistemology and 
the afterlife. The previously mentioned article by Bonmariage is among these.19 Another 
article from the book is “On the teleology of Perception” by Chittick.20 This is important 
because he analyses sensation in relation to Ṣadrā’s notion of substantial motion (ḥaraka 
jawharīya) and his gradational ontology (tashkīk). As the title suggests, Chitttick’s point 
of view is the teleological aspects of Ṣadrā’s theory of sensation. I think not only for the 
sensation theory, but in general as well, the originality of Ṣadrā’s psychology lies in these 
two principles. Thus, although I have avoided the centrality of self-knowledge in Ṣadrā, 
these two theories can be considered to be the most central and most original parts of his 
ideas related to intentionality.  
In Persian and Arabic, Dinānī and Āmulī’s works are two of the main studies one can find 
on Ṣadrā’s ideas of copulative existence and mental existence. In terms of understanding 
tashkīk, I claim that Ṣadrā’s tashkīk is a different version of univocal understanding of 
being. From this perspective, Mehdi Haeri Yazdi and his Hiram-i Hastī (The Pyramid of 
Existence) is an important source for his emphasis on the continuity and unbrokenness 
                                                          
18 Michot, 1985, “Avicenna’s Letter on the Disappearance of the Vain Intelligible forms after Death”, 
Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, pp. 94-103; Black, “Avicenna on the ontological and epistemological 
status of fictional beings”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8, pp. 425-453; 
Kaukua, 2007, “Avicenna on Subjectivity”, Jyväskylä).  
19 This article was originally presented in Transcendent Philosophy (An International Journal for 
Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism) in 2000.  
20 Chittick spares a chapter on Ṣadrā’s theory of sensation in his relatively recent book In Search of the 
Lost Heart: Explorations in Islamic Thought (2011, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press). 
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among different levels in the pyramid of existence. His claim about reflecting and 
applying the Sadrian ideas of wujūd not only to different areas of ontology but also other 
disciplines such as political philosophy can be seen as a challenging practical question in 
philosophy. Another interesting point is the centrality of copulative existence in Yazdi’s 
analysis. Let it suffice that the importance of this book for my research lies in its 
connecting the semantic questions on predication and copulative being to ontology, and 
building up the big pyramid of being in inter-related levels of continuity through the 
concept of gradational ontology. Tashkīk in this analysis is different from analogy and 
ambiguity, and the term rather means that existence is a single reality that is manifested 
at different levels of intensities.  
Al-insān by Hāshim Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ḥasan is one of the books containing different 
aspects of Ṣadrā’s psychology. This book, however, is a basic introduction for 
understanding Sadrian psychology written in a descriptive style rather than an analytical 
one. The strength of this book is that it excludes no part of psychology and includes both 
sense theories and eschatology. A similar presentation of ideas on soul is by al-Muslim 
(2009) and his book al-Nafs Numūzajan. Muslim’s focus is on exploring the originality 
of Ṣadrā’s ideas on the soul. He starts with Qazvīnī’s and Mutahharī’s lists of original 
principles of Ṣadrā (Muslim, 2009, p. 59 ff). So, other than providing an elaborate 
presentation of Sadrian psychology, this book is important due to this focus on originality 
as well. I do not share the ideas that imply the world of similitudes is an essential part of 
Ṣadrā’s philosophy. In that regard, the sections in this book where such principles are 
presented as part of Ṣadrā’s originality are problematic. The main problem with these is 
that the stability implied by a realm of similitudes contradicts Ṣadrā’s dynamic 
understanding of being in which all save God are in substantial motion. And second, 
primacy of being contradicts the idea of a Platonic world of similitudes which entails the 
primacy of quiddities. I think one should choose between two interpretative stances for 
Ṣadrā: either centralize the world of similitudes or centralize the primacy of being. His 
work is too obviously based on the need for the latter. 
In terms of providing a reconstruction of Ṣadrā’s philosophy in a modern scheme, there 
are a number of attempts, some more successful than others. I will mention one of these 
books due to its relevance. Mahmoud Khatami tries to open a space for the subjectivistic 
self of Ṣadrā in modern, predominantly objectivistic theories. The author’s attempt to 
picture Ṣadrā establishing a self that goes beyond the triplet in modern conception as 
scepticism, solipsism and idealism is noteworthy. This is important in two ways. First, he 
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points to the opportunity of finding fresh answers to modern questions by the help of past 
philosophers. Second, and more importantly, I share his intuition that Ṣadrā offers 
original frameworks with his ontology and psychology and this framework generally is 
different from his contemporaries as well as from modern philosophers. With a similar 
approach, I too consider Ṣadrā’s epistemology to be different from the idealist or realist 
frameworks.  
Ṣadrā’s ontological evaluations have a semantic nature as well. However, he does not 
pursue this to establish independent disciplines such as Suhrawardī does for logic. As a 
result, his works on logic do not constitute a major feature of his corpus. This affects the 
scholarly work on his logic. Among the few works which there are, one important work 
in English is Lameer’s evaluation and translation of al-Taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq.21 Lameer’s 
ambitious book traces the duo of taṣawwur and taṣdīq back to Fārābī. He discusses how 
the question about the nature of these two terms was a well-established philosophical 
topic by Ṣadrā’s time through an evaluation of the previous theories together with Ṣadrā’s 
critique of these predecessors. Not only for the elaborate contextualization of the terms 
conception and assent (taṣawwur and taṣdīq), but also for the quality of the translation of 
Ṣadrā’s treatise, this work is one of the most important books in English for Sadrian 
studies.  
For a more general approach to Ṣadrā’s philosophy, Fazlurrahman’s early and 
comprehensive work on many aspects of Ṣadrā is still a good introduction in English. 
Together with Fazlurrahman’s classic work, Rizvi’s Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics and 
Ibrahim Kalin’s Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy are two important scholarly 
works. Kalin not only includes translation of various Sadrian texts, especially his treatise 
on Ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl, but he also describes Sadrian epistemology within its 
historical and cultural context. Rizvi focuses on different aspects of Sadrian philosophy 
and presents a critical examination of Ṣadrā’s tashkīk (modulation as Rizvi choses to 
translate). 
Understanding Ṣadrā as well as reconstructing the question of intentionality in the context 
of medieval philosophy requires understanding other ancient and medieval philosophers. 
The literature on philosophies of mind is quite comprehensive and promising in this 
respect. Avicenna has a central place for the histories of psychology and thus there are 
more articles related to his idea of intentionality. Besides, many articles about the history 
                                                          
21 Lameer (2006), Conception and Belief in Sadr al-dîn al-Shîrâzî. Tehran: Iranian Institute of 
Philosophy. 
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of intentionality relate the concept to Avicenna’s psychology even when they do not 
discuss his ideas in detail (Lyons, 1995, pp. 3-4). There are two parallel areas of 
publication which are related to my research on intentionality: one is on Avicenna’s inner 
senses and the other is the scholarly work on the translation of intentio as maʿnā’, maʿqūl 
and qaṣd. Moreover, I have not focused so much on the transition and the translations of 
intentio. This is mainly because there are already significant studies by scholars in both 
Latin and medieval studies using textual and historical analysis such as that by Dag 
Nikolaus Hasse. I have tried to find a larger base for discussions of intentionality related 
to Avicenna, thus I take all discussions on his ontology (mental existence in particular) 
and his psychology (his inner senses in particular) into consideration.  
Turning now to medieval discussions of Avicenna, Kaukua lists two different opinions 
on Avicenna’s importance in intentionality discussions. According to one group it is 
Avicenna’s maʿnā’ and its translation intentio that triggered most intentionality 
discussions after him. The other group writes the history of the concept independently 
from Avicenna (Kaukua, 2007, p. 38). Spiegelberg points to Latin intentio and Arabic 
maʿnā’ and maʿqūl as the sources of intentionality (Kaukua, 2007, p. 36; Caston, 2008). 
Gyekye points to the links between different translations and is one of the sources of the 
most common positions that intentionality is from Latin intentio and that intentio is a 
translation of maʿnā’ (Gyekye, 1971, pp. 32-38).  
Hasse gives an elaborate discussion of Avicenna’s psychology and its impact in the Latin 
West. The book also has one of the largest sections on Avicenna’s faculty of estimation. 
In terms of the history of intentionality, Hasse agrees with Caston that Avicenna is not a 
major figure for related discussions, and that a history of intentionality independent of 
Avicenna is possible. This might be related to his understanding of estimation. Many 
scholars relate the immateriality of the object of estimative power (which Avicenna 
names as maʿnā’) to the immateriality claim of intentionality. Hasse, on the other hand, 
has a narrow understanding of estimation: a psychological phenomenon of animal 
instincts. Kaukua himself thinks the argument is built on a confusion of intentionality 
with intentio (he translates maʿnā’ not as meaning but as intentio (Kaukua, 2007, p. 35)). 
Intention is in a strict sense the proper object of the estimative faculty. With his work, 
Kaukua has shifted attention in research on intentionality from estimation to self-
awareness. In his stance, intentionality is an integral part of subjectivity.  
Black, in contrast to Hasse, understands estimation more broadly (Kaukua, 2007, p. 39) 
and does not leave estimation out of her discussions of intentionality. However, she builds 
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her concept of intentionality mainly on the indicators in Brentano’s intentionality. As a 
result, four aspects of intentionality become related to intentionality: object-directedness, 
mental existence, consciousness, and knowledge of non-existents (Black, 2010). Black 
and Kaukua share a similar approach to Avicenna’s psychology which is based on active 
understanding of the soul in which self-knowledge is an essential constituent. In contrast 
to more particularist readings, they choose to solve alleged-discrepancies by harmonizing 
Avicenna’s ideas with each other as it occurs for example in the discussion of abstraction 
versus emanation.22  
In addition to books on Ṣadrā and Avicenna, in relation to my research, compilations of 
articles that discuss the theories of different historical figures are some of the most useful 
materials among the literature on intentionality. I will discuss many of the other related 
literature in various parts of this thesis rather than here.  
  
                                                          
22 “Is abstraction or emanation the dominant theory in Avicenna’s epistemology?” is one of the important 
topics for contemporary interpretations of Avicenna. This debate is mainly heated by Dag Hasse: (2001) 
“Avicenna on Abstraction”, in (ed.) Robert Wisnovsky, Aspects of Avicenna, (Princeton) pp. 39–82; 
D’Ancona, Cristina, (2008), “Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna”, in (ed.) Knuuttila, and Karkkainen, 
Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, p.47-71; Acar, Rahim, (2003), “Intellect 
vs. Active Intellect: Plotinus and Avicenna” in (ed.) Reisman, Before and after Avicenna : proceedings of 
the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill) pp. 69-87; Mcginnis, Jon 
(2007) “Making Abstraction less Abstract”, American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings of 
the ACPA, vol.80. p. 169-183. Although it is an earlier text, Davidson has similar discussions. Davidson, 
1992, Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, NY, p. 74ff. Davidson and Fazlurrahman favours 
emanation in the process of producing intelligibles and think abstraction is merely a rhetorical tool.  
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1.4 HOW? 
Think now 
History has many cunning passages, contrived 
corridors 
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions, 
Guides us by vanities. Think now 
She gives when our attention is distracted 
And what she gives, gives with such supple 
confusions  
T. S. Eliot “Gerontion” 
With a research topic on Mullā Ṣadrā’s intentionality, I am already inclined to the view 
that intentionality can be translated into medieval discussions by queries on “mental 
existence”. Discussing a past philosopher’s ideas on a modern topic needs a further 
justification. A sceptic would challenge the nature of such an inquiry first from a historical 
aspect: did Mullā Ṣadrā conceptualize intentionality originally? And a further concern 
can follow: does the question of intentionality emerge in any of the medieval 
philosophical texts? In terms of Mullā Ṣadrā, the problem was not yet formularized at his 
time. As far as the historical nonexistence of a concept of intentionality is concerned, the 
original presentation of the concept by Brentano posits intentionality as a continuum of 
ancient and medieval concepts such as inexistence and inner language.  
A deeper concern can be raised in terms of commensurability issues: is the modern 
question of intentionality applicable to medieval psychologies? The ancient and medieval 
idea of human and cosmos is radically different from that of modern theories. Antony 
Kenny claims that a vast majority of works in analytical philosophy manifest this kind of 
misunderstanding caused by confusing the contexts of concepts in Descartes and 
philosophy of mind:  
In other philosophical traditions since the Renaissance it is not so easy to identify, 
as a specific area of philosophical study, the field which bears the name ‘philosophy 
of mind’. This is because since the time of Descartes the philosophical study of the 
operations of the human mind has taken place in the context of epistemology. 
Epistemology, as I have said, is the discipline which is concerned above all with the 
justification of our cognition, the indication of claims to knowledge, the quest for 
reliable methods of achieving truth. Epistemology, as contrasted with philosophy of 
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mind, is a normative rather than descriptive or analytic branch of philosophy (Kenny, 
1993, pp. 18-19). 
Kuhn presupposed coherence and homogeneity inside paradigms and this resulted in 
incommensurability of frameworks. As a result, between-paradigms translations are 
considered as impossible. Moreover, he denies any superiority assertion between 
paradigms. In order to solve the first denial of translation, a common vocabulary that 
combines common and disjunctive vocabulary is possible. Since intentionality is at the 
juncture of psychology and epistemology, it appears to be almost impossible to translate 
to ideas of soul and knowledge. I suggest this problem can be solved by finding a 
vocabulary that is emptied of both traditions’ understandings together with sets of 
vocabulary that is filled with every possible vocabulary each tradition would include. This 
is a language based application similar to the mathematical GCF (Greatest Common 
Factor) and LCM (Least Common Multiple) to vocabulary of different philosophical 
traditions. In order to achieve this, first I need to investigate the largest possible 
vocabulary that covers discussions and concepts in both traditions’ vocabulary. The result 
of this is “rational bridgehead” (Rorty, 1984, p. 2) which is maintaining a medium that 
bridges the different frameworks. At the second stage, the bare essentials of the concepts 
are extracted by a parsimonious scan of their terminology. 
In terms of the second idea on denial of any superiority claim, the principle of charity can 
be useful in our readings for avoiding value-loaded or teleological interpretations. In a 
simple way, the principle of charity can be described as interpreting one’s words in a way 
that favours the writer.23 Accordingly, even with discrepancies in the text which are very 
                                                          
23 There are different formulations of the principle in semantic theories, as the theory plays important role 
especially in behaviouristic theories of meaning. For the related discussions through Quine and Davidson 
see Ranganathan (2007), Ethics and History of Indian Philosophy, Delhi, pp. 116 ff; Speaks, Jeff, 
"Theories of Meaning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/meaning/>). Davidson’s radical 
interpretation is sometimes connected to his principle of charity (Fodor and Lepore, 1994, pp. 101-119). 
Yet for Davidson it is important to emphasize that the radical interpretation is a possibility rather than a 
necessity for languages and that the principle of charity depends on the radical interpretation. Who the 
radical interpreter is and with which tools she is equipped are important for understanding Davidson. The 
interpreter is not a mind reader for him, yet she already has a language and a set of concepts that 
somehow match those of the interpretee. She has concepts of truth, intention, belief, desire, and attention. 
And she is aware of the circumstances and how human behaviours’ change according to the 
circumstances (Davidson, 1994, p. 125). This last point is required as the meaning and interpretation is 
not merely an internal business, yet it is partially observational and behavioural. Davidson seems to inject 
the idea of intention into the behavioural theories of meaning. In this case, for interpretation, 
correspondence as well as coherence is abstracted from observation. In Quine’s case, the principle of 
charity is applied by the idea of finding the interpretation that maximizes the truth of the interpretee’s 
words (Quine, 1960). “The maxim of translation underlying all this is that assertions startlingly false on 
the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language. This maxim is strong enough in all 
of us to swerve us even from the homophonic method that is so fundamental to the very acquisition and 
use of one's mother tongue. The common sense behind the maxim is that one's interlocutor's silliness, 
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obvious, the reader will try to harmonize the ideas with each other in the best possible 
way. When there are possible flaws in a theory, the reader tries to fill in the gaps, again 
in a way that favours the author. This principle is commonly mentioned as part of rational 
reconstructions of previous philosophers (van-Ketel, 1991, p. 120 ff.). The principle owes 
its commonness to Davidson. The main assumption is that the agent is rational. One can 
find this activity problematic. One problem is the harmonization of a philosopher’s words, 
and that reconstruction is inevitably in accordance with what the reader’s own idea of 
what is ‘rational’. In this sense, one falls into the trap of superiority just by trying to avoid 
it. 
Additional case against incommensurability claims can be built by a pragmatic argument 
as well. If we assumed that all the big thinkers in history faithfully worked on 
commensurable contexts, would we still have the rich picture of the history of ideas we 
have today or would we end up with a list of enclosed clusters of ideas (Rorty, (1984, 
2004), p. 2)? The practices in philosophy draw attention to the loose, almost non-existent 
methodology used by practicing philosophers. The reason for the lack of interest in a 
methodology might be due to the nature of the methodological question being historical 
rather than philosophical. 24 So why did I feel the need to ask this historical question? 
Given that my work is on a seventeenth-century philosopher and that my claim is that his 
ideas can be reconstructed, I am forced to legitimize my treatment of Sadrian theories. I 
separate between the text and the context in which the text is written. As question-
dependence defines the nature of the study I need to make sure that this research is not 
about the texts per se and the contexts per se. Let me discuss the idea of context-
dependence in contrast to question dependence and historical methods further by 
evaluating one of the recent historical methodologies suggested by Quentin Skinner. 
According to Skinner, historical texts are embedded in their time and contexts just as 
speech acts are. He claimed that holistic approaches to historical literature as well as 
perennial approaches are fallacies (Skinner, (2002, 2010), pp. 57-89). As well as the 
                                                          
beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation - or, in the domestic case, linguistic 
divergence”(Quine, 1960, p. 59). Quine quotes the formulation of the principle of charity in this sense of 
maximizing and selecting the most rational interpretation from Wilson: “We select as designatum that 
individual which will make the largest possible number of ... statements true” (Quine, 1960, p. 59). 
Quine’s application in particular is quite immune to anachronistic readings for my type of research and 
had been discussed in terms of its value-loadedness (van-Ketel, 1991, p. 53 ff.) 
24 One may argue that the metaphilosophy discussions in contemporary philosophy and the medieval 
discussion of the classification of sciences with specific relation to the nature of metaphysics are 
methodology discussions of philosophers. However, these two are more about the nature of philosophy 
and its place among other sciences rather than a discussion on how to analyse previous philosophers or 
historiography. 
35 
 
assumption of speech acts, Skinner also assumes that it is possible to uncover the author’s 
intentions.  
Skinner, influenced by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson (Skinner, 2002, pp. 4, 53; 27-
40) focuses on speech acts and intentions. With the focus on speech acts, his theory 
emphasizes the importance of the locutionary force. In order to understand an utterance, 
it must be “located in the appropriate linguistic context” (Bevir, 2000, p. 395). Skinner 
criticizes two orthodox approaches. The first is the context of religious, political, and 
economic factors which determines the meaning of any given text, and so must provide 
the ultimate framework for any attempt to understand it (Skinner, 1969, p. 3) The second 
orthodoxy insists on the autonomy of the text itself as the sole necessary key to its own 
meaning, and so dismisses any attempt to reconstitute the "total context" as gratuitous, 
and worse (Skinner, 1969, p. 3). Accordingly, extracting a universal meaning out of any 
text in history is regarded as a mistake. This is the point where it becomes impossible to 
interact with historical texts and produce fresh ideas from them. Besides Skinner’s 
extreme method, Bevir puts forward a more down-to earth theory: weak intentionalism.  
Bevir defines text in such a way that it contains temporal features on the one hand and a-
temporal features on the other (Bevir, 2000, p. 388). Bevir claims that meaning has no 
existence apart from the individuals. Accordingly, the meaning is dependent on both the 
author and the reader (Bevir, 2000, p. 387). Giving a place to the intentions of the reader 
together with the intentions of the author balances Skinner’s strictly author-dependent 
method. Using Bevir’s first differentiation of temporal and atemporal parts of the text 
together with the intentions of the reader opens more space for an idea of reconstruction. 
But more needs to be discussed on Skinner’s method in order to go beyond his strong 
contextualism. 
The main problem with Skinner’s theory is that with his approach it is almost impossible 
to engage with a philosopher in history, and thus his ideas lead to antiquarianism. 
Moreover, it treats every piece of work in such a monadic way that none of the monads 
(texts from different contexts) can interact with each other. According to this, Aristotle 
cannot even interact, for example, with Thales. What is more central for my research is 
his idea of texts as speech acts. On this view, reconstructions become impossible. Giving 
an example from a different discipline, how can a play from the fourteenth century be 
performed in the twentieth century? From a different perspective, Skinner’s approach can 
prove to be useful for a philosophical approach as well. Skinner’s approach gives past 
ideas a chance to be listened to in their own holism. As much as I would love to, I cannot 
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reject this kind of a help in my research. This is the reason why I have chosen to refer to 
Ṣadrā and Brentano’s historical connections from time to time.  
A similar stance to Skinner’s is supported by Seyyed Hossein Nasr in defence of the 
holism of Islamic philosophy (Nasr, 1972, pp. 53-61). According to Nasr, an attempt to 
interpret and be in communication with these texts when freed from their original contexts 
and backgrounds (be it cultural, religious or methodological, such as not focusing on the 
experiential nature of knowledge when an illuminationist philosopher is being 
discussed)25 is a reduction of these traditions to a branch of philosophy. With his 
fundamental separation of philosophical traditions from more experiential traditions, Nasr 
seems to express the problem of incommensurability from a different perspective:  
To say that this or that statement of Hegel resembles the Upanisads or that Hume 
presents ideas similar to Nagarjuna’s is to fall into the worst form of error, one which 
prevents any type of profound understanding from being achieved, either for 
Westerners wanting to understand the East or vice versa. Comparative study in this 
incommensurability serves no good when performed in a reductionist method. When 
each tradition is evaluated in its own context, comparative philosophy serves in a 
way to emphasise the differences and better understand the traditions: However, the 
function of comparative philosophy should be to serve the truth and to reveal 
contrasts and differences wherever they exist (Nasr, 1972, p. 58).    
Nasr’s and Skinner’s approaches with their emphasis on context-dependence and 
incommensurability are important for a researcher dealing with different traditions and 
historical texts. On the other hand, from the perspective of a philosophical approach, their 
offerings are very limited and it appears that an inquiry of this nature is constrained by 
both textual or historical methods and antiquarianism. Even when a researcher aims to 
follow their contextualist methodology, it is difficult to master the necessary skills 
required for a well-executed antiquarian work. Nader el-Bizri expresses the gap between 
the capacities required for a full-grasp of a historical philosophical text in Islamic 
philosophy and the demands inherent in philosophical research itself (Bizri, 2010, p.5, 
10). 
                                                          
25 First each tradition needs to be understood in its own structure of meaning of the religion “the first 
necessary condition for a meaningful comparative study will be a complete awareness of the structure and 
levels of meaning of the religious and metaphysical traditions of the East and West” (Nasr, 1972, p. 55). 
Additionally, the notion of man and its faculties in relation to knowledge is required: “Comparative 
philosophy between East and West is impossible without considering the hierarchic nature of man's 
faculties and the modes of knowledge accessible to him.” (Nasr, 1972, p. 56). 
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The aims and objectives of such learned exegetes and custodians of archiving, differ 
from the purposes of philosophers per se, who focus on the evolution of concepts 
and on the questions of ontology, epistemology, logic, value theory, etc. (Bizri, 2010, 
p. 5). 
The tension between the textual and historical requirements and the innovative nature of 
philosophy is recognized by many others:  
Either we read the philosophies of the past so as to make them relevant to our 
contemporary problems and enterprises, transmuting them as far as possible into 
what they would have been if they were part of present-day philosophy, and 
minimizing or ignoring or even on occasion misrepresenting that which refuses such 
transmutation because it is inextricably bound up with that in the past which makes 
it radically different from present-day philosophy; or instead we take great care to 
read them in their own terms, carefully preserving their idiosyncratic and specific 
character, so that they cannot emerge into the present except as a set of museum 
pieces (MacIntyre, (1984, 2010), p. 31).  
Similarly to Nasr, MacIntyre claims that the “habit of treating philosophy as an exercise 
which could be carried on in entirely contemporary terms […] is very widespread” 
(MacIntyre, (1984, 2010), p. 17), and as a result, the chance to learn "what an alternative 
could look like is being missed” (MacIntyre, (1984, 2010), p. 19). Thus, in place of the 
antiquarian imprisonment, MacIntyre warns about the imprisonment of one in her/his own 
time’s model. Rorty takes the method of the analytical philosophers to be one of "rational 
reconstructions" in which the arguments of great dead philosophers are treated as 
colleagues with whom they can exchange views (Rorty, (1984, 2010), pp. 49, 53). Either 
by carrying contemporary vocabulary into the past or by interpreting the old vocabulary 
in terms of contemporary vocabulary, one big criticism of rational reconstructions - 
borrowing Rorty’s notion - and treating great dead philosophers as contemporaries, is the 
criticism of "distortion" (also van-Ketel, 1991, p. 61 ff ).  
Mostly, these criticisms imply that there is an original text or a whole entity of original 
vocabularies that is distorted when they are rephrased in the contemporary contexts. Thus, 
it is considered that contemporary vocabulary and previous vocabulary are 
incommensurable; similarly, it considers that notions from different traditions are 
incommensurable. In most cases, the implication of this verdict is that using one side of 
any of these parts to understand the other causes a distortion. But is that really the case? 
Is there really no other way, other than imprisoning one’s language with one of the side’s 
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vocabulary? Might there not be a third way in which a higher order or common ground is 
used to blend vocabularies of both languages of communication?  
These discussions on historical context and the holism of traditions are related to different 
disciplines such as history, semantics, the history of ideas, philosophy, linguistics, and so 
on. A further claim on the issues, thus, would require a more discipline-based discussion 
and larger space rather than a short introductory discussion of a dissertation. In terms of 
my research and methodology, I have decided to develop it to be less concerned with 
these technical questions. It develops in two stages. The first part is about the way the 
text is made available and the way I understand and interpret it. Second comes a phase 
which is less dependent on the context and text. In this second stage the research question 
is at the centre and a reconstruction is built around it. This reconstruction is neither an 
historical investigation of a concept in the manner of extreme historicism, nor is it an 
independent interpretation that is ahistorical and that favours only the interpreter’s view 
point. This is a reconstruction of a concept around a question which takes the coherence 
of the author’s texts and the historical context of ideas as part of this reconstruction. The 
nature of the reconstruction is, however, defined by the nature of the question. Thus, my 
reconstruction is philosophical. 
This research builds on the optimistic assumption that we are able to communicate with 
historical texts and that these texts contribute useful insights into the questions of our time 
as well. This is a dialogue in both directions from the past to the present, and from the 
present to the past. The principle of charity and the notion of "coherence" and the bridging 
of high order vocabulary will be useful in defining the basic material of a loose 
methodology.  
Problem Resolution 
1. Criticism of distortion and anachronism 1. Principle of Charity and Coherence 
Test 
2. Incommensurability  2. Higher order Vocabulary 
 
The texts and contexts are mere tools for the first stage of reconstruction which is reaching 
the ideas and understanding the texts. A study of historical texts can take different forms 
depending on the central approach of the researcher: it can be textual, systematical, and 
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holist in the sense that it engages with each single idea of a philosopher in relation to the 
other ideas in that philosopher’s system. It can be historical in which case the context and 
social conditions and the predecessors as well as the successors of a philosopher become 
important. The research can take an exegetical structure in which the historical text is 
reconstructed with updated explanations, comments or revised versions of the contents of 
the original text. The exegesis can occur in a more independent form and the original text 
can be used in a new context or with new goals. The research on a historical text, similarly 
can approach the text with less strict historical methodologies. In this, a reconstruction 
can take place in form of an independent study. We can remember contemporary example 
of this as Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. Kripke combines Wittgenstein’s 
discussions of private language (PL) argument and rule-following argument. He applies 
Wittgenstein’s scepticism in PL to the rule-following discussions and reconstructs the 
sceptical Wittgenstein.  
 
1.5 THE CHAPTERS 
The introduction chapter is followed by the second chapter which is built on the 
methodological concerns mentioned above for the nature of this kind of research. This 
chapter is about the historiography of intentionality. What intentionality means for 
Brentano and how Mullā Ṣadrā builds his ontology around existence are the first to be 
explored in each philosopher’s own words and worlds/contexts. The chapter tracks ideas 
in two parallel lines starting from Aristotle, one reaching Brentano and the other Mullā 
Ṣadrā.  
One feature of intentionality which I emphasize is that it is about a human being’s relation 
to the extra-mental world. The third chapter will focus on the production process of 
intentional objects through perception. The first part of this chapter aims to anchor the 
relation of the human to the world through a detailed analysis of the external senses. The 
framework in this chapter is Aristotelian. This is due to the centrality of De Anima 
(Aristotle’s most influential book on the soul) to most discussions in ancient and medieval 
philosophies of the mind. Ṣadrā does not change this framework: his presentation and 
terminology is no exception to his contemporaries, and is similar to Aristotle and 
Avicenna. We also see the influence of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, especially in the sections where 
criticism of the peripatetic features is considered. In places, Ṣadrā’s quotations mirror the 
paraphrasing of Avicenna found in Rāzī’s books. Aristotle’s sense perception is triggered 
by the extra-mental object which is the object of sense. For Ṣadrā however, the role of 
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extra-mental object is reduced to preparing the soul for sense perception and the real sense 
object is created internally. As a result, the intervention of extra-mental object is reduced 
to a minimum.  
In order to understand Ṣadrā’s position, in addition to the process of perception, his ideas 
on the soul and substantial motion are studied in this chapter. I believe his approach to 
external senses is one of the most distinctive parts of his philosophy. And what attracts 
attention is that this part of his philosophy is little studied thus far. But when it comes to 
his approach to inner senses, it is a different story to that of the external senses. 
With his internalist approach, for Ṣadrā the internal senses are not clearly distinguished 
from the external senses or the intellect. Recalling the threefold classification of classical 
knowledge as external senses, inner senses, and intellect, Ṣadrā claims that the active 
agent at all these levels is the soul. This monist approach to the soul is fundamentally 
different from the Peripatetics and even from Plotinus, to whom Ṣadrā seems to have had 
a strong loyalty. His stance regarding Plotinus is interesting because Ṣadrā quotes 
Theology of Aristotle approvingly and claims to be following Plotinus’ conception of the 
soul and his ontology. Yet he admits monism in psychology and ontology which is 
essentially non-Plotinian.  
The second part of the third chapter gives a general scheme of the classical understanding 
of the inner senses through Avicennian presentation and discusses how Ṣadrā places them 
in his philosophy. The difference becomes blurred between inner and external senses; we 
come to understand Ṣadrā’s soul further by the soul being the active agent at all levels. 
Thus his principle of the unity of the soul and that “the soul is all its faculties” are 
discussed in detail in this chapter.  
Chapter three not only aims to discover Ṣadrā’s conception of knowledge processes and 
his idea of soul, but also to show the nature of the objects of senses. Being the active 
agent, the soul is the creator of the objects of senses and these objects are not extra-mental. 
Ṣadrā’s accounting for the agent is important as well. He denies the materialist 
understanding in which the perception is explained through material bodily organs and 
the brain. 
Chapter four starts with exploring the activity of the soul and the creative nature of a 
human further. This explains how a human can create a unique world of mental objects 
and, further, how she symbolizes this world and turns it into communication by logic and 
language. This chapter is mainly built on two aspects of the world created by a human, 
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namely, language and logic. These two realms are conventionally established. As a 
systematic philosopher, Ṣadrā’s approach to logic and language is parallel to his ontology. 
Accordingly, the language used for knowledge reflects the idea of ontological gradation 
(tashkīk) which is his central ontological principle.  
With the process of object production investigated and the symbolism of this world 
already discussed, chapter five is more about the ontological issues related to intentional 
objects. I believe Ṣadrā’s main contribution to the discussion of intentional objects is his 
comprehensive idea of existence. As a result of this, this last chapter is a detailed 
investigation on his conception of “existence”.  
 
Now, shall we begin? 
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2 CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON INTENTIONALITY 
AND THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY 
In light of the discussions in the introductory chapter, in order to reconstruct Ṣadrā’s 
philosophy around the question of intentionality I will use the historical context at the 
first stage of discovering the clusters of vocabulary. This will work in two dimensions: 
first, to explore the common historical discussions and concepts, between Brentano and 
Mullā Ṣadrā, and second, to translate the more comprehensive vocabulary into a 
transferable version applicable to modern discussions. Historically, the main characters 
in Brentano’s presentation can be traced back and changed into two parallel timelines, 
both starting with Aristotle, but with one reaching Brentano and the other one through to 
Mullā Ṣadrā. The difference starts after Avicenna when his texts are transferred to the 
Latin-speaking world. Aquinas’ and Ṭūsī’s transformations and interpretations of 
Avicenna constitute two traditions of the philosophies of psychology.  
For the line tracing back from Brentano, I selected the figures that appear in his 
presentation for his own historiography such as Aristotle, the Neoplatonists and Aquinas. 
This historiography connects medieval discussions of East and West since it regards 
medieval interpretations of De Anima (DA) as important, and theories in the east 
especially those by al-Fārābī, Avicenna, al-Ghazālī, and Averroes had been highly 
influential on development of later discussions in the west.  
Mullā Ṣadrā, on the parallel line mentioned above, has been influenced by different 
traditions from those which influenced Brentano. His ontology and psychology are the 
main areas related to discussions of intentionality. Thus I will focus on the philosophers 
who have influenced him in his idea of wujūd (existence) and the notion of nafs (soul). 
The epistemological interest will be limited to certain issues that are related to the central 
ontological and psychological issues such as external senses. Other possible issues such 
as certainty, causation, and detailed discussion of self-awareness will be omitted.  
My aim in this chapter is two-fold. One is to share the concerns (although at the minimal 
level) of authors such as Skinner and Pocock about the importance of historical contexts 
and linguistic conventions to understand historical texts of philosophy in order to avoid 
any teleological goals. As a result, part of my method has been reading the texts in their 
context with a loose sense of the historical method. In terms of the reconstruction of texts, 
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I use the clusters of terms with similar meanings, and concepts used under similar 
discussions. This second method of scanning vocabularies is applied to history in this 
chapter.26 Thus, whilst discussing each related philosopher’s ideas on ontology and 
psychology, what I will collect is also large clusters of sets of vocabularies used by 
different philosophers in similar discussions. The first part of the chapter is Brentano’s 
own historiography. The remaining sections will be on the soul, perception and 
imagination. These are the central notions that can be used to build a vocabulary pool of 
terms used for related discussions on intentionality. The philosophers mentioned are 
elected either in terms of their influence on Ṣadrā and Brentano, or because of their 
importance for medieval psychology. 
2.1 BRENTANO AND HIS HISTORIOGRAPHY 
It is undeniable that all contemporary discussions take Franz Brentano as the starting point 
for the problem of intentionality. Brentano himself, on the other hand, claims no 
originality for his conceptualization of intentionality. He mainly relies on Aristotle’s 
theory on sensation, and the theories in medieval psychology that followed DA. 
However, Brentano’s own evaluation of Aristotle and the medieval theories is vague 
(Perler, 2001, p. 203). One of the reasons for this is that Brentano himself seems to have 
kept his reference to Aristotle obscure. The exact places of the referred discussions in 
Aristotle’s books are not made clear and in most cases Aristotle is referred to without 
citations or quotations. However, in order to trace the problem of intentionality in 
Brentano’s philosophy, Hedwig suggests that the very early statements about the problem 
of intentionality are to be found in Brentano’s interpretation on Aristotle’s DA (Hedwig, 
1979, pp. 328-9). This sound claim also shows that Aristotle is the inspiration behind 
Brentano’s articulation of the problem of intentionality. Aristotle’s original theory can be 
different from Brentano’s interpretation. However, Brentano’s usage of Aristotle’s 
philosophy links him to the problem of intentionality. In this early reference, Brentano 
evaluates Aristotle’s eidos aistheton in DA 425b24. In the stated passage Aristotle "refers 
to an immaterial inexistence of sensible forms in the receiving and perceiving sense" 
(Hedwig, 1979, p. 329). There, a differentiation between the extra-mental forms found in 
the object and forms found in the mind of the perceiver is made. Hedwig points that this 
differentiation is a current terminology in the late Scotism and that it originated in Arabic 
Aristotelian and Augustinian epistemological traditions. In this case, Brentano can be 
                                                          
26 A sophisticated and systematized version of this approach has been part of some German philosophers’ 
discussions. One central figure of this approach is Koselleck and his Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. 
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accepted as reading Aristotle through the specific lenses of this late medieval terminology 
(Hedwig, 1979, p. 330).  
However, Brentano’s unfinished 1887 study Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 
together with his 1889 and early 1890 lectures on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ at Vienna 
University are more famous for his introduction of the medieval notion of intentional 
inexistence of an object (McDonnell, 2006). Here is the famous paragraph in which 
Brentano introduces the problem of intentionality: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of 
the middle ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an 
object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, 
reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be 
understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, 
although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation 
something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, 
in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. 
This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental 
phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, 
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those 
phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves 
(Brentano, 1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25). 
Brentano’s historiography of this intentional inexistence is given just in the footnotes of 
the same pages of PES as:  
Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the 
soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; 
that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the 
object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. In Philo, likewise, 
we find the doctrine of mental existence and in-existence. However, 
since he confuses them with existence in the proper sense of the word, 
he reaches his contradictory doctrine of the logos and Ideas. The same 
is true of the Neoplatonists. St. Augustine in his doctrine of the Verbum 
mentis and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact. St. Anselm 
does the same in his famous ontological argument; many people have 
observed that his consideration of mental existence as a true existence 
is at the basis of his paralogism. St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that the 
object which is thought is intentionally in the thinking subject, the 
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object which is loved in the person who loves, the object which is 
desired in the person desiring, and he uses this for theological purposes. 
When the Scriptures speak of an indwelling of the Holy Ghost, St. 
Thomas explains it as an intentional indwelling through love. In 
addition, he attempted to find, through the intentional in-existence in 
the acts of thinking and loving, a certain analogy for the mystery of the 
Trinity and the procession ad intra of the Word and the Spirit (Brentano, 
(tr.s) Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister,1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25)
27
. 
Brentano, with both his interpretation of Aristotle’s DA and his PES, posits the problem 
of intentionality in terms of an already existing terminology of medieval psychology 
brought to his time through Philo, Neoplatonists, and Augustine (Caston, 2001, pp. 24-
5). This line of history seems to be a parallel history to the terms intentio, phantasma, 
maʿna, maʿqūl and qaṣd. The answer to the question, “Is intentionality necessarily 
developed in this line of translation?” is arguable. On the one hand, some researchers such 
as Caston and Hasse claim that an independent history for intentionality from the Arabic 
philosophers is possible: a tradition that existed long before translations from Avicenna 
and others (Caston, 2001, p. 24; Hasse, p. 128); the more common historiography for 
intentionality regards Arabic philosophy conducting an important and determining role 
in the Latin west (McDonnell, 2006, p. 133; Hedwig, 1979, p. 327). But generally, intentio 
is tracked through Arabic translations of maʿna, maʿqūl (Hedwig, 1979, p. 327; Hasse, 
2000, p. 128 see fn. 278) and qaṣd (Hasse, 2000, p. 128). These are used mostly in logical 
and psychological contexts.  
Although there are parallels between the historiography of Brentano’s intentionality and 
the terms stated above, it should also be kept in mind that the history of a word is not 
enough for tracking the history of a concept most of the time.28 Thus, Brentano’s main 
claims about intentionality must also be considered in order to extract main features of 
the notion of intentionality. What is the nature of the claims, and which clusters of 
questions do they contain? Brentano’s famous paragraph can be revisited for this 
evaluation: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by [....] intentional (or mental) 
inexistence of an object, ....reference to a content, direction towards an object, [...] 
or immanent objectivity [...] This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively 
                                                          
27 The italics added by me.  
28 Hasse gives an extensive evaluation of the relation of some of these notions to intentionality (Hasse, 
2000, pp. 127-8). 
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of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. 
As mentioned in the introduction, three basic claims can be extracted through these 
sentences (Jacob, 2010): Firstly, it is constitutive of the phenomenon of intentionality that 
they are directed towards things different from themselves. Secondly, objects that mind 
is directed towards are characterised by intentional inexistence. Thirdly, intentionality is 
the mark of the mental: all and only mental states exhibit intentionality. 
As a result, the directedness of mental phenomenon and their relation to the physical 
world are important features of intentionality. Here we gather the three main ingredients 
about intentionality: mental phenomenon, content, and physical world. However, defining 
the limits for the mental is not clear. It might be obvious to the modern reader that the 
activities of bodily organs such as growth and movement are not mental (Bynum, 1993, 
pp. 90-108; Sorabji, 1972, p. 15; Sorabji, 1993, pp. 164-5; Shields, 2009, p. 243ff).29 Yet, 
it can be asked: how will sense perception that is dependent on organs such as eyes be 
assessed? How will experiences such as pain and emotions be considered, while they 
might be discussed as being apart from our mental life and it is difficult to assign objects 
to them. On the other hand, totally a priori processes seem to be excluded from the 
philosophers’ lists of main topics. These, at least superficially, appear to be non-dependent 
on the extra-mental world such as productions of judgement. However, they definitely 
have a content to be dealt with in discussions of intentionality.  
Brentano’s main claim is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. When we 
investigate this argument, we find that this presentation is circular: from mental to 
intentional and from intentional to mental. The scope of the mental can be further 
elucidated if we attempt to escape this circular reasoning by following discussions on the 
soul in ancient and medieval philosophies. In most of these, the soul is an umbrella 
concept. It covers physical and immaterial actions and features that can be thought of in 
relation to human. Pains, emotions, anger, intellection, contemplation, estimation, as well 
as looking for food, will, and heart beats and so on … 
Brentano’s historiography is an important step for the methodology of this research as 
well. As I mentioned in the “How?” section, my methodology is basically about finding 
the common vocabulary between Bretano’s discussion on intentionality and Ṣadrā’s 
                                                          
29 See DA 414a29-415a12 “Of the psychic powers above enumerated some kinds of living things, as we 
have said, possess all, some less than all, others one only. Those we have mentioned are the nutritive, the 
appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking. Plants have none but the first, the 
nutritive, while another order of living things has this plus the sensory.” 
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philosophical language. And later comes reconstructing different parts of Ṣadrā’s 
philosophical discussions around the intentionality question. So Brentano’s 
historiography gives us the common historical names and possible common notions. The 
names Aristotle, Neoplatonists, Augustine and Aquinas together with his presentation of 
intentionality as the mark of mental draw our attention to the DA literature in Ancient and 
Medieval ages. Morever, his reference to Aristotle’s sense theory might be indicator that 
we need to focus on the immaterialization process. Immateriality as a criteria is 
accordingly used by modern scholars for historiography by Sorabji. Difference between 
the mental and extra-mental has been interpreted by him as a further criterion of 
separateness of object and subject as well. Accordingly he denied intentionality for 
theories that admit identity principle.  
In this research, I try to frame intentionality in the simplest possible framework that is 
free from theoretical burdens. Accordingly, I will not necessarily take immateriality as a 
criterion for intentionality, neither separateness of the subject and object of mental 
processes. We can now start to explore the Ancient and Medieval pool of vocabulary 
further by Aristotle’s idea on the soul.  
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2.2 ON THE SOUL 
2.2.1 Defining the Soul and its Relation to Body and the Question of 
Immateriality 
Aristotle’s On the Soul is an intense evaluation of the concept of soul which starts with 
the criticism of his predecessors. He describes his idea of soul in three aspects of the soul: 
vegetative soul (capacity of life and growth), sensible soul (capacities of sensing in 
addition to vegetative capacities), and rational soul (capacity of thinking (rationality) in 
addition to the others). This taxonomy dominated discussions in the medieval ages. When 
it comes to Brentano’s relation to Aristotle, we find a number of refinements, but not 
without quite frequent theoretical continuity (such as the idea of non-physicality of 
thoughts, and unity of the soul): his schema of discussion remains loyal to Aristotle. He 
continues to discuss the idea of soul, the sense perception and the thinking process with 
a similar flow of discussion. This influence of Aristotle on Brentano maintains the 
continuity in the discussion on the soul (the soul itself is not necessarily accepted by 
Brentano) and its faculties from Aristotle to Brentano, and therefore we do not need to 
construct further bridges for the rational reconstruction. 
Aristotle tries to find the most comprehensive definition of the soul possible that is 
applicable to all living things (DA II.1, 412a1). Thus, whatever the definition is, it needs 
to contain the most common feature of living things, which is life and growth. With this, 
we find that his idea of the soul is essentially physical: the body is alive and is a living 
body in virtue of the soul. In this form, the discussion of the soul is set within an anti-
Cartesian frame. We cannot find the ultimate differentiation of soul and body in the form 
we find in Descartes. All living forms have a type of soul which is for their bodies and 
many bodily functions are explained in terms of the soul’s actions, in contrast to 
Descartes.  
Aristotle sees the soul as a unity which bears different functions differing from anger to 
contemplation. Aristotle accepts the physical explanation of (e.g.) anger, yet he thinks 
there is more to the soul or its actions than the body (DA I.1, 403a3-b19). As a result of 
this notion of unity, Aristotle talks about the interaction of body and soul more 
comfortably than Descartes:  
The most important attributes of animals, whether common to all or 
peculiar to some, are, manifestly, attributes of soul and body in 
conjunction, e.g., sensation, memory, passion, appetite and desire in 
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general, and, in addition, pleasure and pain (De Sensu et 
Sensibilibus/DSS 436a6-10, tr. J. I. Beare). 
The starting point of his analysis is the completed composition of ensouled bodies. 
According to his hylomorphic language, every material thing is a composition of matter 
and form (DA II.1, 412a1-27). And ensouled ones are no exception:  
Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean 
self-nutrition and growth and decay. It follows that every natural body 
which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite (DA II.1, 
412a13-17, tr. J.A. Smith). 
He rejects the previous ideas that the body is something predicated on a subject. The 
relation of body and soul and the outcome, that is the life of the natural body, is explained 
with a definition of the soul as: “the soul is the actuality of the body”. In Metaphysics 
1035b14-16 he says that the soul is the substance of the ensouled things. Both the soul of 
a composition, matter and form, are listed among substantial beings:  
We say that substance is one kind of what is, and that in several senses: 
the sense of matter or that which in itself is not a this, and in the sense 
of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is 
called a this, and thirdly in the sense of that which is compounded of 
both (DA, II.1, 412a7-8, J. A. Smith).  
When we investigate the given objects in this world, the soul is substance as form of a 
natural body having life in potentiality (DA, II.1, 412a19-27; Polansky, (2007, 2010), p. 
154). Since soul is described mainly in its completed form as for an ensouled body, it is 
no surprise that Aristotle regards the soul and the body as inseparable (DA, II.1, 413a5). 
The relation of body and soul is connected to the idea of actuality:  
Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, 
while it cannot be a body; it is not a body but something relative to a 
body. That is why it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind. It was a 
mistake, therefore, to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a 
body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of 
that body, although evidently one chance thing will not receive another. 
It comes about as reason requires: the actuality of any given thing can 
only be realized in what is already potentially that thing, i.e. in a matter 
of its own appropriate to it. From all this it is plain that soul is an 
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actuality or account of something that possesses a potentiality of being 
such (DA II.2, 414a19-28, J. A. Smith). 
The question about the soul and the body becomes unnecessary according to Aristotle, 
just like asking about wax and its shape (DA, II.1, 412b6-9). As the paragraph above 
suggests, this does not mean that soul and body are identical or that they are one in a 
weaker sense of the word (DA, II.1, 412a17, DA, II.2, 414a1-20). In contrast to this, I 
previously focused on the composite: “It follows that every natural body which has life 
in it is a substance in the sense of a composite” (DA 412a17-22). According to this 
definition, a soul is “A substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life 
potentially within it” (DA, II.1, 412a20-22). The question then is, “What kind of actuality 
is the soul, if it does not maintain identification or a unity as an outcome?” Is it actuality 
corresponding to knowledge and to reflecting? He talks about sleeping and waking in 
order to explain this further. Sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of a soul 
where sleeping corresponds to knowledge possessed but not employed and waking to 
reflecting. As a result:  
It is obvious that the soul is an actuality like knowledge; for both 
sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these 
waking corresponds to reflecting, sleeping to knowledge possessed but 
not employed, and knowledge of something is temporally prior (DA, 
II.1, 412a26-7, tr. J. A. Smith). 
This presentation is open to interpretations of soul as an umbrella term for a complex of 
different actual capacities, to a dual natured compound , a term of multiple substances, or 
a unity of some sort that sees the soul as the same as its capacities.  
The discussion of a definition of the soul starts with the common feature that is life and 
motion. Aristotle talks about soul as the form of the body as well as the actualization of 
the body. Another definition mentions soul as the substance. His hylomorphism, on the 
one hand, denies the identification of the soul with the body and as a result, denies 
reductionist and eliminationist approaches to the soul. On the other hand, the soul is 
defined in a dependent way to the material constitution, i.e. the body (Shields, 2009, pp. 
298-303). As a denial of his predecessors he claims that his approach is a third way 
between physical explanation and an idealist one.  
But we must return from this digression, and repeat that the affections 
of soul, insofar as they are such as passion and fear, are inseparable 
from the natural matter of animals in this way and not in the same way 
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as a line or surface (DA, I.1,403b16-403b19, tr. J. A. Smith).  
Aristotle’s hylomorphism and explanation of the soul as being dependent on the body has 
been targeted by Platonist readers after him. For Neoplatonists, two issues are essential 
to prove regarding the soul: maintaining the immateriality and independent existence of 
the soul and maintaining the soul and the body as essentially two different natures. 
Moreover, the definition of the soul with actualisation (DA, II. 1, 412a27-30) as sort of 
assimilation becomes a problem for Neoplatonists. This makes the soul’s survival 
impossible after the body’s death. Because of this, Plotinus favours separability at the 
expense of Aristotle’s definitions of the soul.  
If the soul is assimilated [to the body] with which it is associated in the 
way that the shape of the statue is related to the bronze, then when the 
body is divided, the soul will be partitioned with it, and when a part of 
the body is severed, a portion of the soul will join it; the withdrawal in 
sleep will not take place if the actualisation of – to be truthful there will 
not even be any sleep. Moreover, if the soul is an actualisation there will 
be no rational opposition to appetite, and the whole, being in 
consonance with itself, will undergo one and the same affection 
throughout (Enneads IV.7, 8 (5), 1984, Armstrong, pp. 375-7; tr. 
Sorabji, 2004, p. 245).  
Plotinus rejected the idea of soul being the form of the body and being its actualisation. 
This approach separates body and soul dramatically in favour of the soul. It should yet be 
noted that in terms of the essential difference between natures of soul and body both 
Plotinus and Aristotle share same concerns and they adopt different versions of dualism. 
The main issues are the substantiality of the soul alone and its separability from the body 
and survival of the soul after the decay of the body. According to Plotinus, the compound 
of body and soul is different from the person, he identifies person with the cognizer.30 
The difference between the nature of the soul and that of the body makes the relation itself 
problematic as well. Let us remember that after Aristotle the image of the soul as 
imprisoned in the body is back in the picture with Platonist influence (Phaedrus 246-8). 
According to Plotinus, the descent into body is not necessarily evil, but still the soul is 
descended. It is also necessary for animation in the world (Steel, 1978, p. 34). 
                                                          
30 For a detailed analysis of this twofold interpretative process see Peter Adamson, 2001, “Aristotelianism 
and the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus”, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 211-232. 
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Accordingly, the descent is in line with the world order.31 Plotinus’ explanation of 
descent is metaphorical and it is indeed the partial soul’s experience of a temporary 
process of suffering and confusion (Shaw, 1995, pp. 64, 65). Steel explains that this is 
because the soul does not descend according to Plotinus in the strict sense, the soul’s real 
habitat is the intelligible world and it remains there: “By reason of the soul’s highest 
principle, it belongs to the intelligible world and is never separated from it even when it 
is bound to the mortal body” (Steel, 1978, p. 34). Plotinus does not differentiate between 
higher souls and human soul. As a result, the nature of the soul is homogenous (Steel, 
1978, p. 28). Because the human soul is the same as higher souls, it is directly in relation 
to higher realms than the earth. A necessary consequence of this idea is that the soul 
cannot mix with the earthly and material things. This kind of exclusion between material 
nature and material activities from immaterial ones is followed by Avicenna. 
A different view is held by Iamblichus who rejected the view that the human soul is 
always perfect; as a result, it is impassive when it is combined with the material body. 
This soul is not homogenous or same in essence with higher souls (Shaw, 1995, pp. 62-
69).32 Contrary to Plotinus’ homogenous soul that remains unchanged in the human, 
Iamblichus claimed full descent of the soul and therefore it has to have undergone change. 
A radical claim follows this argumentation: even the substance of the human soul is liable 
to changes, not just its faculties or acts (Steel, 1978, p. 52). This idea of substantial change 
in the soul is one of the essential innovations that will be needed to explore Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
theory later. The idea of descent of the soul brings out the idea of the elevation 
(apotheosis) of the soul to the higher realm as well. This will be relevant to discussions 
about the extra-mental senses and the possibility of perceiving the sound and smell of the 
higher realm. Iamblichus is important due to his revisions in Plotinian ideas of descent 
and apotheosis and as a result his explanation of change in the soul.33 
When we reach Avicenna, the influence of both Aristotle and Neoplatonists are 
observable in his theories. On the one hand, he perpetuates Aristotle’s hylomorphic 
language. On the other, he admits distinction among different levels of the soul and 
                                                          
31Asfār, v.8, p. 409; tr. Peerwani, p. 304; Uthūlūjiyā, p. 84. 
32 The similarity with the higher souls implies relevant discussion of the godlikeness of the human. The 
similarity is what makes it possible for human beings to perfect themselves. For a detailed discussion of 
the idea of godlikeness (homoiosis theos) see Sedley (1999) ‘The ideal of godlikeness’, in G. Fine (ed.), 
Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 309-328.  
33 Shaw explains that Iamblichus changed the common ideas on ascent of his time into a correlative 
relation between descent and ascent (Shaw, 1995, p. 24). Iamblichus’ importance in terms of change can 
be due to the influence of gnostic and especially of Pythagorean teachings in his thought (Shaw, 1995, p. 
239).  
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accepts that the rational soul is immaterial. As a result, he maintains the idea of 
separability of the soul.34 His famous thought experiment, the “flying man”, is an 
important sign of the Platonist tendencies in his thought. 35 His introspective proof of the 
soul also reminds one of the introspective proofs of the soul in Augustine who had been 
an interest for Brentano.36  
For Avicenna, the soul continues to be part of the investigation of living bodies. With the 
continuing hylomorphic terminology, the soul is “a form, or like a form, or like a 
perfection” (Avicenna, ShN, I.1, p. 6).37 Avicenna, in contrast to Aristotle and Brentano, 
hesitates to define the soul as a form. Thus he focuses on the idea of the soul as the 
perfection of the natural body. Avicenna reflects the influence of Platonist approaches 
through Neoplatonists for which the soul is independent and immaterial. It has a different 
nature from the body. The human being, accordingly, is isthmus of material and 
immaterial through her combination of body and soul. Soul has an accidental relation to 
body, and the soul is of heavenly origin. The body causes the soul to become an individual 
soul. 
Different mixtures of elements produce bodies which are recipients of the souls. The soul 
comes to existence only when it attaches itself to an appropriate mixture, and this 
attachment takes place with the intervention of heavenly bodies.38  
We are certain that when it happens that the soul exists, it has come to 
be with the coming to be of a certain mixture, and that in addition a 
certain configuration of rational actions and passions comes to be for 
the soul (ShN, V.3, p. 226 tr. Kaukua, 2008, pp. 79-80). 
This attachment is the first perfection of the soul. As the soul takes action to actualize 
different particular souls in itself such as vegetative, animal, and so on, then the soul goes 
through second perfection (Marcotte, 2000, p. 93). Although Avicenna’s soul seems to be 
changing in the explanation, one should keep in mind that he rejects substantial change. 
Change in the soul occurs only in the accidents. 
                                                          
34For Neoplatonic approaches to Aristotle and Plato’s ideas on soul see Gerson (2005) Aristotle and Other 
Platonists, pp. 131-173. 
35Ṣadrā quotes Uthūlūjiyā (pp. 22-3) in a similar context in which the author is reported to disengage 
himself from his body and explore his inner world (Asfār, v. 8, p. 360). 
36O’Connor, 1921, The Concept of the Human Soul according to Saint Augustine, dissertation in Catholic 
University of America; pp. 34-46 
37 “لامكلاكوا ةروصلاك وا ةروصلا يه” ShN I.1, p. 6. 
38 For a detailed analysis on Avicenna’s notion of mixture see Stone, Abraham (2008) “Avicenna’s 
Theory of Primary Mixture” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 18, pp. 99–119. 
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Rāzī summarizes Avicenna’s proofs of immateriality as being twofold: one is showing 
difference between the constant part of the soul, the ego, and the changing part, the body. 
The psychological continuity, despite the constant change in body and corruption in 
organs etc., proves that the soul is immaterial and different from these corruptible parts 
of the human (LI, p. 233). What follows this is the claim that the soul is a being that does 
not occupy space.  
In the second proof, Avicenna brings the awareness of bodily functions to our attention. 
We are aware of our soul's actions such as hearing, seeing, and so on; whilst we are not 
aware of the actions of the organs such as the heart (LI, p. 234). In addition, the functions 
such as imagination, dreams, and intellection cannot be found in the extra-mental world. 
Thus, they should be in the soul. And this proves that the soul should be different from 
the material beings of the extra-mental world.  
A related notorious topic in Avicennan literature is the flying man argument.39 However, 
what goal the flying man argument serves is as debatable as much as its source and the 
scope of its influence. As well as proving the existence of the soul, the flying man 
argument can be seen to serve as proof of the soul’s independence from the body, or the 
substantiality of the soul, or even to the manifest the centrality of self-awareness. In the 
case of self-awareness, the idea is that the human has privileged unmediated knowledge 
of the soul, so this knowledge is continuous and infallible. This is related to the idea of 
unmediated knowledge which is an important claim for illuminationist theories. This is 
also related to contemporary discussions on first person perspective and the privileged 
access to the self. The flying man argument has also been influential in the Latin world 
with a growing emphasis on the notions of incorporeality and self-awareness (Hasse, 
2000, pp. 86-92; Marcotte, 2000, pp. 69, 71, 75).40 
We say: one of us must imagine himself as created all at once and 
perfect but with his sight veiled from observing external things, and as 
created floating in the air or the void so that he would not encounter air 
resistance which he would have to sense, and with his limbs separate 
from each other in such a way that neither meet nor touch each other. 
He must then reflect upon [the question] whether he would affirm the 
                                                          
39 Black reports that the label “flying man” is not originally Avicenna’s but Gilson’s (1929–30), p. 41 
(Black, 2008, p. 83). 
40 For more on the flying man see: Hasse, 2000, pp.80-92; Kaukua, 2007, p. 24, 71; Marmura, 1986, pp. 
383-39. For Avicenna's influence in the Islamic world see: Muehlethaler, 2009, pp. 179-204. As for the 
influence in the Latin world see Hasse, 2000, p. 86-92. For the relationships between Augustine, 
Avicenna and Descartes see Sorabji, 2006, p. 212-229.  
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existence of his essence. 
He would not hesitate to affirm that his essence exists, but he would not 
thereby affirm any of his limbs, any of his internal organs, whether heart 
or brain, or any of the external things. Rather, he would be affirming his 
essence without affirming for it length, breadth, or death. And if in this 
state he were able to imagine a hand or some other limb, he would not 
imagine it part of his essence. 
Now, you know that what is affirmed is different from what is not 
affirmed and what is established is different from what is not 
established to him. Hence the essence whose existence he has affirmed 
is specific to him in that it is himself, different from his body and limbs 
which were not affirmed. 
Thus, he who is attentive has the means to be awakened to the existence 
of the soul as something different from the body – indeed, as not body 
at all – and to be acquainted with and aware of it (ShN, I.1,p. 16, tr. 
Kaukua, 2008, p. 72).
41
 
A similar argument is found before Avicenna in Augustine. Augustine is under the strong 
influence of Plato in defence of the independent existence of the soul from the body. A 
similar case to the flying man occurs in Augustine’s writing in varied contexts or usages, 
two of which are continuous and direct knowledge of the self and the non-bodily 
knowledge of the self (Sorabji, 2006, pp. 212-223). Sorabji considers Avicenna’s 
argument to be similar to the second usage. However, both usages (especially the idea of 
self-awareness) are at the centre of Avicenna’s argument (Kaukua, 2008, pp. 81-82). In 
this sense, Sorabji’s evaluation is a somewhat simplified examination of Avicenna’s 
flying man. As discussed, there is not a single usage for Avicenna’s flying man argument. 
Avicenna seems to be employing the argument in a pragmatic way and interchangeably 
in relation to a variety of cases on the soul. The ambiguity of applications of this continues 
when we read Ṣadrā as well.  
We can find similar introspective thought experiments to the flying man argument in 
Plotinus, Augustine, and Avicenna’s notions of the self-knowledge. Ṣadrā too quotes the 
author of Uthūlūjiyā. I think as well as self-knowledge and the privileged access and 
infallibility of direct knowledge, there is another layer to these discussions in the 
                                                          
41 Marmura classifies three variations in Avicenna’s texts in ShN and Ishārāt (Marmura, 1986, pp. 383-
395); and Hasse finds similar discussion in Mashriqiyyūn and Risāla al-adhawiyya in addition to the 
previous texts in Marmura’s analysis (Hasse, 2000, pp. 81-2). 
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Neoplatonic context: it is the homology of the human with the macrocosm.  
At times I became solitary in myself and removed my body on a side 
and became as if I was a substance disengaged [from matter] without 
the body. I was inside my essence [or myself], outside of all things. I 
saw in myself beauty and loveliness, and I remained very much 
astonished at it. Then I learned that I was a part of the eminent divine 
world possessing active life. When I became certain of that, I elevated 
by my mind from that world to the divine Cause. I became as if settled 
in It and suspended by It. I was beyond the whole world of Intellect 
(Asfār, v.8, p. 360, tr. Peerwani, p. 267; Uthūlūjiyā, Mīmar I. p. 22). 
To sum up what is discussed so far, Sorabji draws attention to the parallels between 
Augustine and Avicenna, and he claims that Porphyry is the possible source for both 
thought experiments of the flying man (Sorabji, 2006, pp. 212-229; Sorabji, 2004, p. 66). 
Bizri mentioned some other scholarly interest in Avicenna’s flying man in relation to its 
influence and reported that it was the seeds of intentionality as well as foresight of 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum and modern ‘brain-in-vat’ discussions (Bizri, 2003, pp. 82-3). 
Ṣadrā’s quotation from the author of Uthūlūjiyā brings Plotinus into the picture as well as 
the idea of microcosm. Ṣadrā’s take on the argument with an important twist will be given 
in the next section. Let it suffice for now to mention that what dramatically separates 
Avicenna and Ṣadrā is that there are strict boundaries between different levels of beings 
in Avicenna whilst in Ṣadrā’s case, all share a single reality that includes consciousness. 
Returning our attention to the idea of immaterial soul, another influential philosopher on 
Ṣadrā’s thought is Suhrawardī. 
For Suhrawardī, knowledge processes in humans are explained as being closely related 
to isfahbad light. The one who really sees is not the material organ but the immaterial 
soul and its ruler, isfahbad light. Just as the sense perception is dependent on the self, all 
other types of knowledge depend on the knowledge of the self. Consciousness itself is 
one of the features of light. Light is evident to itself and not absent from itself (ḤI, p. 81). 
The human self is an incorporeal light (ḤI, p. 86) which is evident to itself and self-
knowledge of which is never absent. Apprehension of oneself is neither superadded to the 
self nor part of one’s self, and neither is it accidental. Human beings are unconscious 
about their organs because the body is not conscious, it is not light; it is darkness.  
Self-knowledge is important for Suhrawardī’s theory of knowledge. He establishes that 
self-knowledge is an unmediated, permanent knowledge that does not cease after death 
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of the body. Self is presented as being different from the body, the organs, or totality of 
the bodily parts; and the knowledge of the self is different from the awareness of body 
or the parts of the body (Marcotte, 2000, p. 181) Internal organs are defined as dark, 
just like the body and they cannot know themselves, this type of knowledge still 
contains some kind of objectification.  
Moreover, self-knowledge must be unmediated; it should not take place through forms, 
universals, or particular perceptions. It is not reducible to anything else. Self has the 
capacity to know itself intrinsically (Marcotte, 2000, p. 192). Self-knowledge needs no 
external proof, thus it is self-evident (ḤI, p. 82). And as Suhrawardī states, "Whatever 
perceives its own essence is incorporeal light" (ḤI, p.79); self-knowledge therefore 
proves incorporeality.  
Following his strong Neoplatonic tendency one can expect Suhrawardī to accept pre-
existence of souls, and a universal soul which is the one main source of all human souls 
(Aminrazavi, 1996, p. 90; Roxanne Marcotte, 2000, p.205). However, his words in 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq prove otherwise (ḤI, pp. 131, 109). Suhrawardī thinks that the ruler 
light for human being exists simultaneously with the body: 
This light [he means the dominating light of the human species] was not 
existent before the body, for each individual has an essence that knows 
itself and that those of its states are hidden from others. Thus, the human 
managing lights are not one, since otherwise that which was known to 
one would be known to all, which is not the case (ḤI, tr. Walbridge and 
Ziai, p. 132). 
Some lights are real and others are only accidental. Accidental lights become dark when 
their contact to essential light is cut off. In this way, Suhrawardī links the existence of 
darkness to light as well. Darkness is the absence of light. Things exist hierarchically at 
different levels according to their intensity of light. The relation among different levels 
of light is domination when it is downwards and it is love when it is upwards (ḤI, p. 
97).  
A thing is either light and luminosity in its own reality or is not ... light 
is divided into light that is a state of something else (the accidental light) 
and light that is not a state of something else (the incorporeal or pure 
light). That which is not light in its own reality is divided into that which 
is independent of locus (the dusky substance) and that which is a state 
of something else (the dark state).  
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The barrier (barzakh) is the body (jism) and maybe described as a 
substance that can be pointed to. Some barriers are seen to be dark when 
light ceases to shine on them. Darkness is simply an expression for lack 
of light, nothing more; and it is not one of the privates conditioned upon 
possibility. [...] thus, it is established that everything that is neither a 
light nor illuminated dark. If a barrier is cut off from light, it does not 
need something else to be dark. Therefore these bodies are dusk 
substances. There remain some barriers that never lose their light - the 
Sun, for example. These are like other barriers that may cease to have 
light in that they are barriers, yet they differ in having light continually. 
The light by which these barriers differ from the others is superadded 
to their being barriers and subsists in them. It is thus accidental light, 
and its bearer is a dusky substance. Therefore, every barrier is a dusky 
substance (ḤI, tr. Walbridge and Ziai, pp. 77-8).  
The fundamental formula of Suhrawardī’s theory is that everything is explained through 
a hierarchy of light. Aminrazavi points to this as an application of Avicennan ontology 
with a change in the matrix so that hierarchy of beings is turned into hierarchy of lights 
(Aminrazavi, 1997, p. 31; HI, p. 2). Things, according to their dependence on light or 
being light themselves, are called incorporeal lights and accidental lights, and the 
absence of light is named as darkness. Dark states are caused by light even though light 
itself may also be accidental (ḤI, p. 78). Incorporeal lights are in a hierarchy and divided 
into two as dominating lights (qāhira) (which are in no way in relation to barriers) and 
lights that control (mudabbira) the barriers (barāzih) (ḤI, p. 102).  
The continuity of each species is not something that occurs by chance. Suhrawardī 
claims that individuals are not prior, rather some luminous species which are brought 
into being by dominating lights are prior to each individual and preserve the species 
even when the individuals cease to exist (ḤI, pp. 101-102). He claims the 
simultaneous existence of human soul, body, and ruler light of the particular human 
both in order to protect the difference of each individual human and also the difference 
between the world of pure lights and the ruler lights of human beings. In terms of the 
second claim about universal soul, Suhrawardī says:  
[B]ut when they [i.e. the Ancients] said, “There is a universal man in 
the world of intellect”, they meant that there is a dominating light 
containing different interacting universal - not in the sense that it is a 
predicate, but in the sense that it has the same relation of emanation to 
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these individuals. 
Some men adduce in proof of the forms the argument that humanity per 
se is not many, so it is one. This is not valid (ḤI, tr. Walbridge and Ziai, 
p. 109). 
This discussion takes us back to the formation of the human self which is a combination 
of body and soul. The sensible soul is differentiated from the vegetative soul mainly by 
its ability of sense perception. Among the ideas mentioned so far, there are two 
important discussions for understanding Mullā Ṣadrā’s notion of soul. One is the idea 
of change in the soul, and the immateriality of soul. In terms of the map of ideas before 
Ṣadrā’s time, for the first one, we find that the hylomorphic Aristotelian approach 
survives in Avicenna’s understanding of the human. Two parts of hylomorphism appear 
as two more distinguished parts: body and soul. In terms of the immateriality, the soul 
is – as Avicenna claims – an immaterial substance. He claims substantiality and 
immateriality of the soul and this makes his approach further from Aristotle and closer 
to Plotinus. In terms of the notion of change for the soul, Plotinus and Avicenna deny 
any substantial change for the soul. The real realm for Plotinus’ high soul is the higher 
realm. Avicenna’s proofs for the immateriality of the soul are followed by Suhrawardī.  
The common notions about human soul in Ancient and Medieval theories discussed so 
far focus on the immateriality of soul and dual nature of human (as soul and body). 
Intentionality as an immaterialization process is thus mainly related to the parts of soul 
that can relate to the material things as the first levels require interaction with matter. 
On the other hand, intentionality as maintaining the objects that are different from 
physical things, can only be related to the purely immaterial things and the immaterial 
part of the soul, the intellect.  
The definition of the soul as perfection also opens a window to define intentionality 
more closely to the soul. However, it is also seen so far that substantial change is denied 
by most Peripatetic and Neoplatonist philosophers. Knowledge in Peripatetic 
explanation employs mainly a passive role for the human soul. More importantly, if it 
is a change, it is not more than an accidental change. Avicenna’s differentiating various 
faculties of the soul draws attention to the relation of the soul and its faculties. If the 
soul is seen as part of the intentionality question, how much role do the faculties of soul 
play in this process?  
Aristotle’s idea of sense perception is one of the essential puzzles of Brentano’s 
intentionality. This is because he makes Aristote’s sense theory one of the main 
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examples of intentionality. Different historiographies of the term also go back to 
Aristotelian perception theory, some starting from sense perception and some others 
with his phantasia. In the next sections, first the theory of sense will be discussed, and 
second, an investigation on inner senses will follow. 
 
2.3 SENSE PERCEPTION 
Brentano starts the history of intentionality with Aristotle’s concept of mental inexistence 
and talks about a special case of psychical indwelling. This indwelling should be 
somehow different from the physical and the extra-mental things which are manifested 
by ordinary objects. Brentano extracts two claims from Aristotle’s DA; first, that sensing 
is an immaterial process that takes form without matter, and second, that the object sensed 
is in the sensing subject. We can thus say that Brentano’s interest in Aristotle starts with 
Aristotle’s theory of senses and include different experiences of the self, up to 
conceptualization.  
Aristotle had already spoken of this psychical indwelling. In his books On the 
Soul he says that what is experienced, as something experienced, is in the 
experiencing subject; that the sense receives what is experienced without matter; 
and that what is thought is in the understanding (PES, (tr.s) Rancurello, Terrell 
and McAlister, 1874, I.125). 
Aristotle’s physics rest on a hylomorphic theory of things, these things are separate 
existents composed of matter and form.42 In this concrete unity, body can be stated to 
play the part of the matter and thus possesses the attributes. Soul plays the part of the 
form and thus is the essential attribute (Ross, 2004, p. 40). When it comes to 
epistemology, intellection is defined in totally immaterial terms. Physical things as 
being composed of matter and form on one side and intellection being purely 
immaterial and free from matter, knowledge turns into a process about distillation or 
abstraction of forms. This process is considered to happen in a number of stages 
(Leijenhorst, 2007, p. 84). The impression of signet ring in wax is a celebrated 
metaphor for the sensible forms being received without matter (DA, III.4, 429b). 
Brentano discusses this example when he evaluates Aristotle’s theory of sense 
perception:  
                                                          
42“The form and the matter are not separate from the thing, whereas the place can be separated” (Physics, 
209b22-209b29). 
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Of course this metaphor is not absolutely perfect in that the formed wax does not 
individually bear the same form as the seal, but only one like it, while the sense 
which takes in the form of the sensible bears the same form. And for this reason 
the wax takes on the form of the seal as a physical subject and through a kind of 
corruption, for it had up to this point; but sense does not receive the sensible form 
through actual alteration43, even if such an alteration may accompany the 
reception of the form through may accompany the reception of the form, […] 
(Brentano, tr. George Rolf, The Psychology of Aristotle, 1977, p. 55). 
Aristotle defines sense perception in relation to animal’s capability of movement and 
nutrition. Sense perception is causally defined and triggered by an extra-mental object. 
The controlling organ that is the centre for all the senses is the heart and every sense 
organ is accepted to have their specific objects called the proper sensible (Aristotle, DA 
II.6, 418a7ff).44  
There are two main definitions of sense in the DA: sense as "abstraction" and sense as 
"actualization". For the first, Aristotle defines sense perception as receiving the form 
(devoid of matter) of an extra-mental object:  
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of 
receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in 
which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; 
what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or 
gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or 
sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort 
and according to its form (DA, II.12, 424a18-23, tr. J. A. Smith). 
The text is quoted in the same way when it is translated to Arabic. And the sections in 
bold can be found word by word in the Arabic sources.45 The example of wax and ring is 
the same example Brentano uses to show the source of the idea of intentionality in 
Aristotle. Avicenna describes sensation in the same way, as the presence of the form of 
the sensed object in the soul and later this is repeated by Rāzī in his summary (LI, p. 234).  
As mentioned in the discussions regarding soul, Avicenna continues the hylomorphic 
language. Sensation as reception of forms without matter is built on the idea that things 
                                                          
43His explanation of the alteration also shows that he does not follow literalist readings of Aristotle. 
44 For Aristotle’s proofs that heart is more worthy of being the centre rather than brain, see Gross on cell 
doctrine, 1999, pp. 31 ff.  
45See Kitab al-nafs li-Aristutalis, 1949, p. 85; ed. Badawi, Aristu fi Nafs, p. 60; Paraphrase, p. 285; K.RN, 
p.43, 45, 10-15. 
62 
 
are a composite of matter and form, and that the form can be abstracted from the object 
and still be representative for the object from which it is taken:  
This natural body has certain principles qua natural body, as well as additional 
principles qua generable and corruptible or in general alterable. The principles by 
which it acquires its corporeality include whatever are parts of its existence as 
actually present in [the natural body] itself, and these are more appropriately called 
principles, according to [the natural philosopher]. They are two: one of them is like 
the wood of the bed, while the other is like the form or shape of the bed. What is like 
the wood of the bed is called material, subject, matter, component, and element, 
according to various considerations, whereas what is like the form of the bed is called 
form (ShST I.2, tr. McGinnis, p. 14). 
Perception is a change that occurs when substances with complementary capacities for 
acting and being acted upon come into contact (Everson, 1997, p.26). But how are extra-
mental objects turned into sense objects/mental objects (if they are ever internalized)?  
The process is described as a change in the sense organ which is mostly interpreted as an 
immaterial change when DA is read by the Neoplatonists. The ambiguity of the nature of 
change in Aristotle’s words has caused a debate among modern scholars as well. The 
literal readings of Aristotle (such as the notorious reading of Sorabji) find an 
immaterialized version of Aristotle in the commentators of the late antiquity. The original 
text is understood literally. Accordingly, the organ physically changes; such as in the case 
of seeing a red object, the eye becomes red.46 The interpreters such as Burnyeat find 
continuity in the texts of Aristotle and commentators of late antiquity (Burnyeat, 2001, 
pp. 29 ff.). 47 According to them, Aristotle too claimed that the change is an immaterial 
one. However, the revisions by the commentators are not limited to describing the nature 
of change in sensation.  
                                                          
46 Sorabji links the immaterializaion of theory of sensation and history of intentionality. He writes a 
developmental history for intentionality, that the concept according to him, can be traced back to Aristotle 
and later occurs some deep dematerializations. Emphasis to diversity of different senses also begin after 
Aristotle (Sorabji, 1991, p.227). The concepts changes from hands of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and 
Philoponus to Arabic writers as they "contributed to the process of dematerialization the idea of an 
intention, understanding as a nonphysical message or information" (Sorabji, 1991, p. 228). Later this 
further dematerialized interpretation is transmitted from Arab writers to Aquinas and other 13th century 
writers. Sorabji further links this trace to Brentano. 
47 I must mention here that Burnyeat’s main aim to prove literal readings wrong is to show that Aristotle’s 
philosophy is no longer credible for modern functionalist discussions. The title says the aim of the paper 
openly: M. F. Burnyeat, ‘Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)’ 
[‘StillCredible?’], in Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, eds. M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Paperbacks), (1992, 1995), pp. 15–26. 
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The idea that “sensation depends on a process of movement or affection from without, 
for it is held to be some sort of change of quality” (DA II.5, 416b32-33, tr. J. A. Smith). 
This brings out the idea of some sort of difference of the sensed objects from the extra-
mental objects. As a result this implies some level of immateriality. 
Sorabji gives a long list of descriptions of the change during sensation made by the 
commentators and the obvious change that comes with the commentary tradition. 
According to his presentation, the change is described more and more immaterial in time. 
This, he thinks explains the immateriality claim that appears in Brentano’s intentionality 
thesis. As mentioned before, one can also think that the emphasis of the immateriality in 
sensation process is originally found in Aristotle’s text. The important thing (regardless 
the change being “spiritual” in Aristotle’s text or not) is that when the theory reached to 
Mullā Ṣadrā or Brentano, we find the immaterial explanation attributed to Aristotle. In 
this spiritual understanding of change, we see Averroes rather than Avicenna is influential 
(Knuuttila, 2008, p. 13). Albert the Great and Aquinas are among the philosophers who 
continued the idea of spiritual change in the western world. Moreover, it needs to be 
mentioned that the idea of a spiritual change in sense perception had remained as a 
commonly accepted idea in Latin scholasticism (Knuuttila, 2008, p. 14). 48 
It is spiritual change when the form of the source of change is received in the subject 
of change supraphysically, the way the form of a colour is in the eye, which does not 
become the colour it sees. Sense activity involves supraphysical change. The 
intention of the sensed form comes to be within the sense organ (Aquinas, Summa 
theologiae, I.78.3, v.11, p. 131) 
In Mullā Ṣadrā’s version of sensation we find that the idea of change is inseparable from 
the identity principle and substantial change. 
If not the immaterial nature of the change in the sense organ; other issues in the DA are 
revised by the Neoplatonists. A harmonization of the Aristotelian texts with each other 
has taken place as well as the harmonization of Aristotle with Plato. The Aristotelian ideas 
follow a more complicated path when the Neoplatonised Aristotle (commentators’ texts 
as well as a DA paraphrase (including quotes from Plotinus’ Enneads, yet received as 
Aristotle’s Theology) are translated and interpreted in the Islamic lands (Adamson, 2001, 
p. 211). So we have DA translations beside the effect of its interpretations by the 
commentators, and the DA paraphrase which includes sections from Enneads and various 
                                                          
48 For a different view on Aquinas idea of change during sense perception, see Pasnau, 1997, pp.11-18. 
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partial texts quoted from Plotinus.49 With this complicated list of books, the ideas are 
transformed in surprising ways: syntheses of texts that are naturalized versions of Plato 
and Plotinus as well as mystified versions of Aristotle become available (Adamson, 2001, 
pp. 211-232).  
When we reach Avicenna, the process is explained more materially than the Neoplatonic 
tendencies. This shift in Avicenna’s language can be sought through the influence of 
Galen on his thought and as a result of his profession of being a physician (Hall, 2004, p. 
72). A duality of immaterial and material tendencies become clearer with Avicenna’s 
centralization of Active intellect (ʿAql faʿāl) and the configuration of bodily elements 
(mīzāj) in his philosophy.  
The more developed idea of active intellect is also an influence of the Neoplatonic reading 
of Aristotle. Through different interpretations of Aristotle’s DA 340a10-25,50 different 
candidates for active intellect already are emergent before Avicenna. We find 
commentators discuss the active intellect being the rational soul, or, a separate intellect, 
or even the God himself. Active intellect can be seen as the cause of the knowledge in the 
first place and seen as the first mover. Sorabji reports this case from Alexander (Sorabji, 
2004, p. 104). Active intellect can be the reason why the soul recognizes the matterless 
forms in the first place. In that sense it is an agent intellect (Sorabji, 2004, p. 109). We 
find this case in Aquinas, who talks about these with the influence of Avicenna as well. 
The source of both is Themistius’ tripartite classification as potential, active and 
productive intellect. The productive intellect is the inspiration for agent intellect (Sorabji, 
2004, p. 109). Another function related to the agent intellect is the ability to separate 
matter from the form. Thanks to this capacity, human beings can start the abstraction 
process during sensation.51 One further function of active intellect is making concept 
formation possible (Sorabji, 2004, p. 104). The active intellect is considered by Alexander 
as a separate intellect because of Aristotle’s GA 736b28. In this section Aristotle 
differentiates other parts of the human from his nous. And nous is given from outside.52 
                                                          
49 Zimmerman argues for existence of a lost original paraphrase of Plotinus that is the source of these 
various texts (Adamson, Peter (2001) “Aristotelianism and the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus”, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 211-232). Zimmerman, F. W. (1986) “Origins of the so-called 
Theology of Aristotle” in (ed.) Kraye, J. , and Ryan, W. F., and Schmitt, C. B.,  Pseudo- Aristotle In the 
Middle Ages (London: Warburg Institute), pp. 110-240. 
50 ʿAql munfaʿil and ʿaql faʿāl in (1954) Arisṭūṭālīs fī-l-nafs, p. 72-75; DA 429a10 ff, ed. Badawi, Cairo: 
Maktaba al-nahḍa al-Miṣriyya.  
51 This idea is reported from Alexander by Sorabji, 2004, p. 104. 
52 “It remains, then, for the reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any 
connexion with the activity of reason” (GA 736b26-28). “Just as the intellect acts thus from outside with a 
view to the growth of the persons concerned, so in the case of the embryo itself does nature form from the 
purest material the flesh and the body of the other sense-organs, and from the residues thereof bones, 
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Priscianus or Simplicius (Sorabji, 2004, p. 115) regards that it is the rational soul, as did 
Themistius and Philoponus (Sorabji, 2004, p. 104).  
Avicenna’s active intellect is the lowest of cosmological intellects. It is a cosmological 
principle as well as an epistemological one. Thanks to this principle, the rational soul 
becomes activated. Again, through rational soul’s contact with the active intellect, 
recognition of forms as well as formation of generalizations becomes possible. When 
intellect takes control of compositive imagination, it turns into cogitative imagination. 
With this, it becomes prepared to receive the intelligible from the Active intellect. In a 
way, since the human soul becomes active when it is connected to the separate Active 
intellect, one can argue that Avicenna indeed synthesized the two previous ideas that 
active intellect is a separate intellect and that it is the rational soul in human. In his 
version, the actuality of the rational soul is dependent on human being’s contact with the 
separate active intellect. According to this connection, the human intellect experiences 
different potentialities or actualities.  
You will find that the acquired intellect to be the governor whom all the rest serve. 
And it is the ultimate goal. It is followed by the actual intellect (al-ʿaql bi-l-fiʿl), 
which is served by the habitual intellect (al-ʿaql bi-l-malaka), and the material 
intellect (al-ʿaql al-hayūlānī) is entirely disposed to serve the habitual intellect. Then 
the practical intellect serves all these, because the bodily relation exists, as will 
become clear, for the perfection of the theoretical intellect and its purification, and 
the practical intellect is served by the faculty of estimation (Najāt VI, ed. Fakhry, p. 
206; tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 37).53 
A further point about Avicenna’s Active intellect is that it is both the cosmological and 
epistemological principle. The forms in the natural beings are given by active intellect. 
As the cosmological principle, it is called the ‘giver of forms’ (wāhib al-ṣuwar). By this 
conjunction of functions, active intellect is a necessary component for Avicenna’s claim 
that certainty in knowledge is possible through the quiddities and forms.  
So many aspects of the peripatetic explanation of cosmology and epistemology are built 
on hylomorphism. The mentioned differentiation between active and passive intellects is, 
similarly, necessitated by the hylomorhic and dualist nature of the peripatetic philosophy. 
                                                          
sinews, hair, and also nails and hoofs and the like; hence these are last to assume their form, for they have 
to wait till the time when nature has some residue to spare” (GA 744b22-28). 
53 All references are from Fazlurrahman’s translation which corresponds to the sixth article of the second 
section of Najāt (page numbers 196-232 in Majid Fakhry ed. (1982)).the roman numbers refer to chapter 
numbers in Fazlurrahman’s translation. For example I. p. 24 would correspond to II.6.1, p. 196 in 
Fakhry’s edition. 
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The thinking part of the soul cannot mix with the body or the bodily things. As a result of 
this, the body is not a tool for intellectual part of the soul, either (Paraphrase, p. 311). In 
this sense, the famous Platonian idea that "soul as the place for forms" is in reality true 
only for the thinking part of the soul (Paraphrase, p. 307, 11; ed. Badawi, Arisṭūṭālīs fī-
l-nafs, 1954, p. 73). The rational soul contains the forms in a potentially (Paraphrase, p. 
307: “wa laysa as-ṣuwar fī-hā bi’l-fiʿl”). Accordingly only the one who says that the 
intelligible soul is the house for forms is right (Paraphrase, p. 311). This is Aristotle’s 
compromised denial of the Platonist approach that the soul as a whole is the house of 
forms. The necessity of Active intellect occurs at this point by the fact that there is no part 
of the soul, which can store the intelligible forms. The memory as well as the other inner 
senses is a material faculty that is located in the body. With exclusive understanding of 
body and soul (between material and immaterial; as well as between particular and 
universal) in which one does not mix with the other (as material with immaterial, for 
example), the intelligible forms cannot be stored by human beings. There is an excluding 
relation as well as a hierarchy between the abstraction of sensed forms and intelligibles. 
The sensible forms are particular and still related to particular material objects. 
Accordingly they cannot be received by the intellect. The important thing at this point is 
to point out the difference of dualism in Avicenna’s epistemology from the monism in 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s. 
One related question that emerges from this first definition is about the relation of the 
form of the extra-mental object and the internalized object which is the sensible form: are 
they identical or not? In case of the internally received object, we know that it is somehow 
different from the extra-mental object: we can see a high mountain which has a magnitude 
larger than the size of our eye. If the sensation were a direct reception of the object without 
any change, then this would not be possible. The peripatetic tradition explains this with 
the reception of the form alone. Thus the difference between the extra-mental object and 
the internalized object is that the latter is devoid of matter. Although this answer seems 
to solve the problem, the first question remains: what is the relation between the extra-
mental form and the sensible form?  
Despite this superficial reading of Avicenna that the form in his theory is the identical in 
the soul and in the extra-mental world that only their loci is different, the scholars have 
other opinions in relation to this matter. In my interpretation, I discuss that the forms are 
identical in Avicenna’s theory and in that context, Ṣadrā and Avicenna have contrasting 
theories intrinsically mainly because of the role of imaginative power over sensation. My 
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reading of Avicenna is built on a number of assumptions. First assumption is that giver 
of forms and the active intellect are identical. This entails that the forms present in the 
active intellect are the same as the forms that appear as the compounds of matter and form 
which are given by the giver of forms. The second is that the soul perceives the forms 
from the active intellect and that the soul is a passive receiver of forms. The details of this 
second assumption are that human soul is unable to retain intelligible forms. And that 
Avicenna also denies any form of unification with the active intellect.54 As a result, human 
always and only have temporal access to the intelligible forms (Turker, 2010, p. 69). This 
is the idea of connection with active intellect in contrast to unification (ittiṣāl over ittiḥād) 
(Kalin, 2010, p. 49). 
Avicenna talks about three different loci for universals (ShI, V.1, 1960, p. 196; 2005, p. 
148). The universal itself, the universality of the universal, and something to which 
universality attaches are different. This might imply that each type of universal is different 
from the other. The universal can be considered as particular, as universal and as the thing 
itself without any conditions attached to it as of universality or particularity. In the 
exclusive ontology of Avicenna it is difficult to think of a single thing being particular 
and universal at once (ShI, V.2, 1960, pp. 207ff.; 2005, p. 157).  
Moreover, Avicenna talks about activity of the imagination at the process of forms in the 
mind. Especially this idea of intrusion of imaginative powers at the process of sensation 
is close to the way Mullā Ṣadrā explains sensation. And some commentators of Avicenna 
have interpreted him in this way, such as Ṭūsī. Ṭūsī claimed that the sensible forms are 
shadowy versions of the extra-mental forms (IshRT, v.2, p. 308).  
Yet, in favour of the identity claim (I mentioned initially) between the sensible form and 
the form in the extra-mental object, Avicenna also finds unity among these three loci of 
universals. 
Avicenna also favours the idea of the passivity of soul and denies unification with the 
active intellect. It is essential for his quiddity-based (māhiyya) epistemology and ontology 
that knowledge is maintained through forms. The identity of the sensible forms and the 
forms in the soul is crucial for possibility and certainty of knowledge. So through the 
connection of active intellect the forms are received and certainty is guaranteed by the 
                                                          
54For Avicenna’s criticism of Porphry on the identity claim, see Kalin, 2010, pp. 50-56; Rizvi, 2009, p. 
91ff. 
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identity of active intellect with the giver of forms. So the idea of quiddity-based 
knowledge requires identity of forms.  
With the active intellect as the cosmological and epistemological principle, the forms are 
the main constituent and informative parts of the composite of matter and form. Thus, 
when the form is internalized, in terms of the informative value, nothing is lost from the 
essential meaning of the extra-mental object. Avicenna identifies quiddity (māhiya), 
reality (ḥaqīqa) and essence (zāt) (ShMd, I.7, p. 28). As the form is abstracted with the 
help of connection with the active intellect, the form abstracted is the same as the form in 
the extra-mental object.  
According to this interpretation, Avicenna’s sensed form is identical to the form in the 
extra-mental object and to the form in Active intellect. The sense is seen as a passive 
process of reception of forms. And as well as the extra-mental object, the connection with 
active intellect is necessary for the actualization of the reception of forms.  
So far the peripatetic definition of sensation as a change in the sense organ caused by the 
sense object is discussed with its implications on the relation of the sense object and 
sensible form. The second definition of sensation found in the DA sparks another 
dimension of this relation. That is about the possible identity of the perceivable, the 
perceiver and the perception. In terms of the relation of sensation and its organ Aristotle 
expresses the identity as: “A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated. 
The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same” (DA, 
II.12.424a24-424b19). 
Let us now further discover this second definition of sensation and the identity principle. 
The second definition given by Aristotle for “sensation” is through actualization and 
alteration: “what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object 
is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two 
interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other 
and is identical in quality with it” (DA, II.5, 418a3–6, tr. J. A. Smith; Kitāb al-nafs li-
Aristutalis, 1949, p. 63).55 The idea of assimilation is found in Arabic sources in a loyal 
manner to their Greek source (Kitāb al-nafs li-Arisṭūṭālīs, 1949, p. 63; ed. Badawi, Arisṭū 
                                                          
55See also DA, III.2, 425b27-426a1 “The activity of the sensible object and that of the sense is one and the 
same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and 
actual hearing: a man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which has a sound is not always 
sounding. But when that which can hear is actively hearing and that which can sound is sounding, then 
the actual hearing and the actual sound come about at the same time (these one might call respectively 
hearkening and sounding).” 
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fī-l-nafs, p. 44; K.RN, p. 46).  The idea of identification is continued by Muslim thinkers 
such as Kindi. However, Avicenna and Suhrawardī rejected it strongly. 
The peripatetic version of the identity principle is built in an imprinting sensation theory. 
Thus it requires separation of the extra-mental object and the perceiver at beginning of 
the process. Identity happens in the perceiver’s receiving the quality of the perceived 
object. But for Mullā Ṣadrā, the identity is not between an extra-mental object and a 
mental one. Both the sensible objects and the created forms are internal in his theory.  
Before Ṣadrā, the identification of the knower and the known is widely accepted by 
Neoplatonists and illuminationist school while Avicenna was strongly against it. 
Avicenna aside, we can still find peripatetic philosophers like Kindī, defending the 
identity thesis. Yet, the idea of change in substance caused by the sensation is originally 
Sadrian. At this point, the case of sense organ changing into the quality of sense object is 
interpreted as a kind of unification. Identification does not change the essence of the 
perceiver in Kindī: 
When [the soul] unites with the intellectual form it and the intellectual form are not 
distinct, because [the soul] is not divided, such that it would undergo alteration. 
When it unites to the intellectual form it and the intellect are one and the same thing, 
subject and object of thinking [‘āqila wa maʿqūla]. Therefore, the intellect and the 
intelligible object are one and the same thing with respect to the soul (On the 
Intellect; tr. Adamson, 2012, p. 97). 
The identity thesis of Mullā Ṣadrā comes with the stronger idea of change than the notion 
of change in peripatetic tradition: 
The human soul descends to the level of the sensible when it perceives it... [the soul] 
becomes the same (ʿayn) as the seer (bāṣira) whilst seeing, it becomes the same as 
the hearer while hearing, and the same goes on for the other senses (Shawāhid, v.1, 
p. 228). 56 
The soul is united in some kind of unification with its faculties and their tools. That 
is why the existence of anything in them is identical to its existence for the soul. 
Perception consists of the existence of the perceptible thing to the perceiver. So 
inevitably the soul becomes aware of an existence by which the body and its faculties 
become qualified, not of that which is outside of it (Asfār, p. 193-4, tr. Peerwani, p. 
143). 
                                                          
56 Translation mine.  
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As a result of the discussions mentioned above, we reach an immaterial understanding 
of change in which the soul (rather than the extra-mental object) plays an active role 
and sensation is a more essential change than a change of accidents. Mullā Ṣadrā 
presents two principles to establish this sensation theory: the substantial motion (ḥaraka 
jawharīya) and a stronger identity thesis than already proposed Aristotelian one. 
This much should suffice for the peripatetic notion of sensation in the Islamic world. 
To sum up, the theories of sensation discussed so far, the peripatetic tradition accepted 
that the process of sensation is explained as an imprint theory in which the matterless 
form is gained in the soul. In this process the soul is regarded as a receiver. Yet, this 
process is also defined as an entelechy in which the soul activates some possible inactive 
capacities of cognition. In Aristotle’s case this is explained as the sensed organ being 
potentially the sensible object and this is considered as an early formulation of identity 
thesis. The explanation of imprint theory remained in Kindī and Avicenna’s theories. 
The first one remained a follower of the identity thesis whilst the latter strongly rejected 
it. Other approaches to sensation emerged as the relational approach of Baghdādī in 
which abstraction is rejected. Suhrawardī explains sensation as a direct connection and 
as unveiling. He adopts and develops Avicenna’s idea of immaterial soul and his denial 
of identity thesis. So discussions on immateriality and passivity of the soul as well as 
the abstraction and identity during the process of sensation are the main points that will 
be shaping the theory proposed by Ṣadrā. We can now move on to the discussions as 
Avicenna’s influence is carried to the Latin world. 
Following medieval theories of sense perception after Avicenna in the Latin world, 
Aquinas is one of the main figures. He continues some Avicennan ideas in his 
psychology. However, it is not so easy to classify his philosophy with one characteristic 
alone. Some readers claim that Aquinas is a direct realist while some others think that 
he is a representationalist.57 This debate is mainly about the nature of the perceived 
forms and their relation to the extra-mental objects which are their source.  
Aquinas presents two levels of cognition: sensory cognition and intellectual cognition. 
Sensory cognition is the product of physical organs (responsible for external and 
internal senses) while the intellective cognition is not mediated by bodily organs 
                                                          
57Panaccio (2001) discusses different approaches in this sense, and the reason for labelling many 
peripatetic theories as representationalist is the idea that objects cause an imprint or image in the soul. 
Pasnau challenges the idea and claims that the strong relation between the sensation and the extra-mental 
object together with the notion of similitude require both direct realism and representationalism (Pasnau, 
1997, pp. 197, 218-9). 
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(Pasnau, 1997, p. 12). This classification recalls Avicenna’s differentiation between 
practical and theoretical intellect, and it can be assumed that the same worry about 
keeping the immaterial nature of intellectual cognition is lying behind both of these 
classifications.  
He follows the Aristotelian terminology of hylomorphism. There are forms for the 
knower as all "cognition is according to some form, which is the principle of cognition 
in the knower" (Herrera, 2005, p. 6). Thus, the cognizer has two forms, its own forms 
and the forms of the thing it is thinking about. Robert Pasnau exemplifies this as intellect 
thinking about X having its own form on one hand and the form of X (Pasnau, 1997, p. 
13). In order for knowledge to occur, there must be a similitude between the external 
and internal forms (Herrera, 2005, p. 7). However, these forms in the intellect do not 
bear all the features of the extra-mental object anymore. Although a stone outside is 
heavy and extends through space, the form in the intellect does not anymore. Here one 
important feature of Aquinas’ theory is brought about: that the ways these forms exist 
in the intellect are special. Aquinas calls this intentional or spiritual existence.  
A spiritual alteration occurs in virtue of a species’ being received in a sense organ 
or the medium in the manner of an intention, not in the manner of a natural form. 
For a species received in a sense in this way is not received in keeping with the 
existence that it has in the sensible object (Sentencia libri De anima II.14.268-73, 
tr. Pasnau, 1997, p. 14). 
In this way, all cognition is claimed to occur through these species of the cognized thing 
in the cognizer. However, it is not the forms that are present outside and inside the mind 
that creates cognition alone. According to Aquinas, these species were generated by the 
object and multiplied through the medium and the percipient. Thus, cognition was 
created in a causal chain of species (Pasnau, 1997, p. 15).  
Let’s examine his theory of vision in order to see how this chain of species links the 
extra-mental and the mind. Here we need another term which is different from forms or 
species, namely, ratio. Species communicates a ratio to determine its subject. A ratio is 
a notion opposite to natural. Although actual fire contains heat, “a species of fire that is 
received in the air will not make the air hot, nor will a species of fire received into a 
sense organ make the sense organ hot, nor will a species of fire received into the intellect 
make the intellect hot” (Herrera, 2005, p. 11-12).  
According to Aquinas, visible bodies multiply their species in the medium (air or water). 
In general, the medium potentially has species, and when a species is emitted from a 
72 
 
visible body, the medium actually has the species. Aquinas calls these less material 
emitted species in medio. And they communicate the intentio or ratio that is present in 
the hylomorphic composite. The species in medio communicates the ratio, which is the 
medium for the sense organs. Like the air or water, sense organ has potentiality to 
receive the formality in the species in the medio and when communicated, this 
potentiality changes into actuality. These received species by the sense organs are called 
sensible species. Sense organs actually sense specific things through sense species. This 
species is more immaterial than the previous. Later, the sense organ communicates the 
common sense, which is unifying sense of the data coming from different senses. The 
common sense, in return, communicates the percept to the imagination where the 
percept will be called phantasm. 
The chain of species from extra-mental realm to medium one, to sense organ, to 
common sense and to the imagination ends with the production of phantasms. It can be 
said that the role of the species is to communicate the ratio from one ontological level 
to the ontological level above it. Species loses its materiality at each level and the 
species in the intellect is the most spiritual (immaterial) being of all (Herrera, 2005, p. 
10-12).  
Causality includes only higher levels’ influence over lower levels. Accordingly, 
phantasms cannot affect the higher level beings, such as the species in the intellect. On 
the other hand, the active intellect does not contain any intentions that can cause the 
actual knowing in human intellect. In this picture, neither the phantasm nor the active 
intellect can directly cause active knowing for the human. In order to solve the problem 
Aquinas proposes a solution which reminds one of Averroes:  
In virtue of the agent intellect and by its turning to sense images [phantasms] 
(which, in turn, represent the realities of which they are images), a likeness 
[similitude] is effected in the possible intellect, but only with respect to the specific 
nature. And it is thus that species are said to be abstracted from sense images […] 
(Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 85 a. 1 ad. 3, v 12, p. 57).58 
He explains how intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms as follows: 
Sense images are illuminated by the agent intellect and further, by its power, 
species are abstracted from them. They are illuminated because sense images, 
                                                          
58Sections in [] are from Herrera’s translation Herrera, 2005, p. 13. 
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by the power of the agent intellect, are rendered apt to have intellectual 
intentions or species abstracted from them, […]  
The agent intellect, moreover, abstracts species from images, in that by its power 
we can consider specific natures without individuating conditions, and it is by 
likenesses of these natures that the possible intellect is informed (Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 85 a. 1.ad. 4, v. 12, p. 57).  
It is the sensible intentions that take place within phantasms. The same intentions exist 
in phantasms immaterially and they exist intelligibly in the intelligible species and 
subsequently in the concept. Herrera links Avicenna’s notion of three aspects of a 
quiddity with Aquinas’ theory. According to Avicenna, a quiddity (māhiyya) can be 
considered by itself, in a thing and in the mind. Herrera states that in a similar fashion, 
intentio is common among the different levels of species in Aquinas’ theory. With such 
an understanding, Aquinas finds the ability to say that the ratio is uniform among ratio 
in intellect and outside existent’s ratio: 
In addition having distinguished between the ratio and its mode of being, Aquinas 
can have the same ratio existing in various modes of being: in the form-matter 
composite, in the species in medio, in the sensible species, in the phantasm, in the 
intellect as intelligible species, and in the concept (Herrera, 2005, p. 15).  
In sum, the gap between material beings in extra-mental world and the immaterial 
nature of their knowledge in the mind is linked by Aquinas through species (both 
intelligible and sensible). The idea that a ratio can exist under various modes of being 
seems to be influenced through Avicenna. Moreover, the notion of transferring the 
intention in the imagination seems to have been adopted from Averroes. Following 
Brentano, Averroes is the main influence on Aquinas. Aquinas’ abstracted forms are 
the basis of knowledge and they constantly keep the connection between the 
intelligibles and the extra-mental objects:  
Our intellect abstracts both species from sense images –in so far as it considers the 
natures of things as universal – and yet, at the same time, understands these in 
sense images, since it cannot understand even the things from which it abstracts 
species without turning to sense images (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 85 a. 
1.ad.5, v.12, p. 57). 
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Averroes’ more spiritual explanation of sensation than the materialist readings of 
Aristotle,59 as well as the ontological contributions of Avicenna about the differentiation 
of quiddity and existence and three aspects of a quiddity, might have strengthened the 
idea of inexistence for Aquinas and thus caused the development of the 
conceptualization of intentionality by Brentano. If we search for the intentionality in 
this sense of immateriality, the origin is Averroes’ sensation rather than Avicenna. In 
terms of the ontological implications, in contrast, Avicenna seems to be more important. 
As I have mentioned earlier, I accept a loose usage of immateriality which can be 
maintained by the notion of abstraction. Following this, I do not follow Black’s strict 
classification in which only Averroes’ sensation theory is a possible candidate for 
intentionality. However, I share the general concern that Avicenna’s sophisticated 
approach to inner senses is a stronger candidate for intentionality. It must be noted still 
that if a strong notion of immateriality is going to be applied, then neither Avicenna’s 
theory of inner senses nor his sensation theory would be eligible as a candidate. This is 
because Avicenna makes it clear that the inner senses are located in the brain which 
makes them material processes. Let me now discuss the next level of abstraction after 
the external senses. Following Aristotle’s presentation, that is the imagination. 
2.4 IMAGINATION 
As implied in the evaluative paragraphs on Aristotle and immateriality of sense 
perception, a larger investigation can shed light on Brentano’s reading. Caston claims that 
Brentano’s evaluation is not limited to sense theory and intentionality seems to cover 
larger cognitive processes including all mental processes and experiences which go 
beyond sense perception and inner senses. In accordance with that, it is clear that the 
notion of intentionality requires including more of cognitive processes than phantasma 
alone. This section will deal with Aristotle’s presentation with phantasia and its reception 
after him. I will follow Fazlurrahman’s insight that the discussions on phantasia are the 
origin of Avicenna’s inner senses. The irregular cases that are neither sensation nor 
intellection and the notion of proper sense object can also be added as two central issues 
that sparked the discussions on inner senses. In order sense perception to occur, there 
must be the proper object before the sense organ. This presence must somehow cause a 
                                                          
59See Black on this difference of interpretation of Averroes’ sensation theory of Aristotle and its 
consequence in terms of the development of the notion of “intentionality”: Black, (2011) “Averroes on 
the Spirituality and Intentionality of Sensation” in In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the 
Sixth/Twelfth Century, (London: Warburg Institute), pp. 159-174. 
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change in the subject so that the organ gets active and it starts to operate. 
For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond 
the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which moves is prior 
in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less 
the case (Metaphysics Γ 1010b35-1011a2, tr. W.D. Ross). 
This explanation of sense perception is highly object-oriented and causal. This causal 
explanation then is combined with his notion of proper objects in which certain faculties 
are related to specific objects:  
Whatever is visible is colour and colour is what lies upon what is in itself visible; 
‘in itself’ here means not that visibility is involved in the definition of what thus 
underlies colour, but that that substratum contains in itself the cause of visibility. 
Every colour has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent; 
that power constitutes its very nature (DA, II.6, 418a26-b2, tr. J. A. Smith). 
The first chapters of the third book of DA are about irregular cases that are not classified 
as either sensation or intellection. The first case is the possibility of a sixth sense that is 
beyond the five external senses. The second issue is the awareness of the senses, such as 
in vision, when one sees other than the seen object we also perceive that we are 
experiencing vision. But this perception of the perception cannot be explained as a form 
of sensation. The third issue is incidental perception in which data of more than one sense 
is being analysed, combined or judged on. As each sense can only work on their proper 
sense objects, the incidental perception is not sensation. The fourth issue occurs when the 
perception occurs without any object being present.  
The irregular cases that cannot be explained with the ordinary definition of sensation force 
Aristotle to create a more comprehensive system about senses and the knowledge process, 
rather than just the operation of the five senses and their organs. The sense organs owe 
their actions to being part of a system, aisthetikon that is composed of the senses and the 
heart as their governor and centre. As a result, the ability of the sense organs to perceive 
depends upon their connection to the heart (Everson, 1997, p. 141). In terms of the fourth 
issue, Aristotle presented imagination and memory as a solution. In that sense, these two 
faculties play the in-between role between sense and intellection. ). Brentano evaluates 
the same topics but relates them to unity of the soul (Brentano, 1997, p. 58-65). He claims 
that these issues prove that the soul is not the subject of the senses and the sensory 
activities but the embodied soul is (Brentano, 1997, p. 66). Instead of accepting the 
multiplicity of the sense organs, or attributing different sense organs a common property, 
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Brentano thinks, Aristotle solved these problematic cases through a notion of unity:  
According to him [Aristotle], the sensitive part is single in its subject, just as the 
various radii of a circle meet in one centre, so the heterogeneous influences of 
sensory qualities meet finally in a single organ which alone has the special required 
for sensation (Brentano, Psychology of Aristotle, 1977, tr. George Rolf, p. 67). 
The idea of a unified system goes parallel with our very first sentences about Brentano’s 
interpretation of Aristotle, which does not radically separate any of these two sides. He 
doesn’t want to lose the link between the physical and the immaterial or the body and the 
soul or the senses and the intellect. He sees that for Aristotle, “the entire body of living 
being belongs to one and the same substance […] in man sensation is something bodily, 
and intellectual thought something mental; nonetheless, one and the same being thinks 
and senses” (Brentano, Psychology of Aristotle, 1977, tr. G.Rolf, p. 67).  
Aristotle denies sixth sense (DA III.1 424b20-21). This denial might be in order to avoid 
regression or having uncountable number of senses. As a result, the faculties of soul are 
sense, intellection and imagination (Polansky, 2007, p. 362). This rejection is continued 
in the later tradition by Avicenna, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (Mabāḥith, v.2, p. 318) and Mullā 
Ṣadrā. Ṣadrā summarizes this common stance as:  
Likewise, the nature does not transfer from the level of animality to a level above it 
except when it has perfected all that is in that level. Hence, if there was the possibility 
of another sense it would have been actualized for the animal. Since it is not 
actualized in man who is more perfect than animal qua animal, we learn that there is 
no other sense existent [in man] except these [five] (Asfār, v.8, tr. Peerwani, p. 236). 
Democritus among Presocratics is reported to claim that there are more than five senses 
and that some different species might have stronger powers of sense (Polansky, 2007, p. 
362). In Maqālāt al-islāmiyīn, Asharī mentions sixth sense in relation to God’s capacity 
to create a further sense in human and in relation to after world (Maqālāt, v.2, p. 32). 
Asharī concludes that majority of people denied the notion of a sixth sense. Despite the 
denial of a sixth sense, for Ṣadrā, a sense which is created in human for giving her the 
perception of the after world is important. Yet, he assigns imagination for this function; 
not a sixth sense. Also as extraordinary powers of sense, Ṣadrā follows Neoplatonists that 
there are higher senses as well as lower ones. Moreover, sensation can be attributed to 
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celestial spheres. As these are higher levels of existence, the power they have should be 
higher and stronger than that of animals and humans.60  
Another denial in DA is possibility of perception of common sensibles. Aristotle explains 
that among the three types of objects (accidental, common and proper), only proper 
sensibles can trigger sensation. Accordingly a sense cannot be assigned to perceive 
common sensibles (DA, III.1, 425a14-425a26).   
Further, there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensibles either. [..]for 
each sense perceives one class of sensible objects. So that it is clearly impossible 
that there should be a special sense for any one of the common sensibles (DA, III.1, 
425a14-425a26, tr. J. A. Smith). 
This does not mean that common sense is wholly rejected in Aristotle’s theory. He thinks 
incidental perception is possible because sensation is a unified system centralized by the 
heart. So, the word common in common sense does not refer to the common sensibles or 
common sensibility. It refers to the idea that the external senses have a centre and make 
up a unified system. This reference to a root and source is metaphorically described as 
common water, shared by all the houses in a street by Themistius, Peter of Spain and 
Albert the Great (Pasnau, 2004, p.188-9). In Avicenna’s theory the word common refers 
to a common destination (ShN IV.1, p. 163). 
The vague usage in Aristotle has resulted in different interpretations on what common 
sense is. It can refer to the unified system of the external senses, or to a central faculty 
that is post-sensory, one can even argue for identity of common sense with imagination. 
Aristotle does not enumerate common sense among the faculties which raises suspicion 
that it might be simply referring to the unified system of perception. In contrast to 
Aristotle, common sense is generally accepted and enlisted among the inner faculties in 
medieval ages (Wolfson, 1935, p. 86).  
The discussion on perception of perception in DA III.2 can be regarded as one of the 
functions of common sense as well. First of all perception of perception is not part of 
sensation. Every sense has its proper objects, but the senses themselves do not carry the 
properties of being proper objects for themselves. Colours are proper objects for the sight, 
but the sight itself does not have any particular colour that is sensible to the eye. Aristotle 
moreover thinks that we simultaneously know our perception, so when we see, we 
                                                          
60 Details of higher senses will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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perceive that we are seeing. In the De Anima, Aristotle claims this awareness emerges 
automatically with sense perception itself. 
Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing or hearing, it must be 
either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight. But 
the sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. 
colour: so that either there will be two senses both percipient of the same sensible 
object, or the sense must be percipient of itself. Further, even if the sense which 
perceives sight were different from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, 
or we must somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, we ought to do 
this in the first case (DA, III.2, 425b11-17, J. A. Smith). 
However, in De Somno et Vigilia (DSV), with particular example of hearing, he talks 
about awareness differently. Perceiving that one is hearing whilst s/he is hearing (or 
seeing) is related to common sense:  
Now, since every sense has something special and also something common; special, 
as, e.g., seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the auditory sense, and so on with 
the other senses severally; while all are accompanied by a common power, in virtue 
whereof a person perceives that he sees or hears (for, assuredly, it is not by sight that 
one sees that he sees; and it is not by taste, or sight, or both together that one discerns, 
and that sweet things are different from white things, but by a part common to all the 
organs of sense; for there is one sensory function, and the controlling sensory organ 
is one, though differing as a faculty of perception in relation to each genus, e.g., 
sound or colour); and since this subsists in association chiefly with the faculty of 
touch (for this can exist apart from all the other organs of sense, but none of them 
can exist apart from it—a subject of which we have treated in our speculations 
concerning the soul); it is therefore evident that waking and sleeping are an affection 
of this. This explains why they belong to all animals; for touch alone belongs to all 
(DSV 455a13-455a26, tr. J. I. Beare)61 
I could not find a spacious discussion of perception of perception in Avicenna or Ṣadrā. 
Aquinas however makes revisions on Avicenna’s discussion on common sense and 
discusses this function (perception of perception) as part of senses.  
                                                          
61 One should draw attention to two points about these sections of DSV. First of all as the book is about 
sleep and sleeplessness, how these phrases relate to sleep must be considered. Aristotle discusses in this 
book the states of being awake and sleep closely related to senses. He claims that sleep and awake-ness are 
exclusively animal states which plants cannot have. The other thing is Aristotle`s treatment of senses as a 
unity at these paragraphs. His treatment of common sense is no exception and also common sense is 
presented to be active at all stages of sense perception. This is a strong proof for those interpreters who 
claim Aristotle’s perception is a unified system.  
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It belongs to sense to have cognition of sensibles inasmuch as they are sensible. For 
we have cognition of the difference between white and sweet not only with respect 
to the what-it-is of each thing, which pertains to intellect, but also with respect to the 
different impressions on sense. This can be brought about only through a sense (tr. 
Pasnau, 2004 p. 193). 
The incidental perception and the perception of non-present objects are cases which can 
be considered related to imagination as well as common sense. Discriminating and 
combining of different senses such as white, and sweet is one example. Phantasia finds 
itself a larger place than common sense in the De Anima. Aristotle places phantasia in 
between external senses and intellect. However, whether phantasia is a faculty on its own 
or only a movement is not clear.  Chapter three of book three is dedicated to phantasia. 
Phantasia is “that in virtue of which we say that a phantasm presents itself to us. It is one 
of the faculties or dispositions in virtue of which we judge, and judge truly or falsely (DA 
III.2, 427b30).” 
Not only for the judgements, but also the problematic cases, such as dreams, where some 
sort of perception take place despite the absence of perceptual objects are accounted for 
due to phantasia. Aristotle posits “possibility of producing a false judgement” as one of 
the distinguishing features of phantasia. This is also presented in relation to common and 
accidental sensibles. Aristotle says that sense perception is always true. It is mainly 
because of the relation of proper sensibles to their sense faculties. On the other hand, the 
nonconventional relation of common and accidental sensibles creates opportunities to 
mistakes (DA III.3, 428a5-428a18).  
This capacity is where many scholars find the connection between intentionality and 
Aristotle’s psychology. In terms of the relation to discussions on intentionality, the special 
cases where the object of experience is not present in the extra-mental world such as in 
dreams, future thoughts, hopes etc. are discussed by Aristotle. He criticized his 
predecessors and claimed to have an account comprehending these special cases. 
According to Aristotle, there are changes he called phantasmata in the receivers bodies 
that represent or model the objects in question, and by undergoing these changes the 
subjects become able to have thoughts with these contents "whether or not the 
corresponding objects exist in the world" (Caston, 2007). Thus, these representations –
phantasmata-, are capable of retaining contents in the absence of objects of experience.  
Whenever one actually remembers having seen or heard or learned something, he 
perceives in addition as we have already observed that it happened before; and before 
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and after are in time.  
Accordingly, if asked, of which among the parts of the soul memory is a function, 
we reply: manifestly of that part to which imagination also appertains; and all objects 
of which there is imagination are in themselves objects of memory, while those 
which do not exist without imagination are objects of memory incidentally 
(Aristotle, On Memory 1, 450a18-25, tr. J. I. Beare).  
Phantasia acts as an imprinting of the sensory stimulation, which it replicates like a kind 
of cast and helps remember something which is no more sensible. Fortunately, the strategy 
is not restricted to memory. This is why Caston thinks phantasia can be linked to 
intentionality.  
Thought always requires a phantasma. Thanks to this ability, many features of the object 
can be ignored in the service of our purposes and we can use symbols and abstract content 
to understand one another (Caston, 2007). The relation among sense perception, phantasia 
and intellection is not so obvious in Aristotle’s philosophy. There are different places in 
his works where Aristotle attributes different features to these capacities or where he uses 
these notions to account for different puzzles about the soul. We must remember however, 
a more systematic and hierarchical relation is established among these faculties only after 
Aristotle. One can refer to phantasia and sense perception as two separate faculties and 
place phantasia in-between sense perception and intellection as most commonly 
accepted. One can also take aisthetikon as a system which possesses the capacity of 
perception together with a further capacity of phantasia (Everson, 1997, p. 158). In any 
case one must not identify sense perception with phantasia: Aristotle apparently 
attributes sense to every animal while attributing phantasia to only some of them 
(Everson, p. 185). With this in mind, it can be claimed that Aristotle’s phantasia too 
performs interpretative work over sense data. However, in this way, phantasia’s role in 
non-present data, like in dreams and memory would be excluded (Everson, 1997, p. 166). 
In his evaluation of Aristotle’s psychology, Everson suggests two meanings for Aristotle’s 
usages of phantasia. In one, phantasia is "used in order to refer to all states in which there 
is a perceptual or quasi-perceptual appearance", and in the second and more restricted 
usage, it is used for "those states in which there is a quasi-perceptual appearance". In DA 
III.3, it is used in this restricted sense (Everson, 1997, p. 184-5).  
Similar to sense perception, Aristotle’s phantasia also had been interpreted in a more 
immaterial fashion by his commentators. The Neoplatonist Simplicius understands 
phantasia as a faculty "which has mental images", and Stephanus sees it as a faculty 
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which "interprets the data of perception without recourse to mental images" (Sheppard, 
1991, p. 168). The ideas of phantasia being different from sense perception and being 
capable of falsehood as well as truth seem to be retained.62 Different activities of soul 
Aristotle writes about are considered as different faculties of the soul of different levels 
by Neoplatonists. With Neoplatonist influence, Aquinas for example, states that the vision 
is more spiritual than other senses. This idea is not found in Aristotle’s text DA (Burnyeat, 
2001, p. 130-137). Phantasia then, is considered as a higher faculty than sense perception 
(Sheppard, 1991, p. 168). Plotinus, taking this point further, claimed that there are two 
different phantasia, one lower than the other: "lower one which has phantasmata that 
reflect the impressions of sense perception" and a higher one "which uses verbal formulae 
to apprehend pure Forms" (Enneads 4.3.29-31).  
Moreover, Plotinus develops a complex theory of intellection in which he talks about two 
types of intellectual activities: discursive and noetic (Crystal, 2002, p. 180). An important 
feature of these in relation to intentionality is that any intellectual act is a process in which 
the thinking subject comes to think some kind of object (Crystal, 2002, p. 181). Discursive 
intellection acts upon the external data, and thus is not generative of its own content; it 
combines, divides and compares incoming impressions which it receives from both the 
sensory and intellectual (noetic) worlds with ones which it had previously received 
(Crystal, 2002, p. 181). As there is no direct connection between discursive intellection 
and its content, Plotinus thinks that this is where fallibility occurs from time to time in 
the intellection process. The noetic intellect, in contrast to the discursive one, is turned to 
itself. As a result, the content of noetic intellection is the One and the self (Crystal, 2002, 
184-5). 
Neoplatonism tends to accept the realm of independent forms. They shadow Aristotle in 
regarding knowledge as a kind of abstraction process of forms from things that are 
composites of form and matter. Intelligibles are treated as identical with the intellect at 
times and as prior. Thus, according to some scholars, Neoplatonists do not have 
                                                          
62“That imagination is not sense is clear from the following considerations: Sense is either a faculty or an 
activity, e.g. sight or seeing: imagination takes place in the absence of both, as e.g. in dreams. Again, 
sense is always present, imagination not. If actual imagination and actual sensation were the same, 
imagination would be found in all the brutes: this is held not to be the case; e.g. it is not found in ants or 
bees or grubs. Again, sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part false. Once more, we 
do not, when sense functions precisely with regard to its object, say that we imagine it to be a man, but 
rather when there is some failure of accuracy in its exercise—then it is either true or false. And, as we 
were saying before, visions appear to us even when our eyes are shut. Neither is imagination any of the 
things that are never in error: e.g. knowledge or intelligence; for imagination may be false” (DA, III.3 
428a5-428a18, tr. J. A. Smith). 
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intentional objects for intellection (Sorabji, 2001, 105-115).63  
Aristotle’s interpretations that is synthesized with Platonism by the efforts of 
Neoplatonists have been very influential in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna has been one of 
the important figures at the conjunction of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian interpretations. 
His ideas show signs of developing many Aristotelian ideas although reviving them 
through Neoplatonic glasses. In relation to intentionality, many scholars seem to focus on 
his estimative faculty (wahm). This emphasis on the estimative faculty (wahm) would be 
followed because it carries a link between the human mind and the extra-mental world. 
The estimative faculty is assigned to detect and create immaterial features which are not 
detectable with the ordinary senses. Here it would attract attention that immateriality 
starts with this faculty for Avicenna. And the sense organ is still material. So instead of 
dematerialized version of sense perception in Avicenna’s thought we find a sensation 
theory that is more loyal to Aristotle and more physical.  
If we search for the traces of intentionality in relation to the nature of objects, then the 
inner sense of estimation is where a less material object is seen in the picture. The object 
of cognition in estimation is the meaning (maʿna). These are not sensible to the extra-
mental sense faculties. Estimation is important for another reason. Most scholars argue 
that the estimative faculty is one of Avicenna’s innovations that dominated medieval 
discussions in both the western and eastern traditions for centuries. I think it is more 
illuminating to see Avicenna’s inner senses in their wholeness. One of the reasons is that 
it is easier to see the functions of different faculties of the soul in that kind of a 
presentation.  
Aristotle differentiates imagination and external sense in relation to their function and 
objects. Phantasia is generated by sense perception and it is different from sense 
perception in two ways: First, it can be both a true and a false judgement, while sense 
perception is always true. Second, it can function when the object of perception is absent 
as well as when it is present, while sense perception is possible only with the presence of 
object. Phantasia, moreover, is related to animal movements. The desire of an animal to 
get closer to something useful for the animal is with the help of phantasia (DA 427a17-
19; DA 431a15; Watson, 1982, p. 103, Wolfson, p. 89). Avicenna has even a more 
developed system of differentiation.  
                                                          
63I will argue further in the next chapter that these evaluations are not necessarily accurate.  
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Avicenna’s separation of the inner senses is not arbitrary. As Deborah Black successfully 
points out, Avicenna tries to consider different functions while also considering different 
types of objects. In Ishārāt, he says that every faculty has one function and furthermore, 
every faculty has one organ acting as a tool for this function (Ishārāt, v.2, p. 342). 
Accordingly he differentiates between receptive and retentive functions according to their 
work on forms and intentions/meanings (maʿānī) (ShN I.5, p. 43). The soul can only 
perform one activity at a time (Black, p. 10; Kaukua and Kukkonen, 2007, p. 101), one 
faculty cannot be retaining and receiving those that comes through the external senses 
simultaneously (ShN V.4, p. 231-2). McGinnis develops Black’s approach even further 
and talks about inner senses as a result of three principles of: 1. Differentiation between 
different cognitive objects, 2. Between receptive and retentive powers, 3. Between active 
and passive powers (McGinnis, 2010, p. 111-3). This idea of differentiation requires 
multiplicity of some sort for the soul. As I discussed in previous chapters, Avicenna’s 
case is a separation of different parts of soul in their function and nature. This is a radical 
dualist separation of material and immaterial parts similar to Plotinus’ dualism of noetic 
and dialectic soul. Ṣadrā reports a group that argued against differentiation of senses as it 
implied multiplicity of senses. In this case separate senses entail separate selves and this 
is opposite of unity of the soul. Interestingly Avicenna is quite strict in both differentiation 
of senses and unity of the soul. Another interesting point is similar issues come up as 
these two are being discussed and Avicenna seems to be taking two different stances in 
accordance with the topic being about unity and differentiation. He should be taking the 
soul as some sort of unity that is capable of some kind of multiplicity. In Ṣadrā’s case we 
find that he focuses on the monist nature of the soul by emphasizing the notion of unity 
of the soul and the fact that the soul is the real knower, perceiver, mover etc. whilst in 
other theories these functions are primarily related to the organs or faculties.  
To sum up, behind Avicenna’s detailed classification of inner senses, there are three types 
of variables. The objects of the sense can be either a form or a meaning, it can be a passive 
faculty and merely receiving or it can be an active one and works further on the material 
received by another faculty. The main point is that no two functions are performed by one 
faculty and every faculty has a body organ (Ishārāt, v.2, p. 342). 
Regarding the proofs I will only mention the proofs for the common sense in order to 
showcase the nature of his argumentation. I previously mentioned two points for the 
necessity of common sense stated in Avicenna’s texts. Mullā Ṣadrā repeats and discusses 
84 
 
the arguments used in support of proving the existence of common sense. He lists three 
of these in Asfār. These proofs also give hints about the functions of the common sense.  
The first argument focuses on the sense data and judgements on that data coming from 
different senses. The ability to say ‘something white is sweet’ requires some faculty that 
goes beyond the five senses; it must be different from the intellect according to these 
philosophers because it functions on the sense data. Thus there must be a faculty that 
exists and different from the five senses as well as from the intellect (Asfār, v.8, p. 243). 
Ṣadrā finds this argument weak, because judgement is a function of the intellect in 
humans. It is the faculty of estimation (imagination) in animals that functions in the 
similar cases.  
The second argument in support of common sense is our ability to connect particular data 
to universal quiddities. For Ṣadrā, the idea of the intellect’s perception of particulars 
through the help of sense organs is important. In the second proof the assumption is based 
on the dual nature of epistemology that separates particular data from the universal data 
dramatically. It implies that the functions and abilities that operate these functions are 
different as well. Whilst Mullā Ṣadrā rejects such dualist implications and assumes soul 
can know particulars as well as universals; he finds this argument weak too. The case of 
rain-drops and seeing them as a line is another example used to make a similar claim. 
Mullā Ṣadrā defends his point by proposing that intellect acts on the data of the vision 
and mends the image and the result would be the soul’s perception of a line that does not 
exist in the extra mental world or that is not before the eye to be seen (Asfār, v.8, p. 244-
247; Ishārāt, v.2, p. 332-3). 
The third argument, which Mullā Ṣadrā thinks is the strongest of the three arguments, is 
that humans perceive forms which do not exist in the extra-mental world, or they can 
dream about things that do not exist in extra-mental reality (Asfār, v.8, p. 248). What 
makes this argument stronger is also the weakness of the refuting arguments. Two 
arguments set to objects this third argument rest on the vision as an imprint or the brain 
being the faculty. Since Mullā Ṣadrā does not accept these assumptions, the arguments 
are not acceptable for him. 
Similar cases to the ones argued in Avicenna’s proof for differentiation will reappear in 
Ṣadrā’s texts as proof of the unity of the soul. This is one of the contraries in Avicenna’s 
body of writing that he argues for the differentiation of faculties together with unity of 
the soul. The discrepancy is observable when his sentences are compared in regards to 
similar cases. He discusses the role of bodily connection of inner senses when 
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differentiation is the case and he argues for independence of soul from the body when the 
topic is the unity and immateriality of the soul. 
Ṣadrā reads Avicenna favouring his arguments on unity over differentiation. Not only a 
developed idea of differentiation of senses, but also Avicenna’s psychology gives a 
developed picture of human faculties relating human to a higher principle, active intellect.  
Similar to Aristotle, abstraction is the main feature for Avicenna’s epistemology: “All 
perception is but the abstraction by the percipient subject of the form of the perceived 
object in some manner” (Najāt VII, ed. Fakhry, p. 207, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 38). However, 
Avicenna presents intellect from two aspects showing that sources for human knowledge 
are twofold. 
It is as if our soul have two faces: one – [which must not be receptive at all to effects 
to a bodily nature]–must be directed towards the body and another aspect must be 
directed toward the higher principles and it must always be ready to receive from 
what is in There in the Higher Plane and to be influenced by it (Najāt IV, ed. Fakhry, 
p. 203, tr. Fazlurrahman p. 33).64  
Avicenna’s dualist epistemology is important. Avicenna’s linking the extra-mental 
physical with a nonphysical higher realm to human knowledge is a nice example of his 
combination of Aristotle and Plato.  
In terms of Aristotle’s phantasia, Deborah Black points out an interesting debate between 
Avicenna and Averroes. Averroes sees Avicenna’s estimation faculty as "a superfluous 
addition to the authentically the Aristotelian faculty (phantasia)" (Black, 2000, p. 59). 
Averroes says “[Avicenna] distinguished himself from the rest of philosophers by 
assuming in the animal another faculty than the imaginative, which he calls estimative 
faculty” (cit. Kaukua, 2007, p. 27, Tahāfut). Interestingly, for a needless addition, 
estimative faculty has a quite central and important place in Avicenna’s psychology. The 
notion of estimation is used to explain human and animal cognition where the cognitive 
action is pre-intellectual; but also more complex than merely sensible (Black, 2000, p. 
59). This debate slightly reflects the difference of transmission lines where Avicenna 
follows a tradition that reads Aristotle with Neoplatonist lenses and Averroes tries to 
revive Aristotle without Neoplatonist tendencies.  
                                                          
64This recalls the discussions on the nature and change of the soul among Neoplatonists. Avicenna seems 
to be willing to keep both the features of changeability and stability and immateriality of the soul with 
this twofold understanding. Note to the translation: Sections marked with“[]” belong to Khalidi 
translation, 2005, p. 28-9. 
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What Avicenna does with Aristotle’s imagination seems to be to use the faculty as an 
umbrella notion that covers different senses under itself (Kaukua, 2007, p. 28). This new 
comprehensive notion can be divided into a number of inner faculties, such as estimation, 
imagination, memory, common sense and cogitative imagination. 
In Avicenna’s hierarchy of different faculties of human soul, in which each lower faculty 
serves the upper one acquired intellect is the governor of all other intellects. After that 
actual intellect follows. Habitual intellect serves actual intellect while habitual intellect 
serves it. After them, comes estimation.  
[…] and estimation is served by two faculties, one preceding it and one subsequent 
to it. The faculty that is subsequent to it is the one that preserves what it conveys, 
and the faculty that precedes it includes all the animal faculties. Then the faculty 
of imagination is served by two faculties that serve it in different ways, for the 
appetitive faculty serves it by carrying out its commands because it impels it to 
move, while the faculty of representation serves it by being receptive to the 
combination and separation of its forms. 
These two faculties rule over two groups. The faculty of representation is served 
by phantasy, which is in turn served by the five senses. As for the appetitive 
faculty, it is served by the locomotive faculty that pervades and muscles, and this 
is where the animal faculties end. Then the animal faculties as a whole are served 
by vegetative faculties, first and foremost the reproductive faculty […] (tr. by 
Muhammad Ali Khalidi, 2005, p. 32-3; Najāt VI, ed. Fakhry, p. 206; tr. 
Fazlurrahman, p. 37) 
Faculties related to the vegetative soul are followed by animal soul’s faculties. Inner 
senses follow the five external senses, ending with the estimative faculty at the highest 
level.  
According to DA I.5, first comes the phantasia, this is the common sense which collects 
the forms "imprinted (munṭabiʿa) in the five senses" (ShN, I.5, p. 44). Secondly comes 
imagery, the formative faculty that uses what common sense receives from the five senses, 
so that the images retained remains in it after the disappearance of those sensible (Kaukua, 
2007, p. 39-40; ShN IV.1, p. 165). Avicenna presents one and the same compositive 
imagination in the animal and the human soul. The manifestations of imagination differ 
according to the controlling faculty, whether controlled by estimation or by the reason. 
Thus, retaining images, receiving intentions and keeping them in the memory and finally 
composition and division of the received forms and intentions become possible as a result 
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of the cooperation of these faculties (Black, 2000, p. 60; Avicenna, ShN I.5, p. 43-46). 
In order to understand the cooperation of these senses, consider someone seeing 
something yellow and judging that the thing is honey and sweet (Hasse, 2000, p. 137). 
The thing can be tasted and thus confirmed to be honey and sweet by the sense-data. But 
the judgement rests not on such a probable sense-data, judgement is made without 
"perceiving ... at the time of the judgement". Here, the actual data on sensing yellowness, 
intention ‘honey’ is "retrieved from memory by compositive imagination" (Kaukua, 2007, 
p. 55). A holistic theory of the internal senses is needed for this kind of an explanation: 
the former experiences about honey must have come together with some data about 
sweetness and yellowness, and then going under division and honey, sweet, yellow, and 
so on is separated. Eventually, later when yellowness is sensed the former combination is 
called back. And the yellow thing is judged to be honey.  
Falsehood comes to the picture with the inner senses as well. In ShN IV.3 Avicenna 
explains this as follows: "when a man happens to find honey abominable because of its 
similarity to gall. Because estimation judges that it has the same qualities as that and the 
soul follows this estimation even though the intellect would deny it" (Hasse, 2000, p. 
137). It appears that error occurs when there is combination of concepts, or previous data 
or judgement is in the picture. In the other cases, soul is passive and there is no space for 
error. The judgement is made by the faculty of estimation. Estimation is the highest and 
ruler faculty for non-human animals (Black, 2000, p.61). As the example shows for 
humans, estimation can sometimes come opposite to the intellect. In cases like the one 
stated above, estimation can be an impediment to rational act and wrong judgements. We 
can think of other cases in which estimation and intellect works in cooperation as well. 
In this case, human beings can grow a deepened understanding of the physical world 
around them (Black, 2000, p. 62). Falsehood cannot emerge from sense perception as 
Aristotle’s understanding of sense is that it is infallible. And it cannot be from the higher 
realms as that is realm of perfections. In the middle stage human soul is active and 
combines, analyses and reshapes the data coming from sense data. So it should be through 
imagination that falsehood is explained. This will be important later when the discussion 
comes to fictional beings.  
In sum, Hasse can be followed in his remarks on that Avicenna’s faculty of estimation is 
unique to Avicenna and he most probably took some of Aristotle’s remarks on phantasia 
as a starting point (Hasse, 2000, p. 139). Moreover, he refined Aristotle’s theory of soul 
as he distinguished between five internal and five external senses (Knuuttila, 2008, p. 8-
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9) which combined Aristotle with Galenic medicine (as seen in the change of the centre 
of the perceptual system from heart to brain) (Hasse, 2000, p. 138, fn. 338) and with 
Neoplatonist influence.65  
Apart from what Avicenna does with estimative faculty and inner senses, in order to avoid 
a one dimensional presentation of Avicenna’s relation to mental states, his abstraction 
theory and explanation of intellection should be examined too. 
Avicenna tells us that the intellect is a common name (ishtirāk al-ism) used for two 
faculties of human rational soul: the theoretical and the practical faculty. The practical 
faculty has dominance on the bodily faculties, so it is not affected by them, but rather 
bodily faculties should be affected by the practical (D’Ancona, 2008, p. 55). Since the 
soul is immaterial by its source, it is the practical faculty which is in contact with the 
body. Practical faculty is responsible of movements and is related to the animal faculty of 
appetite, to the animal faculty of imagination and estimation, and to itself.  
It is related to the animal faculty of appetite in that dispositions originate there 
that are specific to humans, which dispose it quick to actions and affections, such 
as timidity, shame, laughter, crying, and similar things. It is related to the animal 
faculty of imagination and estimation on so far as it uses it to discover measures 
pertaining to the realm of generation and corruption, and to discover the human 
arts. It is related to itself in that, along with the theoretical intellect, it generates 
the commonly held opinions, for example that lying is repugnant (Najāt IV, ed. 
Fakhry, p. 202-3, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 32). 
With its dualist approach to different parts of soul on the other side the theoretical faculty 
deals with only the immaterial or higher realms. “[T]he theoretical faculty […] is the 
faculty that is related to the realm that lies above it, being affected by it, benefiting from 
it and receiving from it” (Najāt IV, ed. Fakhry, p. 202-3, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 32). Different 
parts of soul have different functions and this requires that each one has different nature 
as well, some more material than the other. It equally requires that some are active and 
some others are passive faculties.  
It is as though each one of our souls has two aspects: one aspect –which must not 
be receptive at all to effects of a bodily nature-, must be directed towards the body 
and another aspect must be directed towards the higher principles. This latter 
aspect must always be receptive to what lies there and be affected by it (Najāt IV, 
                                                          
65For details of Avicennan centralization of brain as the central organ for inner senses, see Pormann, 
2013, pp. 91-108. 
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ed. Fakhry, p. 202-3, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 32). 
As being totally immaterial, theoretical faculty has a tendency to be imprinted with the 
universal forms that are abstracted from matter. If the forms are not universal forms 
already the abstraction process from any material attachments is supposed to be carried 
by the lower faculties.  
The function of the theoretical faculty is to receive the impressions of the 
universal forms abstracted in themselves, it simply receives them; if not it makes 
them immaterial by abstraction, so that no trace whatever of material attachments 
remains in them (Najāt, V, ed. Fakhry, p. 203-4, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 33).  
The interesting point is that the idea of imprint is used even for immaterial stages of 
knowledge. Intellect as a theoretical faculty has two aspects, one aspect in relation to what 
is below it and the second in relation to higher principles. This is reminiscent of the 
exclusive explanation of Plotinus for the intellective faculty as noetic and discursive. 
Moreover, this is related to the transition of DA. Adamson points to how a stronger 
separation between rational soul and lower parts of soul is drawn in DA Paraphrase 
(Adamson, 2001, p. 228; Paraphrase, 117-120).  
The rational soul does not perceive, in its essence, anything of the intelligibles, 
except through the meditation of the senses and the imagination. I would even go 
so far as to say that it will only have an intelligible form after this form has been 
sensible or imaginable (Risāla fī al-nafs, tr. Kaukua, 2007, p.30). 
The rejection of interaction for the higher part of soul with bodily functions requires a 
new account. And accordingly theoretical faculty’s operation of abstraction is explained 
through levels. 
It seems that every apprehension involves acquiring the form of what is 
apprehended. If what is apprehended is material then it is simply the acquisition 
of a form abstracted from matter in some way. However, the types of abstraction 
differ and their degrees are varied (tr. Muhammad Ali Khalidi, 2005, p. 28). 
Avicenna is a synthesiser of Plato and Aristotle and his psychology and epistemology 
represents this combination. The contents at different levels of knowledge are brought 
about by abstraction from the outside world as well as the reception of intelligible forms 
from a higher world, the active intelligence. When we follow the ideas of inner senses 
after Avicenna, Suhrawardī is another important figure. 
Suhrawardī’s explanation of inner senses is closely related to theory of lights and his idea 
of the place of human in the hierarchy of lights. Similar to Averroes (with different 
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intentions, though) he rejects the strict classification of inner senses. It is previously stated 
that everything comes out of lights and every corporeal individual is preceded by its 
luminous species that comes out of lights. Human beings, as part of the corporeal world 
have the most perfect constitution (ḤI, p. 131). 
From one of the dominating lights, the incorporeal light that is the controlling 
light in the human fortresses is brought into being for the human –the most 
perfect- constitution. That dominating light is the lord of the talisman of the 
rational species. It is Gabriel –upon him be peace! - the proximate father among 
the mighty lords of the Kingdom of dominance. It is “Ravan-Bakhsh” the Holy 
Spirit, the bestower of knowledge and confirmation, the giver of life and virtue. 
This emanated light is the managing light, the “commander of humanity”, that 
which calls itself “I” (ḤI, tr. Walbridge and Ziai, p. 132).  
Remembering lights’ pure nature, they need a mediate to rule over the barriers and that 
mediacy is the spirits:  
[T]he commanding light controls the body by its mediacy and gives it light. The 
propitious light that the commanding light takes from the dominating lights is 
reflected upon it from this spirit. Sense and motivation occur by that which ascends 
to the brain and is moderate.it accepts the luminous sovereignty and returns to all 
the organs (ḤI, tr. Walbridge and Ziai, p. 135). 
Just as the human is explained in the frames of the light hierarchy, her faculties are no 
different. Suhrawardī posits every faculty of the human body as a shadow of what is in 
the commanding light (ḤI, p. 139). This fits well with the picture drawn about vision. 
Just because all faculties are shadows of the commanding light, the actions of these 
faculties are in actuality supposed to be referred to the light. That is why it is the light 
that really sees when human sees but not the bodily organ, i.e. eye. Suhrawardī’s 
immaterial account of sensation shows similarity to Ṣadrā’s general theory of sensation.  
Suhrawardī revises the division of imagination that Avicenna offers (ḤI, p. 136). 
Suhrawardī criticises Avicenna for his division of different inner senses such as 
common sense, imaginative faculty and estimative faculty. Instead he suggests that they 
are one and the same faculty which bears all three functions:  
The truth is that these three [referring to estimative faculty, imagination and 
imaginative faculty] are a single thing and a single faculty, named differently 
depending on how they are considered (ḤI, tr. Walbridge and Ziai, p. 138).  
91 
 
It must however be noted that the statement above does not remain the same in some of 
his other books where he shows more loyalty to Avicennan classification of five inner 
senses. In Hayākil, Suhrawardī follows Avicenna’s scheme, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (ḤI) 
this loyal classification cannot be found (Roxanne Marcotte, 2000, p.158). Suhrawardī’s 
passive imagination in Hayākil is still the storehouse for the common sense. Active 
imagination is identified with the cogitative faculty, thus functions of combining, 
separating and gathering meaning together with judging are contained. Estimative 
faculty is not in relation with cogitative faculty. Marcotte summarizes this change as 
Suhrawardī giving the positive function of Avicenna’s estimative faculty to the active 
imagination and giving the negative functions of Avicenna’s active imagination to 
estimative faculty (Marcotte, 2000, p. 159). 
In HI Suhrawardī first reduces different inner faculties to one main representative and 
imaginative faculty and he reduces this to a rational faculty that unites all (Marcotte, 
2000, p. 160). Eventually, one single faculty of representation bears Avicennan 
representative and passive imagination, faculty of estimation and active and 
compositive imagination (Marcotte, 2000, p. 161).  
Because of the existence of some situations where intellect contradicts this 
representational faculty (similar to the situations where Avicenna talks about the 
estimative faculty contradicting intellect), Suhrawardī distinguishes this faculty from 
the ruling light. This point in his theory sounds a little contradictory. How can the 
faculty differ from its origin, i.e. the ruling light?  
In relation to the discussions about materiality, the presentation of Suhrawardī’s theory 
so far can be summed as well. The imaginative faculty derives from rational soul, and 
is away from any materiality. The products of this faculty (especially meanings) are 
immaterial as a result (Roxanne Marcotte, p. 165). Despite the importance of 
Suhrawardī’s theories on development of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas, the main sources for 
Ṣadrā’s theory of inner senses seem to be Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. I will discuss 
Rāzī’s influence when I present Ṣadrā’s psychology. This is mainly because he quotes 
and benefits from the material Rāzī maintained in Mabāḥith generously. Suhrawardī’s 
main influence appears to be his idea of hierarchy of lights which Ṣadrā uses to explain 
the ontological gradation of wujūd.  
Discussion of imagination will not be complete without mentioning one name that made 
khayāl the centre of his cosmological explanation. Ibn al-ʿArabī is this name, and he is 
important with his idea of wujūd and khayāl especially when Mullā Ṣadrā is considered. 
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Ibn al-ʿArabī’s theoretical mysticism is based on a peculiar study of human nature, and 
its goal is to track the path to perfect human thus we can say, his theory is among the 
prominent psychology theories of the medieval ages. In terms of explanation of 
imagination as a faculty, and in terms of proving mental existence Mullā Ṣadrā gives a 
long quote from him (Asfār, v.1, p. 317-8).  
Human beings, according to this have this unique capacity to create imaginations through 
their imaginative faculties. Nonetheless these images are dependent on the activity of the 
mind. Thus; they do not have continuous existences. Moreover, they have no existence 
whatsoever outside the imaginer’s mental world. Ability to create imaginations is 
common to every human (Fuṣūṣ, p. 102). “Through imagination (wahm), every human 
may create in the faculty of his imagination (quwwa khayālih) what has no being except 
in it [the faculty]. This is common to all humans” Different from the ordinary people, the 
wise person who purified his heart (or the gnostic) can use this faculty to create 
imaginations outside of the faculty.  
The mystic (ʿārif) creates through his spiritual concentration (ḥimma) what has being 
in extra-mental reality to act as a locus for his concentration; indeed, his 
concentration continues to sustain it and support the perpetuation of what it created. 
When oblivion from preserving what he created overcomes the mystic, that created 
thing becomes non-existent, unless the mystic commands all planes of existence in 
which case such oblivion does not arise since at all times he is present on some plane 
or another (Fuṣūṣ, tr. R.W.J. Austin, p. 102-3). 
However, this existence, too, is non-continuous. Similar to the imaginations of the 
ordinary people, it is dependent on the gnostic and it fades when the gnostic falls into 
ignorance. 
When the mystic who has such a command creates something through his spiritual 
concentration, it is manifest in his form on every plane. In this case, the forms 
maintain each other so that if the mystic is absent on a certain plane or planes which 
present on another, all the forms are maintained by the form on the plane to which 
he is not oblivious. Neither the commonality of people nor the elite are ever 
completely oblivious (Fuṣūṣ, tr. R.W.J. Austin, p. 102-3). 
Through estimation (wahm)—every human has the ability to create imaginations in their 
powers of imagination (khayāl). He also seems to talk about power of imagination as a 
kind of storehouse of sensible forms and wahm as the action that carries the abstraction 
of forms.  
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He seems to be attempting to answer the ancient question about how human beings 
manage to know extra mental realities and create forms, by presenting the notion of 
isthmus (also barzakh, some kind of in-betweenness). Imagination is this kind of a 
mediator where different kinds of worlds (sensible- intelligible in our case) can meet but 
not interact with one another. At this point, again, some continuity with Peripatetics can 
be claimed: Ibn al-ʿArabī follows their hylomorphic explanation and embraces the 
problem of how one manages to extract forms from the extra-mental world of form-matter 
combinations. 
With this question in mind, we need to remember the different types of imagination as 
part of the answer. Imagination carries two features through all these levels of barzakh 
and creativity. How human carries creativity is also linked with the interaction between 
different levels of imagination. As Ibn al-ʿArabī claims, they don’t exclude but 
comprehend each other; human creates through contact with absolute imagination.  
This interaction among levels is the key to understand human imagination being 
characteristically creative besides being a medium. Ordinary imagination seems to be 
explained through the mediatory character of imagination to use the term of it being a 
barzakh. Barzakh makes it possible for new characteristics to come to existence. One of 
the points in Ṣadrā’s philosophy under the influence of Ibn al-ʿArabī is this idea of in-
betweenness. Ṣadrā’s innovative idea of copulative being (wujūd rābiṭī) is explained with 
a similar function of isthmus-ness. Another point is the notion of human as barzakh. And 
lately barzakh is useful to explain in-betweenness of imagination (between sensation and 
intellection) dependent on in-betweenness of human beings. In the case of human 
imagination they are the places where knowledge starts to become possible as matter-less 
forms can be produced. In the case of gnostic; they actually can create outside the 
imagination too. This is through interaction with absolute imagination.  
Imagination is a barzakh, and its nature of being in-between also makes its products have 
different features at the same time. In dreams for example, dreamer experiences seeing 
corporeal things which are not corporeal. Ibn al-ʿArabī assumes a realm for these things 
that are bound between senses and intelligence. It is also through imagination that spirits 
establish contact with bodies. “The objects he sees possess corporeal forms, yet they dwell 
not in the world of corporeal bodies, but in that imaginal world which is the 
soul"(Chittick, 1989, p. 115). Similarly, meanings are realities from intelligible world; 
imagination can take meanings and give these meanings to sensory forms. Although both 
meanings are free from any matter and sensory forms are dependent on matter, the product 
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of imagination can mix different features of these two: “Part of the reality of imagination 
is that it embodies and gives form to that which is not a body or a form, for imagination 
perceives only in this manner. Hence it is a sensation not manifest and bound between the 
intelligible and the sensory (Futūhāt III.377.11; tr. Chittick, 1998, p. 332). 
These created images of human mind maintain a reality of their own; thus, there are three 
levels of known things (maʿlūmāt): rational, sensory and imaginal. The first is the level 
of meanings disengaged from substrata. Rational faculties receive the meanings directly 
(bi tarīq al-bidāya). The sensory level is perceived by the senses. And the inbetween level 
is perceived by neither. “They are meanings that assume shape (tashakkul) in sensory 
forms; they are given form by the form-giving faculty (al-quwwa al-muṣawwira), which 
serves the rational faculty” (Futūhāt II 66.14, tr. Chittick, 1989, p.115). 
How does imagination find the power to have contradictory forms of meanings and 
senses? The answer is given through God’s divine name ‘Strong’; that imagination 
possesses the strength to combine the two; hence he says it manifests the divine name the 
“Strong” (al-qawī) (Futūhāt IV 325.2).  
Imagination is neither existent nor non-existent, neither known nor unknown, 
neither negated nor affirmed. For example a person perceives his form in the 
mirror. He knows for certain that he has perceived his form in one respect and 
not perceived his form in another respect [...] he cannot deny he has seen his 
form and he knows that his form is not in the mirror, nor is it between himself 
and the mirror [...] hence he is neither a truth teller nor a liar in his words "I saw 
my form, I didn’t see my form" (Futūhāt I304.16; tr. Chittick, 1989, 118).  
In terms of the truth value of those sentences about images, the same kind of in-
betweenness applies. Propositions regarding imaginations can be said to be neither true 
nor wrong as the object of imagination is neither from one dimension or the other of its 
two faces. 
One question remains: Why is imagination important for human beings? Firstly, when it 
is regarded as a faculty for human beings, the in-betweenness of imagination is what 
makes the passage from the sensory to the intelligible possible. Moreover, imagination is 
important for the metaphysical and mystical abilities of human beings and can maintain 
human beings a creative power. It gives human being a reach beyond the physical 
realities, even the realities about after life. Imagination gives gnostic the power to affect 
extra-mental realities but in such a way that is observable to only other gnostics. The 
creative powers both as the common imagination and gnostic’s ability are made possible 
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through God’s imagination. Ibn al-ʿArabī presents different levels of imagination not in 
an exclusive but in an interactive way. This interaction gives human imagination the 
power to reach beyond the physical and the ability to create.  
One important issue in Ibn al-ʿArabī’s presentation of imagination is how he relates this 
faculty to other senses and to reality. His approach is that dreams and the faculty of 
imagination give us humans a better chance to be connected to the reality better than the 
senses do. Dreams as part of imagination are important for the human beings as they 
witness reality of the things: "Dreams are key lock to unlock mystery of cosmic ambiguity 
and the constant transformation of existence. New creation is never more clearly 
witnessed than in the world of dreams [...]” (Futūhāt, III 198.23) Accordingly, the nature 
of the cosmos is to be verified truly by the knower as it is a form of imagination, and it 
needs interpretation like a dream needs interpretation. Moreover, the spectrum of 
imagination is not restricted with this world: not only the reality of this world as it is 
manifested to us now but also reality of the barzakh after death can be perceived through 
capabilities of imaginative power (Chittick, 1998, p. 337).  
Ibn al-ʿArabī talks about different sense organs and attributes an in-between situation for 
imagination too. What happens in the process of sleep and dreams is imaginative power 
overcoming the animal spirit. Thus although an observer sees a sleeping person, the 
sleeper manages to experience herself in different realms, under different conditions, e.g. 
a ruler, in fear, so on although she is a teacher lying safely in her bed: 
God appointed for human spirits natural instruments, such as the eye, the ear, the 
nose, and the palate. He placed within them faculties that He called “hearing”, 
“eyesight”, and so forth. He created for these faculties two faces, a face toward the 
sensory things, the world of the witnessed; and a face toward the Presence of 
Imagination. He made the presence of imagination an all-embracing locus, more all-
embracing than the world of the witnessed. Within this Presence, He assigned a 
faculty named “imagination” to many faculties, such as form giving, reflection, 
memory, fantasy, reason, and so on. Through these faculties the human soul 
perceives all the objects of knowledge given by realities of these faculties.  
Through eyesight’s face toward the world of the witnessed, the soul perceives all 
sensory things and lifts them up to imagination. It preserves them in imagination 
through the preserving faculty [memory] after form giving faculty has given form to 
them. The form giving faculty may take affairs from diverse existent things, all of 
which are sensory and compound from them an alien shape, the totality of which the 
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soul has never seen in the sensory domain. However, there is no part of it that it has 
not seen.  
When human beings are sleep, eyesight gazes by means of the face that it has toward 
the world of imagination [...] (Ibn al-ʿArabī Futūhāt, III.38.12, tr. Chittick, 1989, p. 
338; cf Asfār, v.8, p. 248).  
Ibn al-ʿArabī’s explanation of imagination is highly influential on Ṣadrā. His alternative 
explanation of intentionality is built on the creative capacity in human which reflects Ibn 
al-ʿArabī’s insights on ḥimma. The two faces of sense are reminiscent to Ṣadrā’s 
immaterial explanation of sensation. The discussion on the faculty of imagination 
concludes with Ibn al-ʿArabī’s notion. 
Returning to Avicenna’s classification the next faculty is the mutakhayyila. This faculty 
functions in relation to either intellect (in humans) or estimation (in animals). This is one 
of the active faculties and it combines different forms and meanings with each other or it 
separates them. One innovation of Avicenna is claimed to be the next faculty, which is 
the estimation. This faculty perceives the particular meanings which are not observable 
or sensible: 
We judge on sensibles with meanings we do not sense, they are either [I] not sensible 
in their nature or [II] they are sensible; however we don’t sense them at the time of 
the judgement. [I] is such as hostility and inferiority that the sheep perceives from 
the form of the wolf, and all the meanings that alienates the sheep from the wolf, and 
the consent that the sheep receives from its owner, and all the meanings that makes 
the sheep love the owner. 
And these are cases for the animal soul, the sense doesn’t lead to any of these cases, 
or anything like these. Thus, the faculty that perceives these is a different faculty and 
it is called estimation (wahm).  
II such as we see something yellow and we judge that it is honey and it is sweet, but 
we do not derive it from tasting it at the time. This is from the sensible kind however, 
the judgement itself is not sensible apparently (ShN IV.1, p. 166). 
The last of the senses, the retentive and the recollective faculty works in relation to 
estimative faculty. Memory is one of the basic three inner senses Aristotle mentions in 
DA. This is different from sense perception because sensation is for the present whilst 
memory is related to the past. In the sense that its object is not present and at the present 
time, it is similar to imagination. Memory too, is related to imprints in the soul. Though, 
Aristotle differentiates between different types of imprints and as a result, the imprints 
97 
 
caused by sensation are different from those of memory. Aristotle makes it clear that 
memory is a physical faculty. When the agent is in movement the memory becomes. 
When the person is old, the memory becomes weak due to its relation to the body. Similar 
to imagination, memory is found in animals. This shows that it is different from the 
intellect as animals cannot possess intellect (De Memoria et Reminiscentia/ MR 449b4-
451a1). The material nature of the faculty of memory continues in Avicenna’s theory. For 
Avicenna, memory retains what the estimative faculty perceives of non-sensible 
intentions existing in individual sensible objects (Najāt III, ed. Fakhry, p. 201-2, tr. 
Fazlurrahman, p. 31; ShN IV.1, p.169). Two names refer to this faculty, it is named ḥāfiẓa 
because of its preserving of what is in it; and it is mutadhakkira for its spread of preparing 
/capacity them to prove (ShN IV.1, p. 167 -8). (ShN, IV.3, p. 182ff.)Avicenna makes 
memory the storehouse of the meanings (maʿānī) whilst it was more materially described 
by Aristotle as it deals with imprintings.  
Now, with the faculty of memory, our quest for the intentionality-related terms ends. Now 
it is time to give a quick summary of the findings and list the main concepts that will be 
further used in the next chapter both with a relation to Mullā Ṣadrā and intentionality. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this historiography chapter, I tried to trace back Brentano’s intentionality thesis on the 
one hand and detect pieces for reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā’s possible intentionality 
thesis. The chapter is divided into three main sections as three sections on the soul, sense 
perception, and imagination. The question of intentionality concerns how people relate to 
the extra-mental world. In terms of providing the pool of terms common among many 
ancient and medieval philosophers, Aristotle’s DA is the centre of most of the discussions. 
His definition of the soul as the perfection/actualization and form of the body is 
affirmatively developed after him by some and criticised by some others with a more 
immaterial understanding of the soul. Separability and immateriality of the soul is also 
related to the cognition processes and production of immaterial objects in the mind. One 
of the interpretations of Neoplatonic approaches to human soul and their cognitive 
theories in terms of intentionality discussions is as such: When human is regarded as 
micro cosmos and knowledge is seen as some kind of recollection, this creation is turned 
into a self-revelation of the cosmos within. Another important idea discussed by 
Neoplatonists is the substantial change of the soul.  
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In terms of the cognitive processes, I mainly focused on the sense and imaginative 
faculties. This is because of the way many scholars constructed their intentionality 
historiographies. According to these, the common candidates for intentionality are sense 
perception, imagination, estimation and self-knowledge. So accordingly this chapter 
scanned different philosophers’ related theories starting from and based on Aristotle’s 
DA. The question at this stage is what the findings from these philosophers are. The 
immaterialist explanations of soul that claims it is different from material beings and that 
it is something beyond the body are common points between Neoplatonist and 
Aristotlelian explanations of the soul. In that sense, Aristotle, Avicenna and Plotinus, and 
so on, share the title dualist with varying applications of the term. At this point, soul’s 
relation to the body, and how dependent the soul is to the body are two issues that require 
attention: Can the soul come to existence without the body; can the soul survive after that 
it is separated from the body with death? Influence of both traditions is observable in 
Avicenna’s soul as the soul cannot come to existence without certain configuration of the 
matter is prepared for the specific soul on the one hand. On the other hand, substantiality 
of the soul as independent and immaterial self is emphasised and chosen over the 
substantiality of the compound of body and soul. The flying man argument is discussed 
accordingly.  
The discussion on sensation brought the question of soul’s relation to its activities into 
the picture. The concepts in DA created a literature on what the sensation is together with 
the notions of medium, proper object, change and the identity thesis. The questions of 
how active the soul is in the sensation process as well as whether the perception, perceiver 
and the perceived are identical, similar or different are proved to be central to examine 
the nature of sense objects. Since sense objects are members of the set of intentional 
objects, these two questions will be also part of my reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
intentionality. Another crucial concept for detecting identity of sense object to extra-
mental object is the Active intellect which is a central cosmological and epistemological 
principle for Avicenna.  
From the next chapter, I will start the reconstruction of Mullā Ṣadrā’s intentionality. I 
started this chapter trying to create a cluster of intentionality related terms from 
psychological ancient and medieval texts. Rather than a large set of notions, I ended up 
with the idea that it is better to take this historiography as exploration of the essential 
questions for a medieval quest of intentionality. So the questions that are common among 
these discussions are proved to be primary over the answers and partially more important 
99 
 
than the notions. Let me then summarize the essential questions to be extracted from this 
historiography. 
The role of the soul is important to define the main tendency of a theory of intentionality. 
What is the soul? What is soul’s relation to the extra-mental world, to its own actions, 
and to the products of its experiences? For example, is the soul active, or is it passive? 
Centralizing the soul for intentionality might be one of the important consequences of this 
chapter. Second, how do human beings produce knowledge? Is it a relational process; is 
it a projection, or internalization? What is the role of extra-mental objects in the process? 
Are they necessary, or accidental for sensation? Are there any other third agents that play 
a role in the process of production of forms of perception? What is the relation among 
perception, perceived and the perceiver? Who or what is the real perceiver? What happens 
to the internalized object (assuming perception is internalization of an extra-mental 
object)? What happens to the soul? 
The first step for reconstruction of intentionality is Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of sense 
perception. The above-mentioned questions will shape the next chapter and my 
investigation of sensation theory. This will help picture how intentionality takes place on 
the one hand, and explore nature of intentionality with its relation to mind on the other 
hand.  
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3 CHAPTER III 
PERCEPTION AND THE SOUL 
In the previous chapter, together with Brentano’s three claims on intentionality, I tried to 
follow Brentano’s own historiography as a lineage from Aristotle to Brentano. This 
chapter will investigate Ṣadrā’s notion of intentionality through the process of perception. 
This will reveal not only the production of intentional objects, but also the nature of the 
agents of this production, humans.  
Intentionality is mainly traced in two large clusters of vocabularies that emerged around 
“immateriality” and the “mental". Both claims are related to the human being and its 
relation to the extra-mental world. Brentano’s examples from his predecessors give the 
clue that intentionality can be traced through classical knowledge processes such as sense 
perception, inner perception and intellection. In its Neoplatonic reading, Aristotle’s sense 
perception occurs as the process of abstracting the immaterial form from the extra-mental 
sense object through a non-material change (Brentano, PES, 1874, 1924-5, 1.124-25).  
In terms of the historiography of intentionality, the different interpretations of Aristotle’s 
words seem to have influenced the way in which contemporary researchers wrote their 
histories of the term. Some started their search for intentionality with Aristotle’s concept 
of phantasia (Caston, 1998, p. 254; Sorabji, 2001, p. 60).66 Sorabji researched the earlier 
chapters of DA and examined the theory of sensation. He focused particularly on the 
commentators’ more immaterialized reading of Aristotle’s sense perception, which I 
believe is Brentano’s reading as well (Sorabji, 1995, pp. 194-226). Some other scholars 
such as Hedwig, Hasse, and Gyekye focused on the translations of the word intentio 
backwards from Brentano in history. These analysed ‘intention’ either as it appears in the 
Medieval Latin texts, or in the Arabic texts that gave rise to those Latin translations.67 
This second one resulted in some scholars’ emphasis on Avicenna’s estimative power 
when they wanted to discuss the history of intentionality, or in some cases the scholars 
shifted the discussion to mental existence or issues in logic. The interest in estimation 
comes with different perspectives. Sorabji’s focus on the history of intentionality is on 
                                                          
66 See also Caston, Victor, (1998) “Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality”, Philosophy and 
Phenmenological Research vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 249-298, p. 254; Perler, “What are intentional objects? A 
controversy among early scotists”, in Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, pp. 203-226. 
67 See Gutas (2012) on the translation of maʿna as intention “The Empiricism of Avicenna”, Oriens 40, 
pp. 391-436, at p. 427.  
101 
 
the immateriality of the object, the organ, and the change. So he thinks that it is not 
Aristotle but the commentators who had a notion of intentionality in the sensation theory. 
He also mentioned the estimative faculty as a candidate for being a source of 
intentionality, because its object are the meanings (maʿānīʾ) (1991, pp. 236-7). But his 
general stance is not straightforward; he mentions that he is convinced by Caston that 
Aristotle’s phantasia can be seen as the source of some of the features of intentionality 
(Sorabji, 2001, p. 60). Black considers Hasse to be at the opposite end to the estimative 
theory as the candidate for intentionality. Hasse, in his detailed analysis of estimative 
faculty, agrees with Caston that Avicenna is not an essential part of the history of 
intentionality thesis that ends with Brentano (Hasse, 2000, p. 128). Black remains hesitant 
about accepting any of the two extremes, and instead seems to take a more comprehensive 
approach to the topic. In terms of his sensation theory, Avicenna does not have an 
intentionality theory (Black, 2011, pp. 159-174). 
One can also find the reception of Brentano’s thesis and define intentionality in 
accordance with Chisholm’s famous criteria that I have mentioned in the introduction: 1- 
failure of existential commitment, 2- failure of truth functionality, and 3-failure of co-
existive expressions (Kaukua, 2007, p. 36). We find these criteria used by Black, Caston 
and Kaukua. It is interesting to observe the usage of a linguistic criterion even after the 
linguistic turn has lost its influence on philosophical discussions. Kaukua is aware of the 
gap between propositions and mental phenomena, yet he is content with the usage of these 
criteria (Kaukua, 2007, p. 37). Accordingly, he finds that three of the criteria are 
applicable to Avicenna’s estimation. He explores another interesting point about 
intentionality that self-awareness is an essential part of the discussion (Kaukua, 2007, p. 
39). This point is rather surprising when we read Black claiming that consciousness is not 
an essential part of Avicenna’s estimation. Black’s claim is based on the fact that 
estimation is common between animals and humans (Black, 2010, p. 3). 
Jacob presents the three principles from Brentano’s intentionality. Black formularizes 
these into four issues: object-directedness; mental existence; consciousness; knowledge 
of non-existents. In this investigation, I tried to find a comprehensive approach and thus 
included all levels of cognition in the concept of intentionality. The umbrella term which 
is used in order to comprehend all intentionality related concepts is “mental existence”. 
This problematization is affirmed by usages and discussions found in Avicennan texts 
such as: ShMd I.2 where Avicenna states that universals do not exist extra-mentally and 
in ShI.I.5 where he talks about impressions “in the soul” (tartasim fī nafs irtisāman) and 
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again in ShI. V.1.2 where he talks about different issues related to universals and 
quiddities. 68 These usages might have also given rise to Latin usages such as esse 
intentionale and Brentano’s intentional inexistence or inner word. In ʿIbāra, he expresses 
the denotation to affections in the soul (āthār fī-l-nafs) which brings the ontological and 
linguistic aspects together (ShIb, p. 9). In addition to these points, the centrality of the 
soul became clear in the historiography chapter. The importance of soul will be duplicated 
when Ṣadrā is the focus of research. 
In order to follow the continuous line of psychology-related discussions from ancient to 
medieval, the presentation of intentionality is shaped by the very frame of Aristotle’s DA. 
The DA created an influential literature that affects Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and 
framework of psychology in the Islamic world as well.  
In this chapter, Ṣadrā’s account of external senses will be discussed with two aims. One 
is to follow the frame provided by the DA literature, which is mainly presented by 
Aristotle and Avicenna. The second is to explore the nature of human beings’ relations to 
the extra-mental world through the process of sense perception. As a result, the plan of 
the chapter is defined by DA’s flow of discussions. In most places in his Asfār, Ṣadrā 
presents the discussions in a similar framework. Aristotle discusses sense perception as a 
relation of the sense organ to an extra-mental object with a change in the medium and in 
the sense organ. Aristotle presents some of the first expressions on the identity theory. 
The sense is an actualisation and a change is happening on or to the sense organ. In order 
for this to take place, a special relation is required between the sense organ and the object. 
Accordingly the concept of proper objects emerges. The sense organ, the activity or 
passivity of the soul and the extra-mental object and the outcome of the perception are 
four main discussions that compose this chapter. The source of all four discussions is 
Aristotle’s DA.  
In this chapter, I will give a detailed presentation that summarizes Ṣadrā’s own stance in 
Asfār. The production process of the mental objects will then be pursued with the 
discussions on the inner senses. By the comparative presentation of Ṣadrā’s inner senses 
with that of Avicenna’s, it will be clear that the differentiation between inner and external 
senses is not essential for Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory. Even at the level of sensation, the 
                                                          
68 In this, I share the intuitions expressed by Deborah Black, (2010) “Intentionality in Medieval Arabic 
Philosophy”, http://individual.utoronto.ca/dlblack/articles/intentions.pdf accessed: 28.01.2014; Later 
Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality, special issue of Quaestio 10, pp. 65-81.  
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imagination and the intellect are at work. On the other hand, despite his extreme 
internalism, Ṣadrā’s progressive understanding of the soul requires that in order for the 
soul to perfect itself, experience through the external senses is necessary. Thus we find 
an immaterialized explanation of the senses together with a unified and monist 
understanding of the soul. In this account the notion of soul is freed from the duality of 
matter and form. In Ṣadrā’s theory, in place of the multiplicity of senses, we rather find 
that the unity of the soul is the main issue.  
3.1 EXTERNAL SENSES 
The DA can be said to dominate psychology discussions in the Middle Ages, and sense 
perception is one important part of it. This is partly because Aristotle posits sense 
perception as the basis for knowledge. Another reason for the importance of sense 
theories is that the nature of explanation (being materialist or immaterialist) is dependent 
on one’s philosophical proclivities to Aristotelian or Platonic approaches. For the present 
investigation, sense perception is important as it is a bridge between the mental and the 
extra-mental. Intentional objects can be formulated as a question about the objects of 
perception. In the previous chapter I discussed two central definitions of sensation: 
abstraction and actualization. In terms of the nature of a relation to the extra-mental 
world, peripatetic theory’s material tendency is observed in the causal explanation of 
sensation by the soul’s passivity and the triggering power of the extra-mental object. As 
well as the necessity of the extra-mental object, the change in the medium (in Aristotle’s 
case) and in the sense organ (addition of relation to nerves and centrality of brain in 
Avicenna) proved this materialist tendency further. The main language is based on a 
hylomorphic cosmology and epistemology. In Avicenna’s philosophy, cosmology and 
epistemology are connected through a developed notion of the active intellect and of a 
human being’s ability to connect with it (rather than unite with it). The success of 
Avicenna’s hylomorphic language is dependent on a second point other than the active 
intellect. It is that the quiddity is informative and is the basis of knowledge. For example, 
knowledge of an object is possible in this approach through the knowledge of the quiddity 
of that object without knowledge of the particular properties of it. Abstraction and 
knowledge are a simple transportation of forms from extra-mental object to the human 
mind. And both forms are in their essence identical to their form in the active intellect. 
The reason behind this identity is that they are given by the active intellect.  
104 
 
In contrast to Aristotle’s causal account, sensation is not triggered by the extra-mental 
sense object for Ṣadrā. The sensation is an internal and immaterial process.69  
Someone should not say: The perceptive faculty though not existent in 
these organs but it has the instruments, so when the attention of the soul 
is driven to the eye, it sees, and to the ear it hears.  
For we say: When the soul is attentive to the tongue, then does the 
tongue perceive the taste? Or to the skin−when the skin is beaten−is it 
in pain or not? If it perceives then our objective has been obtained. But 
if it does not perceive then it entails that the perception is not particular 
to the tongue, rather [instead of] the tongue [the soul] becomes 
[attentive] to the hand in its being the tool for the taste [and then 
perceives the taste] (Asfār, v. 8, pp. 274-5; tr. Peerwani, p. 202). 
Sense object, medium (more central in Aristotle than in Avicenna), and the sense organ 
are important in Peripatetic theory. The object of the perception for Ṣadrā, on the contrary, 
is internal and its presence is different from imprinting. He continues to use the same 
terminology. However, he changes the frame at times, or expresses them with more 
spiritual application of the terms. Here is an example to how he shifts the usage of proper 
objects to a more immaterial one by change of the frame:  
The intelligent ones by the self-evident [knowledge] of their intellects 
perceive that the perception of the objects of sight is obtained in the 
sight and not in other than it, and the sensation of the sounds is obtained 
in the ear and not in other than it. Also, the self-evident [knowledge] 
judges that the tongue is not the organ of sight, and the eye is not the 
organ of taste. It also judges that the tongue is [the organ of] taste and 
the eye is [the organ of] sight (Asfār, v.8, p. 274; tr. Peerwani, p. 201). 
[A]ccording to minute [or subtle] reflection the sensible in essence is 
the form which is present with the soul and not something extra-mental 
corresponding to it (Asfār, v.8, p. 238 ; tr. Peerwani, p. 174). 
The notion of a medium continues to appear in a similar fashion and the notion is used 
with a more spiritual meaning of the word and now related to illuminative relation (iḍāfa 
ishrāqiyya):  
It has been discussed earlier that the contact between the two [i.e., the 
seer and the object of sight] though not a necessity, nevertheless it is 
                                                          
69 For the centrality of subject, see also Asfār, v.8, pp. 275, 277, 278. 
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necessary that there be either the object of contact, or the existence of a 
corporeal intermediary between the two by which both the intermediary 
and the passive object are under the rule of one body, some receiving 
the effect because of the existence of aptitude in it, and some not 
receiving [the effect] due to the non-existence of aptitude (Asfār, v.8, p. 
235; tr. Peerwani, p. 173).  
[T]he illuminative relation is appropriate [to be called] the relation 
between the agent of form and its essence. This relation, as we have 
established, is realized in the vision between the soul and the form 
emanating from it on itself [or its essence] (Asfār, v.8, p. 214; tr. 
Peerwani, p. 159). 
Not only is the sensation an immaterial process, but also its agent is not the organ any 
longer. In this explanation the real actor is the soul: 
Also, the intelligent ones by the self-evident [knowledge] of their 
intellects know that the seer is not the eye, nor the hearer the ear, nor 
the speaker the gullet, but it is the man who is the hearer, the seer and 
the speaker (Asfār, v. 8, p. 275; tr. Peerwani, p. 202). 
In this immaterialist account of sensation the sense organs are merely tools and faculties 
for the soul. Ṣadrā explains the soul’s need for these tools with a metaphor about glasses. 
The fact that one needs glasses to see better does not entail that the glasses are the seer 
(Asfār, v.8, p. 276; tr. Peerwani, p. 203). Unlike many philosophers of his time, Ṣadrā 
thinks that the soul can interact with the world herself and she can perceive particulars. 
As part of this approach, the soul plays an active role in the production of sensation. 
Following Aristotle’s idea of change, the change that is supposed to occur in the sense 
organ is carried by the soul. The contrasting peripatetic notion of passivity is best 
described by Aquinas: 
A sense is a passive power, meant to be in action by a sense object 
external to it. This outside source of internal change is the per se object 
of sense perception and where it differs the nature of sense power 
differs (Aquinas, Summa theologiae I.78.3, v.11, p. 131). 
If perception is thought to be a passive process, then the mind can be considered as some 
form of a container. In line with his denial of a passive process, Ṣadrā redefines the mind. 
The mind is the soul’s ability to acquire knowledge that has not yet been attained 
(Chittick, 2002, pp. 220, 221). One can think of the mind as a tabula rasa which is being 
filled and shaped by the perceptions and experiences: “the soul is the same as its 
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perceptions and the things that are known (al-nafsu maḥallun li-mudrikāt wa-maʿlūmāt) 
(MQ, p. 51)”. In terms of their ontological place, since the soul is the same as its 
experiences, existence of the sensibles are dependent on the soul, and they occupy a realm 
of imagination. 
Rather, [according to us] it is through the subsistence of its form by the 
perceiver (Asfār, v.8, p. 277; tr. Peerwani, p. 204). 
[K]now that every sensible perception’s subsistence is by the 
imaginative perception, and every imaginative perception’s subsistence 
is by the intellection. Also, if a sense separates from the intellect it 
cannot exist, for its existence without the intelligence is not possible 
(Asfār, v.8, pp. 239-40; tr. Peerwani, p. 176).  
What is sensed is an abstracted form. In this manner, Mullā Ṣadrā’s sensible form and the 
Peripatetics’ sensible form appear to have the same feature of being abstracted. 
According to the Peripatetic explanation of vision, for example, the sensible forms are 
abstracted by the human, while in Mullā Ṣadrā’s vision the abstracted forms emanate 
from a purer realm than the extra-mental material world.  
Perception in general does not take place – as the well-known doctrine 
of majority of the philosophers states-by the perceptual faculty’s 
abstraction of the perceptible form itself from matter and encountering 
it along with its enveloping material attachments –since it has been 
established that forms imprinted in matter cannot move locally… 
Perception occurs because the giver [..] bestows another psychic and 
luminous cognitive form, thanks to which perception or knowledge 
arises. This form is the actual sentient and the actual sensible at the 
same time. As for form-in-matter, it is neither sentient nor sensible, but 
is only a condition (or occasion) for the emanation of that (actually 
cognized) form (Asfār, v.8, p. 212-13, tr. Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 224). 
Imagination is dependent on the activity of intellect. Following that lineage, sensation is 
then dependent on the intellect. What is more, Ṣadrā claimed that the sensibles are 
intelligibles: “Now every sensible is an intelligible, in the sense the intellect perceives it 
in reality” (Asfār, v.8, p. 240, tr. Peerwani, p. 176). The correspondence (between the 
extra-mental and the mental) is transformed into a mental relation. The forms are created 
by the imagination and for this reason no sensation becomes complete without the 
intervention of imagination. In this frame, the created forms are particular existents:  
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If the sense [of sight] perceives an external form, such as a square 
having two squares one on each side in a particular relation externally—
that shape being existent externally only with the external detached 
material accidents extraneous to the quiddity of the square as a creation 
and an existence, for it is existent in the matter receptive to division—
then it is for the imagination to make a form corresponding [to the 
external form] which is either similar to it, or different from it. [This it 
does] by one simple making, and [the form produced] resembles the 
external [sensible] in dimensions and positions (Asfār, v.8, p. 282; tr. 
Peerwani, p. 209). 
Like many aspects of his psychology, Ṣadrā’s active understanding of the perceptive soul 
is reminiscent of some Neoplatonic approaches. Despite this similarity, Plotinus is 
separated from Ṣadrā’s monism by a dualist approach to the cognitive processes. 
According to Plotinus, the purely immaterial soul is never subject to change (Steel, 1978, 
p. 157). Yet, in contrast to Plotinus, another Neoplatonist, Iamblichus challenges this idea, 
applying idea of change to the soul (Steel, 1978, p. 156,157).  
The presentation in the above mentioned paragraph from Asfār can be treated with some 
suspicion. Firstly, on the one hand, Mullā Ṣadrā eliminated the imprinting theory and 
abstraction process, while on the other, the soul still ends up having an abstracted form. 
This abstracted form, however, is different from the extra-mental object present for 
perception. How can the soul then create a form correlating with the extra-mental object 
if the form does not come from it? Apart from this isolation from the extra-mental world, 
another problem occurs: how can the soul create a sensible form while it is itself 
immaterial? Mullā Ṣadrā claims that the identity principle is the key. The soul creates an 
immaterial form whilst it confronts the extra-mental object and becomes one with it 
(Hāshim Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ḥasan, 2009, pp. 133-6). This creation cannot be an act of 
the sense faculties alone: “[E]very sense perception’s subsistence is by the imaginative 
perception, and every imaginative perception’s subsistence is by the intellection” (Asfār, 
v.8, p. 240, tr. Peerwani, p. 176). Ṣadrā’s sensation is never complete without the 
intervention of the imagination. Consequently, we need imagination for the creation of 
forms as well as for the reception of them. This intervention of the imagination is the 
reason why Ṣadrā’s theory is built on an activity of the soul. If not for this, one would 
suspect that his sensation is even more passive than the peripatetic approach. However, 
with the act of the soul, every sensation is an active construction of the soul. This 
explanation is, however, not satisfactory. 
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According to Ṣadrā, the substantial change even at the lowest level of knowledge is made 
possible with a further principle: the principle of substantial motion. This is an original 
idea because change in substance is radically anti-Aristotelian and anti-Avicennan. 
According to them, change can only occur in the four categories of quality, quantity, place 
and position (McGinnis, 2010, pp. 84-7, Aristotle, Categories, 3b32-4a5). Substantial 
change is an important principle to understand Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of the nature of the 
soul.70 Thanks to this idea of substantial change, we find a unique explanation of a 
human’s nature which goes beyond dualist or materialist explanations.  
Simply by virtue of the fact that a human can be unified with its objects of perception, the 
knowledge process changes her and knowledge occurs as a substantial movement. The 
lowest levels of perception are not excluded from such change in the human and in their 
identity. The essential change that the soul undergoes even at the lowest levels of 
knowledge engenders a different approach to knowledge itself. Knowledge is the process 
in which the soul travels from a material being into an immaterial one. A further claim is 
also made: that knowledge is indeed a mode of existence. Both the knowledge is a level 
of existence and with the knowledge the soul changes and travels to a different level of 
existence. Thus, through knowledge the soul changes in its essence. And with the identity 
principle, the soul is nothing but the things that it perceives:  
All of man’s real perceptions and all of his knowledge, intelligible or 
sensible… are not separable from its existence and distinct from its 
existence. But its precept is essentially just its very existence 
(Shawāhid, p. 203, tr. Darebidy, 2002, p. 177). 
Each level of knowledge is a level of existence according to Ṣadrā. This can be combined 
with his views on psychology, namely that the soul is the very things that it perceives. 
The result is that each experience is a level of the human soul. Accordingly, Ṣadrā says: 
The investigation is, the soul has three modalities of being−intellective, 
imaginative and sensory. It has the unification with intellect, 
imagination and senses. So the soul at its perception of the sensibles 
becomes precisely the same as the senses (Asfār, v.8, p. 278; tr. 
Peerwani, p. 205).  
This presentation is interesting for many reasons. One of the striking issues is Ṣadrā’s 
immaterialization of the process. This is related to my claim that Ṣadrā is a hard-core 
                                                          
70 For an elaborate discussion of Ṣadrā’s notion of tashkīk in relation to substantial change, see Rizvi, 
2003, p. 233. 
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internalist and monist. Moreover, this approach has implications that break the dichotomy 
of material-immaterial. Let us remember the centrality of sensation for animal soul. Even 
for Plotinus as well as for Avicenna, the faculties related to the animal are considered as 
material. When sensation is presented as an immaterial case, then the aforementioned 
state of the animal’s soul as material becomes at risk. Either the animal faculties in human 
and animal are going to be considered as being different, and as a result, it will be material 
in one and immaterial in the other; or the animal soul will be considered as immaterial 
too. Ṣadrā choses the second stance and devotes a section to show that the animal soul is 
immaterial (Asfār, v.8, p. 45ff, tr. Peerwani, p. 33ff). 
Let me summarize the sensation theory presented so far. The abstracted form, the 
internalized essence of the extra-mental object, is not wholly informative. Ṣadrā rejects a 
definition of knowledge based on the quiddity. The definition is changed into creation of 
forms in the soul. What is more, Ṣadrā reports that the sensed forms are different from the 
forms of the extra-mental object. This is related to the process in which sensation takes 
place. Sense perception is no longer described as the abstraction or imprinting of forms 
(MQ, p. 54). Rather, it is a process of construction that takes place with the power given 
by God. The agent of the sense is not the sense organ, but the soul: “The soul is not simply 
the receiver of those forms. Rather it is the active [agent] (Asfār, v.8, p. 281, tr. Peerwani, 
p. 208).” 
The form is defined differently from the peripatetic tradition because the form of the sense 
perception does not directly come from the sensed object. Thus, in Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
epistemology, it is no longer the form of the extra-mental object that the human derives 
during the process. The object is both given to the human and created in the human. In 
the sense that the object is created in the human, the sensed and the sensing agent are the 
same (MQ, pp. 36-8; Kalin, 2010, p. 153). The identity is different from the Aristotelian 
approach. The object obtained during perception is different from the extra-mental object. 
Human beings appear to have both a creative and a passive status at this level. Moreover, 
the human soul undergoes some sort of change due to this creation. The idea is that the 
forms are effused (ṣudūr) from the soul. All these points require a different approach from 
that of peripatetic epistemology and psychology. Another point about this definition is 
about the description of sensation as construction, rather than “reception”. 
His epistemology so far is introduced somehow different from common discussions of 
his epistemology in modern scholarship. One can find both Aristotelian and Platonist 
tendencies in this interpretation and it gives priority to one over another. Fazlurrahman 
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appears to value the strong Aristotelian language, whilst Nasr and Kalin emphasize the 
idea of effusion of forms from a higher realm (Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 221ff.; Nasr, p.953; 
Kalin, 2010, pp. 112 ff.). The interesting issue is even in the latter presentation, Ṣadrā’s 
epistemology is given in close relation to Aristotelian terminology. Let me discuss 
Kalin’s evaluation in his important book on Sadrian epistemology to exemplify this point:  
Kalin emphasises that knowledge is a positive gain for the soul that changes it. It only 
occurs between intelligibles and because it is positive change in the soul, there is no loss 
of epistemological value in the form. The form is not created by the soul, rather the mode 
of being in the soul is created in the knowledge process. Similar to my presentation, by 
Kalin, the soul is not explained as a mere container of forms (Kalin, 2010, p.128) and also 
similarity between cosmos and human soul is regarded as the necessary relation that 
maintains knowledge (Kalin, 2010, p. 116).  
There are some issues with this presentation, the first issue is that this looks like a refined 
version of Avicennan epistemology in which the role of Active Intellect is emphasized 
more than the role of abstraction. The focus on intelligibility is presented as an essential 
differentiator between Sadrian and Aristotelian traditions. However, as I discussed in the 
history chapter, hylomorphic language is compatible with the requirement of 
intelligibility and what is more it is necessitated for the knowledge processes. The need 
for abstraction is that the soul cannot know things that are not intelligible. In contrast, I 
discuss in the thesis that Ṣadrā defends the idea of knowledge of particulars, actively 
grasped by the soul. 
The knowledge is a positive gain for the soul but still, in various parts of his writings, 
Ṣadrā claims that knowledge occurs in degrees and in most cases, data gained is a 
distorted version of the reality. The further discussion that will come about his division 
of knowledge and how gradation is applied to knowledge will make this point clearer in 
the fourth chapter. The result is that the loss of epistemic value is inevitable for Ṣadrā but 
the value-loss depends on the perfection level of the knower.  
In Kalin’s case, the content of what is known precedes the knower, because of the relation 
to intelligible world (Kalin, 2010, p.125). Despite the fact that this point is posited as a 
difference from the Peripatetic explanation, in terms of the necessitation of presence of 
an extra-mental object, the content precedes in Peripatetic theory as well. However, if the 
form, not the mode of being is created by the soul during epistemological process, the 
order changes. The knowledge starts with the soul’s attention and thus the soul precedes 
both the object and the content. Kalin’s presentation of identical forms between knower’s 
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mind and extra-mental world is more compatible with the presentation given for 
Avicennan epistemology in this research.  
There are nuances between the homology described in Kalin’s presentation and mine as 
well. As the intelligible world is the centre for Kalin’s explanation, the world is inherently 
intelligible and the source of the things in this world is the world of the intelligibles. This 
commonality of “being intelligible” is mentioned as a feature of existence shared by all 
beings. A notion of homology is defended in my research as well. However, I don’t think 
Ṣadrā needs the mediacy of an intelligible world to claim a similarity between human and 
the cosmos. The case that all is existent, and share the same reality of existence is the 
required similarity that guaranties knowledge.  
It appears Kalin considers that the separation of the notions intelligible and universal lies 
behind the difference of Sadrian and Avicennan epistemologies, and this makes one 
Aristotelian and the other Platonist. However, the theory Ṣadrā establishes is more 
radically different from the previous theories. As it will become clearer, his evaluation of 
existence as well as of knowledge and of the processes of soul is built on monist approach 
that breaks the dichotomy of material and immaterial and employs gradational ontology 
as the main instrument for his attempt. Intelligibility and universality remain to be about 
different ontological levels, however the importance of their difference is now less 
important in his philosophy.  
Before going into details about each sense, a brief explanation on the relation of the senses 
would be helpful to understand Ṣadrā’s unified understanding of the soul. The idea of a 
hierarchy among the senses together with a discussion on the type of relationship among 
the senses is part of the classical literature of sensation theory. In Najāt, Avicenna 
examines how some faculties rule others, and how each faculty serves as part of a system 
(Najāt VI, p. 37; ed. Fakhry, pp. 206-7).71 He follows Fārābī’s approach and he starts the 
hierarchy with the higher intellects.72 The highest in the hierarchy is the holy intellect (al-
ʿaql al-qudsī) followed by the actual intellect (al-ʿaql bi-l-fiʿl), and later by habitual 
intellect (al-ʿaql bi-l-malaka) and lastly material intellect (al-ʿaql al-hayūlānī) follows. 
The intellect which is lower than the material intellect is the practical intellect (al-ʿaql al-
                                                          
71 All references are from Fazlurrahman’s translation which corresponds to the sixth article of the second 
section of Najāt (pp. 196-232 in Majid Fakhry ed. (1982)).the roman numbers refer to chapter numbers in 
Fazlurrahman’s translation. For example I. p. 24 would correspond to II.6.1, p. 196 in Fakhry’s edition.  
72 Fārābī’s systematic approach is also a cornerstone for this literature and it is important to show how 
parallel different disciplines for a systematic philosopher can be. Fārābī’s hierarchy is representative of 
the totality of society and its parts, so this hierarchy, set in a theory of soul, is applicable to ontology and 
moreover to political philosophy. For a detailed discussion on Fārābī, see Davidson, 1992, pp. 49-52. 
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ʿamalī). The inner and the external senses are connected with these higher intellects 
(ittiṣāl) rather than united with them (ittiḥād). The hierarchy among the human senses are 
listed in the order of estimation (wahm), cognitive imagination (mutakhayyila) and 
imagination (khayāl), and common sense (phantasia). All five external senses serve 
phantasia. The hidden assumption behind the notion of rank and hierarchy is that some 
faculties are more immaterial than others. Immateriality here can mean that the nature of 
the process is more immaterial or that the objects that the faculties interact with are more 
immaterial. Suhrawardī makes the hierarchy important among external senses as well and 
centralizes vision (HI, p. 133; Marcotte, 2000, p. 138). Marcotte argues that Suhrawardī 
had developed a vision theory with two levels: one level of vision is material and the other 
immaterial. The immaterial vision is a higher form of knowledge which is a form of direct 
knowledge as well. The higher and direct sense perceives beyond the limits of material 
forms.  
Kāshānī, whose Jāwidan-nāma is translated into Arabic by Mullā Ṣadrā as Iksīr, connects 
the hierarchy of senses to the order of the world and combines cosmology with 
psychology. As a result, he adds a gnostic dimension to the relation of the senses. The 
human is viewed as a microcosm (Iksīr, p. 42). Each sense is a messenger without 
awareness or knowledge (Iksīr, p. 24). This point is different from Aristotle, who claims 
that the perception of perception either automatically comes together with the sense itself, 
or with the common sense. In the first case, the sense organ is identical to the perception 
(DA II.12, 424a24-5). Ṣadrā’s perception occurs with the soul’s command and awareness, 
thus it is hard to differentiate between awareness and perception. But in the sense that the 
attention of the soul is prior to the sensation as its trigger, perception and awareness of 
perception are separable in Ṣadrā’s theory.  
One important aspect of Kāshānī’s gnostic attitude is that the multiplicity of senses is 
drawn together within the unity of the soul (Iksīr, p. 25). Ṣadrā’s cosmology is filled with 
conscious beings, be they animal or plant. A hierarchy is assumed due to a being’s 
intensity of existence. Elements at the lowest stage of the hierarchy are followed by plants 
and then animals. 
Know that God created the substance of plant from the earthly 
substances. It is more perfect in existence than the elements, [and solids 
such as] stone and mud, and also more perfect than the mineral 
substances such as iron, copper, etc. That is because He created in it 
[i.e. in the substance of plant] the faculty which can attract food to the 
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direction of its trunk and roots in the earth. He prepared for it the tools 
and faculties which are its servants (Asfār, v.8, p. 183, tr. Peerwani, p. 
135).  
The different elements and faculties in each being is also differentiated and regarded at a 
level according to the being they are in.  
The nutritive faculty is existent in the plant, but is not prepared to 
receive the sensation and movement, we say: The nutritive faculty in 
plant is different in quiddity from the nutritive faculty in animal, just as 
animality in all animals is different in quiddity from the animality in 
man. Generally the cause of that is, the aspect of potency negates the 
aspect of actuality. If a form becomes powerful in its actuality and 
existence, the matter becomes perfect by it, and its essence becomes 
complete by that form, then its preparedness to receive another form 
becomes invalid due to the intensity of the existence of the form. But if 
the form is weak in being, is between sheer actuality and pure potency, 
then it does not prevent the matter to receive another form more 
[perfect] than it (Asfār, v. 8, p. 178, tr. Peerwani, p. 132). 
Unlike the tradition, a hierarchical approach to the senses does not appear to be essential 
for Ṣadrā .This is mainly because all faculties are considered to be tools of the soul and 
the soul is regarded as the real perceiver. And this is another reflection of monism in his 
philosophy. Senses help perfection of each other and perfection of the substantial being 
that they are part of (Asfār, v.8, p. 184-186). The lowest and most common sense among 
animals is touch. Ṣadrā connects intuitive acts such as looking for food with this sense 
rather than memory. Touch in its role for the search of food needs another sense for its 
perfection, i.e. smell. With this a couple of distant objects will be perceivable for the 
animals. The search also requires a sense of direction which comes with another sense, 
sight. The relation of the senses continues in a similar fashion to what will be given below. 
Ṣadrā seems to be applying the Neoplatonic notion of simplicity to the senses as well. So 
we observe another application of Ṣadrā over the allegedly material parts of the 
psychology discussions and comfortably refer to these material entities as immaterial. 
Each sense becomes perfected and comprehends the others below it. Let me give the rest 
of Ṣadrā’s text explaining the interaction of the senses further:  
Hence the sense of sight has been created for it in order to perceive [the 
things] which are at a distance from it, to perceive its direction by its 
eyes and endeavour to reach that direction. But despite [having the 
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sense of sight] the animal is imperfect because it cannot perceive what 
is behind the walls and behind the obstacles, so it can neither see the 
food which is veiled from it, nor an animal hidden from it. At times the 
obstacle may not be lifted except after the enemy has come near [to it], 
but then it is not possible for it to flee from it. So the sense of hearing 
has been created for it by which it can perceive the sounds from behind 
the walls when they are in movements (Asfār, v.8, p. 185, tr. 
Peerwani, p. 135-6).  
We also observe that Ṣadrā uses functions of different senses interchangeably. Fear of the 
enemy is commonly related to estimative faculty. Here he relates it to hearing the sounds 
that are related to danger. Moreover, the search for food and the notions of agreeable and 
disagreeable are connected to the sense of taste eventually. Both notions are 
unconventional occurring in a discussion of external senses, as they are more close to 
meanings in peripatetic discussions, meanings that are exclusively objects of estimation.  
Now all [those faculties] would not benefit us or animals if there were 
no faculty of taste. Without it, if the food reaches [the mouth] it is not 
perceived whether it is agreeable or disagreeable [to the health of the 
animal], for if it eats [something disagreeable] then it may be destroyed 
[by that food]. Like a tree in whose roots all kinds of liquid is poured. 
It has no [faculty of] taste, so it absorbs all of that [liquid] which at 
times becomes a cause of its drying up. Further, all those [senses] are 
not enough for it if another [organ of] perception called sensus 
communis were not created in the frontal lobe of the brain to which 
come the sense perceptions of five [senses], and are collected in it. If it 
were not there then every affair for the animal would take long, 
resulting in its destruction. Some insects like moth etc., due to the 
absence of [this] internal sense fall again and again on the fire and are 
harmed by it. If it had [the faculties of] imagination and retention of 
what it had sensed the first time, it would not return to that by which it 
was harmed once. Despite having [the sensus communis an animal] is 
imperfect because it is not possible for it to be cautious of that which it 
does not perceive by the [external senses]. For as long as an animal is 
not harmed by a thing, it does not comprehend that it should be cautious 
of it (Asfār, v.8, p. 185, tr. Peerwani, p. 135). 
If any hierarchical relation is to be found to be important for Ṣadrā, it is mainly about the 
locus of the faculties, as in the example of nutrition in plants being higher than that in 
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humans. A second way to find hierarchy is found in a similar fashion to Suhrawardī’s 
material and immaterial visions, Ṣadrā has the idea of lower and higher levels of senses. 
Yet this idea occurs in his theory more in relation to a human being’s journey in 
perfection. The more perfected a human is the higher and more delicate her faculties 
become. This approach is quite Neoplatonic. I will give further details in the specific 
discussions on the senses. Let it suffice for now to say that the higher and lower senses 
are considered in a monist fashion. The journey of the soul connects all the experience of 
the soul, including that of sense perception. Since the soul starts the journey of life in 
corporeal form, the external senses are an essential part of it: indeed it is the very 
beginning. Now that I have explained the general sensation theory, I will discuss the 
details in which more about Ṣadrā’s original sensation theory can be revealed.  
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3.2 MULLĀ ṢADRĀ AND THE EXTERNAL SENSES 
In the previous section of this chapter, I talked about the main discussions in DA and 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s basic principles related to the sensation theory. Let me now carry on with 
each particular external sense to see how Mullā Ṣadrā applies his basic principles and the 
general idea of sense to the particular senses. I will follow the order of presentation in 
Asfār and Shifā, which is the reverse order to Aristotle’s DA and its translations, such as 
Kashānī’s and Hunayn’s translations. 
Faculty of touch is the primary sense. This means that most of the other senses can be 
explained in relation to touch. Moreover, it is the most common among animals, thus no 
animal lacks the sense of touch (Asfār, v.8, p. 135; Mabāḥith, p. 279; ShST, tr. McGinnis, 
p. 67). According to him, this is mainly due to the need for this faculty, which is similar 
to the urge for things that are good for the body and the ability to avoid the danger. Still, 
the will to avoid the dangerous is stronger than the will to move towards food. This is 
because the latter becomes possible with the help of other senses. This shows that touch 
is the first of all the senses as well as the most common of all. He agrees with Avicenna 
and Aristotle on this idea of touch being the most common sense among animals (Asfār, 
v.8, p. 188; DA, II. 2.413b5; ShST, II.3, tr. McGinnis, p. 67).  
In terms of the presentation of external senses and connecting them to each other, we find 
that the Paraphrase of DA and the Persian translation by Kashānī73 include the faculty of 
vision mentioned in the discussion of all external senses. In these, some similarity to the 
faculty is mentioned for each of the other external senses. In Ṣadrā’s presentation 
however, he links each sense mainly to the sense of touch. This latter is in a similar 
fashion to the Greek version of the DA, where Aristotle somehow explains their functions 
as a way of touching. With his illuminationist tendency this might be a surprise. However, 
I think there are two reasons for this in Asfār. First, Ṣadrā presents all the topics in Asfār 
in a parallel way to their original discussions in the texts of Aristotle or Avicenna. Even 
when Ṣadrā has a completely different stance, as in the case of categories, or inner senses, 
he first gives the peripatetic stance in great detail. Second, as the soul starts its journey as 
a material substance, the need for touch and the primacy of touch only in this sense might 
be an expected move from his philosophy. This does not mean that vision is ranked lower 
as a sense. The primacy of touch here is not in terms of its rank.  
                                                          
73 Mullā Ṣadrā, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī (2003) The Elixir of the Gnostics, (tr.) W. C. Chittick (Provo, Utah: 
Brigham Young University) 
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Following the discussion in the relevant chapter, Mullā Ṣadrā shares Avicenna’s idea that 
touch is extended to the whole body whereas Aristotle thinks that the organ of touch is 
deep in the flesh and the skin is the medium for touch (Ḥasan, Hāshim Abū al-Ḥasan ʿ Alī, 
2009, p. 122; DA, II.11.423b23-30). In its Arabic paraphrase it is mentioned that the flesh 
is the organ of touch (Paraphrase, p. 281). Avicenna seems to combine the medium and 
the organ and says that the organ of touch is the skin and the flesh. Perception takes place 
through the nerves rooted in the flesh (Najāt II, pp. 26-27; ShN.II.3, pp.68-9). Mullā Ṣadrā 
claims that the faculty of touch is spread all over the body because the animal body is 
from the genus of a matter qualified with tangibility (malmūsah). The genus of the 
perceiver is the same as the perception (Asfār, v.8, p. 188). This is a similar case to 
Aristotle where he defines senses according to their potentialities of being qualified with 
the quality of their sense object. So, because all the body has tangibility (the potentiality) 
then the whole body can receive forms of objects of touch. Mullā Ṣadrā defends this case 
for other senses too. In the case of vision, because objects of vision are light, the perceiver 
of this should be unified with the object in its essence (so the self should be related to 
light as the agent of vision). The organs of the body are, however, not lights (potentially 
or actually). Thus the light of sight cannot travel through the body as it is not transparent. 
Body and the other senses, such as hearing, tasting and even the internal senses, are like 
the case of vision. The whole body cannot be the organs of these senses due to the 
principle of identity of the perceiver and the perceived (ittiḥād al-mudrik wa-l-mudrak) 
(Asfār, v.8, p. 189). Here, then, together with Aristotle’s claim about proper sense objects, 
we see another application of the unity of knower and known on the senses. However, the 
real identity occurs in the soul and sensation is in essence an immaterial process.  
This implies another feature of touch. All objects possess contact points, and due to 
having contact points they are all potentially objects of touch. However, not every object 
can be a proper object for hearing or taste (Asfār, v.8, p. 190). This recalls the idea of 
proper objects in Aristotle, where each sense starts acting only when their proper objects 
come on the scene and cause some kind of affection in the proper sense organ. The idea 
that, “the genus of the perceiver is of the same genus of the perception” allows Mullā 
Ṣadrā to claim that the organs for imagination, estimation and other inner senses cannot 
be the brain as well. This is important for demonstrating the stance of Mullā Ṣadrā 
regarding the immateriality of inner senses. Mullā Ṣadrā does not exclude external senses 
from immateriality. According to him, external senses, too, are activities of the soul. The 
above discussion he made about vision and other senses about identity is to show that the 
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body or the organs are not enough to explain the process of the senses and that the soul is 
the real perceiver. The role of external objects together with the role of sense organs is 
almost reduced to an accidental necessity:  
Thus, for example, the heat which is felt in essence is not what is found 
–for example, fire- in the body which is adjacent to the organ in contact, 
nor even what is in the heated and so called touching limb. Rather, it is 
in another form, hidden from this world, occurring in that state of being 
proper to the soul, which perceives it through its power of touch 
(Wisdom of the Throne, tr. J.W. Morris, 1981, pp. 134).  
According to this, the line between external and internal senses seems to be very thin in 
that the difference seems to be that external senses have an accidental relation to their 
extra-mental objects. The assimilation theory of Aristotle is still present in this version of 
sense theory, but the forms of the extra-mental objects do not seem to be merely 
abstracted from the received objects and the received forms are no longer identical to their 
source (Asfār, v.8, pp. 212-13).  
Going back to explaining the sense of touch, another issue related to touch is the 
multiplicity of touch. Mullā Ṣadrā gives space to the problem related to varieties of senses 
of touch, and whether there is one or more than one sense of touch. This problem is 
introduced in Aristotle’s DA: 
It is a problem whether touch is a single sense or a group of senses. It 
is also a problem, what is the organ of touch; is it or is it not the flesh 
(including what in certain animals is analogous to flesh)? On the second 
view, flesh is the medium of touch, the real organ being situated farther 
inward. Every sense seems to be concerned with a single pair of 
contraries, white and black for sight, sharp and flat for hearing, bitter 
and sweet for taste; but in the field of what is tangible we find several 
such pairs, hot cold, dry moist, hard soft, etc. (DA II.11.422b19-20 tr. 
J. A. Smith).74 
The claim is that there are four different kinds of touch: one working on hot and cold; one 
on humid and dry, one on hard and soft, and one on smooth and coarse (DA II.11.422b17; 
Avicenna, ShN I.5, pp. 42-43). According to Mullā Ṣadrā, this situation proves only that 
the organ of touch on its own should be free from any one of these and their contraries so 
                                                          
74 Cf. Paraphrase, pp. 277, 281, 285; Badawi, Arisṭū fī-l-nafs, pp. 59, 60. 
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that any one of them and their contrary situations can be attributed to the organ (Asfār, 
v.8, p. 190).75  
There is an interesting section in which Mullā Ṣadrā argues for awareness of plants and 
minerals due to some of their movements. This is in reference to Aristotle’s discussion 
on differentiating the animal and the vegetative soul through the notions of mean and 
assimilation (Asfār, v. 8, p. 191; DA 424a30; Paraphrase, p. 287 (12) ff).76 Ṣadrā’s monist 
ontology requires homogeneity of consciousness as well as other features of wujūd. In 
terms of contemporary approaches, this makes him close to panpsychist theories 
according to which all things possess consciousness. The monist approach is the argument 
that everything is regarded under an extended notion of matter (Strawson, G., 2008, pp. 
24, 36). Ṣadrā’s approach in this section is important because his stance is different from 
the common approach of the Peripatetics and also rejected by the mutakallimīn like Rāzī 
(Rāzī, Mabāḥith, v.2, p. 279). He finds awareness in all existents, even in non-living 
things such as stones. This proves that his cosmology is different from Avicenna’s in 
essence. It demonstrates the monist tendency in his ontology.  
[A]nd you should say: we do not know that animals perceive the 
sensible and that they are aware apart from their moving towards the 
things they want and avoid those they do not want. So much so that the 
deficient animals like spongy ones and pearl oyster do move with 
closing and opening voluntarily. If we did not observe this movement 
from them, we would not know that they have faculty of touch. If the 
situation were like this, we definitely found similar things to this in 
elements and in plants as well. The earth moves away from high into 
the low in one direction. Fire moves away from low to high in one 
direction. 
And when the flowing fire is put a hindrance on its direction of 
movement, it turns away from the hindrance to another direction. But it 
does not go lower and it carries on climbing from other directions which 
                                                          
75 For Aristotle’s discussion on sense organ and contraries see: DA II.10, 422b23 ff.  
76 “A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated. The sense and its organ are the same in 
fact, but their essence is not the same. What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not 
admit that either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; what they are is a 
certain form or power in a magnitude. This enables us to explain why excesses in objects of sense destroy 
the organs of sense; if the movement set up by an object is too strong for the organ, the form which is its 
sensory power is disturbed; it is precisely as concord and tone are destroyed by too violently twanging the 
strings of a lyre. This explains also why plants cannot perceive, in spite of their having a portion of soul 
in them and being affected by tangible objects themselves; for their temperature can be lowered or raised. 
The explanation is that they have no mean, and so no principle in them capable of taking on the forms of 
sensible objects but are affected together with their matter.” DA II.12.424a24-424b19, tr. J.A. Smith. 
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have no hindrance. Plants are likewise, when there is a hindrance before 
their growing or moving, they deviate from the hindrance and tend to 
another direction from the shadowy to the sunny side… 
All these are proof for their awareness of wanted and unwanted things 
(Asfār, v.8, p. 191, tr. mine).   
Accordingly, even the elements show signs of consciousness by the way they move. 
When they are forced into situations unwanted by them, they change direction. Ṣadrā’s 
examples include fire, the simplest plants, and so on not only in terms of a denial of 
consciousness, but also in regards to voluntary action. The position of the Peripatetics is 
quite the opposite.  
Aristotle, for example, denies that plants have perception simply because they are not 
changed in a certain way by the objects of sense; in other words, the imprinting of forms 
does not take place. See, for example, the discussion in DA II.12 onwards: 
This explains also why plants cannot perceive, in spite of their having 
a portion of soul in them and being affected by tangible objects 
themselves; for their temperature can be lowered or raised. The 
explanation is that they have no mean, and so no principle in them 
capable of taking on the forms of sensible objects but are affected 
together with their matter (tr.J. A. Smith) 
Ṣadrā accepts some level of awareness and consciousness and even perception for plants. 
However, he does not think that all of the plants can receive forms. During this discussion, 
Mullā Ṣadrā also shows that he does not totally reject the mizāj explanation of Avicenna. 
He, too, accepts that a being’s capacity to receive awareness depends on their balance in 
their mizāj. He says that the reason plants have less awareness is the presence of 
contradictory elements in them such as fire and water (Asfār, v.8, p. 192). Even so, in his 
explanation, everything including minerals is in a constant and voluntary movement 
towards their perfection.  
Taste is the second of the senses after touch, simply because it is the awareness of the 
body for the things from which it will benefit. Whenever the need for food increases, its 
perception reaches its highest level. It is also the most similar to touch (Asfār, v.8, p. 193; 
Paraphrase, p. 275; Avicenna, ShN, II.4, p. 75). Unlike other senses, air does not play the 
role of medium for taste (Paraphrase, p. 275). 
Contact is one of the conditions for taste due to this similarity. However, contact or touch 
is not enough for taste to occur: the tongue, the organ of taste, is the second requirement 
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for taste to take place, together with the medium of the moistness of saliva (Asfār, v.8, 
pp. 193-4). One issue about taste is that the organ of taste should be free and not be 
qualified strongly with a taste, as this will weaken its sharpness in perception. However, 
moistness being qualified with taste is not enough: 
For something external to the body cannot be a place of 
awareness of the soul. Because the natural connection is not 
obtainable to the soul except through the relation to the body and 
its faculties, and not through that which is outside the 
management of the soul and its control. The soul is united in 
some kind of unification with its faculties and their tools. That is 
why the existence of anything in them is identical to its existence 
for the soul. The perception consists of the existence of 
perceptible thing to the perceiver. So inevitably, the soul 
becomes aware of an existence by which the body and its 
faculties get qualified, and not of that which is outside of it. 
(Asfār, v.8, p. 194; tr. Peerwani, p. 143). 
For Aristotle, the object of taste is flavour. The tongue is the medium whereby the 
assimilation takes place. For Mullā Ṣadrā, the object of the taste (madhūq) is not the 
quality of taste that occurs in the object of taste. It is neither the quality of taste in the 
moistness of saliva nor of that on the tongue. The taste object is, rather, the form that is 
related to taste (ṣūrat al-dhawqiyya) that occurs in the faculty of taste (Asfār, v.8, p. 195). 
Mullā Ṣadrā compares the relation of this faculty and the form to the relation of matter to 
form and the relation of potential intellect to active intellect. This similarity is not 
restricted to the faculty of taste, but also applicable to the other faculties: “The real object 
of sense is the particular form produced (ḥāṣila) for the soul by the faculty of sense” 
(Asfār, v.8, p. 195). 
This point is quite important as we see now that the real object of sensation is no longer 
the extra-mental object that starts the sense perception; the form received is neither the 
form of the original extra-mental object nor the abstracted form of the Peripatetics. The 
form is produced for the soul and emanates from it. At this point, it should also be noted 
that “mental” here refers to internality of the object of sensation. I do not include a realm 
of similitudes or alike within the limits of mental. Thus, in this usage, extra-mental does 
not necessarily mean material. It structurally refers to being outside the mental processes, 
and it locationally refers to being outside the mind. When it comes to quantity, taste has 
numerous objects. These, however, are not of different kinds as it had been the case for 
122 
 
touch. Thus, with a more homogenous kind of numerous objects, taste – just like touch – 
is not a cluster of faculties, but a single faculty (Asfār, v.8, p. 195; Paraphrase, p. 277; 
Rāzī, p. 281). 
Third after touch and taste is the faculty of smell. It is a more delicate sense than the first 
two senses. Mullā Ṣadrā regards the inner parts of the nostrils or nose as the organ of 
smell: “The objects of perception of this faculty are the odours reaching the nostrils by 
the air qualitatively changed by meeting [the odours]” (Asfār, v.8, p. 197; Paraphrase, p. 
273). Just like taste, contact is a requirement for smell to take place; this equally relates 
smell to the sense of touch. However, smell is more delicate than both taste and touch.  
An interesting point about smell is brought up at the end of the chapter on smell. A human 
being has a better ability to perceive delicate odours than animals when they are closer to 
the smell. However, they cannot capture it in a detailed way, instead they can name the 
odours in general as good or bad ones (Asfār, v. 8, p. 198; Paraphrase, p. 271; DA 421a22-
23). There is a more important link between the human’s sense of smell and a human 
being’s experience of higher things. Mullā Ṣadrā accepts the Neoplatonic claim that 
celestial spheres have a special smell and a faculty of smell (Asfār, v.8, p. 198-199). 
In contrast to the Peripatetics’ position that celestial spheres do not have air to maintain 
the condition of contact for smell, Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with mystics saying that that world 
is not conditioned by the physical world’s laws. Dreams, according to him, are another 
proof that a human can experience that sort of smell (Asfār, v.8, p. 199). Assigning a 
special ability of connection to the dreams is not unique to Ṣadrā. We have seen Ibn al-
ʿArabī’s explanation of dreams in the previous chapter. According to Ibn al-ʿArabī, 
thanks to dreams and the faculty of imagination, the soul perceives objects which are not 
material (Chittick, 1989, p. 115).  
Continuing with the senses, the next station is the sense of hearing. Hearing is the 
perception of sound. “The sensible is the sound subsisting by the air compressed between 
the two objects, one striking and the other being struck only (Asfār, v.8, p. 200)”. Mullā 
Ṣadrā quotes three clusters of issues discussed before him. 
The first issue relates to how hearing occurs (Asfār, v.8, pp. 200-1). Some people claim 
that hearing does not occur unless air between two objects, one striking and the other one 
being struck, takes place. This compressed air transmits sound to the nerves which are all 
over the cavity of the ear hole. This process, according to them indicates some 
consequences about hearing; one of these is that the earhole is an essential part of the 
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process and that any closure in the hole causes hearing to cease. Second, as air is the 
medium, any dense body between the object creating sound and the hearer causes hearing 
to take place with difficulty. Third, distance affects the loudness of the sound. Fourth, if 
the sound is transmitted in an isolated place, only those in the area can hear the sound due 
to the air. The example given for this point is that of a reed. So if a person puts his mouth 
on one end of a reed and another person stands on the other end putting her ear there, no 
other person around these two can hear the sound produced. The fifth issue is about when 
as times of strong winds those far away can hear better than those closer. This may be 
caused due to the strength of the sound of the wind being able to cause damage to the 
essence of the other sound and make it harder to hear (Asfār, v.8, p. 201).  
Mullā Ṣadrā presents some problems with these assumptions as well. For example, for 
the first indication, a dense entity is supposed to weaken the hearing at the point when the 
sound of a person reaches someone talking behind a wall. However, someone else can 
hear the speech from the other side. Their77 reply to this objection is that hearing through 
a wall is only possible because some air passes through the wall although in small 
amounts. 
The second objection is about hearing someone’s speech. When someone speaks they 
create waves in the air and this is supposed to distort the totality of the air which should 
affect the sound heard. Their response to this difficulty is that the letters are compressed 
in the air in a particular way and each part of the letters creates waves one by one in the 
air. Each piece of air carrying pieces of speech arrives and raises awareness in the hearer. 
Mullā Ṣadrā mentions these, however he does not think they are really important.  
As well as the notion of medium, the notion of an extra-mental object is accidental in his 
theory of hearing:  
Not because one air [wave] carries that quality [i.e., the sound] and 
reaches with it to the ear-canal; and not because a number of air waves 
transmit all [of the sound] to the other part, [and that part to the other 
part of the air] until the air in the proximity of the ear-canal is qualified 
[by the sound] and transmits that to the ear-canal. This does not negate 
what has been mentioned by us earlier, that is, the soul does not connect 
to the perception [of sound] except through a form obtained in the 
substrata of its disposals by nature. Except, our discussion there was 
about the perceptible in essence for the soul. The perceptible in essence 
                                                          
77 These responses are by Rāzī in Mabāhith, p. 296 ff.  
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for it there is the perceptive form from the object of hearing obtained in 
the faculty of hearing. But here, our discussion is regarding the 
accidental sensible, and that is the external object of hearing. The source 
of this accidental connection is the particular position for the object of 
hearing in relation to the hearer together with the existence of the subtle 
body [i.e. the air] between the two [i.e., the object of sound and the 
hearer] (Asfār, v.8, p. 202-3, tr. Peerwani, pp. 148-9). 
This accidental relation becomes the conditions for hearing. And when the organ of 
hearing, the connecting air, and the object possessing sound come together they become 
the soul’s tool for perception.  
The second cluster of problems concerns the object of sound (Asfār, v.8, p. 203; 
Paraphrase, p. 269). Is it the sound of the air striking the air canal or is it the air striking 
the ear canal together with the air outside the ear as well? According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the 
answer is the air between the two objects compressing the air. The proof for this is that 
our awareness of the direction and distance of sound come together with the awareness 
of sound. Direction is known to leave no traces in the waves as the air reaches the canal. 
From wherever the sound comes, the hearer cannot make the distinction about its 
direction or distance. 
One could respond to this objection by linking the direction to the traces of air: the traces 
of the stroke will be stronger when the object of sound is near, and so on. Let’s think 
about a case where the sound comes from left but the left ear is blocked and the sound 
thus reaches the ear from the right. Mullā Ṣadrā claims the direction of the sound will be 
noticed as coming from the right although the sound emerges from the left. Mullā Ṣadrā 
also replies with another example of two sounds coming from the same distance, one 
stronger than the other. According to the claim we are supposed to perceive one of the 
sounds as coming from a further distance. However, it is not the case. These cases occur 
because it has always been difficult to detect the real reason for our awareness of distance 
and direction of sound.    
Mullā Ṣadrā focuses on and criticises Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdadī’s idea that awareness 
of the direction is obtained by following from where the trace came, and what is left of it 
in the air, which is the distance which it crossed (Asfār, v.8, p. 205; al-Muʿtabar, 1373h, 
pp. 331-6).78 According to this position, right after the sound enters the ear canal (the 
                                                          
78 Ṣadrā might have benefitted from Rāzī’s presentation of Baghdadī’s position here (Mabāhith, v.2, 
p.298). 
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opening of the ear), we perceive the distance through another set of perceptions. And we 
follow the tracks of the sound until it becomes weak. The degrees assumed in Abū al-
Barakāt’s theory worries Mullā Ṣadrā because for him, in hearing there is only perception 
of one thing. The perception of the sound and the distance of that sound are not two 
different things. So, by contemplation we find a set of things that are in reality only one 
existence: “There is the perception of one thing together with its direction, nearness and 
distance.” That makes every sound unique. So each sound is existent in the particular 
direction and position (Asfār, v.8, p. 152). Ṣadrā finds it difficult that the previous idea 
implies that there are previous and past perceptions to each instance of hearing: perception 
of direction distinct from perception of sound. This is related to Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
understanding of material beings as being units of space and time: “The existence of 
something material is not separate from the position and direction” (Asfār, v.8, p. 205-7).  
Just as the sensible is one thing, likewise the sensible perception 
connected to it is one perception. It is precisely the same as the 
perception of its existence, the perception that it is in such a direction, 
and the perception that it is in such a position (Asfār, v.8, p. 207, tr. 
Peerwani, p. 152).  
The features of a thing and its existence are not separable because the existence is the 
same as the existent. The perception comes with a notion of identity and accordingly the 
perceived thing is not separated from the perception.  
It might be useful here to compare Ṣadrā with al-Baghdadī and Avicenna. Perception is 
an abstraction process for Avicenna in which abstracted form is an image of the extra-
mental object. For al-Baghdadī, abstraction is to be criticised and perception is a relational 
process in which both the percipient and the extra-mental object is required (al-Khelaifi, 
1995, pp.66 ff.). The sense object is merely extra-mental object. For Ṣadrā, perception is 
completed by contemplation and the object is internally created. In relation to the 
discussion above, another important difference is that the extra-mental object that plays 
the preparatory role for perception is regarded as a whole for Ṣadrā, and it has its 
particular existence in a particular location etc. As a result, the sound and the distance of 
the sound cannot be two different things and cannot cause different set of perceptions. 
Ṣadrā discusses the senses in the most immaterial manner possible. As he debated in 
favour of celestial smells in the section on smell, celestial spheres can be heard as well. 
This is the ancient discussion which finds its source in Pythagoras and is debated further 
by the Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus, Simplicius, and Proclus (Steel, 1978, pp. 61 ff). 
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So the main claim is about hearing the harmony of spheres. This topic is originally 
discussed by Aristotle as a problem discussed by the Pythagoreans. Aristotle rejects this 
idea. Firstly, the question is whether harmony has a sound. Aristotle indirectly rejects the 
claim that spheres can be heard by rejecting the fact that the spheres make any sound 
(Aristotle, On Heavens, 291a6). This is built on the assumption that sound is created 
through strikes of two hard surfaces, and this further necessitates that sound is a material 
thing. As the spheres are different from the material earth, then we cannot attribute sound 
to it. Many Neoplatonists who accept heavenly music explain the possibility of hearing it 
as an exceptional case only for special humans, e.g. Pythagoras. Ordinary men cannot 
hear it because their ear is not compatible with the celestial sounds. Nicomachus of Gerasa 
thought an ordinary human’s weakness in nature is the reason for their inability of hearing 
heavenly sounds. In a similar way Iamblichus claimed that the reason Pythagoras could 
hear the heavenly music is that he was similar to god79 and no longer in need of 
instruments such as music to prepare him for his own perfection. Music in this view is an 
instrument to create order in one’s self. In Simplicius’ case we have purified souls who 
can grasp heavenly music in a non-physical way. Hearing this music is not only turned 
into an intellectual process but also an inner journey by turning away from the extra-
mental world. Plotinus mentions this at the end of Enneads V.1.12: 
None the less every being of the order of soul is in continuous activity 
as long as life holds, continuously executing to itself its characteristic 
act: knowledge of the act depends on transmission and perception. If 
there is to be perception of what is thus present, we must turn the 
perceptive faculty inward and hold it to attention there. Hoping to hear 
a desired voice, we let all others pass and are alert for the coming at last 
of that most welcome of sounds: so here, we must let the hearings of 
sense go by, save for sheer necessity, and keep the soul’s perception 
bright and quick to the sounds from above (tr. Stephen MacKenna and 
B. S. Page, p. 379). 
Two additional conclusions are related to these claims. In relation to the idea of the human 
soul’s fall from higher realms and the epistemological theory that knowledge is 
remembering, one can conclude: in reality, human beings are familiar with the heavenly 
                                                          
79 Sedley talks about how becoming like god is related to a human being’s return to her former matterless 
form, to her original nature. With improvement of the intellectual self, the human achieves godlikeness 
(homoiosis theoi) (Sedley, 1999, p. 320). This tradition is continued until Ṣadrā and is an important part 
of his psychology. He strengthens the notion of becoming godlike with his unique idea of the human soul 
in constant substantial motion.  
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smells, sounds, and so on. In order to remember their pre-body histories all they need to 
do is to eliminate the relationship to the body and discover what is within (O’Meara, 2007, 
pp. 149-158). Ṣadrā quotes the Uthūlūjiyā and Plotinus’ introspective method and how 
isolation from the world helps elevation of the soul (Asfār, v.8, p. 333, 360; Uthūlūjiyā, 
pp. 22-3, 69). As long as the idea of turning away from the material world is still central 
for him, sensation is an important part of the soul’s elevation. The perfection of the soul 
is started and maintained by the senses. Moreover, the senses themselves are made 
immaterial in his account as they too are connected to intellection.   
Among Islamic philosophers, al-Kindī accepts that the celestial spheres produce their own 
music. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā after al-Kindī followed the idea with two principles: First, that 
the celestial sphere has an efficient causal role over the earthly world of generation and 
corruption. Second, that there is affinity and similarity between the higher realm and the 
world below it. They think that the idea of the difference of celestial spheres from earthly 
beings does not require that celestial beings are totally different from natural bodies, some 
characteristics are shared between two realms (Shehadi, 1995, pp. 43-4). Shehadi lists a 
second argument based on the causal effects of celestial spheres that inhabitants of them 
would be supposed to be deaf and this is not suitable for their high existence. The third 
argument is the fact that humans have music requires that their teleological goal and 
source should have music too (Shehadi 1995, p. 45). 
Ṣadrā has a similar stance to the Neoplatonists and the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (Asfār, v.8, p. 208). 
However, the idea of the unity of soul is stronger for him and explains material and 
immaterial parts of the soul in a similar manner. In terms of the higher senses, similarly, 
he connects them to the material senses. He manages this by a monist approach that takes 
even the lower levels of the soul’s functions as immaterial. I explained this 
immaterialization of the extra-mental senses previously. This paragraph shows how the 
idea of unity of soul and the identity principle is brought into the picture eventually:  
The psychic (nafsānī) Man has the sensations of the things by his 
essence, and the judgment on them by his essence. He does not need the 
natural [bodily] tools for his perception and act. So his perception of the 
external things from the sensibles [or sensory impressions] is either by 
the form of something additional present with him, or obtained in him, 
except that his perception of it is its very form and not by another form, 
otherwise there will entail the chain of double perceptive forms. Thus 
his essence by itself is for perceiving the visible objects of sight, the 
audible objects of ear, and likewise every species of sensibles. Thus he 
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in his essence, for his essence, is [the sense of] hearing, sight, smell, 
taste, and touch. You have learned from what preceded about “the 
unification of sense with sensible”. So he is the sense of all senses 
(Asfār, v. 9, pp. 92-3; tr. Peerwani, pp. 403-4). 
Thus in Ṣadrā’s presentation the third cluster of issues is related to the existence of air 
between the hearer and the object of sound together with the requirement of no thick 
object between the two. In the case of celestial objects ancient philosophers thought that 
the contact is enough for maintaining the transmission of sound. Mullā Ṣadrā does not 
negate the existence of the faculty of hearing in celestial bodies, just as he did not negate 
smell. It indicates that these sensations – smell, sound and so on – are not purely material 
features for him. For him, celestial entities have simpler and more perfect faculties which 
are similar to that of our imagination (Asfār, v.8, p. 209).  
This section is important because it shows that his understanding of celestial hearing is 
not limited to exceptional human beings and also that ordinary hearing is not a physical 
process either. For him, every extra-mental sense is performed by the soul and is non-
physical. This in an interesting way of also making the celestial spheres closer to humans 
and in a way claiming the possibility of perception and perceptibility for them requires a 
frame outside the context of the material-immaterial dichotomy. He uses cases like 
celestial hearing and dreams as proofs of the activity of the soul during “seemingly” 
physical senses. 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s vision is a construction/creation (inshāʾ) that occurs in the human with the 
power of God. This is a construction of a similar form of the object of perception but the 
form in the human emanates from the angelic realm of the soul (ʿālam al-malakūt al-
nafsī). This form is abstracted from material features and external matter. And it is 
considered as an action of the soul itself more than an action of the extra-mental sense 
object (qā’im bi-fāʿilihī) (Asfār, v.8, p. 212). A human being is armed with a creative power 
given from God that enables the soul undergo a change and receive the emanation of 
special abstracted forms of the external objects. Here the idea of abstraction is combined 
with the idea of change in the soul. Ṣadrā devotes a number of chapters solely to vision 
and the first chapters criticize the previous theories of vision. 
Lindberg lists three main approaches in Greek optical thought as a medical tradition 
(mainly Galenic), a physical or philosophical tradition (mainly featured in Aristotle), and 
a mathematical one (pioneered by Euclid) (Lindberg, 1976, p. 33). Although it is almost 
customary to categorise the theories of vision as extramission and intromission theories, 
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when we delve into the details of these theories, one easily sees that this twofold 
categorization, as well as Lindberg’s three-partite categorization are oversimplified. Rāzī 
lists three groups in which two ray theories are included with imprinting theory as the 
third option: a) a ray-like object leaves the eye in the shape of a cone, b) the rays in the 
eye qualifies the air and the rays and the air become tools of the vision (Mabāhith, v.2, p. 
299). 
Ṣadrā, in his take on the history of theories of vision states that there are three clusters of 
theories: theories of Naturalists, Mathematicians, and Suhrawardī’s. Throughout all these 
discussions, the main problems are about explaining vision when it occurs at a distance. 
However, vision happens only when an object is present. The other problem is due to the 
unbalanced sizes of the objects of vision and the organ, the eye. While some theories 
focused on explaining how vision occurred at a distance (by contrast to the nature of 
touch), the others focused on the duality between the object and the organ. In Ṣadrā’s 
presentation, the nature of the light and colour is not discussed as much in detail as in the 
previous philosophers. Apart from this single difference, Ṣadrā follows the same titles as 
had been customary in the vision-literature.  
The first group he mentions are the naturalists, who argue for the imprinting theory of 
sensation. Aristotle’s theory might be one of the most influential theories; however, it 
was not that popular amongst ancient philosophers. Nevertheless, it can still be used as a 
frame for the main discussions of the topic. Remembering his definitions of sense, one of 
Aristotle’s definitions of soul was a relative scheme of actualities and potencies. When 
sight is defined in such a fashion, the first actuality becomes the capacity to be changed 
into the object of sight, which means to change into the colour. The second actuality in 
sight is actually seeing, which is to be changed by colour and to be actually like it 
(Johansen, 1997, p. 36; Paraphrase, p. 264). In a similar context, sense is also described 
as a change. In this definition, a sense object is the agent and the organ of sense is the one 
acted upon. In vision, the form of the object is imprinted in the eye.   
Aristotle claims that vision requires the transparency of its medium (Johansen, 1997, p. 
38; also DA 418b4-10; Paraphrase, p. 259). Colour is transparent, in other words, visible, 
because the medium makes it possible (Johansen, 1997, p. 38).80 
                                                          
80 “But what we call transparent is not something peculiar to air, or water, or any other of the bodies 
usually called transparent, but is a common nature and power, capable of no separate existence of its own, 
but residing in these, and subsisting likewise in all other bodies in a greater or less degree” (DSS 439a21-
5, tr. Beare). Mushaffat used in Arabic for transparency. cf. DA, II.7, 418b4-8; Paraphrase, p. 257. 
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Aristotle treats water and air as transparent, and this means that they are see-through. But 
Democritus and defenders of reflection theories claim just the opposite, that these are 
surfaces for reflection. With the idea of transparency, Aristotle makes it possible that the 
object has more agency (Johansen, 1997, pp. 47-8).  
While Aristotle’s theory is defended by Avicenna, it appeared with some revisions. Light 
is understood as the state or affection of the medium. And the medium is transparent. 
Aristotle’s colour is in a sense always actualized. The medium, on the other hand, is 
sometimes potentially transparent (thus actually dark), and at other times actually 
transparent. Light, in this account, is a state of medium being actually transparent. For 
Avicenna, the medium is always actually transparent while colour shifts from being 
potential to actual (McGinnis, 2010, pp. 104-6).81  
This is built on Avicenna’s differentiation of two kinds of light, natural and acquired light. 
In this revised theory, air does not carry the images. Whilst in Aristotle’s case the light is 
what actualizes the medium and colour is what sets it into motion, Avicenna thinks what 
is needed for actualization of the medium is presence of a body which has either acquired 
or natural light (Hasse, 2000, p. 111). On this issue, Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with the need for 
a transparent medium for vision to occur (Asfār, v. 8, pp. 233-5). However, this need for 
a medium is not necessary but accidental. Because sight –like the other senses-, is defined 
as an immaterial process in its reality. His detailed analysis and criticism of rival theories 
in ShN are summarized in Mashriqiyyūn:  
We say that the image of the object is transmitted through the mediation 
of the translucent towards the receiving member of the body, which is 
smooth and luminous, without the substance of the translucent 
receiving it in any way in the sense that [the substance] is this form; 
rather it happens in no time, when [object and perceiver] face each 
other. [We say] that the image of the object at the moment it gets 
imprinted is imprinted in the crystalline humour and that the faculty of 
sight in fact is not situated in the humour, otherwise one thing would be 
seen as two […] the whole of this image is conveyed in two hollow 
nerves towards their intersection in the form of a cross. Just as a thin 
                                                          
81 “Don’t suppose that white, red, and the like actually exist in the bodies in the way that they are seen but 
that the dark air prevents the vision of it, for the air itself is not dark. What is dark is only that which itself 
receives the radiant light, whereas the air itself (even if there is nothing luminous in it) does not hinder the 
perception of that which receives the radiant light nor does it conceal the colour when it exists in 
something” (ShN III.1, p. 93, tr. McGinnis, p. 106). 
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cone extends –in estimation82-(wahm) from the external form until it 
lets its point fall behind the surface of crystalloid, likewise the image in 
the crystalloid is conveyed through the mediation of conveying spirit, 
which is the two nerves, towards their intersection in the way of a cone, 
so that the two cones meet and cross there and one image-like form is 
formed out of the two in the part of the spirit, which conveys the 
perceived [form],[...] the common sense then receives this form, being 
the perfection of vision (tr. Hasse, 2010, p. 121).  
As well as explaining the imprint through the Galenic idea of spirits and nerves, Avicenna 
also admits interference of inner sense for perfection of the sight. Avicenna’s intromission 
theory on the other hand, betrays the influence of Galenic ideas on notions such as 
crystalline humour and optic nerves (Hasse, 2000, p. 122). The role played by inner senses 
reminds one of the ideas of Baghdādī and Ibn al-Haytham. Both talk about a two-staged 
notion of sensation in the second of which the sensation is formed through interference 
of the inner senses. In Ṣadrā’s case, the external sense is never completed without this 
interference. In that sense, he admits the two staged account and moulds the stages into 
one. In a way, he also challenges a linear explanation formed of sense-inner sense-
intellect, and turns it into a circular explanation in which all the stages are in relation to 
each other and intellect is active at all times. 
According to the second view, vision takes place by the rays of light emanating from the 
eye and falling over the object. Ṣadrā is less critical of this theory. He seems to find some 
parts of this theory compatible with his own approach and even the mechanics of the ray 
theory can be used to further understand his approach to vision. This is because he does 
not explain the details of the process for vision. Furthermore he thinks that the ray theory 
is successful at solving some problems about vision such as seeing objects smaller at a 
distance, and seeing objects in different sizes when they are in water. Despite these 
positive points, the critical problem with the ray theory is that it depends on the material 
structure of the world (Asfār, v.8, pp. 211, 225-228).  
The third theory that Ṣadrā discusses is Suhrawardī’s. For Suhrawardī, vision of objects 
is not solely the result of the reflection of light on the object. This light is what gives the 
object its colour which is later transmitted by the air to the eye. On the contrary, light is 
not material and it cannot be reduced to colour (Marcotte, 2000, p. 143). He evaluates and 
                                                          
82 Hasse translates “wahm” as imagination, which might suggest slips in Avicenna’s usage between wahm 
and khayāl. 
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rejects two previous theories of vision in his Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. In the first one vision is 
accepted as occurring by the emission from the eye of a ray that encounters the objects 
seen. According to the second theory, vision is the imprinting of the things in the 
crystalline humour (ḤI, p. 70). Partawnāma is more in line with the peripatetic 
explanation of vision (Suhrawardī, The Book of Radiance, tr. Ziai, p. 30) since he rejects 
ray theory and accepts Aristotle’s idea of imprint. However, he rejects Aristotelian sense 
theory in Ḥikmat. The difficulty with this theory is to describe how the eye, being different 
from the objects it perceives, manages to capture those objects. When the example of a 
mountain is taken, if seeing is imprinting, how does the eye manage to imprint a mountain 
which exceeds by its magnitude the limits of the eye?  
According to Suhrawardī, vision is neither through a medium in the air nor is it by the 
eye; rather it is an unveiling where vision becomes possible between two things. He 
explains later the main conditions for vision to take place:  
Since you know that vision is not by the imprinting of the form of its 
object in the eye nor by something emerging from the eye, it can only 
be by the illuminated object being opposite a sound eye—nothing more. 
[...] being opposite amounts to the absence of a veil between that which 
sees and that which is seen. Extreme nearness hinders vision only 
because illumination or luminosity is a condition of being seen. There 
must be two lights: the seeing light and the light seen (ḤI, tr. Wallbridge 
and Ziai, p. 96).  
One can think that lights are constraints to the immaterial world simply because 
Suhrawardī sees light as a metaphysical element and reality. However, even in the 
physical realm, the subject and the object must be luminous. This occurs with differently 
when these lights in the physical realm are accidental (ḤI, p.77, Marcotte, 2000, p. 150). 
The light of the subject is important, as “when the act of vision occurs it is ultimately 
the seeing light of the soul", and the object is important for the occurrence of vision. 
The object of vision is subject to two types of light: physical and ontological. The 
condition for the object of vision is to receive the light or be the light itself: “thus, the 
nearer the illuminated object or light, the more easily it is beheld, so long as it remains 
a light or illuminated” (ḤI, p. 96).  
Vision occurs only when its conditions come together. There is the necessity of face-
to-face encounter, absence of any sort of obstacle or veil between the subject and the 
object, and the presence of light (Marcotte, 2000, p. 149). 
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Suhrawardī thinks that in the process of vision, objects receive light and are constituted 
of light (Marcotte, 2000, p. 150). Thus, in his theory, he makes light the focus of his 
ontology and his theory of vision. He presents an active understanding of lights which 
refers to lights in the seer and in the seen. Finally, he sets conditions for vision to take 
place. As a result he gains his highly immaterialised theory of vision. Perfect vision 
only occurs at the metaphysical level when all obstacles between the soul and 
intelligible realities are eliminated (Marcotte, 2000, p. 149). At the metaphysical level, 
similar processes are listed only with a notion of unveiling (Marcotte, 2000, p. 153; ḤI, 
p. 140). 
Suhrawardī sees soul as active and regards perception as an irreducible experience.83 
He makes commanding light (isfahbad light) the real agent of vision, and thus 
Suhrawardī includes vision among rational soul’s actions. This is because the 
commanding light is the ruling rational soul (ḤI, tr. Walbridge and Ziai, p. 139).  
Another important aspect of vision and the senses in general is that they are acts of the 
soul. This has been stated above. Moreover there is another implication of this idea. 
Suhrawardī claims that sensation is not reducible. This is because knowledge must be 
relying on some foundation that does not entail regress, and that all other knowledge is 
built upon. Sense data is one of these bases. And another important reason is that they 
are products of subjective experience. They cannot be defined objectively, and by 
anything other than themselves. 
Ṣadrā differentiates himself from these three theories but also claims to perpetuate the 
theory that ‘Aristotle’ defended in Uthūlūjiyā (Asfār, v.8, p. 213). However, he does not 
explain what the theory in the Uthūlūjiyā is. This indeed is the theory of Plotinus. In terms 
of its basics, Emilsson thinks Galen and Plotinus follow the vision theory that is found in 
Plato’s Timaeus. Lindberg also connects Galen to the Stoic theory of vision (Lindberg, 
1976, p. 10). Both find discomfort in the previous theories for the same reasons. In 
Galen’s approach, the shape is not imprinted in a body unless it is equal to it. For him, 
the medium of air plays a role in perception as part of the body, it is extension of nerves 
(Emilsson, 1988, p. 59). Emilsson connects this to the sympatheia of Plotinus.  
                                                          
83 “There is nothing more evident than sensations to which the definitions might be reduced, since all our 
knowledge is abstracted from sensations. Therefore the simple sensibles are known innately and have no 
definitions. […] the simple sensations and experiences are all without parts and nothing is more evident 
than they. By them, their components are known” (ḤI, tr. Wallbridge and Ziai, p. 74). 
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Plotinus denies the idea of medium as Aristotle presents it for senses (Hansberger, 2012, 
p. 62). On the other hand, a necessary connection between the soul and the sense object 
remains to be important for him. This connection is maintained through sympatheia.  
Remembering Plotinus’ dualist psychology and extreme separation of body and soul, 
denial of a medium might not be as compatible with the idea of a connection gained 
through sympatheia. Not only a tension between admitting some mediacy for the sense 
organ at places is found in Plotinus’ writing but also alterations that combine Aristotelian 
medium and Plotinian notions are observed in the Arabic renditions of the related texts. 
The function of bringing together the materiality of objects and immateriality of the soul 
remain to be the goal (Hansberger, 2012, p. 64-65). However, the role of sympatheia is 
not found in Arabic sources any more (Hansberger, 2012, p.66).84  
Galen’s theory is rejected by both Suhrawardī and Avicenna. Avicenna argued that if the 
rays going out from the eye can travel to the objects and then back to the eye, the first 
journey of the rays from the eye appears redundant as it is possible to have vision only by 
the rays travelling from the objects. Second, he rejects the role air plays in Galen’s vision. 
According to this, if the air changes and acts as part of the soul, in cases in which there is 
more than one seer, the vision of the viewers should be sharper as the amount of optical 
pneuma is larger (McGinnis, 2010, p. 107). Suhrawardī’s rejection of these comes from 
a totally different concern. It is that light is special for him and he rejects these theories 
on the bases that vision is not material. First, he claims that the rays cannot be accidental, 
and second that they cannot be bodies (Marcotte, 2000, p. 140). 
Going back to Plotinus, as Ṣadrā’s possible predecessor; for Plotinus, we are part of the 
cosmos in a permanent state and the cosmos resembles an organism. In Galen’s case, the 
relation of the air as an extension of body is not part of the cosmos (Emilsson, 1988, p. 
59). With this permanent connection between the human and the world, he explains vision 
of an object at a distance without the need for rays or medium. The emanated form, which 
is the abstracted sense object in Ṣadrā’s theory, resembles the special form invented by 
Plotinus, a non-physical omnipresent form which is dependent on the organic unity of the 
cosmos (Emilsson, 1988, p. 57). Thanks to the sympatheia theory, Plotinus assumes a 
unity in the cosmos that connects the sense organ and the sense object. This makes it 
possible for him to claim direct perception of a distant object (Emilsson, 1988, p. 59). In 
                                                          
84 For a detailed analysis on the Arabic adaptations of Enneads sections on vision and medium, see 
Hansberger, 2012, pp. 61-76. 
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Ṣadrā’s case, human being is considered as a microcosm, and this thought keeps s similar 
relation to sympatheia between the human and the cosmos.  
Ṣadrā gives these three approaches and claims that his theory is different from the three. 
Yet, he does not explain how he differs from them. From what he explains we can infer 
that he disagrees with the idea of imprinting in the Peripatetic theory, the idea of rays in 
the naturalist theory due to both their material tendencies. Imprinting theory appear to e 
the most different one from his own approach. The ray theory, on the other hand is 
presented with more positive notes in Asfār. However, the idea of perceiving forms in 
matter is problem for his subjectivist attitude. It is difficult to see how he differs from 
Suhrawardi’s more immaterialist approach in which the light is incorporeal. It seems that 
Ṣadrā would like to disengage from any idea of extra-mental objects in his theory and that 
for Suhrawardī the object and confrontation is part of the theory.85 Suhrawardī establishes 
a relation between extra-mental object and the human soul, yet for Ṣadrā the relation is 
merely between human soul and the internalized form. Thus, he claims Suhrawardī is 
wrong in calling a relation between a body and a light as illuminative relation.86 
Despite his rejection in general, Ṣadrā continues Suhrawardī’s notion of illuminative 
relation. In terms of a tradition, Ṣadrā places himself in line with the author of the 
Uthūlūjiyā. Yet again he does not explain what the exact form of this theory is. I think 
one could deduce from this that the mechanics of vision are not really important for him. 
What really matters is that the sensation itself is not an extra-mental issue and that it is 
not a material process:  
The vision takes place by the creation of form [by the soul] by the power of God. It 
resembles [the object of vision in the external world] but it is from the world of 
dominion of the soul which is disengaged from the external matter, is present with 
the perceptive soul; it subsists by it as the subsistence of act with the agent, and not 
as the subsistence of the object of reception by its receiver […] the external form is 
the preparatory [or occasional cause] for the emanation of that  form [from the soul] 
                                                          
85 His position is summarized in Asfār as: “[T]he vision takes place when the illuminated object is face to 
face with the organ of sight in which there is vitreous humour. If these conditions are found together with 
no obstacle, then there occurs to the soul the knowledge of the illuminative presence of the object of 
sight; the soul perceives it as a clear manifest vision” (Asfār, v.8, p. 212, tr. Peerwani, p. 156). 
86 “Naming this relation–from the soul through the intermediary of the body to something corporeal 
possessing position−as the “luminous relation” is absurd. Because the relations between the bodies, or 
through the intermediary of the bodies and what they consist of is nothing but the positional relation 
[which takes place due to the particular position of the two bodies] such as, facing each other, being 
proximate to each other, having contact, interlocking with each other,being opposite to each other, etc. 
All these relations and positions are shadowy, material relations” (Asfār, v.8, p. 214, tr. Peerwani, p. 158). 
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when the conditions [for the vision] are realized (Asfār, v.8, p. 212-213, tr. Peerwani, 
p. 156-7) 
With the theory of vision, Ṣadrā’s presentation of external senses ends. The chapters that 
follow after the senses in Asfār continue with discussions on inner senses. The flow of 
topics is almost word by word the same with Avicenna. In many places, he also uses the 
versions of Avicenna’s texts paraphrased by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. When it comes to revision 
of the Avicennan inner senses or rejection of the multiplicity of faculties, he often uses 
Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s proofs.  
Ṣadrā’s presentation of inner senses is not particularly distinctive. He explains the five 
inner senses faithfully after Avicenna using summaries of the relevant sections from 
Mabāhith. As mentioned previously, Avicenna’s systematization of inner senses rest on 
differentiation between different cognitive objects, between receptive and retentive 
powers, and between active and passive powers. This appears to be a stricter and more 
sophisticated application of Aristotle’s idea of proper sensibles: 
Each sense then is relative to its particular group of sensible qualities: it is found in 
a sense-organ as such and discriminates the differences which exist within that 
group; e.g. sight discriminates white and black, taste sweet and bitter, and so in all 
cases (DA III. 2, 426b8, tr. J. A. Smith). 
As mentioned before, many of the inner senses appear to emerge from the irregular cases 
that can be classified as neither sensation nor intellect. One solution to these cases where 
an analysis, composition, judgement etc. of data from different senses is regarded is that 
of a sixth sense, responsible for the common sensibles. As well as Aristotle, many 
philosophers after him, such as Avicenna, Aquinas and Ṣadrā, continued to reject the 
existence of a sixth sense (ShN IV.1, p. 163; Summa theologiae Ia78,3, p. 129; Asfār, v.8, 
p. 236). In the Shifāʾ, common sense occurs as a faculty where all external senses end up 
(ShN IV.1, p. 163). But this is not a faculty for common sensibles. It receives all the forms 
which are imprinted on the five senses and transmitted to it from them. It is located in the 
forepart of the front ventricle of the brain (Najāt III, p. 31). In relation to the discussion 
in the DA about common and accidental sensibles, Mullā Ṣadrā says this faculty is not 
what senses accidental or common sensibles. It is where the traces of sensibles are 
collected (Asfār, v.8, p. 237). The relation between a man and his being a father of a 
person is not a function of a faculty but a work of the intellect. Things such as movement, 
dimension, or magnitude have some kind of relation to the external senses. At this point, 
Ṣadrā separates his path from Avicenna. Dimension, magnitude, number and so on comes 
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together with the perception of senses (Asfār, v.8, p. 238). They are not accidental or 
common sensibles, they are perceived together with the senses. Avicenna, as mentioned 
in chapter two, tries to prove their existence through two points. First is the issue of 
incidental perception and the ability to analyse trans-sensation data. The second is the 
differentiation of capacity of retention and reception.  
Mullā Ṣadrā accepts that the existence of such a faculty is not essential and, moreover, it 
is not bodily, nor is it located in the brain: common sense is a faculty of the soul, thus it 
is not located in the brain because the soul is not identical to or existent within the body 
(Asfār, v.8, p. 243). I have discussed Ṣadrā’s evaluation of proofs for common sense. 
However, it should be evident that he neither proves nor disproves differentiation of inner 
senses. As seen in the previous discussion, he tries to reply to Rāzī’s criticisms of the 
Avicennan proofs according to his own stance in which imprinting theory is denied.    
Mullā Ṣadrā largely discusses the previous theories; however, he does not reveal much 
about his original ideas about common sense. His approach to the other inner senses is 
the same. He follows the tradition of proving imagination and its separation from the 
other senses. His presentation on this topic, like the one about common sense, does not 
reveal a lot about his own understanding of imagination. He presents mainly the 
Peripatetic approach, thus his presentation is not novel on its own. He generally states 
that the soul is enough to account for these cases. However, he does not object to the 
Peripatetic inner senses nor does he present arguments against this. This is mainly because 
the active agent for all levels of perception is the soul and the soul is a unity. 
In terms of the relation of khayāl and sensus communis, we can look at how the usage 
changed between Aristotle and Avicenna. After the discussion of external senses, 
Aristotle talked about a sixth sense other than the five external senses and rejected this. 
He also spoke about perception and judgement on data coming from different senses. As 
each sense is strictly bound to its own organ and objects, this kind of perception either 
requires a central perception system for the external senses or a sense that can combine 
the data coming from the senses and different from them. What Aristotle implied as 
common sense is later formulized as a faculty that is a storehouse for the sensible forms 
coming from the different senses. This is found with the name ḥiss mushtarak or 
bintasiya/phantasia. What follows is khayāl, which is important for explaining perception 
as absence of objects or dreams. Following the differentiation principle, Avicenna assigns 
common sense (ḥiss mushtarak) for reception and imagination (khayāl) for retention. 
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Moreover, each faculty has a specific bodily organ just like the external senses. Inner 
senses are located in different parts of the brain.  
After khayal, we have mutakhayyila as the next faculty. This faculty acts under the control 
of the intellect in humans and of estimation in animals. For Ṣadrā, the differentiation of 
this faculty from intellect and estimation is so weak that one can claim they are one and 
the same as intellect.  
Know that although estimation according to us is different from the 
faculties mentioned, its essence is not different from the intellect. 
Rather, it is related to essence of intellect for the particular individual; 
it is connected to it, and its management is for it. So the intellective 
faculty connected to imagination is estimation. Also, its perceptions are 
universal meanings but related to individual, imaginal forms. Estimation 
does not have another essence in existence other than the intellect, as the 
natural universal, as the quiddity qua it has no reality neither the external 
existence nor the intellectual existence (Asfār, v.8, p. 255-6, tr. 
Peerwani, p. 188).87 
So, according to this section, the estimative faculty is a separate faculty from the intellect. 
But its essence is the same as the intellect. This is also related to Ṣadrā’s principle that 
the soul is all its faculties (al-nafs kull al-quwā). 
Mullā Ṣadrā establishes a unified perceptual system where external and inner senses are 
intertwined. Accordingly, no sense perception is merely the work of the sense organs and 
the object of the sense perception is not merely the extra-mental object before the sense 
organ, i.e. the eye. External senses and inner senses are all dependent on the soul and the 
soul is all its faculties: “That the soul is the single faculty which is the perceiver of all 
types of perceptions” (Asfār, v.8, p. 261). 
One striking point Ṣadrā makes is that the soul is the perceiver of particulars and this 
gives him the opportunity to say that the soul is the real perceiver while sense perception 
occurs, e.g. when the eye sees. Sense perceptions and the inner senses in this 
schematization are but tools the soul uses and intellect is active during the processes. 
Ṣadrā and Avicenna’s theories differentiate in the sense that one takes the brain as its 
central organ when the other has an immaterial understanding in which the soul is the 
centre. One of the relevant proofs for the fact that the brain is the centre is the dysfunctions 
in the brain. When one part of brain is damaged, we find that a parallel dysfunction occurs 
                                                          
87 Some changes have been made to the translation. 
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for the function operated by that part of the brain. Ṣadrā replies that the brain or the other 
physical organs function as tools for the soul. It is natural that problems with the tools 
affect perception; however, it falls short of showing that the brain is the centre for 
perception. To say that the brain or the organs are the centres of perception is like saying 
that the glasses are the seer rather than the eye. The central question is about accepting 
differentiation principles. And it can be summed as: does the differentiation of senses 
entail multiplicity of souls? Another important question is related to the range of 
imagination over other processes of sensation. It is active when the object is absent. So 
when sensation is not active, imagination is performing. The defining question is whether 
imagination is active or passive at the time of sensation as well. In Ṣadrā’s case, 
imagination is active at all processes of external senses. Let me discuss the first point 
about unity further. This is important because unity and monism is at the centre of all of 
Sadrian accounts. His answer to the second question is also related to his monism.  
3.3 THE UNITY OF THE SOUL 
“By this demonstration it is established that the substance of 
your soul by which you are you is the hearer, the seer, the 
subject which is pained, delighted, intellective, 
comprehending, striker and walker although for every kind of 
these acts there is a need for a particular, natural tool as 
long as we are in the natural world” (Asfār, v.8, p. 266; tr. 
Peerwani, p. 196) 
When it comes to what is really important for Mullā Ṣadrā, we find that his stance is 
radically different from that of the Peripatetics: “[…] that the perceiver-mudrik of all 
perceptions-idrākāt that belongs to human faculties are the rational soul” (Asfār, v. 8, p. 
261). This implies a unity among all types of perception for a human being. An idea of 
unity for the soul can be found in Aristotle’s thought as well. As was mentioned before, 
some vague references to a unity were given in works such as DSV.  
Now, since every sense has something special and also something 
common; special, as, e.g., seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the 
auditory sense, and so on with the other senses severally; while all are 
accompanied by a common power, in virtue whereof a person 
perceives that he sees or hears (for, assuredly, it is not by sight that one 
sees that he sees; and it is not by taste, or sight, or both together that 
one discerns, and that sweet things are different from white things, but 
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by a part common to all the organs of sense; for there is one sensory 
function, and the controlling sensory organ is one, though differing as 
a faculty of perception in relation to each genus, e.g., sound or colour); 
and since this subsists in association chiefly with the faculty of touch 
(for this can exist apart from all the other organs of sense, but none of 
them can exist apart from it—a subject of which we have treated in our 
speculations concerning the soul); it is therefore evident that waking 
and sleeping are an affection of this. This explains why they belong to 
all animals; for touch alone belongs to all (DSV, 455a13-455a26, tr. 
Beare). 
Ṣadrā’s understanding of knowledge is less related to extra-mental realities. As has been 
discussed in the previous section, for him an extra-mental object’s role is nothing more 
than preparing the soul for accepting abstracted forms. For Aristotle, on the other hand, 
the extra-mental objects are an extremely important part of the theory of knowledge. 
Aristotle claims that the intellect and senses are different in their nature and they require 
totally different processes; one material, the other immaterial. However, with his principle 
that the soul perceives particulars, Ṣadrā claims it is the soul at all times that perceives at 
times of intellection as well as at times of sense perception. 
To make it more understandable, Ṣadrā posits a number of proofs: 
First proof: The soul-self (nafs) is all its faculties because it dominates among different 
inner and external perceptions, estimation (wahm), and also intellect. The exchange 
among these can be possible only if soul (nafs) is supposed to be the main cognizer 
(mudrik) of all these.  
Ṣadrā uses an example we are familiar with from Avicenna’s proofs of common sense: 
our judgements such as, “This sweet and white thing is sugar”. These show our ability of 
conjunctive judgements among data from different senses. There must be a centre and a 
central perceiver which is the self (nafs). The ability to connect white and sweet with the 
sugar is not only about an exchange among senses; it is also about the ability - so to speak 
- to convert between universals and particulars in both directions. Thus, these cases of 
combining different sense-data, and combining particular universal concepts and 
experiences prove that the human self is the centre of all perceptual and cognitive 
processes. In the case of imagining a form, for example, of Zayd and seeing Zayd himself, 
“There must be one faculty which is the perceiver of imaginative form and the sensible 
form so that it is possible for it to arbitrate that this form in imagination corresponds to 
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this sensible. There must be a judge between the two to call to presence the two to judge 
upon them” (Asfār, v.8, p. 262; tr. Peerwani, p. 193). For the judgement to take place the 
governor of composition of meanings and forms or of differentiation must be one and the 
same as the perceiver of meanings and forms (Asfār, v.8, p. 262-3).  
Although it appears that the imaginative form and the sensible form is in action in the 
previous example, Ṣadrā takes a step further and places nafs as the central cognizer which 
is active in the process of matching particulars and universals too: 
When we sense Zayd or ʿAmr, and judge that he is a man or a [rational] 
animal and not a stone, nor a tree, we judge that the particular sensible 
by the universal intelligible. When we perceive an individual horse, but 
we judge that it is an animal and not human, we judge that the former 
sensible is the particular of the latter intelligible idea, and not the 
particular of some other intelligible. So there is in us a single faculty 
which is the perceiver of universal intelligibles and particular sensibles. 
Therefore, it is established that the soul is that single faculty which is 
the perceiver of all types of perceptions (Asfār, v.8, p. 262; tr. Peerwani, 
p. 193). 
A certain familiarity strikes one when one reads the first proof as Ṣadrā uses the very 
same example other philosophers use to prove the existence of common sense (sweet and 
white) to prove a slightly contradictory idea of soul being the main perceiver. Moreover, 
remembering the notion of duality in Plotinus and Avicenna, the parts of the soul that 
interact with universals and particulars were differentiated in their essence. Ṣadrā requires 
a unity of the soul in order to recognize particular instances of universals and concepts. 
Thus he thinks that the knower of the particulars is one and the same as the knower of the 
universals.  
This first proof explains why it is not important for Ṣadrā to differentiate between 
different faculties and why it is not important to differentiate between inner senses. If we 
explain the source of the developed theory of inner senses as the irregular cases that do 
not classify as external senses and as intellect, for Ṣadrā the unity of the soul is itself 
explanatory enough for irregularities. These are not irregularities in the first place because 
the exclusive understanding of proper sensibles is not an essential part of his theory. He 
even claims a further dynamic: not only the transportation of information between inner 
and external senses, but also the transition of the activity of particular to universal is 
brought under the umbrella of unity.  
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The second proof is similar to the first proof. This time, the focus is on the psychological 
nature of this multiplicity. Put in more traditional phrasing, this proof is from the point of 
the knower. This proof can be labelled as the introspective proof. On the one hand we 
have multiplicity that is observed through different functions as perception of 
seeing/hearing etc. objects and cognizing universals. On the other hand, a person who is 
the active agent of these different functions does not suspect that s/he is numerically one. 
When these two unsuspected premises are combined, one would be sure that the self is 
the real centre of all these.  
If the perceiver of intelligibles was other than the perceiver of sensibles, 
then the substance of your essence which is “you”, according to the 
investigation, would not perceive the two together. If you perceive the 
two, then you are one essence that is the perceiver of the two… If not 
then you will be two essences and not one essence. Similar is the 
argument regarding the concupiscent and irascible [faculties] (Asfār, 
v.8, p. 266; tr. Peerwani, p. 195). 
This paragraph points to the continuity of experiences and shows the holist perspective 
of the subject. The assumption behind it is that the differentiation principle entails radical 
separation of different parts of the soul. And that the differentiation principle is 
inconsistent with the continuity of experiences. 
The third proof on the matter is from the point of knowledge. A basic principle that makes 
this proof possible is Ṣadrā’s idea of the soul as perceiver of particulars as well as 
universals. This is connected to his definition of the soul as bodily at the beginning of 
soul’s journey.  
The soul is the perceiver of particulars. There is no doubt that the soul 
is an individual essence and is connected to the body, which is a 
connection with respect to managing [the body] and disposal in it […] 
It is known that a particular soul would not be the manager of the 
universal body otherwise it would be an immaterial universal intellect. 
In which case it would not have the connection with a particular body 
but would be [an entity] having its connection with all the bodies. The 
consequent is invalid, so the antecedent is also invalid. Therefore the 
soul is the manager of a particular body. Now the managing of the 
individual qua individual is impossible except after having the 
knowledge of it from the aspect of its individual ipseity. That is only 
possible by the presence of its individual form before the soul. This 
necessitates the soul to be the perceiver of particulars and the perceiver 
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of universals. Thus in man there is one ipseity possessing numerable 
levels (Asfār, v.8, p. 267; tr. Peerwani, pp. 196-7). 
This proof differs from the first one only in terms of the viewpoints, their contents are on 
the other hand, the same. There, Ṣadrā focused on the point that the different faculties are 
supposed to be considered as a unity and here he focuses on the nature of the thing known. 
He adopts the idea that knowledge requires knowledge of universals (this, though, should 
be indirect knowledge). Accordingly, particulars would not be known on their own. And 
it is mentioned in the first proof that the transition from one to the other requires 
continuity and unity of the soul. 
It is possible to see some similarities between Aristotle and Avicenna’s texts and the idea 
of unity of the soul. There are obvious paragraphs in Najāt where Avicenna talks about 
different perceptual processes being a unity which is the soul: “We say that the soul is a 
single substance and has many faculties” (Najāt XV, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 64). Still, for 
Avicenna the differentiation of each faculty is important. Thus the unity might be 
regarded as the soul being a centre of all these differentiated faculties.  
Again, we say ‘when I perceived such and such a thing, I became angry’; 
it is a true statement, too. So it is one and the same thing which perceives 
and becomes angry. 
 Now this unitary thing is either man’s body or his soul. If it is the body, 
it is either the totality of his organs or only some of them. […] Then 
what becomes angry is that very thing to which the sensory the 
perceptive faculty transmits the content of its perception. Its being in 
this status, even though it be body, is not due to its being body alone; it 
is then due to its being in possession of a faculty by which it is capable 
of combining both these things. This faculty not being a physical one 
must be soul itself. Thus the substratum in which both these qualities in 
here is not the whole of our body, nor yet a single organ in so far as it is 
a physical organ; so the conclusion is that the combining substratum is 
soul itself or body in as much as it possesses soul, the combining 
substratum even in the latter case really being the soul, which itself is 
the principle of all these faculties (Najāt XV, tr. Fazlurrahman, p. 65). 
Two points are clear in Avicenna’s texts: that every faculty is differentiated by their 
functions and objects, and that the intelligibles are given to the soul and never gained 
through other lower faculties of perception. Secondly, it is obvious that all perceptual 
levels are still related to each other and necessary for knowledge.  
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I mentioned before that for Avicenna souls have two aspects, that relating to bodily nature 
and that to higher principles.  
It is as if our souls have two faces: one turned towards the body, and it 
must not be influenced by any requirements of the bodily nature; and 
the other turned towards the higher principles, and it must always be 
ready to receive from what is There in the Higher Plane and to be 
influenced by it (Najāt IV, p. 33). 
However, this unity must not disguise the inevitable gap between the sensible and the 
intelligible. According to Avicenna, neither can particulars be perceived by the intellect 
nor can universals be perceived by senses (ShN V.2, pp. 209-210). 
There are two essential points for understanding Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the unity of the 
soul. The first is that all stages of perception must be completed either by the intellective 
or the imaginative faculties. Accordingly, perception is considered with a sense of 
wholeness or completeness. This makes differentiation of sense perception from other 
stages of cognition less significant. The second point is that the soul can perceive 
particulars. This is an implication of making the soul an active agent behind sense 
perception as well as intellection. The main reason why Peripatetics separate sense and 
intellection is that one perceives particulars and the other one perceives universals. This 
shows why active intellect is such a cornerstone of their cosmology and epistemology.  
As regards the activity of the imagination, we need to recall Ṣadrā’s notion of sensation. 
In the previous section, I mentioned that every sense is completed by help of either 
intellect or imagination: “[E]very sense perception’s subsistence is by the imaginative 
perception, and every imaginative perception’s subsistence is by the intellection” (Asfār, 
v.8, p. 240; tr. Peerwani, p. 176). Accordingly, I claim that even the most material stages 
of knowledge are immaterialised by Mullā Ṣadrā (Asfār, v.8, p. 277; tr. Peerwani, p. 205). 
This results in an ambiguity between the inner and external senses. The examples used 
for proving the existence of inner senses are repeated in his Asfār without strong 
resistance. On the other hand, where he effectively uses these examples is to prove that 
the soul is the real active agent and not the objects in the extra-mental world. Some of the 
examples can be listed as the line seemingly caused by a raindrop, ghouls in the desert, 
and the experiences of epileptics and the images we see in dreams. Ṣadrā combines them 
as the Peripatetics’ third and strongest argument to prove common sense:  
A man perceives forms which have no existence in the external world 
such as what occurs to the epileptics, and also what is perceived by a 
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sleeping person in his dream. He witnesses big sensible forms, audible 
sounds which are distinguished from other [sounds]. Also, those who 
have eminent souls, such as the prophets and the friends [of God], 
peace be upon them, they witness with their sound senses the sensible 
beautiful forms and sounds about which they do not doubt [their 
occurrence], and they distinguish between them and the other [forms]. 
So do those weak in mind when scared and afraid at seeing the battles, 
earthquakes, etc., in the external world may see forms corresponding 
to the states of their mental distress. Now those forms have existence 
because the pure nonexistence would prevent from being distinguished 
from the others, [and since they are distinguished from each other, so 
they exist]. But their existence is not in the external world otherwise 
every one with sound sense [of sight] would see them. Now the 
perceiver of those existing things is neither the faculty of intellect, for 
the intellect prevents perceiving the bodies, dimensions, and shapes 
with measures. Nor is it the external sense because these forms are 
perceived when the senses are more or less quiet and non-active. They 
are also perceived in the dream [state]. Besides, the object of vision 
may also be perceived in the waking state at the closing of the eyes 
(Asfār, v. 8, p. 248; tr. Peerwani, p. 182).  
These cases do not occur frequently in everyday life because they are generally caused 
by weakness in the sense perception, such as in sleep, or emotions clouding reasoning, 
such as in the case of fear causing one to see ghouls or physical conditions such as 
epilepsy. With the effect of the weakened sense the creative imagination becomes more 
active and less controlled by intellection. In these cases we see human beings’ creating 
these non-existent forms and although the soul is still regarded as the agent, they are 
neither in the intellect nor in the sense:  
According to us the imaginative forms which the epileptics witness are 
not in a substratum which may entail their substratum to be either a 
corporeal part from us or a soul. Nay, they are suspended forms which 
subsist by the soul and are preserved by it so long [the soul] witnesses 
them (Asfār, v.8, p. 221; tr. Peerwani, p. 163). 
For perfected souls, there is the possibility to connect with the higher realm and to witness 
what is unseen for ordinary people. Thus, another explanation for perceiving non-present 
things in senses is that the soul interacts with the unseen (Bonmariage, 2002, p. 45). In 
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this case, we cannot directly talk about creativity of the soul for these non-present forms, 
as they come from the realm of the unseen. 
As for the second point that the soul perceives particulars, Ṣadrā lists a number of proofs 
and assigns a whole chapter to this topic in his Asfār. The first proof is that intelligible 
people perceive that the senses take place in the sense organs. If the soul were the 
perceiver, then we would not have particular awareness about particularity of the senses. 
The second proof comes from the factual cases of dysfunction. In these cases when the 
sense organs and parts of the brain are damaged, this damage affects the performance and 
success of the external and inner senses. This should demonstrate correlation between the 
senses and the sense organs. Accordingly, it is not the soul but rather the sense organs 
which are the perceiver. The third proof is built on the multi-layered understanding of the 
world (in a similar fashion to seeing the senses multi-layered as those for particulars and 
others for universals). If the soul is the perceiver, every being that can sense should have 
a soul. In this case we would end up with the absurdity that animals have immaterial souls 
since they too perceive.  
In general, the basic assumption behind these proofs is a multi-layered idea of the world 
and the senses. In this, each layer is dramatically differentiated and distanced from other 
layers, and none of these layers can interact with any of the other layers. However, Ṣadrā’s 
epistemology and ontology is built on a monist approach. His main reply to the proofs 
about the multiplicity of the senses is based on this.  
These cases are used to claim that correlation is superficially true. They are for him only 
proofs that the soul uses these organs as tools and that perception might require some 
physical conditions. However, these do not, according to him, necessitate that these tools 
are the actual perceivers. 
This is possible because the active [or agent] faculty [that is, the soul] 
needs those tools [of perception] for those acts in regard to its activity 
for those acts but not in regard to its essence. For do you not see that 
people having weak eyes need the eye-glasses for vision? 
From that it does not entail that this tool is the perceiver. So is the case 
with these natural [i.e., physical] tools (Asfār, v.8, p. 276; tr. Peerwani, 
p. 203). 
The material features of the sensation as the object, organ, and so on are already discussed 
and it is explained that for Ṣadrā these are redefined as immaterial. The object and the 
147 
 
perception and the perceiver are the same as the soul. And this is possible because, just 
as the extra-mental object is only preparation for the sensation, so is the sense organ.  
After three considerations on the unity of the soul, Ṣadrā adds some particular proofs 
(Asfār, v.8, pp. 268-278). These proofs draw attention to different activities of the soul 
and connect it to the divisibility of the soul. The basic claim in these proofs is that these 
activities are related to the soul rather than the body.  
First particular consideration: The locus (maḥall) of lust and irascibility is not the body, 
and it is not anything bodily. All bodies are divisible. If the body were the locus, then one 
part of the body could be angry and the other part in lust. As a result, we would observe 
one individual in both these states at once. This is absurd, so the locus of these should be 
immaterial. This proof also proves that not only lower levels of the soul such as animal 
faculties, but also emotions, are explained in an immaterial fashion. 
Second consideration: The estimative faculty is non-bodily. If it were bodily, then we 
could think about proportions of things such as friendship as a quarter friendship, a half 
friendship, etc. Moreover, objects of estimation such as enmity and friendship would be 
capable of sensible pointing (al-ishāra al-ḥissīya). In this way, we could think of enmity 
here, and there. But this is not the case. Thus, estimation should be non-bodily. 
Third consideration: The faculty of imagination (khayāl) and memory (ḥifẓ) are not 
bodily. One of the proofs for immateriality is that the imagination is active at the dream-
state and when people with mental health problems perceive non-existent things. Objects 
of dreams, illusions, and similar issues are not bodily and existent. Thus, the faculty that 
perceives them is not bodily due to the identity principle. Secondly, if things that are 
imagined and remembered were imprinted in the brain, then humans would not have 
enough space in their brain for all the experiences they cognized. 
To sum up the arguments we discussed so far, Mullā Ṣadrā’s proofs for the unity of the 
soul, his principle that soul is all its faculties, and that the soul perceives particulars are 
all intertwined. They are connected with the idea of identity. The soul is the same as those 
that it perceives and as well as the soul, its percepts are immaterial. Now let me give a 
summary of the chapter and Ṣadrā’s theory of sensation. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
Mullā Ṣadrā posits monist ontology when his ideas on his approach to the human as a 
microcosm and the gradation of existence (tashkīk) are considered. He still keeps the 
Active Intellect’s role as a source of knowledge, but also applies two important principles; 
firstly, unification of the knower and the known; secondly, knowledge as a mode of 
existence. Knowledge and experiences of self, in this picture, play an important role in 
the human soul’s substantial change and movement from its material departure to its 
higher immaterial destination. On the side of the object, material objects of perception 
present a unity that carries their space-time features into the perception process. On the 
side of the agent, the self undergoes a change with the process of perception which Mullā 
Ṣadrā names as identity of knower and known.  
To sum up, the substantial difference of Mullā Ṣadrā’s thesis from the Peripatetic attitude 
is the principle of ‘unity of being’. The harmony between God, human, and other 
existents, tashkīk, and substantial motion (ḥaraka jawharīya) are closely related to and 
caused by this main principle that existence is one single reality that is the cause of 
multiplicity in the universe (basīt al-ḥaqīqa kull al-ashyāʾ): 
You have come to know that wujūd is a single, simple reality. Its 
individuations are not differentiated between themselves by things 
essential, such as genus, specific difference and the like. Rather, they 
are differentiated from each other by perfection or deficiency, self-
sufficiency or poverty. Now, deficiency and poverty are not things 
which are postulated by the reality of wujūd itself. If this were so, there 
would be no Necessary Being. The consequent is false, as was 
established; the antecedent must therefore also be false. 
It has become therefore evident that the reality of wujūd is, in itself, 
complete and perfect, infinite in power and intensity. Deficiency, 
shortcomings, contingency and the like only come from what is 
secondary and caused. Inevitably the caused is not equal to the cause 
and the emanated is not equal to the source of emanation. It is therefore 
evident that the Necessary Being is the plenary perfection of all things; 
it is the wujūd of all existences and the Light of all lights. (Mashāʿir, p. 
49, tr. Nasr) 
It will then become clear that sense is not only about grasping what is present out there, 
but a construction. Perception becomes completed when imagination is involved. 
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In this new presentation of sensation, the object of sense is no more than a mental object: 
“the sensible in essence is the form which is present with the soul and not something 
extra-mental corresponding to it” (Asfār, v.8, p. 238; tr. Peerwani, pp. 174-5). 
Ṣadrā refuses to take the sense organ as the real perceiver. He takes support from a proof 
from regression: 
You may say that the visual faculty which is in the eye is the eye is the 
organ which perceives the perceptible object, then it transmits what it 
has perceived through the connection which exists between it and 
yourself and thus you gain an awareness of the thing which (actually) 
the visual faculty has already perceived. (In that case) we will ask: after 
the transmission to you, do you (again) perceive the visible object as the 
organ had perceived, or not? If you say “yes” then in that case your 
perception is one thing and you’re your organ’s perception is another. 
But if you say that you do not perceive after the transmission, then you 
have not perceived or heard or felt your pleasure and pain…for the 
knowledge that the eye sees, the ear hears, the feet walk, and the hand 
seizes is not identical with seeing, hearing, walking and seizing, any 
more than our knowledge that someone else is hungry or feels pleasure 
or pain is identical with our feeling hungry, pleasure, or pain (Asfār, v.8, 
p. 265-66, tr. Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 222). 
In this case, it is fair to say that Mullā Ṣadrā’s external senses are not externally centred 
or sourced; in contrast, it all comes from inside or above. This is why: “[E]very sense 
perception’s subsistence is by the imaginative perception, and every imaginative 
perception’s subsistence is by the intellection” (Asfār, v.8, p. 240, tr. Peerwani p. 176). 
The relation of the sense object and the sensation is an illuminative relation. This 
immaterial relation is made possible by the redefined internalized sense object. Thus, in 
terms of the intentionality question reflected to the relation of sensation and sense object, 
we have an internalized sense object, and an immaterial relation between the object and 
the sensation. To say it more exactly, the sensation, the sense object, and the soul are one 
and the same.  
In Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory, we find an upside-down relation of Aristotelian or Avicennan 
external-internal senses hierarchy. The extra-mental world is not the only and unique 
source for intellection as it was for Aristotle. Quite the opposite, even the external 
processes find their source in the human or from the higher worlds than the material extra-
mental world. The identity principle is affected from the structural difference in Ṣadrā’s 
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presentation of sensation. The identity is vague and still about the relation between extra-
mental object and the soul. What is happening in Aristotle’s case is that a potential in the 
soul becomes active and what becomes active is a quality of an object. So the quality of 
the object and quality of the organ are identical. In Ṣadrā’s explanation, however, the 
perception, perceived and perceiver are literally identical. Whilst an accidental change is 
occurring in Aristotle’s human, human in Ṣadrā’s theory undergoes change in the 
substance.  
I can now state some basic principles from what I have discussed among Sadrian texts.  
First, sense perception is an active process for the soul, not the sense organ, whereby the 
soul undergoes a change and an abstracted form that correlates to the extra-mental sense 
object emanates from it.  
Second, the form subsisting in the soul has an accidental relation to the extra-mental sense 
object. However, the extra-mental object still correlates to the internalized real sense 
object and is similar to the abstracted version of itself. The form of the material object 
plays a preparatory role for the soul to accept the emanated form. 
Remembering the centrality of the active intellect in Avicenna’s theory, the active 
intellect’s role as the guarantor of knowledge is given by Ṣadrā to the notion of homology 
of human and the cosmos. What makes a datum true is the similarity between human 
mind as human imagination and the world as the imagination on a larger scale (Khamanei, 
2006, p.153).  
In this chapter I aimed at explaining how the mental world is built and how it is related 
to the extra-mental world. I concluded that the inner world of the mind is actively built 
by the human, thus intentional objects are creations of human beings themselves. Their 
relation to the extra-mental world is of a similarity and built on the homology of the soul 
to the world. In this sense, Mullā Ṣadrā’s epistemology is at some points reminiscent that 
of Plato in which knowledge is remembrance. However, Ṣadrā does not say it explicitly 
and the characteristics of knowledge in his version seem to be more active than a theory 
of remembering. The next chapter will pursue linguistic and ontological aspects of 
intentionality. The first part of the next chapter will deal with the idea of the soul and her 
place in the world. After this introductory section, the first question will be how the 
mentalized objects are turned into symbols and used as entities of language. The language 
of existence is a by-product of this quest. The related question is what kind of language 
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is required for an ontology that accepts mental and extra-mental entities. After these, I 
will give a detailed discussion of the ontological issues on intentionality.  
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4 CHAPTER IV 
LANGUAGE AND LOGIC 
Spoken words are the symbols of “mental experience” [or “of affections in the 
soul” (tr. Ackrill)] and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as 
all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, 
but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for 
all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images (DI, 16a3-
7).88 
The wujūd of a thing is either extra-mental or mental, or spoken, or written. 
The first two are real and the latter two are conventional (Tanqīḥ, tr. mine, p. 
254).89 
In the previous chapter, I focused on Ṣadrā’s version of the theory of perception. Together 
with Ṣadrā’s conception of the soul, I aimed to show the process of the production of 
objects of perception. This chapter discusses the way in which those objects are reflected 
in symbols in language and speech. In previous chapters, the basic claim for intentionality 
is that the discussion on soul is an essential part of medieval discussions. In terms of 
intentional objects in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā, it is discussed that the object of 
perception is internal and produced by the soul. This is not only a more immaterialized 
version of the Peripatetics’ theory of sense perception but a creative way of looking at the 
relationship of human beings to their environment. In Ṣadrā’s case, we find a more active 
agent and a process that is less dependent on the extra-mental world. I also mentioned 
that the theoretical tools Ṣadrā used for this kind of perception theory is the idea of ‘the 
creative capacity of the soul’ and ‘the human being as a microcosm’ which plays a similar 
guarantor role for knowledge to the Peripatetics’ active intellect (MQ, pp. 33-5). Ṣadrā is 
not accounting for the infinite and random creation of mental worlds that are subjective. 
Rather, his idea of homology between the human and the cosmos guaranties certainty and 
objectivity. With this, relationship of similarity the relationship to the extra-mental world 
is assured. The creative power in the human is due to the human being’s status that she is 
created in the image of God. Mullā Ṣadrā finds similarities between the forms in the 
                                                          
88 In the Arabic version the word mental (as narrated by Ḥunayn) is “affections are in the soul” ( يتلاراثلاا
سفنلا يف) (IbAR, v. 1, p. 59). 
89 “مملااو راصعلاا بسحب امهفلاتخلا,نايعضو نارخلااو;نايقيقح نلاولااو .يبتك وا يظفل وا ينهذوا ينيعاماءيشلادوجو” (Tanqīḥ 
the Ibāra section, p. 254). Cf. a parallel text from Aristotle about conventionality of names: “I say ‘by 
convention’ because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even 
inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name” (DI 
16a26, tr. J.L.Ackrill). 
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human mind to the creations in God’s knowledge. He thinks that, whether mental or extra-
mental, the real active agent in existence is always God (MQ, p. 34). Thus, together with 
the idea of the human being’s similarity to the cosmos and human creative nature, he 
points to the dual nature of the human (similarity to cosmos and God) and a human 
being’s in-between status (barzakh). Since the creation process of mental beings are, as 
mentioned, covered in the previous chapters by the process of sensation, this chapter will 
focus on the way these beings are represented in language and writing; it aims to explore 
intentional inexistence further by looking at linguistic and logical entities.  
The main claim is that language is a realm created by and dependent on the human mind 
and that language is basically this humanly world of the mental made apparent/visible 
and symbolized. The relation between object and the mental is turned into a relation of 
words and concepts. The mental status of these linguistic entities comes from the fact that 
they are products of judgements. Here I would like to draw attention to a differentiation 
between an image in the mind and a judgement (Findlay, 1963, p. 5). In Brentano’s case, 
the image (Vorstellung) is passively received by the human. The judgement, on the other 
hand, is maintained by an active mental process. This is similar to the Peripatetic 
understanding of sensation as discussed in the previous chapter. Previously Ṣadrā’s 
different active explanation was also presented. What this means in terms of the mental 
image and the judgement is that both the image and the judgement is actively maintained 
by the soul. Yet, when it comes to the symbols used for these mental images, Ṣadrā agrees 
with the idea that the symbols are derived from the images and thus, in a sense, more 
passive. It is commonly observed in the classical philosophies that the extra-mental world, 
the world of mental constructions, and linguistic entities are constructed in such a way as 
to be connected and distinct at the same time. In modern times, the relation of the extra-
mental object and the mental content is identity when we read Brentano. This might be 
due to his direct realism (Findlay, 1963, p. 7). Meinong thinks that the words are a second 
level of signification and sentences are representatives of judgements (Meinong, 1983, 
pp. 24-28, 28-30). The medieval philosophers show a more complicated case of both 
similarity and distinctiveness between different realms of the extra-mental, mental, and 
symbolic world of writing and speaking. The argumentation about the similarity of the 
object and mental content for Peripatetics were discussed in the second chapter. This 
similarity is built on the hylomorphic language that Peripatetic philosophers use for 
explaining cosmos, existents and knowledge. The distinctiveness makes it easy for 
philosophers to explain how concepts, physical things, and words can have different 
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attributes from each other. Avicenna, for example, discusses different attributes of a 
quiddity when it is mental and extra-mental. We can say that part of Avicenna’s 
theorization of mental existence is related to the second part about explaining differences 
between these realms. Similarly, Fārābī discusses how linguistic terms and concepts are 
different and, as a result, they are ruled by different norms (Abed, 1991, p. 127). Avicenna 
describes the process of language production in a similar way, but more dependent on the 
extra-mental world and on the sensation process. He creates a relative hierarchy between 
imprints (āthār) and meanings (maʿānīʾ). Words in essence signify (tadullu) things 
(umūr) which are extra-mental (ShIb, pp. 1-3). This is a representative theory in which 
linguistic entities are explained in relation to the imprints of the extra-mental objects. 
However, in terms of accountability, Avicenna opens up space for mental interrelations 
as he does not deny meaning for fictional things or accept truth values for propositions 
over these. To put it more clearly, the reference of a word is to the extra-mental object 
when the object is existent and to the mental correspondent when there is no extra-mental 
object that corresponds to the word (ShIb, p. 3).  
The classification of different realms that are parallel platforms of being can be traced 
back to Aristotle as: de re, mental, spoken and written. Given that this type of 
classification is common and dominant between ancient and medieval thinkers, in this 
chapter I will assume that all other than de re being are mental existents. In terms of 
spoken and written entities, they are more of a reflection of what already is a mental being. 
They are symbols for the world of the mental (DI 16a 5–9; IbAR, p. 59).90 In this sense 
the latter two realms are second order and similar to the term derived intentionality, a 
notion found in modern discussions. Objects that possess derived intentionality are 
content-bearing artificially in contrast to mental states that are intrinsically content-
bearing. I will not discuss this connection further as the differentiation of intrinsic and 
derived intentionality is beyond the scope of this research. 
Returning to the original discussion, the difference between the mental and the other two 
symbolic realms is that the latter are conventional and have more dependent modes of 
being than mental existence (Tanqīḥ, p. 254). This conventionality is also related to a 
human being’s creative nature and active role in language and concept formation. It will 
be explained further in the section about assent and conception that the creative role is 
apparent in the judgement and the passivity of language is apparent in the assent. Āmulī 
                                                          
90 A section from DA can be added as a relevant text as well. In DA, soul and imagination is presented in 
relation to speech: “Voice is a certain kind of sound made by ensouled being” (DA 420b 5-7, 29–32 tr. 
J.A.Smith, Paraphrase, p. 269). 
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evaluates Ṣadrā’s words in a way that implies a stronger link between extra-mental world 
and mental existence than that of extra-mental world and language. Thus mental beings 
are individuated (ʿaynī) as being the human construction of a similar world, but writings 
and linguistic entities are not (Āmulī, 1307, p. 30).  
The first sections of this chapter will deal with Ṣadrā’s idea of the soul. The following 
section will be on the nature of proposition, predication, and the copula as mental entities 
(though they are shadowy in comparison to mental beings). This will show how they are 
bound to different rules than physical beings due to their representation of mental beings’ 
intentional inexistence. How such construction of a special world made up of linguistic 
and logical rules can be possible will be the topic of the last section of this chapter. This 
is connected to Ṣadrā’s idea of tashkīk al-wujūd91 and his unique approach to different 
meanings of being. Accordingly, this type of world is possible because existence is a 
single reality manifested at different levels, intensities and priorities/posteriorities. 
  
                                                          
91 The word appears in the translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and re-emerged in Islamic philosophers’ 
writings later. Ṣadrā reinvents the term for his principle of primacy of wujūd (existence). During the text, 
I decided to leave tashkīk in its original form as I did in the usage of similar other terms such as wujūd. 
This is mainly because I want to keep the focus on its original usage in Ṣadrā’s philosophy. In relation to 
predication with tashkīk, Kalin translates the term as predication by equivocality, in relation to 
ontological usage he translates the term as gradation. Rizvi uses a more original term for tashkīk: 
“modulation”. In one of the earliest works on Ṣadrā, Fazlurrahman chooses “systematic ambiguity”. I 
chose to leave the Arabic term as it is because I think each of these translations only partially reflects its 
meaning. I believe the nuances that emerge during the different contexts will be more apparent as the text 
evolves. For a detailed analysis of tashkīk in philosophies before Ṣadrā, see Treiger, 2012, pp. 327-66.  
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4.1 MULLĀ ṢADRĀ’S IDEA OF THE SOUL 
The previous chapter discussed how what is formed in the soul in the process of 
perception is through the action of the soul. The knower, the known, and knowledge are 
identical. The process is explained immaterially and internally. The soul is active at the 
process of sensation and the sense is always completed with the interference of either 
imagination or intellect. The result is that the objects of the sense are among the list of 
most obvious habitants of the mind: what is perceived in sensation becomes mental 
existent. In order to discuss how the mentalized objects are symbolized and carried further 
to the realms of language and logic, I will first need to discuss Ṣadrā’s idea of the soul. 
This discussion will, moreover, add depth to the previous explanation of how the soul is 
active in the sensation process. With this, Ṣadrā’s ideas briefly mentioned previously as 
the soul being active and having creative capacity together with the idea of the soul as a 
microcosm and the human as a god-like being (theosis) will be connected to his 
explanation of what the soul is. And this will be connected to the linguistic discussions 
of mental beings. 
Aristotle’s definition of the soul, which is different from the purely immaterialist Platonist 
approach and the materialist pre-Socratics, formed a new form of dualism which values 
the body as well as the immateriality of the soul. His exploration of this definition started 
with the idea of life. The living bodies were then regarded as having vegetative, animal, 
and rational souls. Each one of these had corresponding faculties and bodily structures. 
When summarising the previous definitions of the soul, Ṣadrā lists them as the form of 
the body, as the perfection of the body, as a compound of soul and body, and as the 
substance (Asfār, v. 8, pp. 7-9).  
That the rational soul is immaterial and different from the body is a celebrated idea by the 
time of Mullā Ṣadrā. The flying man argument or similar introspected thought 
experiments implied this outcome in the hands of Porphyry, Plotinus, St. Augustine, 
Avicenna and Suhrawardī. Suhrawardī’s proofs for an immaterial soul can be given as an 
example.92 The knowledge of the self is not related to the knowledge of the body. This 
requires differentiation of soul from body. The ego/self is not the same as the body. 
Similarly, the consciousness of one’s self is continuous. Awareness of the body, on the 
                                                          
92 For a detailed analysis of Suhrawardi’s soul see Halide Yenen (2007) Sühreverdî Felsefesinde 
Epistemology (Epistemology in Suhrawardī’s Philosophy), University of Marmara/Istanbul.  
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other hand, is not (Asfār, v. 8, p. 46). Following these differences, the soul is neither body 
nor ‘in’ the body (Partawnāma, p. 23). Another proof is given through objects of 
knowledge. The knower should be of the same nature as the known in order to be able to 
conceive it. The universals do not occupy space and are not material. Yet, the human can 
apprehend them. The identity principle requires that the knower should be of the same 
nature as the known. As a consequence, the soul should be immaterial as it is the knower. 
The idea of illuminative relation and this proof is used by Ṣadrā. His employment of the 
proof is for immateriality of imagination as well as immateriality of the soul (Asfār, v. 8, 
pp. 214-5, Asfār, v. 8, pp. 278ff.). Another proof draws attention to the difference between 
body and soul. The body confronts growth, ageing, and other kinds of changes. However, 
the soul remains the same.93 This proves the difference of the soul as well as her 
immateriality (Hayākil, p. 85, Asfār, v .8, p. 45). 
Sadra quotes Plotinus’ introspective anecdote to point to the immaterial nature of the 
human and her similarity to the cosmos.94 The idea of the human as microcosm is not 
unique to Ṣadrā. What makes his attitude unique is the way he combines this idea with 
the substantial motion of the soul and the dynamic reality of existence. The similarity of 
the human to the cosmos can be traced in ancient philosophies as well as modern ones. 
Examples include Plato’s mega zoon, Aristotle’s phusis in Physics (252b26), the Stoic all 
living universe, the Neoplatonists’ idea of kinship between the human soul and the World 
Soul, as well as the biblical idea of the human being created in the image of God (Genesis 
1.26) and the Renaissance idea of proportion (Bizri, 2006, pp. 4-6).  
Mulla Ṣadrā brings about the idea of the identification of man and the cosmos in his Iksīr 
al-‘ārifīn. This book is mainly based on Kāshānī’s Jāwidan-nāma where Kāshāni defends 
unification of the knower and the known.95 This identification comes as one of the 
                                                          
93“The parts of the [body of the] animal may increase at times and decrease at other times due to the 
[natural] dissolution [within]. There is hardly any animal body that is not overpowered by the innate heat 
and the heat of elements within it, the heat of the motion [of the sun] and the air around it especially when 
the summer [heat] increases at the high altitude of the sun, [when its body decreases in weight]. But that 
animal subsists by its individuality in all its states. So we learn that its ipseity is different from its sensible 
structure” (Asfār, v. 8, p. 45, tr. p. 33).  
94 “At times I became solitary in myself and removed my body on a side and became as if I was a 
substance disengaged [from matter] without the body. I was inside my essence [or myself], outside of all 
things. I saw in myself beauty and loveliness, and I remained very much astonished at it” (Asfār, v. 8, p. 
360, tr. p. 267). 
95 For a comparison of the book of the cosmos with the book of human see Iksīr al-‘ārifīn, 2003, p.22; for 
how the coming into existence of different parts of the human is compared to the creation of the cosmos, 
see Iksīr al-‘ārifīn, 2003, p. 28. 
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expected consequences of the uniformity of existence. Moreover, Mulla Ṣadrā links this 
identification to the possibility of a human’s knowledge.  
Man has knowledge of everything. Moreover, his essence has the receptivity for 
every form. There is nothing that is not similar to him (nazīr). The result is that all 
existent things are parts of his existence and, and he is all things due to his oneness. 
Because his existence is a macrocosm, his body is a microcosm (Iksīr, tr. Chittick, 
p. 19). 
This similarity of the human and the universe and its facilitating role reminds one of 
Plotinus and his sympatheia. In Mulla Ṣadrā’s theory, human beings create an emanated 
form which is the abstracted form corresponding to the sense object. This resembles the 
special form invented by Plotinus, a non-physical omnipresent form which is dependent 
on the organic unity of the cosmos (Emilsson, 1988, p. 57). Thanks to sympatheia theory, 
Plotinus assumes a unity in the cosmos that connects the sense organ and the sense object 
(Emilsson, 1988, p. 59). According to Emilsson, this (originally Stoic) term is used by 
Plotinus to account for direct perception by allowing action at a distance. Sympatheia 
depends on the unity of the soul in the world and the soul in the recipient (Emilsson, 2008, 
pp. 24, 27, 28). 
The Iksir al-‘ārifin paragraph, similar to Plotinus’ position, not only claims that the 
human being is a microcosm, but also that the human and the cosmos (other existents than 
human) share some sort of reality which makes such a microcosm-macrocosm relation 
and knowledge possible.96 This point can be used to prove that Mulla Ṣadrā is among 
those philosophers who think knowledge is possible among similar things. The small 
worlds and the great world are not only similar but also they are in harmony. This is the 
reason what makes human beings capable of contemplating on themselves and on the 
world. What is more, the human is also like a mirror for this world (Mafātih al-Ghayb, v.1, 
p.56).  
Existence is one reality shared by all existent things at different levels. By gradation of 
intensity, one reality remains as the source of many (Principle of Unity and Multiplicity). 
Beside his other writings, in Shawāhid, Mulla Ṣadrā explains how existent things are 
differentiated from each other with the seventh witness (shāhid) on existence (Shawāhid, 
1382 [2003 or 2004], pp. 15-6): “particularity (khuṣūṣ) of every existence is through their 
                                                          
96 When the human being (created with this resemblance) perfects its being, it becomes Perfect Man (al-
insān al-kāmil) where its resemblance to the universe results in its being able to command the world 
(Khamanei, 2006, p. 151). 
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being prior and being posterior, perfectness and deficiency, richness and poorness; or 
through their material accidents if these existents are material”. Every existent is unique 
and takes place at a level of existence. 
Going back to the idea of life as the centre of the idea of the soul, life is material for Ṣadrā 
(Asfār, v. 8, pp. 23-24). He follows the established syllabus in previous texts for 
discussing the soul in relation to the body and bodily features, and to the material 
configuration (mīzāj). Ṣadrā also refuses to define the soul in relational terms. Ṣadrā’s 
refutation of identifying the soul as one of these material candidates or as an accidental 
reality in contrast to substantial constitutes partially his proofs of the immaterial soul. He 
discusses the ancient ideas of soul such as ratio and harmony and denies them when they 
are interpreted to prove the soul as material. However, he thinks most of these ancient 
theories are misunderstood (Asfār, v. 8, pp. 286ff.).  
His notion of the immateriality of the soul is stronger than that of the Peripatetics. 
Moreover, the disconnectedness of matter and the immaterial is no more emphasized, so 
his stance is stronger than that of the Neoplatonists as well. This is due to his monist 
psychology in which matter is almost disregarded or matter is dissolved into the 
immaterial. One substance that is material changes into an immaterial substance through 
a continuous process of change. As a result, materiality and immateriality are assigned to 
this very same substance. “The human soul is corporeal in existence and disposal, and 
spiritual in subsistence and intellection” (Asfār, v. 8, p. 402, tr. p. 298).97 
The change in the soul from the material into immaterial can be applied to the directedness 
of the soul’s knowledge. The directedness assumed for the flying man argument can also 
be seen as the source of the dichotomy of direct and infallible knowledge versus indirect 
discursive and fallible knowledge formulized by Suhrawardī as knowledge by presence 
(ʿilm al-huṣūlī and al-huḍūrī). The idea of direct knowledge is important and part of the 
proof of existence and immateriality of the soul for Mulla Ṣadrā (Asfār, v. 8, p. 50). 
                                                          
97 Cf. Asfār, v. 8, p. 395, tr. Peerwani, p. 293: “The material souls [i.e., the souls at the potential level of 
intellect] are distinguished from each other by the attachments attained by them due to the matter. Since 
the souls are corporeal in creation so their ruling-property is the ruling-property of forms and the material 
natures subject to multiplication because of the corporeal agents of distinction. Due to these [attachments] 
there entails the determination of each one of them as their particular existence which is precisely the 
same as their self-awareness; and that continues firmly despite some kind of existential renewal. There is 
no doubt that there always remains the distinction among them because all of them obtain an existential 
difference according to their substantiation from the beginning of their generation till the end of their 
substantial perfection.” 
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However, indirect knowledge evolves into direct knowledge in a similar way. Here, Ṣadrā 
employs the traditional notion of self-knowledge: 
When a man turns within himself and is in the presence of his ipseity 
he sometimes becomes unaware of all universal notions even the notion 
of being a substance, or an individual or the one governing the body. 
When I apprize myself I only sense the being which perceives itself in 
a particular way. Whatever is other than that particular ipseity to which 
I refer by “I” is outside of myself, even the notion of “I”, the concept of 
existence, the concept of the perceiver itself, the concept of the body’s 
manager or soul, and so forth, for all of them constitute universal 
knowledge, and each one is indicated by me by “it”, whereas I refer to 
myself as “I”. Thus, the unawareness of substantiality, or ignorance of 
it does not negate it being one of the essential predicates for the human 
quiddity, and also for the animal [quiddity] (Asfār, v. 8, pp. 50-1, tr. 
Peerwani, p. 38). 
The real knowledge is this kind of knowledge. In regards to awareness of the self, he 
thinks even animal souls are aware of their souls and this awareness is continuous. “The 
animal’s knowledge of its ipseity is continuous, and not acquired by the senses. Whereas 
its knowledge of its internal and external parts [of its body] is not so. Therefore, its ipseity 
is different from its parts [of the body]” (Asfār, v. 8, p. 46, tr. Peerwani, p. 34). 
Ṣadrā’s idea that all forms of souls are immaterial breaks the boundaries of material and 
immaterial in an innovative way. As mentioned before, this is an extreme monism98 in 
favour of the immaterial.99 See, for example, how comfortably Ṣadrā applies Avicenna’s 
flying man to prove immateriality, and directedness of the animal soul as well as self-
awareness of animals of themselves: 
                                                          
98 What I mean by extreme monism is that all that there is is existence, nothing can be talked about or 
even conceived in mind that is not existent.  
99 Sadra gives a textual proof and spiritual reading for this. “The next world is a genus for many worlds. 
All those worlds, despite their levels of priority among them are greater and nobler than this world. 
Likewise, for man and his senses there are many modalities of existence other than this material modality 
subject to generation, corruption and dissolution. That is why the Exalted said: We will substitute your 
likenesses and recreate you in what you do not know [56:61]; and the Exalted said: The next world is 
greater in levels and greater in preferment [17:21]. After mentioning the creation of semen, a clot, a clot 
of tissue, all of which are the natural material levels, the Exalted said: Then We produced him as [yet] 
another creature. So blessed is God, the best of creators [23:14]. This is an indication to the nobility of the 
mode of spirit. The Exalted said: He has created you in stages [71:14]. Then there is the modality of being 
of the friendship [with God] for the one who triumphs in the next modality of being which is higher than 
the modality of being of the foundation of the spirit” (Asfār v. 9, p. 242, tr. Peerwani, p. 503).  
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Man cannot know the external parts [of his body] except through his 
senses; nor can he know the internal parts [of his body] except through 
the dissection [of the body]. Also, an animal cannot know its parts [of 
the body], and if it knows then it is through one of the two [afore-
mentioned] ways. Another demonstration that animal is not just a 
sensible frame: We say, if it is postulated that an animal is created 
suddenly, and created as a perfect [entity], but its senses are veiled to 
see the external things; that it is suspended in the void or in the absolute 
air; that nothing collides with it in [its] standing in the air; that it does 
not sense anything from the qualities; its limbs have been severed so 
there is no mutual contact [between it and its limbs]. Now in this 
condition also it is able to perceive its self [or essence], and can become 
oblivious to all its external and internal parts [of its body]. Nay, it is 
able to affirm its self but is not able to affirm that it has extension, 
height, breadth, or any direction. Even if it imagines a position, or a 
direction, or an organ [of the body] in that state, it is not able to imagine 
that any of those is a part of its self. Thus it is evident that the one who 
is aware of itself is other than the one from which it is oblivious. 
Therefore, its ipseity is different from all the parts [of its body] (Asfār, 
v. 8, p. 47, tr. Peerwani, p. 35).  
Soul is a unity that starts its journey as a material substance. It is the same as her precepts 
and her experiences. This was previously mentioned as the principle of the soul being all 
its faculties.100 The soul’s journey towards her perfection is not reversible. 
                                                          
100 “The soul is all faculties; that it is their unified combination, their beginning and their end. This is also 
the state of every higher faculty in relation to the faculties below it which serve it, even though their 
service is [in the order of] prior and posterior, for some of these faculties are prior to the others, and 
whatever is prior in time is posterior in rank and eminence. The soul that we have, or every animal has, is 
the unifier of the elements of its body, its combiner and composer in a way that is appropriate to become a 
body for it. It also nourishes it, feeds it and perfects it, as an individual by the nourishment and as a 
species through the reproduction; it preserves its health, repulses its sickness, and brings it back to its 
sound temperament when it corrupts, and by which lies its well-being. It keeps it continuing in the order 
which is necessary for it so the foreign external entities do not become dominant on it as long as the soul 
is existent in it. If the soul were not [there], then being the principle of the acts of perception and 
animality, and being the principle of the vegetal and natural acts in the bodily matter, it would not remain 
sound; rather it will corrupt at the dominance of the external states over it. When the imaginative or 
intellectual perceptions, whether joyful or painful, occur to the soul resulting in happiness or pain, they 
affect the body by either strengthening it or weakening it in the faculties of growth. This effect is not just 
from the belief qua belief of happiness or sorrow, rather these are also the states of soul and they affect 
the subtle matter flowing in the body, resulting in the change of states of the vaporous spirit and its 
temperament, and affecting the states of the coarse [physical] body and its temperament through the 
intermediary of the faculties. As for the rational joy, it adds to the strength of the faculties of the body, 
such as [the faculty of] growth, or that which is lower than it in degree, strongly and penetratingly. The 
rational sorrow adds to its becoming weak, to disability, and lassitude, so much so that its act corrupts it 
and impairs its temperament. This is one of the strongest indications that the activity of the soul and its 
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But once it becomes one of the species in actuality, its descending to 
the level of a pure potentiality another time is impossible, just as it is 
impossible for an animal to become sperm and blood-clot after it has 
reached the completion of [its] creation. That is because this is the 
[ascending] movement [of growth] in its essence and substance, so it is 
not possible for it to reverse, neither by compulsion, nor by nature, nor 
by will, nor by accident (Asfār, v. 9, p. 4, tr. Peerwani, p. 343).  
Simplicity requires that each level contain the levels below. Yet the faculties at each level 
come with capacities required for their specific level. The faculties in the higher beings 
are more perfect than those in lower beings. The vegetable soul in a plant is different from 
the vegetable soul in an animal. So in this presentation the notion of simplicity is 
combined with the idea of perfected faculties at each high level. This can be read as a 
redefined version of the definition of the soul as perfection. Each previous level plays a 
preparatory role for the soul’s journey to the next level, or its perfection: 
[The souls] are different in degrees in eminence in the existential 
perfection. The one which is prior directs itself to the one posterior to 
it, which is the directing of a thing to its perfection, and connecting the 
activity to its end, for the end of a thing is the cause of its completion, 
and not the cause of its invalidation (Asfār, v. 8, p. 38, tr. Peerwani, p. 
27).101 
In terms of the idea of perfection, the same type of perfection happens in the human 
internally as human is a microcosm. The human travels from her vegetative being to 
human being and turns into even higher and more delicate beings. 
                                                          
management flow till the ultimate end of the matter and the distant coarse shell [of the body] from the 
core of its most subtle higher substance. Thus it is established that the animal soul, nay the human soul, is 
the combiner of these vegetal faculties of perception, and their near and distant subjects [or bodies]. It is 
also the perfection for the subject [i.e., the body] which cannot be constituted except through it. It is also 
the one which perfects the species and is its artisan. For the things differ from each other by the souls, 
which differ from each other in the reality of species and not just in individual accidents. So the souls for 
the bodies are like the forms joined to the species which are actualized after their completion. Also know 
that the vegetal faculties existing in the plant are different in quiddity and species from the vegetal 
faculties existing in the animal. They are in two subjects [i.e., bodies], and also they are not accidents, as 
is imagined. Rather, [the vegetal faculties] in the plant are the actual substance, whereas in the animal 
they are potential” (Asfār, v. 8, pp. 54-5, tr. Peerwani, p. 40-41). 
101 Cf. “[T]he substance of the soul gradually acquires the levels in perfection, and necessarily includes 
the faculties and [their] branches which are requisite to it and included in it, which were before together 
with the other additions in quantity and quality. Those faculties and [their] branches are continually 
renewed in number according to their renewal in intensity and perfection. There is a beautiful simile 
given by some philosophers for the state of the soul from the beginning of its generation till the end of its 
perfection” (Asfār, v. 8, pp. 172-3, tr. p. 128). 
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The first of those [perfections] is the mineral form. It is the preserver of 
the composition [of the body], and is beneficial to the temperament. 
The second one is the vegetal form, and after that is the animal form. In 
this way the gradual intensity occurs in the substantial form of existence 
until it disengages from the matter and rises above it in essence, then 
there is perception and management, and [the power of] acting upon 
and affecting [something] (Asfār, v. 8, p. 172, tr, Peerwani, p. 128).  
The more perfect it gets, the more perfect and highly sensitive its capacities become. As 
a result, the perfect human becomes capable of perceiving happenings in higher realms 
and, for example, is able to hear celestial music, smell, and so on.  
Ṣadrā places the human in between the cosmos and the divine being as an isthmus 
(barzakh). As well as the similarity to the cosmos, another feature of the human being is 
her similarity to the divine (theosis, taʾalluh). The notion of similarity comes with two 
consequences. First, that humans are chosen among all creatures as the vicegerents on 
earth. Second, that humans possess the capacity to create. This is different from the ability 
to produce that can be observed among animals in cases such as building a nest, etc. 
Creation of inner forms and ability to have a unique inner world is possible for a human 
due to the imaginative power common among all human beings (Asfār, v. 1, pp. 266-8). 
Khamanei lists two types of creative command, one creation from nothing (ibdāʿ), and 
the second, creation from matter (khalq), both of which are applied to human beings as 
well. Similar to human perfection in the senses, the capacity to create can grow more 
perfect such that a human can affect the extra-mental world (Asfār, v. 1, pp. 266-8). 
The explanation is relevant for our quest of Sadrian intentionality in general, because the 
creative power is both part of this journey of perfection and also it is partly the reason for 
human to create intentional objects. There is an additional relation to our discussion on 
language and logic, and that will be mentioned in the discussion on the truth value of 
propositions.  
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4.2 PROPOSITION 
4.2.1 Proposition in relation to Conception and Assent 
Ṣadrā’s monist philosophy is reflected in his attitude to language and writing as a holistic 
approach. In this approach, linguistic forms are loyal reflections of mental beings. One of 
the drawbacks of a holistic approach is failing to differentiate between logical, 
ontological, and linguistic levels of inquiry. On the other hand, Ṣadrā allows us to develop 
a more monist and minimalist theory at all three levels as they manifest similar 
characteristics. I started with his holistic approach because his examination of 
propositions is, on the one hand a combination of sentences and statements, and on the 
other judgements, concepts, and assents. As a consequence of accepting four modes of 
parallel existence – de re, mental, spoken, and written – each level is a shadow of the one 
that comes before it. With a holistic approach of this sense, the inquiry of sentences, 
statements and propositions fall under the inquiry of conception and assent. Ṣadrā accepts 
conception and assent as divisions of acquired knowledge, so we find ourselves bound to 
his epistemology as well as his theory of language. As a monist in the extreme, he thinks 
conception and assent are simple, and they are mental beings.  
An impression, which is the form of a thing occurring to the mind 
(ḥāṣila) or in the mind, or the occurrence of the form of a thing in it or 
to it-since we take all of this to boil down to one and the same thing, 
given that occurrence is the same as existence, that mental existence is 
none other than the form which is in the mind, and that everything 
present in the sense organs of the soul is present in the soul itself 
because the soul is none other than its very sense organs as we have 
established in Asfār (RTT, p. 51, tr. Lameer, p. 120). 
The language he uses in this paragraph is more neutral than that of Asfār. It can be 
interpreted compatible with the Peripatetic account of perception which explains the end-
product as images in the mind and the sense organs as the agent. Yet, he mentions the 
continuity with Asfār as well as the identity of the sense organs, sensibles and the sense with the 
soul. As a result, the usage of sense organs and being in the mind is a looser usage of their 
meanings, freed from the theoretical baggage of Peripatetic theories. 
Regardless of whether the impressions in the mind are accompanied by a judgement, it is 
a conception in Ṣadrā’s presentation. The notion of conception and assent melt into one 
concept to become merely the notion of conception.  
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How do these points come together with the ideas before Ṣadrā and how do they allow us 
to explore more about the language of intentionality? Let me start with some structural 
background with Fārābī, Avicenna, and Bahmanyar. Propositions are the basis for assents 
and conceptions. And propositions are expressed by using sentences.102 Thus, 
structurally, the first unit to understand is sentence. Desire, belief, and wish can be 
expressed with sentences; moreover, they can be used in order to command, request, and 
ask questions. When sentences form the basis for assent or dissent, and when they are 
declarative, then they form propositions. Thus, for example, sentences that express 
greetings or questions are not propositions (Restall, 2006, pp. 9-11). Fārābī talks about 
sentences by terming them “complete phrase” (qawl tāmm). Ṣadrā describes complete 
phrases as those for which it is permissible to be silent at the end of it. One side of the 
complete phrase is a noun without any restrictions of time and the other side is either (he) 
or a word. This second part has a complete meaning which is also attached by time 
(Tanqīḥ, p. 248) Complete phrases are divided into five as statement or declarative (jāzim) 
(DI 17a1-17a7; IbAR, p. 63), imperative (amr), entreaty (taḍarru), request (ṭalab), and 
vocative (nidā) (Abed, p. 37; Ib.FR, pp. 139-40; tr. Zimmerman, p. 226). Avicenna 
follows Fārābī with a similar list. Apart from the first one, the other four have no truth 
value unless by accident (Ib.FR, pp. 139-40). The statements, on the other hand, must be 
either true or false (Ib.FR, p. 139; DnM, pp. 20-21). This is in line with Aristotle’s 
statements in DI:  
Every sentence is significant (not as a tool, but as we said, by 
convention), but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but 
only those in which there is truth and falsity. There is not truth and 
falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor 
false (DI 17a1-6, tr. J.L.Ackrill, IbAR, p. 63). 
A number of terms which appear in Fārābī’s writing are interchangeably used for 
declarative statements such as qawl jāzim, qaḍiyya, ḥukm, ḥaml, taṣdīq, khabar (Abed, 
1991, pp. 37-8). When the statements are about the future, it is difficult to find out whether 
the proposition is true or false (DnM, p. 21). Ṣadrā does not argue within the vocabulary 
                                                          
102 What propositions are, is indeed open to discussion. Moreover, the relation of propositions and 
sentences are not as clear as presented in the above text either. Propositions are claimed to be a) bearers 
of truth, b) objects of belief and other propositional attitudes, c) referents of –that clauses and, d) 
meanings of sentences. The discussion in the main text uses proposition as a mixture of (a) and (d). Thus, 
their relation to sentences becomes less obscure as well: In the simplest sense, propositions are about the 
content carried by declarative sentences. According to this, when one sentence is translated into a 
different language, they express the same proposition. For the details on the definitions of propositions 
see: McGrath, Matthew, "Propositions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/propositions/>. 
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of these terms and he does not give a long discussion on these classifications other than a 
brief section in his Tanqīḥ. For now, and for the sake of the flow of argument, let it suffice 
that sentences come in different types and propositions are part of declarative sentences 
(or statements). Another difference is that one proposition can be expressed by different 
sentences. Propositions are also about the content expressed by a sentence. In Aristotelian 
logic, propositions are simply declarative sentences that bear truth-value. It is still an open 
discussion (in other traditions) whether other types of sentences can be claimed to have 
truth values.  
When it comes to assent and conception, he sides with Avicenna as well. He differentiates 
Avicenna’s approach from the common understanding of his day and criticizes the view 
that assent is conception combined with judgement. According to him the problem is the 
misunderstanding and literal interpretation of Avicenna’s basic definition by his 
commentators. According to Avicenna, a thing can be known from two viewpoints. The 
first one is that the thing is conceived alone, so that its name occurs in the mind 
simultaneously with its meaning. This viewpoint does not include the truth or falsity of 
the statement. In the second one the conception comes together with assent (taṣdīq). This 
one requires a further examination, affirmation on the concept. In this presentation, all 
assents necessarily include conceptions but not vice versa (ShMd, pp. 16-17). Ṣadrā 
reports the statement that “the conception accompanied by assent” has been interpreted 
in three different ways: a) conception is a preparation for assent, thus it is a precondition, 
b) it is part of assent, and c) lastly that conception is identical to judgement (RTT, pp. 45-
9). Ṣadrā rejects all three interpretations. In order to understand Ṣadrā’s rejection, two 
claims (his division of knowledge together with the expression -mentioned at the opening- 
that conception and assent are two parts of acquired knowledge), should be examined. 
In the classical presentations of Ṣadrā’s epistemology, there are two forms of knowledge, 
one direct (knowledge by presence/ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) and the other indirect (acquired 
knowledge/ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī – i.e. Avicennan knowledge) (Kalin, Ibrahim, 2004, pp. 86-
194). The second one is through knowledge of quiddities. The division here into assent 
and conception is a division of acquired knowledge which is passive (infiʿālī). One should 
not be misguided by the usage of “passive”. Even at the level of passive knowledge 
(especially for sense perception which is an act of object on the sense organ and a change 
caused by it for the Peripatetics), Ṣadrā’s perception of knowledge is more active. 
Bahmanyar gives the example of the difference in his Taḥṣīl when he differentiates 
intelligibles from objects of senses (inner and external). He explains that there is an affect 
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and being affected taking place on the organ by the object when perception takes place 
(Taḥṣīl, pp. 489, 498; especially p. 493). However, Ṣadrā believes that even in the early 
stages of knowledge such as sense perception there is an active function of the soul. This 
can be a reason to suspect that the differentiation between “passive and active” is not 
accurate enough but “direct and indirect” is more faithful to Ṣadrā’s explanation. Ṭūsī 
gives a further example in which some objects such as intelligibles are explained in 
relation to their extra-mental existence (Ishārāt, v. 3, p. 14).  
Lameer affirms the usage of the active and passive as he thinks Ṣadrā follows in the 
footsteps of Aristotle when it comes to the affection theory and is a Platonist when it 
comes to knowledge through universals (Lameer, 2006, p. 41ff.). However, he interprets 
the text with partial readings. On the one hand, he finds a tension between the Platonist 
and Aristotelian tendencies in Ṣadrā’s logical applications. At times, he diagnoses this as 
logic not being Ṣadrā’s strongest suit. At other times, Lameer thinks the dominant 
language of RTT is Aristotelian (even if the Platonist tendency is felt in background). 
Accordingly, RTT is merely on acquired knowledge. This knowledge is gained through 
universals and explained in mainly an Aristotelian language; so the dominant language 
of the treatise is Aristotelian.  
To prove his point, he gives an example from Fārābī that he involves both universal and 
particular terms in conception and assent. Ṣadrā on the other hand, involves only universal 
forms. Lameer reads this as indicator that for Ṣadrā knowledge is gained only through 
universals. Lameer seems to be missing the section in Asfār where Ṣadrā explains that the 
soul knows particulars. The tension for Lameer, then, is about the explanation how the 
soul gains universals. For Aristotelians, this is mainly with a connection to the extra 
mental world, however for Ṣadrā universals are gained through contact with immediate 
instauration and as recollection.103 Although this reading of Ṣadrā’s epistemology has 
been common practice,104 Ṣadrā does not really try to prove knowledge as a recollection 
and leaves the mechanics of his epistemology open in many places. Moreover, the forms 
gained in his knowledge cannot be the pure forms received from a higher realm. As I 
discussed in previous chapter, mental consideration distorts reality and human create a 
                                                          
103 “I think that the combination of the peripatetic doctrine of conception and belief and the illuminationist 
account of the occurrence of universal forms in the soul is a fine illustration of the “merging” of different 
philosophical traditions in Shīrāzī’s thought… Thus there is some tension in his epistemology, because 
Plato’sdoctrine of forms implies a metaphysics and epistemology different from Aristotle’s, universals 
having separate existence in Plato, while for Aristotle, universals are only universals in the soul. (Lameer, 
2006, p.40). ” 
104 Nasr and Kalin’s epistemological discussions are good examples to the idea that the forms gained in 
the knowledge processes by the soul are the forms in the higher realms (Kalin, 2004, p.115). 
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form different from the form in extra-mental form. If this form were emanated to human 
from a higher realm, then most his criticism of Peripatetic epistemology would be 
meaningless.105 Knowledge for him is a mode of existence, and thus it too comes with 
levels. And there in reality is only one type of knowledge that evolves from acquired into 
direct knowledge. So, I can summarize my general concerns with Lameer’s reading at 
two points:  
Firstly, as the discussions in previous chapters have shown, Ṣadrā is a monist in his 
epistemology and psychology as well as in his ontology. He thinks that the soul is active 
at all levels of knowledge. Thus, he does not leave sense perception out of this. His 
rejection of affection theory was also described before. The second point will be clarified 
through his rejection of previous positions on assent. However, to summarize that point: 
he thinks assent and conception are both simple and in essence identical. They are built 
on the judgement which is one of the activities of the soul. Ṣadrā’s rejection of the other 
Peripatetics would not make sense if he too simply accepted the divided epistemology of 
particular and universal knowledge and also of assent and conception. If we remember 
the original quotation at the opening of this chapter, language aims to symbolise what is 
in the mind.  
What is more, linguistic entities are mental (in a weaker sense). I think the ‘mental-extra-
mental’ bi-partite classification is exhaustive, thus if one has to find an ontological home 
for linguistic entities, it should be the realm of the mental. However, their difference to 
other mental entities is that they are representations of what is in the mind. So, 
metaphorically speaking, if some actual thing is X, the concept (mental being) of X is like 
a shadow and the words (linguistic entity) used about X are like shadows of the shadows. 
The main mental structures in relation to language are conceptions, assent, and judgment. 
For Ṣadrā, as well as for Avicenna, conception and assent are divisions of knowledge 
(ʿilm) (RTT, p. 43; ShMd, p. 16). And the division is of a generic concept divided into two 
naturally unified terms (RTT, p. 46; tr. p. 109).106 Neither concept nor assent is composite. 
They have their existence in the soul and they are simple qualities. What kind of mental 
beings are they then? They are “two ways of mental being through which things are 
known. As concepts, they belong to the things known that are part of the secondary 
intelligibles that the logicians inquire about in their art.”(RTT, pp. 46-7, tr. Lameer, p. 
                                                          
105 Please see further pages on the idea of distortion as it is reflected on “naming”. 
106 Ṣadrā differentiates three different types of unity for classified things: generic specific and individual 
in accordance to the thing classified or natural, artificial or relative/from a certain perspective (tabīʿi, 
sināʿī, itibārī) (RTT, p.46; tr. Lameer, p. 109). 
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109). 
As mental existents, they take their fair share from being: “they are two ways of being, 
and all being is simple and as such it is individualized by itself” (RTT, p. 47; tr. p. 111). 
But on the other hand “they are two species belonging to the concept of knowledge that 
come under it as two species under a generic concept, in the way in which blackness and 
whiteness come under colour” (RTT, tr. Lameer, p. 111). 
One problematic section of Ṣadrā’s introduction is that assent is simple. This is 
problematic because the common understanding for Ṣadrā’s day – defended by names 
such as Rāzī and the Peripatetics – was that assent is composite. For him, mainly because 
assent and conception are of the genus ‘knowledge’ (RTT, pp. 45-50), and that they are 
the narrowest species that cannot be divided any further. It is not compatible with this 
presentation to claim that assent is composite. Another point is that assent is not the same 
as judgement (ḥukm). The reason is that judgement is one of the acts of the soul, and 
assent on the contrary is passive. Knowledge as affection (ʿilm infiʿalī) is divided into 
conception and assent, and these are passive. Knowledge by presence, in contrast, is direct 
and active] (RTT, p. 75; tr. p.144). 
Ṣadrā’s discussion on simplicity is possibly another problematic part of the treatise. One 
needs to ask, what does simplicity mean? As next chapter shows, his ontology require 
every instant of being be individuated. So, simple at this point can be interpreted as that 
conception and assent are two ways of being each of which individuated through itself 
and not through some additional thing. If we follow this, then we need to admit that in 
reality his discussion in RTT is not only applicable to universal forms, but also includes 
the universals as some forms of individuated beings. And this point further proves that 
the features of existence (e.g, that all existents are individuated) are applicable to 
linguistic beings. 
Another question is that of how assent is different from conception, as it would be difficult 
to differentiate when both are considered simple. Conception and assent are identical in 
terms of instauration and in its being (RTT, p. 48; tr. p. 112). Indeed, Ṣadrā too seems to 
use the common language about conception and assent in terms of the analysis: one is 
conditioned with privation of judgement and the other is conditioned with presence of 
judgement. Lameer suggests that the conception-absolute is what he means by 
“identical”, and that divides into conception and assent (RTT, tr. p. 113). This point 
becomes clear in the RTT itself (RTT, p. 75; tr. p. 144).  
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The main problem Ṣadrā has with the existing ideas on conception and assent is that they 
present a non-dynamic analysis. In that kind of evaluation, assent, conception, and 
judgement first are considered as independent beings and later they are thought to come 
together to form assent (Lameer, 2006, p. 118). These two exist together in unity; their 
existence is one while the notion is two (RTT, p. 51, tr. p. 119). According to Ṣadrā, 
Avicenna’s original account is similar to his. Ṣadrā adds that the ideas attributed to 
Avicenna by latter-day thinkers like Rāzī are not true (RTT, tr. p. 149).107 As a result, 
judgement appeared in their writing as the assent at times and a condition for assent at 
other times. 
I say: the purport of his statements [Avicenna’s] “a conception 
accompanied by [assent]108” and “or the conception is accompanied by 
belief” as figuring the accounts of the Ishārāt and the Shifāʾ is the same 
sense of assent […] and they are one thing, because the relation of 
conception absolute to assent is one of unity and not relative […] 
However, in his statements the expression “assent” is sometimes 
applied in the sense of a judgement and at other times to one of the 
divisions of knowledge (RTT, tr. Lameer, p. 151).  
The confusion is between plain conception and conception with a relation to truth:  
The mistake derives here from confusion between the essence of a thing 
and that of which it is true. Now in the definition of assent, conception 
is understood as being not conditioned by anything and not as the 
particular individual of which the conception is true. And the one that 
is opposite to assent is the notion of conception, restricted by the 
absence of a judgement. That is, disconnected [from it], not 
[conception] absolute, like in all divisions (RTT, tr. Lameer, p. 155). 
The second part of the treatise (RTT) takes a turn we expect from this highly Peripatetic 
approach to propositions. The discussion so far is built on the division of direct and 
indirect knowledge. Indirect knowledge is then divided further into assent and 
conception. In terms of the process of indirect knowledge, as it is not the passage through 
certainty, and as it is the deficient form of knowledge, the representationalist theory in 
the Peripatetic theory appear without dramatic changes. The only twist from common 
                                                          
107 Avicenna employs various stances about the related discussions which possibly resulted with different 
interpretations by his followers and critics (Lameer, 2006, p.49, fn.4). 
108 Lameer translates tasdīq as “belief”. Despite using his carefully prepared translation in general, I 
excluded the translation of tasdīq and changed “belief” into “assent”. Belief appears as a stronger term 
loaded with more implications than the term assent. Belief as a central term for modern discussions of 
epistemology is different from assent which is commonly accepted as a logical term.  
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approaches is that these two parts of knowledge are considered as identical and simple, 
and that they differed for the benefit of analysis. Further on in his RTT, Ṣadrā challenges 
the division of knowledge into assent and conception:  
From the above it emerges that assent is a class of conception absolute 
and that a judgement is an action of the soul which forms no part of 
conceptual, affective knowledge, even though it is knowledge, [but] 
active. This is because the actions linked to the apprehension have a 
being that is coeval with manifestation and inner revelation (RTT, p .56, 
tr. Lameer, p. 131). 
The identity of active and acquired knowledge is read as a mistake by Lameer. As a result, 
he translates the word ʿayn as coeval in place of identical. My reading of this passage is 
literal, and that ʿayn means identity. Let me explain this point through Ṣadrā’s theory of 
sensation. Even at the level of sensation Ṣadrā thinks that the process is immaterial and 
the object of sensation and the perceiver are identical. The object of sensation is 
maintained by the active role of the soul. Even the external senses are active processes of 
knowledge. What differentiates between a lower level of perception, i.e. perceiving a 
stone, and a higher level of perception, i.e. perceiving heavenly sounds, depends on the 
soul’s own perfection.109 As a result, it can be said that the differentiation of different 
types of knowledge is mentioned and used in the discussion as tools for the analysis of 
propositions. In reality, there is only direct knowledge. The success of the knower 
depends on her own success in perfecting her soul. This perfection is achieved through 
the soul’s actions, including sensation in this world.  
Every soul emerges from potentiality to actuality in the period of its 
corporeal life; and according to the acts and deeds, good or evil, it has 
a kind of actuality and actualization in [its] existence, be that fortunate 
or unfortunate (Asfār, v. 9, p. 8, tr. Peerwani, p.343). 
What is discussed so far proves two points related to our main quest on intentionality. 
First, Ṣadrā examines propositions as modes of mental existence. And second, this 
examination is built on a monist epistemology which first starts with a division of 
acquired and direct knowledge, but later two types collapse into one type of knowledge. 
Thus, gradational ontology is applicable to notion of knowledge as well as propositions 
and conceptions and assents. Accordingly, the linguistic discussions on intentionality can 
                                                          
109 “He whose heart is illuminated by the light of certainty [of the Reality], will witness the parts of the 
world, its concrete beings, its natures and its souls changing at every moment. So everything is 
transforming, and its concrete beings are passing away” (Asfār, v. 9, p. 387, tr.Peerwani, p. 600). 
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be considered as modes of existence and moreover, these are not immune to the principle 
of gradational ontology. As in the lower levels of knowledge, humans always create forms 
different from the forms in extra-mental reality, so does the language reflect same type of 
flaws. And depending on the journey of the soul, the level of the language becomes higher 
or lower. 
‘What propositions are’ needs to be clarified further than this. This can be explored better 
when the relation of propositions to concepts and extra-mental world is clarified. The 
clarification eventually becomes a quest about truth values. In contemporary discussions, 
sentences, propositions, statements, beliefs and judgements are differentiated and made 
to compete as the best candidate to be a truth bearer (Connor, 1975, pp. 35-58). In our 
case, propositions are taken to be the carriers of truth and this enables the truth being 
established as an inner reality (Kuenne, 2003, p. 91). In this traditional analytical 
understanding, concepts and their linguistic parallels are tightly bound to each other. 
Thus, we can easily assume that the truth bearers are propositions. There are two options, 
to define propositions extensionally or intensionally. Especially in the mainstream 
Russellian position, it is the extra-mental reality that not only is the truth-maker of a 
proposition, but also makes the proposition possible (Glazenberg, 2013).110 The rival idea 
is to define them intensionally and relate them to the human mind. A third option is to 
construct a realm of true propositions independent of both. In Ṣadrā’s case we are dealing 
with the second type of definition. So when a sentence is stated, it does not refer to an 
extra-mental fact, but rather to a holist inner world. In propositions where something is 
affirmed or denied, the relations are mainly maintained mentally and with internal 
relations among already constructed concepts. Human beings, according to Ṣadrā, 
inherently have essential knowledge about the extra-mental world, and in a similar 
manner to how God has names and those names are prototypes of beings in His 
knowledge; human beings have names which are assigned by him/her to things. These 
names created by humans are never capable of grasping the reality of beings; however, 
they are perfect representations of the abstractions from extra-mental things (Mashāʿir, 
p. 12, tr. Nasr, p. 13). Thus, when we discuss the truth of a proposition, it is indeed an 
internal relation of correspondence to the data in the proposition with the data in mind 
                                                          
110 Not according to the sense or connotation, rather according to its reference or denotation. The 
Moorean-Russelian truth model can appear in the form of an identity version of a correspondence theory 
of truth in which case true propositions are identical to facts in the extra-mental world. Truth is a property 
for propositions in this approach. This is a critical stance against the idealist approach. This identification 
causes difficulty when it comes to explain false propositions. This latter evolved into a correspondence 
theory in which propositions resemble facts in the world. 
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(Tafsīr, v. 3, p. 404ff.). The verse in the Quran says that the knowledge given to Adam 
about names is interpreted as the ability to see the reality of things. The real names are 
identical to the Divine Names (Tafsīr, v. 3, p. 410-11), and they are also the archetypical 
perfect versions of things in the material world. The human is given the faculties to 
recognize these realities. However, the level of their apprehension is dependent on their 
level of perfection. The perfect human is not only able to witness the realities but also 
becomes a locus of manifestations of these realities gathered together (Tafsīr, v. 3, p. 411-
12).   
Propositions as assents are parts of indirect knowledge which indeed contain judgements 
that are actively and mentally constructed. Thus, in the case of language being the 
representation of the mental, we find out how they differ. Language is passive and mental 
as in judgement is active (MQ, p. 51). The truth of a proposition thus is indeed carried by 
the mental content which is represented in the proposition. When the judgement is about 
an extra-mental entity, then truth is sought in correspondence to the extra-mental thing 
about which it gives information. This still is not a direct investigation in which humans 
can inquire directly of the extra-mental object or fact. However, when the proposition is 
about a merely mentally constructed concept without any extra-mental reference, then its 
truth is sought internally through correspondence to the mental individuals of the concepts 
used in the proposition.  
Thus, although the structure of truth theory in general still carries the idea of 
correspondence, the quest for truth starts with an already established holistic world of 
concepts. This feature together with the internalism of the theory makes Ṣadrā closer to 
idealist theories of truth rather than realist ones. Modern correspondence theories are 
constructed in terms of word-world relation. On the other hand, coherence theories are 
constructed internally around a holistic system of concepts and coherence among them. 
Tarski’s controversial approach among modern theories might be seen as being close to 
that of Ṣadrā. Although Tarski himself admitted his tendency towards correspondence 
theories, the essentials of his theory are not necessarily incompatible with non-
correspondence theory either: ‘X is P’ is true if the referent of X satisfies P. The 
satisfaction criterion maintains the relation of word to world, but this is a lot more loosely 
necessitated by an extra-mental entity because the satisfaction can also be maintained by 
a mental relation as in the case of merely mental concepts (Glanzberg, 2013).  
Beside the correspondence feature, the judgement system requires an internal mental 
construction process in both extra-mentally referred and mentally referred constituents. 
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This is what enables one to create fictional concepts for even impossible things and 
formulate judgements on them, such as the ultimate non-existence: 
Intellect (ʿaql) can imagine nonexistence of itself, nonexistence of 
nonexistence, ultimate nonexistence, mental nonexistence, and all 
impossibilities. It can consider ultimate unknown, literal concepts. 
Later, intellect builds judgements on them. For example that one cannot 
gain information about ultimate unknown. […] This is not possible 
because that what is being judged on is itself ultimate unknown. […] 
On the contrary, everything that the mind judges on is existent, [and 
every existent] is possible. […] Intellect has tendency that these can 
only be invalid in essence and impossible in reality. And mind judges 
over them due to their representation of that concept (nonexistence and 
impossibility) (Asfār, v. 1, tr. mine, pp. 401-2). 
A further question which is about the ontological status of propositions is not clearly 
answered in Ṣadrā’s writing either. If propositions are accounted for with an idealist 
reading, does this entail a realm of propositions which are accepted to be mental 
constructions and simple entities from a realm of their own? In this case, there are hints 
of a realist reading as well as a nominalist one. In terms of realism, it requires the 
existence of the thing’s independence from anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, 
conceptual schemes, and so on (Miller, 2012). 
The truth is then established by a third figure which is a transcendent truth maker which 
is other than the thinking agent and her belief system or linguistic universe. This 
understanding of realism is different from a type of realism that accepts that the world of 
ideas is prior reality to the reality of material the extra-mental world. Firstly, Ṣadrā affirms 
the existence of the world of similitudes. This might entail that he is a semantic realist 
(assuming semantic realism requires an independent world other than the extra-mental 
physical world). The idea of an independent world of similitudes requires a different 
stance than the two-fold realism/non-realism debate. Miller explains this twofold 
understanding as in the realism about the extra-mental world, our understanding of at least 
some sentences concerning the external world consists in our grasp of their potentially 
recognition-transcendent truth-conditions. The central question is whether we should 
define a persons’ understanding in terms of the understanding of potentially recognition-
transcendent truth-conditions? (Miller, 2012). According to semantic realists, there are 
transcendent truth conditions other than the extra-mental world and the thinking agent. 
Thus, one could claim truth of a sentence, say, “There are dinosaurs in Berlin”, 
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independently from the speaker and time, Ṣadrā does not mention any transcendent 
conditions about the truth of propositions. One might think Ṣadrā’s acceptation of the 
world of similitudes can be useful at this point. There are flaws with this acceptation 
though. Firstly, although Ṣadrā spends a chapter on the world of similitudes and tries to 
prove it in Asfār, it is almost contradictory for him to claim primacy of being together 
with a world of similitudes which is unchanging. He clearly says that everything other 
than God is in constant change. He does not exclude the heavenly bodies from this, and 
that implies the extremity of his idea for his time. One cautious step would be to not 
ignore the fact that Ṣadrā accepted the world of similitudes and not to claim that he is in 
obvious contradiction with himself; rather, to claim that the world of similitudes is less 
important for him and is not an essential feature. In this case similitudes are a rhetorical 
device and cannot play the serious role of the verifier for truth value. 
If not the world of similitudes, then one can expect another concept in his philosophy to 
be useful at his point: nafs al-amr. So, there is still hope. Ṣadrā also seems to accept nafs 
al-amr: a condition which is neither mental nor extra-mental, a situation where a thing is 
itself without any further conditions. As long as nafs al-amr is interpreted as an 
ontological category, then it is plausible that propositions belong to such a world. When 
it comes to the point of nafs al-amr, I will discuss in the next chapter further that nafs al-
amr is not part of an ontological classification and it is merely a consideration and, thus, 
it is another example of mental existence.111 What is more, knowledge and its reflection 
on language comes in various levels. And unless our agent is a perfect human both 
knowledge and language comes as distorted versions of reality. If propositions were 
related to nafs al-amr, then we would neither have distorted knowledge nor any false 
propositions. This, however, is not the case. According to this, and in terms of ontological 
status of propositions, they can be considered as mental existents which are dependent on 
human beings.  
What makes Ṣadrā different from idealists, realists, and nominalists is that the inner world 
and creation is eventually related to the world as human beings are microcosms. Also, the 
capacity to know is inherent in them. Thus, although a human being is unique with having 
language, and language is totally dependent and conventional, it is still not a perfect 
idealism. When he discusses the truth of sentences, he does not directly keep the relation 
                                                          
111Asfār v. 1 p. 401: “The intellect can consider nonexistence … even non-existence of itself.” Here non-
existence of one’s own is considered as an operation of mind. A similar point is made by Razi in MbR, v. 
1, p 42.  
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of the extra-mental factuality and the fact expressed in the sentence. He investigates the 
truth of sentences through a correspondence to internal factuality. This makes Ṣadrā 
closer to coherence theorists than correspondence theorists. Also, this makes us suspect 
that the propositions have an extra-mental status in a world of nafs al-amr or of ideas. 
Even as entities, the propositions must be dependent on the human and their existence 
shall be similarly internal, in a world of mind/s.  
One essential point about nafs al-amr emerges when it is considered in terms of “thing in 
itself,”112 a state in which something is considered isolated from its attributes. So the 
classical explanation is that the thing is conditioned neither with existence nor without; 
neither particular nor universal (where). In order for someone to consider nafs al amr as 
an ontological concept, distinguishing between quiddity and existence in re as well as in 
mind is necessitated. Peripatetic philosophers would not have an issue with this. 
According to them, only God is pure existence and all else is a composition of existence 
and quiddity. However, Ṣadrā rejects this idea of composition and makes it clear that the 
quiddity and existence are merely mental divisions. In this case he cannot tear something 
apart from that thing’s own existence in re. This can only happen as a thought experiment 
or as a consideration in the mind. It is contradictory to consider an ontological mode 
which is not conditioned with any form of existence and later claim that this mode actually 
is one of the forms of existence.   
One last detail needs to be given at this point. It was mentioned that Ṣadrā’s focus in these 
evaluations is acquired knowledge. He follows the tradition that only universal 
propositions in contrast to singular ones are subject matters of investigation. I think it is 
also related to his understanding about the distorting nature of mental investigation. 
Naming things or classifying or making things subject matters of acquired knowledge 
changes the true nature of things:  
Know that to all wujūdāt there correspond external realities; however, 
their names are unknown.  In order to supply these names, we say 'the 
existence of this', 'the existence of that'.  Moreover, the totality of it 
necessitates in the mind a general concept.  In contrast, the different 
things and quiddities have names and properties which are known.  
However, it is not possible to express the real wujūd of each thing 
among all the different things, or real wujūd of everything, through a 
name or a qualification because the formation of names and 
                                                          
112 For Muʿtazila’s explanation of thing in itself, see Frank, 1978, p. 57 
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qualifications is in correspondence to concepts and universals used in 
logic, not in correspondence to individual ipseities of wujūd nor of 
concrete forms (Mashāʿir, p. 12, tr. Nasr, p. 11). 
This is why naming and language is conventional and necessarily different from the true 
reality of things. This paragraph is further evidence that language and mental 
constructions are not totally dependent on the extra-mental reality as in the case of 
correspondence theories. The interesting part of Ṣadrā’s notion of assent is that he denies 
a composite understanding of propositions as we find it in Rāzī or a simple notion as it 
appears in the Peripatetics. Assent is identical to conception and they are conventional 
versions of mental content. As the production process of mental content is active and 
dynamic, the assent and conception consequently become distorted versions of the extra-
mental reality. This is a second level derivation as the linguistic entities are derived from 
the mental and the mental is actively created in relation to the extra-mental. In a similar 
way to sense perception, the level of certainty and success of this derivation depends on 
the perfection level of the soul. The less perfect the soul is the less truth-bearing the 
language belonging would be. This is the reason why we find the dichotomy of real 
unknown names and names that do not represent reality.  
Propositions can also be investigated in terms of its parts, such as subject, predicate, and 
copula. The next section will focus on these parts and their relation in terms of how they 
come to become a unity as proposition. 
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4.3 SUBJECT AND PREDICATION IN RELATION TO EACH 
OTHER 
Categorical propositions are constructed with a relation between two or more 
components. One group is affirmed or denied over the other group or one or more things 
are denied or affirmed of existence. The proposition carries a judgment that is about the 
affirmed or denied parts of the sentence. This judgment at the same time requires a unity 
between these parts. The sentence is considered to be simple when existence of the 
predicate is affirmed or denied: “X is existent” or “X is non-existent”. It is considered to 
be composite when the sentence is in the form “X is Y”. Ṣadrā thinks both forms require 
some judgemental relation; however, the copulative relation is only required in the second 
form (Asfār, v. 1, p. 92ff, p. 161ff, p. 381ff.; Dīnānī, 1383, pp. 167-9). 
Ṣadrā talks about two types of beings in relation to this: predicative existence (al-wujūd 
maḥmulī) and copulative existence (al-wujūd al-rābiṭī). This classification applies not 
only to the language, but also to the existents. This ontological reflection will be briefly 
discussed later. Predicative existence is independent and stands on its own. Copulative 
existence, on the other hand, is a dependent type of existence, and in the relevant context 
it depends on the subject and predicate. The simple and composite forms can be compared 
to different meanings of “is” and its alleged ambiguity as claimed by Frege and Russell. 
The copula or “is” can be used for different meanings and goals: as Hintikka lists them, 
predication, existence, and subsumption,113 or as Williams lists them existential, 
copulative and identity (Williams, 1981, p. 12). I believe that these ambiguous usages 
other than the predication belong to the copulative existence and they are all different 
manifestations of the relationship between subject and predicate. So if the usages are 
connected under one roof: 
a. X is existent 
b. X is non-existent 
c. X is X 
                                                          
113 “They distinguished between the following different meanings, each with a different formalization in 
the usual formalization of first-order logic (lower predicate-calculus):  
(i) the is of identity, as in ‘‘Jack is John Jr.’’ or Jack = John Jr.;  
(ii) the is of predication (the copula), as in ‘‘Jack is blond’’ or Blond (Jack);  
(iii) the is of existence, as in ‘‘God is’’ or (Zx) (God = x);  
(iv) the is of class inclusion (generic is), as in ‘‘Man is an animal’’ or (Yx)(Man(x)6Animal(x). (Hintikka 
2004, p.27)”. The ambiguity is in the usages of a single word or of its contexts is a matter of discussion 
(Hintikka, 2005, Language, Meaning, Interpretation, Philosophical Problems Today, vol. 2, pp 117-39). 
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d. X is Y (there exists some kind of relation between X and Y, subsumption 
etc.) 
So, according to Ṣadrā, the first two are considered simple and the others are composite. 
Even when it is composite, the relation can entail some existence claim. Thus, two usages 
of “is” in the form of “X is Y” are also distinguished. Among ancient philosophers, the 
most discussed two usages are copula as establishing an existential claim which appears 
in contemporary writings as simpliciter, “wujūd ʿala’l-iṭlāq”, and the copula one as 
“wujūd bi-ḥālin mā”. In ancient philosophy, the usage as a relation other than existential 
import had been more common and later especially with Avicenna the dominance turned 
into existential usage even when a relation is expressed (Bäck, 1987, p. 360). In this 
section I will first start with the categorical propositions of general relations, where 
something is affirmed or denied over something else. 
As a result of the dominance of existential usage even in sentences in the form of “X is 
Y”, principle of presupposition emerges. According to the principle of presupposition, 
the affirmation of something presupposes the existence of the attributed thing (Tanqīḥ, p. 
256). This principle will be useful later when the proofs of mental existence are examined 
in the next chapter.  
The different usages presented in the Frege-Russell claim are found distributed in 
different sections of discussions on predicate and proposition of medieval philosophy as 
well as in Aristotle’s writings. Moreover, the relation of subject and predicate is reflected 
in categories in Aristotle’s work. So here I need to discuss the relation of subject and 
predicate in related senses and the ambiguity of predication, especially copula in the 
proposition. The relations to be discussed hereafter will be of predication, identity, copula 
and existence. These will help us understand more on the nature of mental beings and 
their different levels. So far, how the gradational ontology is reflected on propositions is 
discussed. 
a. Aristotelian Categories 
The Aristotelian categories, mainly four and later multiplied into ten, are not a substantial 
part of Ṣadrā’s philosophy despite the fact that he discusses the categories and uses the 
terminology in his philosophy. I will briefly mention the Aristotelian categories and how 
much they reveals about the relation of subject and predicate. One essential claim that 
comes in Aristotle’s writing is that whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a 
subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also (Cat.AR 1b10-
15; Kat.AR, v. 1, p. 5, Bahmanyar, Taḥṣīl, p. 27). The categories, when dissolved to their 
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bases, are mainly subject and accidents. Again, when dissolved into basics, the categories 
are built on two concepts: said-of and present-in (Studtmann, 2013).114 
Of things there are115: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any 
subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but 
is not in any subject. (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any 
subject. (By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, 
and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, the 
individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not 
said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body 
(for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (c) Some are 
both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a 
subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. 
(d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the 
individual man or the individual horse— for nothing of this sort is either 
in a subject or said of a subject. Things that are individual and 
numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but 
there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject—the 
individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject 
(Cat.AR 1a20-1b9, tr. J.L.Ackrill, Kat.AR, pp. 4-5).116  
The common interpretation is that the “said in” classification distinguishes between 
substances and accidents and the “said of” classification differentiates universals and 
particulars. Primary substances fall into the category of things that are neither said-of nor 
present-in anything. Accidents are always dependent on their substance. Thus, there is 
always a dependence relation between the accidents and the substances. Substances, on 
the other hand, are self-subsistent and need no other in order to be understood (Sharḥ wa 
Taʿlīq-i Ilahiyāt al-Shifā, Tehran: 1382, p. 209). Accordingly substances are prior to 
accidents (ShI, II.1, pp. 57-60, tr. p. 45-48; Asfār, v. 1, p. 43). He later introduces his 
readers to the ten categories of “things that are said”. These are: substance, quantity, 
quality, relatives, somewhere, sometime, being in a position, having, acting, and being 
acted upon (1b25-2a4; Badawi pp. 5-6; ShI 1960, pp. 93-156, tr. pp. 71-123; Bahmanyar, 
Taḥṣīl, pp. 29-35). If I connect this list to the four sentence-forms mentioned above, then 
it can be concluded that the relation between X and Y in “X is Y” can be essential or 
                                                          
114 Studtmann, Paul, "Aristotle's Categories", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/aristotle-
categories/>. 
115 Mawjūdāt in the Arabic text.  
116 The example used in Arabic translation is “writing/ kitāba”. 
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accidental. And when it is accidental, it can be either one of quantity, quality, place, time, 
and so on. Among medieval philosophers the essential and accidental predication had 
been two of the main types of predication. “dhātī awwalī” has been used for the primary 
essential predication and “shāyī ṣināī” or “mutaʿārif” or “ʿaraḍī” is used for the accidental 
predication (Āmulī, 1307, pp. 33, 34). 
This is the case when we consider categories to be merely part of a linguistic 
investigation. 
However, what Aristotle meant to do when mapping categories had been a matter of 
debate especially in terms of reading the categories. Is it a classification of “things that 
are” or about concepts, or words? In terms of our interests in this research, it is fair to say 
that for medieval Islamic philosophers, the ontological interpretation and considering 
categories a classification of beings had been the dominant reading (Rizvi, 2009, p. 69; 
Bertolacci, 2010, p. 37). One important discussion emerged from the ontological readings 
is that what kind of an understanding of “existence” is needed to classify all else under 
being. I will come back to this question with Ṣadrā’s idea of tashkīk. But so far, it can be 
said that existence is considered outside the list of categories for Ṣadrā. The discussions 
on categories play a role in terms of defining wujūd negatively, that what wujūd is not. In 
terms of the ontological reading of Aristotle’s categories (that each category is a different 
class of being), the real correspondence of the discussion in Ṣadrā’s ontology is the levels 
of existence.  
For now, before discussing tashkīk, let me continue the relation of subject and predicate. 
The first one concerns the relation. In order to form a proposition, there needs to be a 
relation between subject and predicate. All things said for the predicate can be said of the 
subject (Cat.AR 1b10-15; Kat.AR, p. 5; Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, p. 27). This premise requires 
the predicate being more comprehensive than its subject. For example, in the case that the 
subject is universal, the predicate necessarily is universal and it cannot be individual. The 
predicate is an attribute (ṣifa) with which we get to know the subject. One cannot learn 
about a universal through a universal. This is the reasoning Bahmanyār brings in order to 
show that the predicate needs to be universal (Taḥṣīl, pp. 26-7). Another important 
implication is that the proposition needs to have at least one universal term (Md.FR, p. 
119 as cit. Abed, 1991, p. 6).  
The second one concerns modal relations between subjects and predicates. Categorical 
propositions can be possible, impossible or necessary according to their content (Chatti, 
2012, p. 24; Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 242). This is determined according to the relation 
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between subject and predicate, not according to their factuality in the extra-mental world. 
Thus, this can be seen as a modal aspect to subject and predicate relation. If the predicate 
is an essential attribute of the subject as in the case of “man is a body”, it is necessary. If 
the predicate is an accidental attribute, for example “man is a writer”, then the proposition 
is contingent. As in the case of “man is an angel”, it is impossible. We can now look at 
each of these three propositions in terms of their truth-value. The impossible proposition 
such as “man is an angel” is necessarily false. Similarly, a negative version of this 
proposition is always true (DnM, p. 24). This is a result of the relation of subject and 
predicate in the impossible proposition: the predicate is never adequate for the subject. In 
the second one, a possible proposition is composed with a non-essential attribute of the 
subject: “man is a writer”. It is not necessarily true. Neither is a universal quantifier 
version of it true: “All men are writers”. In the third proposition, the necessary one is 
made with an essential attribute of the subject: “a bird has wings”. It is necessarily true 
when the proposition is affirmative.  
The third point is on a slightly different aspect to the relation. Two types of predication 
were mentioned earlier, these also can be seen as types of relations between subjects and 
predicates, when a categorical proposition is formed, the predicate can be identical with 
the subject; in this case it is called essential first order predication (dhāti awwalī). The 
term “essential” refers to the identity of predicate and subject both in essence and 
designation (dhāt wa ʿunwān). When the predicate is an individual under the title of 
subject, then the predication is named as accidental. Difference between the predicate and 
subject is the intrinsic criteria for accidental predication. This difference can occur in the 
form of essential accidents, intrinsic or extrinsic concomitant to the subject (Tanqīḥ, p. 
249).  
Remembering Aristotle’s classification of being in a subject and of a subject, one relevant 
classification of predication is univocal (mutawāṭiʾ) and denominative (ishtiqāq) (Tanqīḥ, 
p. 249). Univocal predication takes place when the predicate of something is the same as 
itself. The denominative predication occurs when in a subject and something of the 
subject is possessed in the predicate. The difference between univocal and denominative 
is important as it will be used for the discussions on predications of existence.  
Before I discuss what kind of commonality being possesses, I will first discuss the copula. 
The different types of relations between subject and object will be opened further through 
the copula with ontological implications.  
b. Copula 
183 
 
Avicenna says that a third element in propositions other than predicate and subject is 
needed, that it is hidden (except presuppositions of time (adawāt zamāniyya)) in the 
Arabic language, and that it links (nisba) the other two, and that this is the “connection” 
(rābiṭa) (ShIb, p. 39, Tanqīḥ, p. 255, Asfār, v.1, p. 92). Ṣadrā adds an ontological point 
and claims that the connection in the proposition requires a specific kind of existence. He 
names this as copulative existence (wujūd rābiṭī) (Asfār, v. 1, pp. 92, 161). Thanks to the 
copulative existence we have not only the connection but also the unity in a proposition. 
Copula is neither the subject nor the predicate. However, it maintains a specific relation 
to both subject and predicate (Dīnānī, 1383, p. 169). Its in-between117 status enables the 
connector to maintain the unity (ShIb, p. 41). This is a dependent way of existing and 
when the two sides that the connector links disappear, the connector, too, cannot 
persist.118  
Ṣadrā links the copula to ontology in an innovative way and classifies three types of being: 
predicative being, copulative being (rābiṭī), and copula (rābiṭ) being. Before Ṣadrā, wujūd 
rābiṭī and rābiṭ had been used interchangeably; thus the main classification was into two 
types, copulative and predicative being. This twofold separation of predicative and 
copulative is a reflection of the twofold classification of wujūd into wujūd fī nafsih (wujūd 
by itself) and wujūd fī ghayrihi (wujūd for something else) into propositions (qaḍāya). 
Propositions, unlike extra-mental things, are composed of predicate, subject and 
connection. When the proposition is expressing existence, then it is structurally simple 
(hilya basīṭa). Examples are cases such as “X is existent” or “X is non-existent”. 
However, when the predicate is not existential, then there are more than two things 
necessary to have some mode of existence additional to the subject and connector: the 
existence of subject, of predicate, and of the connector. According to Ṣadrā, both 
propositions have a judgemental connection but the copulative connection is only found 
in composites. Accordingly, copulative being is found only in composite propositions 
which are not made of existential predicates (Asfār, v. 1, pp. 92-3).  
To sum up, there are different dimensions of discussions dealing with predicative and 
copulative: meaning, letter-word, proposition, thing, and each of these realms’ 
dependency or independency. These categories seem to have metaphysical, linguistic and 
semantic applications. Predicative existent is found in existential or simple propositions, 
and in extra-mental reality it is a reflection of independency. Copulative existence is 
                                                          
117 This in-between-ness also reminds one of Ibn Arabī’s idea of barzakh. 
118 For a detailed evaluation of wujūd rabiṭī, see Dīnānī, 1383, pp. 167-186. 
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found in composite propositions where existence of subject, predicate and copula is 
needed. In extra-mental reality it is reflected on the existence of adjectives or accidents. 
This is a case of dependent existence: existence of something in something else, or with 
something else, or for something else (Asfār, v. 1, p. 93). We see examples of accidents 
like white, of relational words such as father-son, and of mere literal connective ‘is’ and 
of literal words such as ‘as’, ‘in’ under the classification of copula or copulative existence.  
Ṣadrā talks about the debate over whether predicative existence is of the same genus with 
copulative one. He claims that their commonality is none other than literal, thus they are 
sharing merely the same words (ishtirāk lafzī) (Asfār, v. 1, p. 95). Independent things 
(wujūd fī nafsih li nafsih) can be either by itself or by other. An example of the first is 
necessary existence (wujūd al-wājib); an example of the second is substance. Dependent 
things can have meaning on their own or not. The first case concerns accidents: we can 
understand white, line, or relations or mere connectors which are literal concepts (ḥarfī) 
(in DnM, p. 20 differentiation of expressions with and without complete meaning).  
Ṣadrā, with this expanded explanation, allows a new mode of existence in the form of 
actual existential connector (Rizvi, 2009, p. 65) which makes copula more than a 
linguistic tool. This is a third usage that is other than a mere linguistic connector of 
predicate and subject. It is also different from the existential ‘is’.  
The application of connective wujūd on the extra-mental world might be related to Ibn al-
ʿArabī’s influence on Ṣadrā in which all that there is other than God is an imagination 
and a realm of in-betweenness. Thus, in reality, all-that-there-is is dependent on God. 
Everything other than god is a dependent and copulative being which is in privation of 
independent existence.  
So far, I have discussed different relations in declarative sentences except the cases where 
the predicate is “existence”. I have decided to discuss it last as it will hopefully reveal 
Ṣadrā’s ontology more than the other usages. And the ontology will reveal more on the 
nature and place of intentional beings as they are investigated as a level of mental beings.  
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4.4 EXISTENCE AS PREDICATE  
There is a curious passage in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: 
The things we seek are equal in number to those we understand. We 
seek four things: the fact, the reason why, if it is, what it is [in Arabic, 
annahu yūjid, limāza, in kāna mawjūdan, wa mā huwa]. For when we 
seek whether it is this or this, putting it into a number (e.g. whether the 
sun is eclipsed or not), we seek the fact. Evidence for this: on finding 
that it is eclipsed we stop; and if from the start we know that it is 
eclipsed, we do not seek whether it is. When we know the fact we seek 
the reason why (e.g. knowing that it is eclipsed and that the earth moves, 
we seek the reason why it is eclipsed or why it moves). Now while we 
seek these things in this way, we seek some things in another fashion—
e.g. if a centaur or a god is or is not (I mean if one is or not simpliciter 
and not if one is white or not). And knowing that it is, we seek what it 
is (e.g. so what is a god? or what is a man?) (PoAR 89b23-36, tr. J. 
Barnes, TAAR, v. 2, p. 407). 
Here Aristotle talks about four different ways in which a human can investigate things: 
the fact, the reason why, if it is, what it is. Some researchers see this differentiation 
between the knowledge that a thing exists from the knowledge of whatness of a thing as 
the source for Avicenna’s ontological and central differentiation between quiddity and 
existence (Shahadi, 1982, p. 62). It must be added, however, that there are other parts in 
Aristotle’s writing where he mentions the thing and its quiddity as identical. What is 
more, he also does not centralise or ontologise this differentiation (Metaphysics 1031b20-
2 vs. 1032a).  
One aspect of separating “what?” questions from “is it?” questions is that quiddity and 
existence are not conceptually the same. This is a logical differentiation. As occurred in 
medieval philosophies, it might or might not be applied to ontology. Another aspect of 
the two different questions is about the propositions that are used in order to answer these 
questions. So for one we would reply with definition or essence of the thing and for the 
second we are expected a confirmation or a denial. Although it is not directly the same, 
the discussions on existence as a predicate, and defenders of both sides contain a similar 
nuance. The main question is whether “existence” in the predicate position causes a 
tautology. Does it merely confirm identity of the thing with itself or does it let us learn 
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something in addition to the information that the thing exists. If we proceed one step 
further “is there anything more to a thing other than its quiddity?” 
Although Fārābī rightly differentiates between natural and logical contexts, mostly the 
discussion has been a blend of logic, language, and ontology (Rescher, 1963, pp. 39-40). 
This is related to Avicenna’s ontologization119 of the essence-existence distinction. 
According to Avicenna, existence is attached to quiddity and becomes existent.120 
Suhrawardī builds primacy of quiddity on this legacy. According to him, existence is 
merely an abstraction, a common term. When existence is the predicate, such as “the 
house exists”, it gives no new information about the house which we would not already 
know when we learn what a house is. Existence is dependent on its subject. As a defender 
of the primacy of wujūd (aṣāla), Ṣadrā claims that existence as a predicate is not merely 
a confirmation of identity of the thing with itself and that an existence-proposition is not 
tautological. In order to claim that no new information is maintained when existence is 
predicated, one needs to identify quiddity with existence. Only then “X exists” will occur 
to be the same type as “X is X”. But for Ṣadrā, existence is identical with the existent 
(Mashāʿir, p. 11, tr. Nasr, pp. 11-12); quiddity however, is a mental construction. We 
gather what X’s quiddity is, secondly, simply because X exists. The X as an existent 
makes it possible for us to abstract a quiddity – Xness. The knowledge process works in 
the opposite direction from common understanding in which first quiddity is provided 
and then existence is predicated on it.  
Ṣadrā’s rejection of Suhrawardī’s thesis is important. In my main reading, I claim that 
Ṣadrā divides the illuminationist claim and accepts one part of it. However, he keeps 
rejecting Suhrawardī’s essentialism. Accordingly, Ṣadrā introduces “existence as a 
concept” and regards it among secondary intelligibles (Mashāʿir, pp. 7, 8, tr. Nasr, p. 8). 
In that sense, existence as a concept is universal. Existence in the discussion of predicate, 
however, is rejected from being an ordinary universal. In that sense, “existence as a 
predicate” is different from other universals as well as the reality of existence. 
Suhrawardī’s claims about existence as a predicate are rejected totally (Mashāʿir, pp. 25-
27). Ṣadrā also adds that wujūd is not genus-like, or it is not predicated with synonymy 
(tawāṭuʾ). Moreover, he does not adopt pure homonymy. His claim is that existence is 
predicated on the things with predication of gradation (tashkīk). Thus, I suppose I need to 
                                                          
119 I am borrowing the term “ontologization” from Bertolacci (2010). 
120 Avicenna’s modal ontology in relation to quiddity/existence will be discussed in the fifth chapter in 
further detail. But for now, let it suffice that the attachment is understood to be mental by some 
interpreters and extra-mental by others. 
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refine my original claim and add that existence as predicate is also different from 
existence as a concept. In Asfār (v. 1, p. 45), Ṣadrā explains that existence as a general 
reality is a mental construction. Existence as a predicate is mentally constructed, too, but 
the way it is predicated is different from other predicates. Accordingly, existence as a 
concept acts no differently from other universals; existence as a predicate acts, on the 
other hand, differently than other predicates.  
In this context, Fārābī stands between Suhrawardī and Ṣadrā: according to him, being as 
a common predicate is not universal but a relation (Lameer, 2006, p. 31). According to 
Fārābī, there are two equally plausible interpretations for “X exists”: that of naturalists 
and that of logicians. According to the former, the actual reality and nature are essential, 
so existence cannot be a predicate. 
Question: Does the proposition "Man exists" have a predicate, or not?  
Answer: This is a problem on which both the ancients and the moderns 
disagree; some say that this sentence has no predicate, and some say 
that it has a predicate. To my mind, both of these judgments are in a 
way correct, each in its own way. This is so because when a natural 
scientist who investigates perishable things considers this sentence (and 
similar ones) it has no predicate, for the existence of a thing is nothing 
other than the thing itself, and [for the scientist] a predicate must furnish 
information about what exists and what is excluded from being. 
Regarded from this point of view, this proposition does not have a 
predicate. But when a logician investigates this proposition, he will treat 
it as composed of two expressions, each forming part of it, and it [i.e., 
the composite proposition] is liable to truth and falsehood.7 And so it 
does have a predicate from this point of view. Therefore the assertions 
are both together correct, but each of them only in a certain way (tr. 
Rescher, 1963, pp. 39-40, Risāla fī jawāb masāʾil suʿila ʿanhā, 
Dieterici, 1890, Leiden, pp. 428-9). 
It seems one part of the discussion is generally is ignored: what does it mean for existence 
to be a predicate?  
From the evaluation given above, I can infer that one side of the criteria is then being 
informative.121 The question became famous for modern philosophers because of Kant’s 
                                                          
121 In Tanqīḥ, Ṣadrā talks about a type of predication (mufīd) in which the predicate and subject are 
different and thus new information is gained. I could not find more information on this type of 
predication. Thus I have refrained from using this notion in place of informative above (Tanqīḥ, p. 249). 
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claim that existence is not a real predicate during his discussion of ontological proof. The 
motive behind Kant’s famous claim might similarly be this informative viewpoint. He 
says the predication of existence, in the example that “God exists” adds nothing new to 
the concept of God: “so setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott” (Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (KRV), A 599). So we see identification of the concept and existence in 
the example of Kant as well. Kant might still be closer to a milder approach (similar to 
Fārābī) than expected. Rescher points out that although he rejects existence as a real 
predicate, he too accepts it as a logical predicate:  
Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat, d. i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, 
was zu dem Begriffe eines Dinges hinzukommen könne!) Es ist bloß 
die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst. 
Im logischen Gebrauche ist es lediglich die Copula eines Urteils (KRV, 
A 598). 
Can we then say that the real predicate is not the logical predicate, but Fārābī’s natural 
scientist’s predicate? If we take “real predicate” as informative, then Ṣadrā does not 
accept Kant’s claim. For Ṣadrā, “man exists” is not identical with “man is man”.  
Once it is established (thabata) that the wujūd of every contingent being 
(mumkin) is its very quiddity in concreto, then one of two alternatives 
follows: either there exists between quiddity and wujūd a difference in 
the significance and in concept, or such is not the case. The second 
hypothesis is false. Otherwise man and wujūd, for example, would be 
two synonymous terms and there would be no benefit in saying “man 
is existent.” In the same way, to say that “man is existent” and to say 
that “man is man” would come to saying the same thing. Besides, it 
would be impossible for us to conceive one of them while neglecting 
the other, not to say anything of other absurd consequences mentioned 
in common books (mutadāwilāt). Furthermore, the absurdity of each of 
these consequences postulates the absurdity of the antecedent. 
Therefore there remains the alternative mentioned in the first place, that 
is, that quiddity and wujūd are different from each other in their concept 
when they are analyzed by the mind, while they form one single unity 
essentially and in their ipseity in concreto (fi al-ʿayn) (Mashāʿir, p. 
29, tr. Nasr, pp. 30-31). 
The predication in the form of “X is X” is named as the primary essential predication. 
Two main types of predication are listed in the relevant discussion: essential primary and 
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common artificial. In essential primary predication, the subject is the same as the 
predicate both in designation and in extra-mental reality (Rizvi, 2009, pp. 66-7). The unity 
of the subject and predicate in existence and quiddity as a consequence emerges as a 
tautological and analytical sentence.  
If the subject is the same as predicate (as in the case of primary essential), analytical 
predications occur. If there is no reality to existence other than the quiddity, then when 
existence is used as predicate, the proposition is analytical. Then one other feature of 
being a real predicate is not being a primary predication.  
It appears now that clarifying the claims about existence as a predicate is necessary. And 
in the case of medieval discussions it is indeed mainly a question about the informative 
nature of the predicate: whether or not existence is more than a logical predicate. So, part 
of the question is whether the predication is more than a primary essential predication. In 
those terms, it makes sense to carry on Kant’s discussion on real predicate and 
accordingly, the real predicate is synonymous with synthetic predicate and common 
artificial predicate. To sum up, judgment is a mental process for Mullā Ṣadrā and as a 
result, it is active. Propositions and assents, on the other hand, are acted upon, and passive 
because they are derived from these first order mental states. One might need to ask about 
existence propositions in the same context. So Ṣadrā places existence-predicated 
propositions differently from other predicated propositions. And he also says the 
predication of existence operates with tashkīk and not with univocality (mutawāṭiʾ). As a 
result, at this point, I think we need to separate Ṣadrā’s ideas on predicate-existence from 
his ideas on wujūd itself. For him, the thing is the same as its existence, and in that sense 
he needs to be regarded as being similar to naturalists among the two groups Fārābī 
mentions. This is because there are not different parts of a thing, one to be predicated over 
the other part. The existence is not separable from thingness. When we say “X exists” the 
predication is not in re but mentally constructed, just as the mental construction of 
“essence-existence distinction”. If a real predicate requires this kind of differentiation, 
then existence is not a real predicate for Ṣadrā. 
So it is the concept of wujūd which is being predicated (Asfār, v. 1, p. 41). Wujūd as a 
concept is, I think, still different from wujūd as a predicate. Ṣadrā talks about the concept 
of existence as being an ordinary mental construction (Asfār, v. 1, p. 45). On the other 
hand, wujūd as a predicate does not act the same as other predicates. Also, it is not 
predicated over things like an ordinary universal concept. Existence is predicated by 
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tashkīk which I claim is a specific form of univocity. Accordingly, the following section 
will be on Ṣadrā’s idea of tashkīk.  
4.5 TASHKĪK: IS IT HOMONYMY? 
What does it mean for each of the beings, when different things are said to be? The source 
of discussions found in the Aristotle’s Categories. Aristotle talks about three types of 
relations among words (depending on interpretation, this can be read about 
meanings/definitions/essences and things). The first group is equivocal: “Things are said 
to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition 
corresponding with the name differs for each”.122 
Secondly comes univocal (mutawāṭiʾ): “things are said to be named ‘univocally’ 
which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common”. 
And thirdly derivative (mushtaqqa): “Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which 
derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination”.  
The terms used in Greek for these three classes are synonymy, homonymy and paronymy. 
A synonymous word picks up different things in extra-mental world. An example of this 
would be “zoon”, “animal” as applied to an actual person and a figure. Homonymous 
words share a definition and a name as in the case of man and animal sharing the meaning 
of animal.  
The essential question related to being is when different things are said to be, whether 
they share only a name, or a name together with a definition. The second pair (man and 
animal) shares the essence of having a sensible soul; the first pair, however, does not. 
Commonality and differences among these usages are important. Fārābī gives an 
elaborate classification of terms as: metaphorical (mustaʿār), transferred (manqūl), 
homonymous (mushtarak), univocal (tawāṭuʾ), synonymous (mutarāḍif), paronymous 
(mushtaqq), narrow or wider sense, and distinct (mutabāyin) (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 
227).  
In this classification, mutarādif and tawāṭuʾ seem to be types of synonymous. Fārābī 
describes mutarādif as being a plurality of names to one and the same thing alone. They 
are words whose equivalent definitions are identical (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 230). 
Mutarādif according to Zimmerman is polynymous in Greek tradition and is synonymous 
in Arabic philology (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 230). We can think of mutarādif as one 
                                                          
122 Muttafiqa asmāuhā as it is translated into Arabic (Kat.AR, v. 1, p. 3). 
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narrow type of synonymy. And a wider sense of synonymy is what Zimmerman translates 
as univocal (tawāṭuʾ). Fārābī’s tawāṭuʾ is a “single word which from the beginning 
applied to several things but signifies a single general notion which comprises them” 
(Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 228). I will keep the original Arabic terminology for four of 
the related terms tawāṭuʾ, mutarādifa, mushtarak, and mushakkak. These three are 
different types of words which mean some sort of commonness. I think that when one is 
considering a philosopher’s explanation about many meanings of being, one should first 
define what each of these terms mean. The discussion on many meanings of being 
depends on what is accepted as being common and what is accepted as being distinct 
about each use. So the question is, for example, is it commonality of the name alone? Is 
it the meaning alone? As long as philosophers restrict many meanings with either 
commonality or difference, then it is easy to define the many meanings as synonymous 
or homonymous. But most of the other choices seem to be on a more subjective line of 
definition between synonymy and homonymy. For this reason, as well as types of 
synonymy (mutarādif and tawāṭuʾ), there are types of homonymy as well.  
Fārābī lists homonymy by mere coincidence as when two words only share the word 
itself. An example is “ʿayn”, meaning, on the one hand, the organ of sight, but on the 
other a source of water. Homonymy can be in a similarity between two things in an 
accidental correspondence, as the word “animal” is used for an actual person on one 
side and a statue of a horse on the other. It can also be built on a relation to a single 
goal (war-man, war-horse, war-speech) or a single agent (medical record, medical 
instrument) (Fārābī, tr. Zimmerman, p. 228-30).  
In terms of many meanings of being, most Aristotelian commentators interpreted him as 
defending a special form of (mushakkak/pros hen or focal) homonymy (ishtirāk) and 
rejecting univocity of being (Rizvi, 2009, p. 46).123 Aristotle presents categories as 
different ways a thing can be said to “be”. In this presentation, substance and essence is 
the essential meaning and the rest depends on this.  
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, as we 
pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;’ for 
in one sense the ‘being’ meant is ‘what a thing is’ or a ‘this’, and in 
another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things 
                                                          
123 According to Bahmanyar, mushtarak predication is about different senses of a name whose name and 
concepts are one but not equally so (Rizvi, 2009, p. 46). For other types of homonymy presented by 
Porphyry (as discrete homonymy, homonymy of similarity, homonymy of analogy, focal homonymy and 
homonymy for those oriented to the same goal, see Rizvi 2009, p. 47.  
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that are predicated as these are. While ‘being’ has all these senses, 
obviously that which ‘is’ primarily is the ‘what’, which indicates the 
substance of the thing (Metaphysics, 1028a10ff, tr. W. D. Ross).  
However his main theory is the idea that being is special type of homonymy appears in 
Metaphysics, 1003a33:  
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that 
‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not 
said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related 
to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the 
sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of 
health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is 
relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it 
possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another 
because it is a function of the medical art (tr. W. D. Ross).  
Shields talks about four usages of predication of being by combining predication with 
Aristotle’s categories. In this case, every category is one sense of being homonymously. 
Some things are said of and in other things, others are said-of but not in, others are in but 
not said-of, and still others are neither said-of nor in (CatAR 1a16–b9). Answering to 
these four types of predication conditions are four types of entities: non-substance 
universals, substantial universals, non-substance particulars, and individual substances, 
the primary substances (CatAR 10a16–b9; cf. 2a11–19; Kat.AR, p. 33-35; Shields, 1999, 
p. 21).  
According to Ṣadrā, existence is predicated with gradation (tashkīk)124 (Asfār, v. 1, p. 41). 
In the relevant chapter of his Asfār (Asfār, v.1, p. 41ff), Ṣadrā connects the concept of 
existence, its predication, and the priority and posteriority of things themselves. 
Accordingly, the mind recognizes some similarity (ishtirāk) in different quiddities of 
things and creates the concept of existence. The concept of existence, then is a notion that 
is intentionally created. This concept, however, is not a predicate that is univocal which 
requires each usage to be distinct from the others; this is not a mere commonness in name 
as well. Otherwise, the mind would not be able to see any similarities. With tashkīk, he 
means gradation in priority and posteriority or intensity and weakness. In this explanation, 
                                                          
124 Lameer reports that tashkīk as a word occurs in Arabic translations unrelated to discussions of being in 
the Rhetoric. Ibn Muqaffa‘, choses the word “tashkīk” to translate homonymy. But the common usage in 
relation to the discussion here is found in Porphyry as one of four types of homonymy: homonymy from 
similarity (Lameer, 2006, p. 28). 
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language is a mirror of ontology. Things in the world have different levels of existence 
according to their intensity or priority, just as language does.  
One last matter is about comparison of focal homonymy for the Peripatetic school and 
Ṣadrā. As I have discussed in the previous chapter on the senses, Avicenna’s ontology 
rejects monistic approaches; it is dualist at its best even when it comes to psychology. It 
rejects substantial motion and gradation in intensity for the substance and other cases of 
ontology.125 Even Avicenna respects some gradual predication on being; it would not be 
outside logic and language. So what does focal homonymy mean for Avicennan 
philosophers? Rizvi again gives an elaborate inquiry on the topic and lists the different 
types of priority as: by nature, by temporal progression, by rank, and by nobility (Rizvi, 
2009, p. 51). We need to wait until Ṭūsī to reach philosophies that embrace the ontological 
implications of this special homonymy (Rizvi, 2009, p. 52). So, Ṣadrā accepts homonymy 
of being not only in logic but with its ontological commitments as well. The core meaning 
of being for him is an actual and all-existential being. As it is manifested in degrees of 
actuality, it is predicated gradually with this focal homonymy. 
Although I have not elaborated it here, I think Ṣadrā’s homonymy is closer to univocity 
than homonymy in some respects. For Aristotle, being is used for many with a core-
meaning and each being has different features to them. Thus we can formulate this as 
follows. A and B in the formulation show two cases of distinct existents, and they both 
share some meaning about existence in Aristotle’s text.  
A. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning1= existent 1 
B. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning2= existent 2 
Disjunctive meaning 1 and 2 do not have anything necessarily in common. 
                                                          
125 Gradational ontology and the identity principle are two distinctive problems that Ṣadrā needs to defend 
against Avicenna. In terms of substantial change and intensity of existence, he blames Avicenna for 
confusing existence and quiddity. “I say concerning it: Shaykh has confused existence with quiddity in 
every place when desiring to refute the transformation in substance. He considers the movement in being 
[i.e., trans-substantial movement] to be the emergence of the thing at every moment to another quiddity in 
actuality. But that is not the case. The intensity and weakness though different in kind but their difference 
in quiddity is there when the actual existence has been obtained by the two. Also, in the gradually 
intensifying movement each existence one individuality in time has one quiddity at every moment which 
is assumed to be its limit of existence in potency, and proximate to actuality, as its explanation was given. 
So the movement in the animal beings, for instance, only entails the emergence of the moving-being from 
an animal-being to another animal-being, and not the emergence of animal from its animality to other 
than it, such as for instance, to the being a sphere. Thus, for everything which is receptive to intensity and 
weakness there is the possibility of intensity and weakness in it. The category of substance according to 
us is like the category of quality in being receptive to both [weakness and intensity]. Hence it is possible 
for some of its kinds connected to the matters to have the transforming movements in [their] substance” 
(Asfār, v. 8, p. 304, tr. Peerwani, p. 225). 
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Ṣadrā, on the other hand, explains that all existents are manifestations of the same reality 
at different intensities (MQ, pp. 38; 33-4). One can think core-dependence can be applied 
to this idea of stages of intensifications, such as different colours can be thought of as 
sharing a common meaning of colour. But the gradation (tashkīk) Ṣadrā claims is different 
from Aristotle’s core-dependence. Ṣadrā’s idea of wujūd requires a stronger commonness 
than core-dependence. If I follow the colour example, it must be the exact colour that we 
find in different intensities, not different colours. In Ṣadrā’s case, although all existents 
manifest one single reality, they all take their actuality and existence from the One. All 
other than the One is a weak and dependent manifestation of the same reality.  
C. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning1 (with y level of 
intensity/priority/etc.)= existent 3 
D. x-core meaning+ disjunctive meaning1 (with z level of intensity/priority 
etc.)= existent 4 
The comparison of A, B with C, D shows that in Aristotle’s case, there is essential 
difference assumed in the existents A and B and their state of “being existent” is common. 
In Ṣadrā’s theory, however, C and D are the same realities, but they manifest the exact 
same reality in different modes. This different approach will later be discussed in the 
research to allow Sadrian philosophy to employ intentional objects among existents.  
A related topic to existence being a single reality is whether existence can be used for 
God and other existents when it is considered as a univocal meaning. For Avicenna, 
existence in God is unique and pure, all else is a compound of existence and quiddity. It 
will be discussed in the next chapter, that existence is attached in a special way to the 
quiddity (there are different traditions that take this differentiation as mental and extra-
mental). For Rāzī, existence is univocal and there is no commonness between God and 
the created things in terms of their existence (Wisnovsky, 2012, pp. 40-2). For the 
illuminationist tradition, the reality is carried by quiddities and the world is a hierarchy 
of different levels of quiddities where existence is merely a mental construction. In terms 
of God’s existence, however, He is pure Light (ḤI, p. 132; Mashāʿir, p. 8, tr. Nasr, p. 8). 
For Ṣadrā, the principle of tashkīk will suffice to solve the problem of differentiating God 
and other things, thus, he does not need to either claim that the existence has slightly 
different meanings in both (as with the Peripatetics’ example of pros hen homonymy), 
nor invent two totally different meanings for existence (as Rāzī’s example of equivocal 
existence).  
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One can solve this through three considerations: anteriority and 
posteriority (taqaddum and ta’akhkhur), perfection and deficiency 
(tamām and naqs), richness [in itself, and in need of nothing else] and 
need [independence and dependence] (ghinā and hājah). […]But the 
meaning of "wujūd being existent" signifies that if it is actualized either 
by itself or by an agent, it has no need, in order to be realized, of another 
existence which would make it become realized, in contrast to non-
wujūd, because of its need in becoming existent of the consideration of 
wujūd and that which is adjoined to it (Mashāʿir, p. 20; tr. Nasr, pp. 21-
22). 
As the above paragraph suggests, the main principle in his linguistic explanations is also 
an ontological principle: tashkīk. And the language about existence is not considered 
different or distanced from the metaphysics about existence. In this sense, Ṣadrā continues 
Aristotle’s steps on the parallelism between language and ontology. Now let me give a 
summary about this chapter which has focused on logic and language. 
The linguistic part of my research comes to an end with the section on gradational 
ontology. The semantic approach is seen to be applied to ontology with Ṣadrā’s idea of 
tashkīk.126 This section showed that tashkīk is re-applied to language about existence by 
him. So the ontological claim that existents are of different intensities and degrees is 
applied by to language and linguistic entities are seen as a degree of being. Assent and 
conception are regarded as identical and representation of the judgement which is an 
activity of the soul. When existence is used as the predicate, we find that the sentences 
that involve existential predicates are informative. This is built on his ontology that 
concept is different form the reality and the existence. Moreover, as a reflection of his 
ontology, Ṣadrā claims that existence as a predicate applies in grades just as the reality of 
existence is in degrees of intensity. In the last section of the chapter I focused on the 
multiplicity of being. The result of this section was that because existence is a single 
reality that becomes manifested with different degrees at each existent, for Ṣadrā 
existence multiplicity of beings should be univocal. 
The next chapter has two goals to complete the discussion on intentionality: first, to see 
how the ontology that appears as the source of above mentioned linguistic ideas 
functions, and second, to place intentional objects into the Sadrian scheme in the form 
                                                          
126 This idea of application is claimed and analysed deeply by Rizvi, 2009.  
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of mental existence. As part of the second goal, different examples of mental existence 
will be analysed in more detail.  
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5 CHAPTER V 
ONTOLOGY 
 
Hamlet: My father- methinks I see my father 
Horatio: Where, my lord? 
Hamlet: In my mind’s eye Horatio.  
Previously I discussed different examples of aboutness at different stages of knowledge 
such as objects of sense perception, logical entities, concepts, and linguistic entities 
together with the way mental constructions are represented in language. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
philosophy, psychology, epistemology, ontology, and language are tightly interwoven. 
As a result, despite being at different levels, the same rules and principles are applicable 
to all those parallel universes of beings, knowledge, and language. This chapter will take 
more of a bird’s-eye view of objects at different stages of knowledge and try to gather 
them under the umbrella of “mental existence”. This aims to complete the circle which 
started with Brentano’s definition of the mental when more about the nature of mental 
existence is explained. Intentionality, as Brentano described it, was meant to be a positive 
definition of mental states. In contrast to negative definitions, intentionality or aboutness 
would tell us what “mental” is. Built on this, he also made another negative definition 
that every mental phenomenon was to have an intentional inexistence: “Intentional 
inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon 
exhibits anything like it” (PES, (tr.s) Rancurello, Terrell and McAlister, 1874, pp. 88-89). 
In terms of a phenomenon different from physical phenomena, one related term to 
intentionality from medieval philosophy is ‘mental existence’. Brentano as the inventor 
or resurrector of the concept “intentionality” traces inexistence back to Aristotle. Another 
inspiration for him is Aquinas, who claims that immateriality is the very reason why a 
thing is cognizant, and his explanation comprehends sensibles and intelligibles (Pasnau, 
1997, p. 49). In the previous chapters, I examined objects of external and internal senses 
as other possible cases for intentionality. In terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, it is made 
clear that his internalism or realism is so strong that he does not greatly differentiate 
between objects of internal and external senses. External senses are related to the extra-
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mental objects only in terms of a preparation to create the sensible forms in the human; 
this process is led by the soul. At each stage of sense perception, the other two capacities 
of imagination and intellection have roles to play in order for perception to be completed. 
The case is even less material and independent of the extra-mental world when it comes 
to the internal senses. It is thus very hard to distinguish the internal senses from each other 
or from the intellect in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Knowledge is a result of an activity of 
the soul, and the soul also changes during this process. An implication in relation to 
intentionality is that the objects of knowledge are not extra-mental and that they are 
creations of the soul. One important thing about these stages of knowledge is that for 
Mullā Ṣadrā each stage of knowledge is a mode of existence. More will be said on this in 
the following sections. 
As for mental existence, everything that does not have an effect extra-mentally is ‘mental 
existence’:  
This existence that belongs to things and the quiddities upon which [all] 
specific effects (āthār) corresponding to it are not found when the soul 
conceives of them (yataṣawwaru-hā) and that are present (ḥāḍīra) in 
the world of the soul, even when it stops to look at the external world, 
is called a mental (dhihniyyan), tenebrous (ẓilliyyan), and imaginative 
(mithāliyyan) existence (MQ 220.20-3 tr. Marcotte, 2011, p. 9). 
Accordingly, objects of external senses must have mental existence as well as universals, 
quiddities/essences, and relational and relative connections (ʿaraḍīyāt and iʿtibārīyāt). 
Mullā Ṣadrā uses the term relative connections (iʿtibārī) for mentally constructed 
situations. For example, things in re are not composed of quiddity and wujūd. The mind 
observes, analyses, and constructs these concepts. In other words, the distinction between 
existence and quiddity is conceptual. 
In the previous chapters, different positions on Brentano’s problem of intentionality and 
his historiography have been discussed with a related discussion of Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
psychology, logic, and linguistics. With these investigations I aimed to dissect the 
problem of intentionality into matters related to human nature, logic, and language. In 
Brentano’s presentation, intentionality has been presented close to psychology and the 
medieval term inexistence is introduced. One way of investigating the notion of 
intentionality is to ask how a human is able to possess intentionality. How a human ends 
up with this inexistence is not only related to theories of the soul but also to epistemology. 
The common research method is to exclude the more material process of sense perception 
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proposed by literal readings of Aristotle and the Peripatetics. However, I believe that 
Aristotle and Avicenna’s objects of all perception processes can be named by this form of 
inexistence. Hence, even though the object of external senses and internal senses together 
with the organs and faculties of these are material, abstraction still starts even at the level 
of sense perception. Mullā Ṣadrā’s claim is stronger though. For him, the object of even 
the most material perception process is internally created and different from extra-mental 
things. Thus, all objects of perception and intellection are different from extra-mental and 
material beings. They all have a unique way of existing in the human soul. Mullā Ṣadrā 
names this mental existence and introduces us to a unique world created by the human. 
The soul is, on the one hand, active, since it creates the objects of knowledge internally, 
while on the other the soul itself undergoes a substantial change with the knowledge.  
In the following sections the mental constructions will be discussed together by focusing 
on their ontological status. As ontology is the main focus of the chapter, firstly the 
primacy of wujūd – which is at the centre of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical system –, will 
be examined. The chapter will form sections on the primacy of wujūd, proofs of mental 
existence, and modern discussions of intentional objects. Up to this point I aim to present 
the general material we find in Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of wujūd first and the questions and 
debates in the modern discussions second. One can see these two stages as the raw 
material and the goal of production. The material we find in Ṣadrā’s ontology will be 
viewed as products in the case of the section on proofs of mental existence and the 
examples of the mental existents. The section that showcases different examples of mental 
existents will provide an opportunity to see examples of mental existence as applications 
of intentional objects. In presenting the different cases of mental existence, I aim to 
conclude the general discussion on intentionality with an optimistic statement that Ṣadrā’s 
ontology is a strong candidate for successfully accounting for intentionality in general 
and intentional objects in particular with a novel attitude through a gradational and monist 
understanding of existence. 
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5.1 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE 
The notion of ontological priority can be found in Aristotle’s priority by nature and 
substance. In the Metaphysics he explains priority by nature and substance: 
Some things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others (4) 
in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those which can be without other 
things, while the others cannot be without them,—a distinction which 
Plato used. If we consider the various senses of ‘being’, firstly the 
subject is prior (so that substance is prior); secondly, according as 
capacity or actuality is taken into account, different things are prior, for 
some things are prior in respect of capacity, others in respect of 
actuality, e.g. in capacity the half line is prior to the whole line and the 
part to the whole and the matter to the substance, but in actuality these 
are posterior; for it is only when the whole is dissolved that they will 
exist in actuality. In a sense, therefore, all things that are called prior 
and posterior are so called according to this fourth sense; for some 
things can exist without others in respect of generation, e.g. the whole 
without the parts, and others in respect of dissolution, e.g. the part 
without the whole (Metaphysics, 1019a2-14, tr. W. D. Ross). 
He mentions three other types of priority in the same chapter of Metaphysics Z. The first 
set includes priority by “being in the beginning”, “by reference to something”, “by to 
place”, “by being prior in time”, “prior in movement”, “in power”, or “in arrangement”. 
The second set includes epistemological priority. For example, things that are prior in 
formula are different from things prior in perception. Whilst universals are prior in the 
former, particulars come prior in the latter (Metaphysics 1018b9-1019a). His Categories 
has a more systematised list of different priorities: temporal priority; priority by being in 
a sequence that cannot be reversed (as in ‘one’ being prior to ‘two’); priority in reference 
to something in an arrangement (as letters are prior to syllables); natural priority in terms 
of importance (as in the priority of honour and love), and natural priority in terms of an 
implication (as in a cause being prior to its effect) (CatAR 14a26-14b23). Avicenna makes 
the link between priority of rank (martabī) and nature. For example, the body is prior to 
the animal in comparison to substance and the position of substance as a principle (ShI. 
IV.1, tr. p. 125). He adds a dimension by showing the application of primacy to the notion 
of existence. One example is that one existent is dependent on the other as the case of 
multiplicity is posterior to one. This is not in terms of bestowing existence, but rather that 
the posterior existent is necessarily linked to the primary one (ShI. IV.1, tr. p. 125). Mullā 
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Ṣadrā makes primacy an important part of his philosophical system, and in a way he re-
contextualizes the discussions on primacy. He talks about primacy of existence, and uses 
this principle with three meanings:  
The first meaning is about extra-mental reality. As an extra-mental reality, there are no 
distinct entities called essence and existence. All that is real is existence. Secondly, 
primacy means having the capacity of affecting. Thus, existence is the source of causes. 
Its primacy means that existence is the main cause of all existents. Thirdly, it is similar to 
substantiality and independence: its primacy means that existence exists without needing 
or depending upon anything else.  
The different types of priority as listed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics also show how 
things can differ from each other in terms of their individual existents. Only by their 
existence do they have specific temporality, locus, etc., and these also differentiate them 
from each other. Bahmanyār, too, links different types of priorities to the ambiguous 
hierarchy in which all types are connected in an ambiguous ontological hierarchy (Taḥṣīl, 
p. 467).  
In short, primacy refers to being the main source of independent reality and being the 
main principle other things rely on. Thus, primacy of existence means that existence is 
this main principle. If existence is taken as the primary reality, then the language of 
quiddity-based philosophy must change. For example, there is no longer identity between 
the concepts individual, reality, and quiddity (dhāt, ḥaqīqa, and māhīya) (ShI I.5, p. 31, 
tr. p. 24). For Mullā Ṣadrā, reality is identical with existence (wujūd), and quiddity 
(māhīya) is not the real existence. So the process of knowledge is therefore different from 
Avicenna’s. It is no longer certain knowledge, according to him, when knowledge is 
gathered through the quiddity (māhīya) (Kalin, 2010, p. 104).  
Indeed, for Mullā Ṣadrā (as the first meaning of primacy suggests), there is only existence. 
There is no dichotomy of existence and quiddity in reality. All that quiddity has is a 
shadow of reality and a shadow of existence (Shawāhid, pp. 7-8) created by the minds, 
and dependent on the minds. As there is nothing outside existence, then existence cannot 
be defined. Definitions can be made through genus and differentia. There cannot be any 
differentia that existence is supposedly being differentiated from (Shawāhid, p. 6; 
Mashāʿir, pp. 6-8). Moreover, the first meaning implies that mental beings are real. The 
comprehensibility of existence means that even impossible things that can be thought of 
are some kind of existence (Asfār, v. 1; p. 268). Accordingly, intentional objects including 
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round square, Golden Mountain, and so on are included among existents and are given an 
ontological level.  
For Mullā Ṣadrā, wujūd is the principle for unity and multiplicity. Each existent actualizes 
its own being by their own existence. The result is that this makes existence the cause of 
individuation as well as the common principle (as discussed in previous chapter) among 
existents. Existence is not an empty reality, but it is the reality that all other realities are 
derived from. For example, when we are talking about a tree, the different features of 
being a tree, such as nutrition, colour, having branches, etc are not different from the very 
existence of the tree. The existence of the tree is full of content and thus, we are able to 
derive from its existence the features that make the tree itself. The intentional objects fall 
under the same principles as well. Thus, each mental object is unique and individuated. 
What makes them themselves is their very existence in the mind and their being of bearing 
a content. For example, the only state of being that ultimate nonexistence has is the 
attribution that “that very concept cannot be existent”. 
The simplicity of wujūd makes it possible that each level of existence comprehends the 
features of the lower levels. In order to have his idea of wujūd in a comprehensive fashion, 
he talks about three degrees of existence. The first degree is wujūd which does not depend 
upon anything other than itself. This is the principle of all things and it is beyond the 
bounds of any limits. The second degree is wujūd that is dependent on something other 
than itself. Ṣadrā gives various examples such as intelligences and the souls of the heavens 
and the basic natures (heat, cold, dryness, and humidity), and celestial bodies, and 
material substances. The first two degrees remind one of Avicenna’s classification of 
wujūd into necessary and contingent (ShI. I.6, p. 29ff). His classification is also built on 
the idea that all that exists should be dependent on one Necessary Existent and that 
regressive dependence is impossible. This is not only a theory of beings, but also 
Avicenna’s take on the ontological proof for God (‘proof of the veracious’/burhān al-
ṣiddīqīn). Mullā Ṣadrā does not criticise Avicennian terminology, nor does he try to revise 
or change its language. Moreover, he places the Avicennan language of wujūd at the heart 
of his ontology. Yet he changes the context in which this language is used, and introduces 
a loose usage by interchangeably using the word wujūd with mawjūd.127 The third degree 
is wujūd munbasiṭ (‘extended’). With this third level, Ṣadrā makes a similar shift in the 
Avicennan language. This level of existence is extension and comprehension of individual 
                                                          
127 Before Ṣadrā, Dawāni makes distinction between wujūd and mawjūd important part of his theory 
(Pourjavady, 2011, pp.89ff). Surprisingly, the distinction plays not a significant role in Ṣadrā’s 
philosophical language.  
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concrete things and quiddities. The relation of wujūd to the existents (mawjūd) is not in a 
manner which is like that of the abstract universals and abstract quiddities. Extension is 
explained with the gnostic approach to “Compassionate Breath” (al-nafas al-Rahmānī).  
This wujūd is in reality the first emanated among contingent beings (al-
ṣādir al-awwal) from the First Cause (al-ʿilla al-ūlā), and called “the 
Truth by which creation is created (al-ḥaqq al-makhluq bihī).” And this 
wujūd is the source and principle of the existence of the universe, and 
its life and its light which penetrates into all that there is in the heavens 
and the earths. It exists in all things according to that thing in such a 
way that in the intellect it is intellect, in the soul it is soul, in nature it is 
nature, in the body it is body, in substance it is substance, and in 
accident it is accident (Mashāʿir, pp. 40-41, tr. Nasr, pp. 44-45).  
Ṣadrā’s tripartite classification here is open to interpretation. Does each level refer to a 
stable ontological level as it appears to be at first read? Or might these be three aspects of 
one and the same reality, wujūd? Munbasiṭ accordingly would reflect the dynamic aspect 
of existence.128 The explanation of wujūd munbasiṭ is a unique synthesis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
principle of tashkīk and the primacy of existence. This combination enables Mullā Ṣadrā 
to talk about everything in terms of existence, irrespective of whether something is 
impossible or possible or non-existent. Munbasiṭ wujūd is almost as though God’s face 
towards existents. Mullā Ṣadrā also thinks wujūd munbasiṭ is one (Asfār, v. 2; p. 347), 
which explains that all existents carry the same homogenous existence. This one-reality 
takes the shape of the thing that exists, so “[i]t exists in all things according to that thing 
in such a way that in the intellect it is intellect, in the soul it is soul, in nature it is nature, 
in the body it is body, in substance it is substance, and in accident it is accident”. If this 
is interpreted further, one can also say that existence is the same as existents. This is also 
compatible with Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea that every existent is particular and individuated: 
“You have already come to know that wujūd is a concrete, simple reality and that it is not 
a natural universal” (Mashāʿir, p. 33, tr. Nasr, p. 35). This additionally explains why 
Mullā Ṣadrā rejects a concept of wujūd, as the reality of wujūd which collects under it all 
the different examples of existents. What we have in hand about wujūd is nothing except 
the particular existents. What collects them in reality is God. There is no other existence 
other than God. And in relation to God’s creation there is no other holistic entity that we 
                                                          
128 I find various interpretations of this section as an exciting opportunity for alternative ontologies and 
even theological discussions about God’s relation with its creations. However, I refrain from stabilizing 
the paragraph with either one or another interpretation about the three degrees of existence.  
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can call as existence, there are existents which manifest the different levels of the reality 
of existence. The whole universe is built on a relation of this kind. A further explanation 
of how wujūd is the same as mawjūd is given in Mashāʿir:  
Wujūd is positive and real, which is the result of our previous 
demonstrations showing that wujūd is real and is that which is the 
principle of effects [on things] and the source of determinations and that 
by which quiddity becomes existent and that by which non-existence is 
repulsed from it. Such wujūd is a wujūd in concrete (Mashāʿir, pp. 28-
9, tr. Nasr, p. 30).  
It is thus made clear that wujūd is not an empty concept, it is also not an ontological 
content-less situation that happens to things as if wujūd is added on or attached to 
quiddity. 
Not only is wujūd the most comprehensive reality, it is also a dynamic reality. This is the 
reason why it cannot be constrained by the static frames of quiddity. According to Mullā 
Ṣadrā, knowledge is itself a mode of existence (Asfār, v. 3, p. 306).  
The primacy of wujūd implies a number of characteristics about wujūd. This is the reality 
all realities in the world depend on. Firstly, there is nothing outside wujūd (Taḥṣīl, p. 280; 
Asfār, v. 1, p. 33). All that can be talked about, or referred to even as a negation of its 
existence, is listed under wujūd in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Wujūd is not only the most 
comprehensive concept, there is also nothing in reality beyond existence as well. As the 
ultimate reality, it is God that really exists. Everything other than God has a dependent 
and accidental existence which can also be expressed as relational-copulative and 
shadowy. In this scheme of the generality of wujūd, it is also important for Mullā Ṣadrā 
to prove mental existence. In agreement with the Peripatetic philosophers, Mullā Ṣadrā 
posits existence as the most common and evident primary reality (Mashāʿir, p. 6). 
So, for Mullā Ṣadrā existence as the primary notion is also ontologically the best known: 
“The reality (inniyyah) of wujūd is the most manifest of things presentially and through 
direct discovery” (Mashāʿir, p. 6, tr. Nasr, pp. 6-7).  
Secondly, as there is nothing outside it, wujūd cannot be defined. This, again, is in 
agreement with the Peripatetics (Dānishnāme, tr. Morewedge, p. 15). Because it is the 
most common, wujūd has no genus, and it has no differentia to be differed from others 
that will fall under a genus with wujūd. A full definition (ḥadd), on the other hand, is 
composed of genus and differentia:  
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Consequently, whoever seeks to define it is mistaken, because it would 
need to be known by something more obscure than it. However, one 
can seek to awaken (tanbīh) the person [who wants to define being] and 
to provoke in him a remembrance. But in any case it only concerns a 
verbal definition (Mashāʿir, p. 6, tr. Nasr, p. 7). 
Thus, a full definition of existence cannot be given. Similarly, a description requires better 
known realities or concepts for the concept to be described. But wujūd is the most evident. 
Thus nothing can be known better than the wujūd itself. As a result, wujūd cannot be 
described. These two claims are the reasons why those philosophers who attempted to 
define wujūd ended up with tautological definitions (Mashāʿir, p. 6ff). 
Another characteristic is that wujūd has no opposite. This, in terms of necessary being, 
was claimed by Peripatetics such as Fārābī and Avicenna (al-Madina al-Fāḍila, ed. S.H. 
Nasr, M. Aminrazavi, p. 120). For Mullā Ṣadrā, not only necessary being, but in general 
being has no opposite (Asfār, v. 1, p. 398). Non-existence is not opposite of wujūd, non-
existence is the absence of it. This is again related to the generality of wujūd. An idea of 
“opposite” requires two contraries that fall under one genus. However, it was mentioned 
that wujūd is the most general and there is nothing else that makes up a common genus 
with wujūd. Non-existence is not excluded from wujūd, as it has its share of existence as 
well (Asfār, v. 1, p. 401). It is re-defined as an artificial concept created by assuming the 
privacy of existence. Related to the fact of wujūd having no genus and definition, another 
result is that wujūd is not substance or accident (Asfār v. 6, p. 57; Asfār, v. 1, pp. 62, 258). 
Quiddities, in contrast, accept division and have parts such as form and matter; genus and 
differentia. This is due to quiddity being a secondary and mental reality in comparison to 
wujūd. 
The fact that everything falls under either one or another category of being helps us define 
Ṣadrā’s place in the ontological discussions about intentional objects. The result is already 
mentioned that intentional objects are considered as existents. But further explanation is 
needed on what this existence is. And that is discussed here that this existence is the 
ultimate reality that bears all references to content, essence, and relations. Thus, 
objectness as well as mentalness is not excluded from this new explanation. They too are 
existent and they too are not separable from existence because their very existence and 
reality is built on existence and the idea of essence, objectness etc are secondarily built 
by the mind over their content-ful existence. Consequence is that the notion of existence 
here is a comprehensive and extended version. This is different from many modern 
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theories that regard existence constrained to being material or three dimensional actuality 
in extra-mental world.  
The idea that wujūd has parts is rejected as well. Parts can be mental or extra-mental. 
Mental parts require genus and differentia, and extra-mental ones require matter and form. 
Wujūd cannot be considered in relation to any of these.  
One essential feature is that wujūd is simple (amr basīṭ) (Mashāʿir, p. 7). This is how 
wujūd is the reality and all other things take their reality from it:  
The englobing of existing things by the reality of wujūd is not like the 
englobing of particulars by a universal concept, and its holding valid 
for them… the reality of wujūd is not a genus nor a species nor an 
accident since it is not a natural universal (kullī tabiʿī). Rather its 
englobing is of another kind of englobing which is not known except 
by the gnostics, those who are "firm in knowledge" (al-rasikhūn fi’l-
ʿilm).  It is interpreted sometimes as the "Breath of the Compassionate" 
(nafas al-Raḥmān), sometimes as the Compassion "which embraces all 
things," or as the "reality (al-ḥaqq) by which things are created (al-
khalq)," according to a group of gnostics; and as the expansion (basṭ) 
of the light of wujūd upon the temples of contingent beings (hayākil al-
mumkināt) and the receptivity of the quiddities and its (light of wujūd) 
descent (nuzūl) into the domiciles of ipseities (manāzil al-huwiyyāt) 
(Mashāʿir, p. 9, tr. Nasr, p. 9). 
Thus, one should combine the two features that wujūd is the reality and that it is simple. 
One of the implications of the simplicity is that neither existence nor existents are 
compounds of any kind, e.g. form and matter. Analysable parts of existents are products 
of the human mind and the result of mental analysis:  
Therefore we say: each of the realities of these species has a mode of 
existence as a material body by which its members are differentiated, 
through which its individuals are multiplied, and in which they are 
found closely tied to one another in terms of space or time. In the same 
way, each of them has a specific intellective existence, differentiating 
its species in meaning and concept. […] 
Existence by itself is inclusive of all these meanings with its simplicity 
and unity.”(RIAA, tr. Kalin, 2010, pp. 281-2). 
207 
 
This is the principle of basiṭ al-haqīqa. The source of this principle could be the 
Neoplatonic idea that only one comes out of one. Beside its Neoplatonic reminiscence, 
the similarity to Parmenidian monist existence should also be noted.  
I think the next principle which combines the simplicity at the centre of all existents, - the 
principle that existence is the principle of one and many -, makes his idea of wujūd appear 
similar to Parmenidean existence. Ṣadrā accepts and writes about the Neoplatonic idea of 
cosmos which starts with one emanating from one. However, the idea that wujūd is the 
principle of one and many rests on the ontological gradation of wujūd. And the ontological 
gradation rests on the idea that it is one and the same reality that is manifested at different 
levels. In the previous chapter I claimed that Ṣadrā’s wujūd is univocal. In his theory, the 
explanatory of role of emanation is kept, yet gradation is built on a stronger idea of 
oneness that is shared by all existents: 
Verily the reality of everything is its wujūd, which is that from which 
its effects and [existential] conditions result. Wujūd is therefore the most 
appropriate of all things to possess reality because that which is other 
than it [wujūd] becomes the possessor of reality through it, and it 
[wujūd] is the reality of all that possesses reality, and it does not need, 
in its possessing reality, another reality. It is in itself in the objective 
world, and other than it by which I mean that the quiddities exist 
objectively through it and not through their own essence (Mashaʿir, pp. 
10-11, tr. Nasr, p. 11).  
Nothing is left outside of existence and, accordingly, one other innovative principle in 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is that knowledge is a mode of existence (Asfār, v. 3, p. 411). 
This principle is implied by Aṣālat al-wujūd, as the primacy of existence excludes nothing 
from existence. Further reasons for this principle are claimed through the similarities 
between existence and knowledge.  
Let me start with defining knowledge. In his Risāla fī-l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq (RTT, p. 
43), Mullā Ṣadrā follows the classical definition of knowledge that it is the presence of a 
thing in the mind. This process is a change in the soul and a form becomes present at the 
end of it (RTT, p. 45). But he changes this representationalist theory when he is presenting 
his own theory. Mullā Ṣadrā rejects previous knowledge theories, since in those theories 
knowledge is acquired through quiddity or relation. Mullā Ṣadrā posits knowledge as the 
essential part of the human soul’s substantial movement. Each process of knowledge 
changes something in the soul. As was discussed in the chapter about Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
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psychology, Ṣadrā sees the soul as the agent at all levels of perception. Thus, even when 
the soul sees, it changes.  
Here are some of the similar features of wujūd and knowledge: firstly, just as existence is 
the most general and it cannot be described or defined, every attempt to define knowledge 
results unsuccessfully and with tautology as well:  
It seems that knowledge is among those realities whose ipseity 
(inniyyah) is identical with its essence (māhiyyah). Realities of this kind 
cannot be defined, for definition consists of genus and difference, both 
of which are universals whereas every being is a particular reality by 
itself. It cannot be made known through complete description either 
because there is nothing more known than knowledge as it is an 
existential state of consciousness (ḥālah wijdaniyyah) which the 
knower, being alive, finds in his essence from the very beginning 
without veil or obscurity. It is not [in the nature of knowledge] to allow 
itself to be known by something more apparent and clear because 
everything becomes clear to the intellect by the knowledge it has. How 
does then knowledge become clear by anything other than itself? (Asfār, 
v. 3, p. 306, tr. Kalin, 2004, p. 89). 
Just as existence is in grades, knowledge has different levels and kinds: 
By the same token, knowledge has various kinds, some of which are 
low in degree such as sense-perception [since] it is impossible to sense 
multiple sensibles through a single sensation. [But] some are higher in 
rank, such as intellection, in that a single intellect is sufficient to 
intellect an infinite number of intelligibles, as in the case of the simple 
intellect. In short, whatever has a higher status in being is more capable 
of [attaining] the knowables (maʿlūmāt) and more intense in containing 
quiddities. … when we know something through its perfect definition, 
we know it with its full truth and reality even if we cannot know all of 
its parts [i.e., its sensate and intellective properties] at once due to the 
impossibility of knowing the very truth and reality of anything at a 
given time (Asfār, v. 3, pp. 411, 412, tr. Kalin, 2004, p. 97). 
In his MQ, knowledge is shown to manifest levels and shapes of difference, just like 
wujūd (MQ, p. 59). Accordingly, in the soul there are different abstractions which 
are subsumed within a unity: sometimes as low as the level of the earth and at other 
times as high as the heavens and intellects.  
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And finally, knowledge is a particular reality just as existence is. Kalin explains this in 
the following terms:  
Even though the circular and non-definitional nature of knowledge 
represents common sense epistemology in Islamic thought and is shared 
by various schools, this is where Mullā Ṣadrā takes his departure from 
his predecessors by equating knowledge (ʿilm) with being (wujūd). For 
Mullā Ṣadrā, the ultimate object of knowledge is being particularized 
through a myriad of modes, states and instances. In fact, in many places, 
Mullā Ṣadrā defines knowledge simply as a mode of being (nahw al-
wujūd): when we say that we know something, we affirm or deny the 
existence of something, and this cannot be other than being. In this 
generic sense, being is the standing condition of all knowledge and 
precedes the discursive considerations of the knowing subject (Kalin, 
2004, p. 89). 
In RTT, Mullā Ṣadrā talks about knowledge as the genus of the conception and assent and 
the two being simple species (nawʿ) (RTT, p. 47). He states that that of which presence is 
gained (ḥuṣūl) in the soul is wujūd (RTT, p. 51). Rizvi points to the same claim from 
Sadrian texts as, “If one does not have cognition (maʿrifa) of oneself, his self has no 
being, because being is the same as light, presence and consciousness (shuʿūr)” (Rizvi, 
p. 84). Thus not only is knowledge identical to wujūd, but so too is consciousness.  
O the intelligent and smart one! Look at the soul, its existential modes 
and states, and its being united with a group of existents from this mode 
of existence in every existential mode. It is of a bodily nature with the 
body, a sense with the senses, an imaginal [reality] with imagination, 
and an intellect with the intellect. ‘And no soul knows where it shall 
die’ (Qur’an 31:34). When the soul is united with nature, it becomes the 
organs. When it is united with the senses in actuality, it becomes the 
very sensibilia that have come about for the senses in actuality. When 
it is with imagination in actuality, it becomes the imaginal forms that it 
has. This continues until it reaches the station of the actual intellect, and 
becomes the intellective forms that have obtained for it in actuality. The 
wisdom behind this is that when God instaured in existence an 
intellective unity, which is the world of the intellect, and a physical 
multiplicity which is the world of the senses and imagination with 
degrees, the Divine Providence made it necessary to create a 
comprehensive being (nashʾah jāmiʿah), by which everything in the 
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two worlds is perceived. And it designated for it a subtle potency 
corresponding to this all-encompassing unity. It is through this 
correlation that the perception [of the two worlds] is possible (RIAA, tr. 
Kalin, p. 264). 
The soul’s journey from a material beginning to a high and immaterial entity is mainly 
thanks to the substantial change that takes place through knowledge:  
 When the soul becomes stronger, it becomes the locus of multiple 
meanings. Each of these meanings, when found by themselves as a 
weak existence, is a form for a deficient corporeal species such as the 
intelligible [reality of the] horse, the intelligible [reality of the] tree, and 
the intelligible [reality of the] earth. Each one of these has a form. When 
this form is found in the extra-mental world, it is the form of a material 
species with an essence different from any other material species. When 
it is found in the intellect, its intellective form is existentially united 
with an intellective substance because the intellective existence is an 
exalted and noble being in which all of the intelligibilia can be found 
with one single existence in contrast to the unity of the hylé and forms 
of corporeal things in it (RIAA, tr. Kalin, p. 276). 
Mullā Ṣadrā in reality does not totally reject other theories of knowledge, especially 
Peripatetic correspondence theory, but modifies them so that knowledge will be 
appropriate to the reality of wujūd. As the reality of wujūd is dynamic and all existents 
are in constant movement, the stability of quiddities is far from giving the real picture of 
the world. Thus knowledge through quiddities and forms - the acquired knowledge - is 
not rejected, but rather is taught to be insufficient in his system. The reality of wujūd can 
only be experienced through direct knowledge, i.e. knowledge by presence.  
Previously I gave a large discussion on how my presentation differs from other 
contemporary presentations of Ṣadrā’s epistemology. It is useful to mention here that one 
essential difference is that gradational ontology is applicable on knowledge in my 
presentation. As a result, there are not different types of knowledge categorically 
differentiated, rather there is one knowledge that comes in varying degrees. 
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5.2 PROOFS OF MENTAL EXISTENCE 
5.2.1 1st Proof and Particularity of Mental Existents 
The first proof that Mullā Ṣadrā presents in Asfār can be called the ‘conceivability 
argument’. The very conceivability of things that do not exist extra-mentally is the proof 
for their mental existence. We conceive extra-mentally non-existent things even when it 
is impossible that they could exist, such as the coincidence of two opposites (ijtimāʿ al-
naqīḍayn), the particle that cannot be divided any further (jawhar fard), and a partner to 
the Creator (sharīk al-bāriʾ). These non-existent things can be differentiated from one 
another. They also refer to mental individuals and they can bear judgements, and thus 
truth value can be associated with them as well. The things in the mind can be 
differentiated from each other. The differentiation of an absolute non-existent is 
necessarily impossible. If something is differentiated, it must have some sort of existence. 
These things are not extra-mental existents therefore; they must possess existence 
mentally (Asfār, v. 1, p. 319ff).  
An important issue about this proof is Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on tamayyuz 
(differentiation). Since Mullā Ṣadrā clearly states that mental things are differentiated 
among themselves, this implies that they are individuated.  
So all contingent beings, with their differentiations and grades in 
perfection and deficiency are, in their essences, in need of It [the 
Necessary Being] and derive their sufficiency in being from It. 
Considered in themselves, they are contingent beings made necessary 
by the First, the Necessary Being -- transcendent is He. Indeed, they 
are, in themselves, illusory and perishing, and they are not made real 
except by the Real, the One, the Unique: “All things are perishing save 
His face” (28:88). The relation between It and that which is other than 
It is analogous to the relation between the rays of the sun (Mashāʿir, pp. 
48-9, tr. Nasr, p. 53). 
Every existent is differentiated by its own existence, the locus and presence, and intensity 
it possesses, as well as its proximity to the Necessary Being. Ṣadrā states this in the next 
sentence of the above mentioned paragraph: “The same is true for the wujūd of contingent 
beings in which there is differentiation in their proximity and distance from the One, the 
Real; for the whole proceeds from God” (Mashāʿir, pp. 48-49, tr. Nasr, p. 53). 
The main criticism for this proof relates to the definition of knowledge. The claim is that 
knowledge cannot be obtained through non-existents. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s epistemology in 
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which knowledge is a mode of existence, how can non-existence be a source of 
knowledge? The criticisms Ṣadrā mentions are two: for those who regard knowledge as a 
relation there is nothing to be related to as they reject mental existence as a concept and 
the possibility that non-existents (maʿdūm) can have any kind of existence. Knowledge 
as a relation is contentless. It relies on the two sides of knowledge for this relation to be 
established. For those claiming that knowledge is a representation, the same problem 
occurs as it relies on references occurring both extra-mentally and mentally and their 
correspondent (Asfār v. 1, p. 320). So, in terms of knowledge through non-existents, we 
no longer have extra-mental objects that are abstracted or referred to. 
Mullā Ṣadrā says that the main goal of knowledge is not obtaining the similitudes or 
images of the extra-mental objects, but rather it is grasping a reality. In terms of mental 
existents, a shadowy form of reality occurs in the mind through knowledge. The only 
difference is that the forms obtained in this process are not established (thubūt) extra-
mentally. The forms are created by the knower. Also, as was stated before, Ṣadrā does not 
follow Avicenna in identifying reality with quiddity. Knowledge is not produced through 
matching or discovering the quiddities. 
For Mullā Ṣadrā’s monist ontology, things which are non-existent in the extra-mental 
world share a specific mode of existence. In the case of non-existence, we extract 
existence as a concept and create “non-existence” in our minds. This non-existence has 
no reality other than being a concept for supposition of non-existence. Thus we can 
predicate and judge on its very abstraction. Likewise, the concept of fire can be given as 
an example of other mental concepts. The effects of burning or heat do not take place for 
the concept of fire. However, as their fair-share of existence requires, they share the 
feature of differentiation (tamayyuz). Connecting Ṣadrā’s ontology to his epistemology, it 
can be said that all that can be known is that which has been differentiated (Asfār, v. 1, p. 
281). 
Thus, with this proof we also gain insight into Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontology and his conception 
of non-existents. Ṣadrā thinks that all that exists (extra-mentally or mentally) shares the 
same existence. They are all differentiated. In terms of his epistemology, although he 
rejects the relational attitudes claimed by theologians and the Peripatetics (the latter in 
the form of a representationalist theory and not content-free), his approach also requires 
a correspondence theory. The only difference is that he constructs this relation inside the 
mind for non-existents such as the mythical bird anqā. Thus, he continues by claiming 
that knowledge is some kind of occurrence of the presence of a form (Rizvi, p. 88). Thus, 
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both the form gained and the thing from which the form is gained are still necessary for 
him. In terms of the attitude of representationalist theories to nature, one that is carried 
from the extra-mental world to the mind as an abstracted form, Ṣadrā claims that things 
such as anqā can have their individuals without nature. Thus, he has a more nominalist 
stand in that sense.  
I will talk about contemporary discussions later, and in comparison to that discussion, we 
can say that Mullā Ṣadrā’s stance keeps both of the ontological and referential 
implications. Whilst the first proof is more related to the ontological assumption, the 
second proof is closer to the referential.  
5.2.2 2nd Proof and Fictionals 
The first proof was about non-existents (maʿdūmāt) in terms of solely thinking about them 
(taṣawwuru al-maʿdum faqad). The second proof is about judgements on mental things. 
We make affirmative true judgements (ḥukm thubūtiyya ṣādiqa) on non-existents; we 
judge non-existents and even make generalizations about them, such as that "anqā is 
flying" and that "the sum of the two sides of a triangle is equal to the third side" are known 
mentally. However, the triangle and anqā have no existence extra-mentally. We intuitively 
know the truth of these sentences. The truth of an affirmative judgement requires the 
existence of its subject/substratum. For the truth value of these, the existence of an extra-
mental substratum is not sufficient, since no extra-mental substratum is the substratum of 
these propositions.  
Then, given the truth of these judgements, their substratum must have a mode of existence 
which is different from extra-mental existence. Sabzawari lists this proof among proofs 
for mental existents, and adds that this proof requires the principle of presupposition 
(Sabzawari, 1977, p. 55; Rizvi, 2009, p. 62). When the dominant interpretation of 
existential usage of “is” was being discussed in the previous chapter, I mentioned that one 
of the results of this was the principle of presupposition (qāʿida farʿiyya) which is as 
follows: affirming something of something presupposes the existence of the subject. 
Mullā Ṣadrā does not seem content with the contents of this proof so far, so he adds three 
explanations which answer criticisms for this proof. The first criticism is made about the 
physicality of flying and the second one is about the nature which a name requires. Ṣadrā 
differentiates between name, nature, reality, and members of a reality. So in terms of anqā, 
in order to be able to use the word, one does not need a nature (which is physical and 
extra-mental). Thanks to differentiating between nature and members of a concept, it is 
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enough for it to have mental individual reference. Together with fictional beings, Ṣadrā 
includes judgements about the past in this proof.  
5.2.3 3rd Proof and Generalizations as a Proof of the Mental 
The third proof comes from generalizations and some sources name it the case of 
universals. As was discussed before, the universal as universal cannot be thought to exist 
extra-mentally. Thus, the product of mental abstraction such as whiteness must have a 
specific realm which is mental existence. Besides generalizations and abstractions, this 
proof is also related to the second proof. The possibility of predication and judgement is 
possible through universality. Otherwise, one would not be able to speak about common 
things of the same kind of things and say “Every X is Z”. Without universality, predication 
of this kind would not be possible.  
Mullā Ṣadrā opens up this proof with a section he calls istibṣār:  
We can conceive of abstracted entities (al-umūr al-ʿintiẓāiyya) and 
privative attributes (al-ṣifa al-maʿdūmiyya) in extra-mental reality and 
we can predicate them of things. It follows that they have some 
affirmation, which is either in extra-mental reality but that is impossible 
because they are ‘beings of reason’, or they exist in the mind (Asfār, v. 
1, p. 327, tr. Rizvi, 2009, p. 83). 
With this istibṣār, his proofs for mental existence come to an end. Ṣadrā’s proofs on their 
own do not appear to be original. However, his giving an extended space to the debates 
on mental existence is important. The reason why his discussion on mental existence is 
unique, however, is not due to the proofs he mentions. It is the preliminary principles, 
such as the creative power of human beings and the principle of primacy of being. Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s proofs in Asfār are mainly repetition of what had already appeared in Ṭūsī and 
Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī. Rāzī’s presentation of the proofs is in contrast to others, not in order 
to affirm the notion of mental existence.  
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5.3 WHAT IS AN INTENTIONAL OBJECT? 
As the long discussion of mental existence implies, I take Mullā Ṣadrā’s objects of 
perception, concept of existence universals, and quiddity not only as examples of mental 
existence, but also as examples of intentional objects.  
This section aims to link contemporary and medieval approaches to the ontology of 
intentional objects. The main question, “What kind of an existence do intentional objects 
have?”, was at the very beginning rejected by some philosophers, as they either chose to 
eliminate them altogether or reduce them to other entities. This rejection of the legitimacy 
of the question arises mainly from the naturalistic intuitions of the philosophers. The other 
approach is acceptation of intentional objects and accounting for them with a new attitude 
to existence. This new attitude can either take place by expanding the notion of existence 
beyond extra-mental and physical things by introducing mental existence as part of 
existence or by introducing a concept larger than existence such as “thing”. In this section 
I will first examine the expansive attitude with examples of Meinong and the Muʿtazila. 
In the second part, I will discuss eliminationist and reductionist approaches. And, lastly, 
I will discuss the examples of mental existence.  
When Meinong and reductionist philosophers are discussed I will try to keep the 
presentation sufficiently broad to keep the contemporary frame. The problem of 
intentionality, as mentioned in the previous chapters is introduced by Brentano in the 19th 
century as a revised term from medieval intentional inexistence. Its initiation to analytical 
framework was made by Chisholm and from then on the story of intentionality took place 
in a totally different philosophical language. In the analytical tradition the problem is 
mainly discussed through propositional attitudes. In order to preserve the language 
difference, the presentation will be slightly long.  
5.3.1 Meinong and Introduction of a Theory of Objects 
“Even non-existents can be signified by a name”  
(Posterior Analytics, 92b29-30). 
One important issue about intentionality is its indifference to actual reality. It is not 
sensitive to truth-values or the extra-mental realities. This is the very feature that makes 
it troublesome for most theorists. Think about imaginations, beliefs, fears, etc ... Let’s say 
I utter: "I do not like X" but thinking that X is dead, thus X no longer exists extra-mentally, 
is my utterance meaningless, or is the psychological experience of dislike unreal? What 
about the ability of imagining impossible objects like square circles, golden mountains, 
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and so on? Or how is the status of hallucinating things like ghosts, or similarly having 
irrational fears like that of witches? 
Taking Aristotle’s statement about naming, and adding intentional relations created 
between non-existent objects and mental states, new questions about the notion of 
existence occur: if non-existents can be referred to, or be signified by a name but do not 
exist actually (extra-mentally), how can we refer to them? Do we need to call them 
existents, just with an intuition that if we do not say so we would miss out on some of the 
meaning? Can they be called existents just because they appear suitable for reference? 
On the other hand, if they are existents, does that mean that they have another kind of 
existence other than the extra-mental existence? Does this imply that there are degrees of 
existence? Or if they are non-existents, how can we explain their situation? How is it 
possible that “an object may have a set of characteristics and yet no kind of being at all?” 
(Chisholm, 1972, p. 248). Or is it really possible to ask for criteria of being suitable to 
possess sets of characteristics or properties? How are objects that have no extra-mental 
reference to be accounted for? 
Intentionality is presented as a positive definition of the mental, thus it is mainly a topic 
of the metaphysics of consciousness. Moreover, intentional objects became a highly 
debated topic in ontology as well because of the ontological problems that intentionality 
raises. In this section, I will take Meinong’s presentation of intentional objects and 
objections raised against it, since it has been one of the most discussed models. This is 
mainly because Brentano did not discuss the ontological consequences of his idea of 
intentionality in detail. It is mainly Meinong who focused on this and established a theory 
of intentional objects. His main assumption was that existence and object-ness were 
separable.  
But before this, I need to discuss his psychological starting point. I believe that one 
important step is taking intentional objects seriously: e.g. those about beliefs, 
hallucinations, dreams, desires, etc. The result is that he does not try to re-interpret 
relevant cases into other cases. So the first step is accepting relata (each side of the 
relation) of these as objects, towards which we have attitudes. While most other 
approaches try to interpret sentences containing intentional objects, and either ignore or 
reduce them to analysable propositions, Meinongians take the question as it appears 
(Priest and Read, 2004, p. 422).  
To discover the outcomes of this first step, a schema will be presented taking help from 
Kriegel’s argumentation (Kriegel, 2008, pp. 82-3). Afterwards, the contained-premises 
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will be discussed. 
P1. If x is a cat-seeing, then there is a y, such that y is an intentional object of x. 
P2. Both cat-seeing and cat-hallucinating are of the same intentional type. 
P3. Intentional acts/states that belong to the same intentional kind have the same kind of 
intentional object.  
C. If x is a cat-hallucinating, then there is a y, such that y is the intentional object of x. 
I assume that this list of arguments is applicable to Meinong’s theory as well. This 
argumentation at its end requires an account for these intentional objects. When accepting 
that there are objects of intentionality which do not exist extra-mentally, being the relata 
becomes one thing and existing becomes another. And this can be another way of 
expressing the possibility of “hav[ing] properties without existing” (Gibson, 1998, p. 67).  
When the problem is defined in a very simplified way through intentional acts/states and 
a relation of them with intentional objects, then the first place to start a discussion 
becomes the third premise, and the problem of relation. There are three options in terms 
of relation. In the first group, there are those who accept that there is a relation. In the 
second group, there are those who claim that there is a contingent relation which does not 
construct. They also deny that relations need relata, besides denying the relation itself. In 
the third group there are those who claim that there seems to be a relation but actually 
that proposition about relation can be paraphrased and the relation can be ignored. 
When a philosopher takes the relation seriously she either brackets the relata with 
explaining them in a reductive way, or she takes the relata seriously as well. I take the 
second position to be similar to Meinong’s; it accepts the third premise and, what is more, 
it derives the conclusion afterwards.  
For Meinong, the realm of objects is wider than the realm of existents. Some of the objects 
exist and some do not. Some of those that do not exist may be said to be, to subsist, and 
some may not be said to be at all (Chisholm, 1972, p. 246). Even the unthinkable is an 
object; so the carrier of any property and whatever can be experienced in some way is an 
object. The unthinkable has the property of being unthinkable at least. The theory includes 
objects, properties or attributes, mathematical objects, and states of affairs (Objektive) 
(Chisholm, 1972, p. 246). In this case, objects that do not exist are occupied and, what is 
more, an ontological explanation about “carrying a property and not existing at the same 
time” is suggested.  
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Meinong’s theory relies on two basic principles:  
1. Principle of Independence of So-being from Being (Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit des 
Soseins vom Sein): Suggesting a wider realm of objects requires independency of being 
an object and existing. A successor of Meinong, Mally, formulated this by the 
conceptualization of so-sein. According to this theory, “the so-being of an object is not 
affected by its non-being” (Marek, 2009).  
2. Principle of Indifference of the Pure Object to Being (Satz vom Außersein des reinen 
Gegenstandes): Separating being an object and existing implies that existence is not part 
of the nature of an object. So the second principle states that, “The object is by nature 
indifferent to being, although in any case one of the object’s two objectives of being, its 
being or its non-being, subsists [is the case] (Marek, 2009).”  
Meinong is quite careful about retaining two logical principles: the excluded middle and 
non-contradiction. According to the law of the excluded middle, there cannot be a third 
realm other than being and non-being. Thus, this formulation does not imply a third realm 
other than existence and non-existence. Those objects like Golden Mountain and round 
squares have no kind of being at all, they are homeless objects (Chisholm 1972, p. 248). 
Meinong does not accept degrees of existence. He accepts the rule of the excluded middle, 
and thus everything is either existent or non-existent. So, what are these non-existent 
intentional objects? Although existence (Sein) is not in degrees, so-being (So-sein) of the 
objects is. And these objects are classified and explained with their so-sein.  
Since there are horses, for example, there is also the being of horses, 
the being of the being of horses, the non-being of non-being of horses, 
and the being of the nonbeing of the nonbeing of horses. 
And since there are no unicorns, there is also the non-being of unicorns, 
the being of the non-being of unicorns, and the nonbeing of the 
nonbeing of the unicorns (Chisholm, 1972, p. 246). 
Some of the objects have being and some do not. Those that do not have being are defined 
according to their so-beings. If so-being of an object is non-contradictory, it is a possible 
object. If it violates the contradiction law it is an impossible object. If so-being of an 
object violates the law of contradiction, that object is an incomplete object. The most 
poorly endowed object, of which even Meinong is suspicious of calling it an object, is the 
defective object because it seems to have very little so-being (Chisholm, 1972, p. 248). A 
point may be clarified here: we talk about so-being of everything; so-beings have so-
beings as well.  
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The idea of detachability between being and so-being helps Meinongians solve the prima 
facie contradiction which their basic motto contains. “There are objects of which it is true 
that there are no such objects” can be taken as non-contradictory according to this 
Meinongian schema of objects. Russell paraphrases sentences that include non-existents 
in such a way that assumes an existential quantifier. This un-detachability drives him to 
accept the assumption that, “there are no true propositions about what does not have 
being” (Marek, 2009). But Meinong’s theory generates truth value for other sentences 
that include non-existents by detachability of “there is” and “there exists”. This separation 
lets the theory solve the problem of contradictory sentences about non-existents as well.  
While “The square is round” is a contradictory statement, “The round square is round” 
and “The mountain I am thinking of is golden" are true statements. In Russell’s theory 
these are false statements. In Meinong’s theory, however, there are differences between 
statements about being and so-being. So,  
a Sein statement (for example, "John is angry") is an affirmative 
statement that can be existentially generalized upon (we may infer 
"There exists an x such that x is angry") and a So-sein statement is an 
affirmative statement that cannot be existentially generalized upon; 
despite the truth of "The mountain I am thinking of is golden" we may 
not infer "There exists an x such that I am thinking about x and x is 
golden" (Chisholm, 1967, pp. 261-2). 
The discussion of detachability can be connected to the principle of presupposition in 
medieval discussions or the existential import of Frege and Russell’s discussion on 
propositions. By the principle of detachability, Meinong and Mally avoid existential 
import or presupposition of existence. So it is fair to say that for them although the relata 
in two parts of a sentence are regarded as important, this importance comes without the 
burden of any implication on existence. 
Detachability of sein and so-sein also implies that being is different from objects. And 
this leads to the second principle.  
An eye, educated with medieval discussions of ontology, would find Meinong’s 
discussion very familiar. However, a closer examination is required to understand the 
nuances and similarities.  
Let me start with Kriegel’s introduction with three premises. First, does an experience of 
vision necessarily require an extra-mental object? As we have discussed in the history 
section, the answer is affirmative for Aristotelians, however, for Ṣadrā, extra-mental 
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object is merely in order to prepare the soul’s attention to an object and although the 
object is listed as a condition, he gives priority to the human soul as the mere necessity 
for perception. Secondly Kriegel mentions cat-seeing and cat-hallucination as same 
intentional type. This premise is affirmatively shared by both Aristotelians and Sadrians. 
In this, I am referring to the abstractedness of mental objects, objects of dreams and 
objects of mental diseases. However, the rank of existence for an object of dream and 
mental object of hallucination might not be the same. For example, dreams, when they 
acquire human contact with a higher realm, maintain a higher object to the soul 
(Bonmariage, 2002, pp. 49ff). According to this the fourth claim about having same 
intentional type need to be revised. In terms of being existent and sharing the features of 
existence as being individuated, having reality etc. intentional objects created by different 
faculties are the same. However, their ranks are necessarily different as each existent is 
unique and also their highness in rank depend on both the soul that creates them and the 
source that they come from be it extra-mental object or a higher realm of perfect beings.  
Secondly we can look at the principles Meinong mentions: Principle of Independence of 
So-being from Being and Principle of Indifference of the Pure Object to Being. Despite 
the similarity in Avicenna’s separation of being into essence and existence, these 
principles are not applicable to Ṣadrā’s ontology and thus Ṣadrā’s theory is not compatible 
with Meinong’s version of object theory of intentionality.   
  
5.3.2 Reductionist Answers to the Problem of Intentional Objects: Russell and 
Quine  
Russell tried to solve the problem (though not directly the problem of intentional objects, 
but rather the problem about reference to non-existent things) by paraphrasing these 
sentences. He paraphrased these sentences and turned them into sentences which quantify 
and state the objects in an existential statement. For example, “The golden mountain is 
golden” would be paraphrased as “There exists an x such that x is both golden and a 
mountain”. While the first statement was true according to Meinong, the second was false 
according to Russell. I am not sure the first one would be true according to Russell too. 
The first objection can be raised concerning the two sentences being the same. The 
question is whether such a paraphrase is successful or not. What is more, is it possible? 
Meinongian intuition would not accept this paraphrase because it eliminates one of the 
important features in sentences. “There is” and “there exists” is not the same, and thus 
the former cannot be equal to the sentence which is paraphrased through the second. 
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Russellians, on the other hand, do not discuss the reason for the possibility of such a 
paraphrase.  
Russell’s theory, although implying some ontological consequences, was originally about 
reference and descriptions. When it comes to Quine, he adopts Russell’s ontology (Quine, 
1961, pp. 5-8). Although a very influential text in his “On what there is”, Quine does not 
develop a detailed argument against noneist theories. The basic assumptions behind his 
theory can be restricted to as the following two:  
Ontological Assumption: Predication implies existence. 
Referential Assumption: Every singular term refers to a kind of being (Bremer, p. 2). 
Existence is mostly about extending in space and locating in time. Unlike Russell and 
Meinong (Priest defines him as a Platonist), Quine accepts some abstract entities but he 
tries to reduce their number. His basic claim in the paper is that “to be is to be of a bound 
variable”. To sum up, he tries to build a simple ontology that is compatible with Occam’s 
razor and solves the claim posed by Plato’s beard (Quine, 1953, pp. 2, 17). 
Quine introduces us to two characters: McX and Wyman. Wyman believes that all terms 
denote and some of the objects that are denoted are existent and some are subsistent.  
Quine objects to this theory because of its ambiguous use of “exists”. But he fails to arrive 
at a less ambiguous one.  
On the other hand, he blames this theory for overpopulating the world. One problem is 
that neither of his objections apply to Meinongian or noneist theses, since in these 
subsisting is not posed as a third way between existence and non-existence. Things simply 
exist or they do not. According to Meinong, those denoted are objects but not existents. 
They are not subsistent either. Thus, the world is not overpopulated by additional 
existents, as Quine claims.  
As an alternative, Quine adopts Russell’s theory in two steps: 
First, he takes names and translates them into descriptive phrases. And then he applies 
Russell’s paraphrase.  
Priest objects and finds Quine to have erred in both steps:  
a. These names are not equivalent to their translated descriptive versions. Kripke’s theory 
had shown that proper names and descriptions “hook on to reality in different ways” 
(Priest, 2005, p. 109). If they hook on to reality in the same way, descriptive statements 
would be analytical, but they are not. 
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b. Russell’s paraphrase does not give us an equivalent of the original sentences. Therefore, 
the second step is controversial as well.  
Russell’s position seems to be a stronger criticism for Meinongianism. Quine, on the other 
hand firstly does not oppose the claims of the Meinongian thesis and this is the reason 
why some of his objections do not affect Meinongianism. Additionally, the rest of his 
argumentation depends on translation of proper names to descriptive statements and the 
contingent relation between the name and description causes this attempt to fail at its very 
beginning. Quine’s own alternative about existence is not clear: what really does being 
bound of a variable mean? And what exactly allows mathematical objects to exist 
according to mathematical theories on the one hand, and all statements about fairies to be 
false on the other? 
The contemporary discussions are mainly on propositional attributes. The main trend in 
the analytical tradition is to reduce the intentional into extra-mental realities. Although 
Meinongians take intentionality seriously, they still reject accepting different intensified 
levels of existence. Instead of explaining intentional objects among existents, they instead 
conceptualise ‘objectness’ which accepts levels, which has a different truth value realm 
and which is indifferent to existence. Meinong’s idea of indifference reminds one of 
Avicenna’s idea of the three aspects of essence (ShI. V.1.). His attitude about thingness 
in general also appears very close to the quiddity of Avicenna. Details of Avicenna’s 
quiddity will be discussed further together with Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontology. 
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5.4 QUEST FOR A DIFFERENT FRAME TO THE PROBLEM OF 
INTENTIONALITY: MENTAL EXISTENCE 
Tenants of the house 
Thoughts of a dry brain in a dry season 
“Gerantion” 
 
In this research I aimed to discuss intentionality in pre-Brentano texts by describing the 
ideas on the soul and perception processes of different ancient and medieval philosophers. 
My quest in this research has been mainly to consider the largest possible context in order 
to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of intentionality. Thus, intentionality is 
related to all processes including sense perception and intellection in which human beings 
create a world unique which is for them, and objects in this world manifest different 
characteristics from the objects in the extra-mental world. Thus, they have inexistence as 
Brentano names it, or they have mental existence as Avicenna calls it.  
Mullā Ṣadrā’s attitude for mental existence is reported to be one of the most original ideas 
in his philosophy. This would disappoint many, as neither his question nor his proofs are 
as original as one would expect. Marcotte finds the close steps of mental existence in 
Avicenna’s “maʿna” since maʿna has no extra-mental reality, and also in the 
representative nature of images for sensory objects in the mind (Marcotte, 2011, p. 157). 
In his presentation of the problem of mental existence, Rizvi adds an alternative 
suggestion that Avicenna’s modal classification is part of the discussion of the mental 
(Rizvi, 2009, p. 79). He also traces the question back to the Platonic tradition. It is Nasīr 
al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī who have more extensive discussions regarding the 
question of mental existence before Mullā Ṣadrā. The latter was one of the rare figures 
who wrote to reject the idea itself instead of to prove it. Ṣadrā largely mirrors the proofs 
for mental existence already presented objectively by Fakhr al-dīn Rāzī in Mabāḥith. 
5.4.1 Concept of Existence 
Avicenna’s thought that existence is added to quiddity is interpreted as an ontological 
evaluation about extra-mental reality as well as a logical one by philosophers like Fakhr 
al-dīn al-Rāzī and Averroes. However, as Ṭūsī’s defense of Avicenna shows, for 
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Avicenna, the distinction of quiddity and existence is not extra-mental (Izutsu, 1971, p. 
3; Kalin, 2004, p. 87; Ishārāt, v. 3, p. 14).  
Some of the discussions on the topic can be seen as a confusion about predication on 
existence. Consider talking about the existence of a tree. When this is carried to language, 
the statement occurs as “X exists” or “X is an existent”. “X is existent” is in the same form 
as “X is white”. The question is then whether the word “existence” carries same 
characteristics as another word, say, “white”. As its form is similar to “X is white” in this 
formularization, existence appears to be an adjective (Izutsu, 1971, p. 4). 
Existence’s appearance as an adjective implies that it is a concept that is dependent on 
something else, as in our case existence becomes dependent to the tree. This is 
strengthened by the idea that quiddities are possible situations and existence is attached 
to them. Eventually this requires the assumption that the quiddity of X exists before X’s 
existence. This is absurd. In order to avoid absurdity and regression, Avicenna claims that 
the accidentality of existence is a special one, different from other accidents. Mullā Ṣadrā 
discusses this point in terms of Avicenna’s own principle that substances are prior to 
accidents: 
Shaykh al-Ra’is Ibn Sina has said in his Taʿlīqāt (Glosses) as follows: 
“The wujūd of accidents in themselves is their wujūd for their respective 
substrata, except for this accident which one designates as “wujūd.” 
This latter differs from all other accidents as a result of the fact that they 
have need of their substratum in order to exist, whereas wujūd does not 
need wujūd in order to exist. It is therefore not correct to say that wujūd 
in its substratum is wujūd in itself if one means by that that wujūd has a 
wujūd (other than itself), as whiteness has a (difference from something 
that is white). Rather, one can say that it is so in the sense that its wujūd 
in its substratum is the very wujūd of the substratum, whereas in the 
case of all other accidents than wujūd, their wujūd in their respective 
substratum is simply the wujūd of their accidents” (Mashāʿir, p. 34, tr. 
Nasr, p. 36).  
Suhrawardī builds up ontology on a hierarchy of lights. His ontology is mainly built on 
the dual language of light and darkness. Shades of light, - thus different configurations of 
light and darkness - make up the world of existent things. He, however, denies attributing 
existence to the existents, and as a result he identifies reality with quiddity and light by 
differentiating them from existence. What Suhrawardī actually means is that there is no 
reality to existence other than that of a concept or a mental construction (ḤI, p. 45). Fārābī 
225 
 
might be the first to focus on such a problem in terms of predication. He talks about two 
types of approaches to evaluate existential propositions, i.e. sentences like “X exists”. 
One is from the point of logic and the second is ontological. Although “existent” is 
“predicate” in the first, it is not according to the second. Extra-mental reality makes up 
the perspective of the second perspective. Logically, the sentence is made up of a subject 
and a predicate (Rizvi, 2009, p. 64ff.). Thus, the first perspective sees existence as a 
predicate. However, there is only a unity in the extra-mental reality. Ṭūsī expresses this 
by saying that wujūd is an intellectual predication (Ashkivārī, 2008, p. 62). Fārābī’s 
formula that, “Existence of something is nothing but itself”, must have given inspiration 
to Ṣadrā’s rejection of essentialist approaches to existence such as Suhrawardī’s (Rizvi, 
p. 65). Ṣadrā’s reply in this context had been differentiating between existence as a 
mentally-constructed concept and existence as actual reality. 
According to Ṣadrā, the case Suhrawardī describes is true of existence as a concept:  
It (wujūd) is in essence a reality which is simple (baṣīṭ), distinguished 
by its essence without having a genus or specific difference. And also 
it is not the genus for other things and it has no specific difference, no 
species, no general accident and no specific accident. But what is said 
concerning its being an accident for existents, from the point of view of 
abstract mental meaning that does not involve the reality of wujūd. 
Rather, it is the mental meaning of it which is derived from secondary 
intelligibles such as thingness, possibility, substantiality, accidentality, 
humanity, blackness, and other abstract words which are drawn from 
verbal nouns, upon which is based the manner in which an account is 
given of real or unreal things. Our discourse does not concern it [to 
explain secondary intelligibles] but what gives an account of them [i.e., 
reality of wujūd] and that it is a single, simple reality which does not at 
all need, in its realization or actualization, anything to be added to it, 
any condition of specific difference or accident whether it be of a class 
or an individual (Mashāʿir, p. 7, tr. Nasr, p. 8). 
For Ṣadrā, existence as a reality or - better put - as a dynamic reality, cannot be described, 
defined, or named. As soon as human beings try to make sense of reality, they freeze and 
distort it and create concepts and quiddities. As a result, the reality of existents is turned 
into concepts and their reality is distorted and conceptualized.  
Know that to all wujūdāt there correspond external realities; however, 
their names are unknown. In order to supply these names, we say ‘the 
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existence of this’, ‘the existence of that’. Moreover, the totality of it 
necessitates in the mind a general concept. In contrast, the different 
things and quiddities have names and properties which are known. 
However, it is not possible to express the real wujūd of each thing 
among all the different things, or real wujūd of everything, through a 
name or a qualification because the formation of names and 
qualifications is in correspondence to concepts and universals used in 
logic, not in correspondence to individual ipseities of wujūd nor of 
concrete forms (Mashāʿir, p. 12, tr. Nasr, p. 13). 
Thus, Ṣadrā does not reject most of the inquiry on how existence is an accident or an 
adjective or a concept. He places these characteristics under a concept of existence. This 
concept has the same characteristics as any other concept and it is a distorted picture of 
the reality of existence. The concept of existence is a mental construction. As a result, it 
cannot reflect the dynamic reality of existence. So, grasping the reality and freezing it 
without any distortion is only possible at rare moments of origination and resurrection129. 
The reality of wujūd is not mental existence (wujūd dhihnī) that is common among many. 
Only as a concept is existence (wujūd) a common meaning (Mashāʿir, pp. 7-8). 
So wujūd is not mentally constructed (iʿtibārī). It is not a universal reality (does not have 
mental existence), it is not particular or universal, nor general or specific. However, all 
these cases emerge from wujūd itself. One of the related issues is the expansion of wujūd 
on things, as it is not universal this expansion is not like that of a universal on particulars. 
Ṣadrā uses the term sarayān (expansion) for explaining this. Every existent is 
differentiated from another by itself, and not with any other differentiation (Shawāhid, 
pp. 6-7). One can tie this idea of sarayān with Mullā Ṣadrā’s wujūd munbasiṭ (extended 
existence). So, at the level of ordinary things, wujūd is manifested as each thing that there 
is.  
5.4.2 Non-existence 
One of the classical classifications of things that are is to discriminate among the actual 
things, the things in the mind (ShI, I.5, p. 32, tr. p. 25), and the things from the linguistic 
realm either as they appear in spoken or in written form. Rizvi traces this back to 
Aristotle’s De Interpretatione and the Late Antique commentaries (Rizvi, 2009, p. 58). 
Other than things in re (fi’l-ʿayn), all others are indeed uninstantiated in the extra-mental 
                                                          
129Ali Shirvani,“Epistemology and Transcendent Philosophy” 
http://www.Mullāsadra.org/new_site/english/Paper%20Bank/Transcendent%20Philosophy/13-
78140%20@%20Shirvani.htm, accessed: 20th June 2013. 
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world and have a dependent existence: they are mainly the products of human minds. 
When reduced to a bi-partite classification of existence-non-existence, in terms of their 
uninstantiated status, all other than actual extra-mental things can be regarded as non-
existents. 
Another classification was Avicenna’s tripartite classification of possible beings, 
impossible beings, and the necessary being. In the latter classification all things that exist 
extra-mentally are considered to be necessary (either necessary by itself or by something 
else). All else can be listed as non-existent. When possible things enter this, I must add 
that non-existent, in its most general usage, has two sides: one possible and close to actual 
existence and a second one closer to mere non-existence: We can think the possible 
actually existent in extra-mental world. However, ultimate non existence cannot be 
conceived to be actualized at all.  
Although the Peripatetic approach works on a dual classification of actual existents and 
non-existents, some theologians claimed another category that is in-between. They named 
it subsistence instead of existence (Sabzawari, 1977, p. 75). Muʿtazila’s subsistence, for 
example, is defined as being more general than existence. They call this a “state” (ḥāl) 
and instead of existence they apply “subsistence” to it. So a state is an attribute of an 
existent which is neither existent nor non-existent (Sabzawari, 1977, p. 76). Ṣadrā does 
not accept the idea of a state as an in-between status. Ṣadrā’s main idea is that the things 
that can be said about maʿdūmāt including the negated attitudes (ṣifa salbiya) all 
eventually come back to being about wujūd (Asfār, v. 1, p. 400). Their separation from 
the extra-mental existence which is one of the levels of wujūd does not benefit their 
togetherness in existence per se. Its benefit for non-existence is not due to its being a 
concept. As a concept, it is not different from other concepts. It is the estimative power 
according to Ṣadrā that can abstract the subject for non-existent (maʿdūm) and judge that 
it is vain or invalid. Not according to the concept itself as the representative concept in 
mind. That is rather in ultimate nonexistence (ʿadam muṭlaq) (Asfār, v. 1, p. 400). 
Non-existence, too, is similar to ultimate non-existence (ʿadam muṭlaq), but only from a 
different perspective. In terms of its concept it has a share of ultimate existence (wujūd 
muṭlaq). It is evident that what non-existence and existents (ʿadam wa mawjūdāt) share 
in terms of wujūd is not the wujūd from which nonexistence (ʿadam) is said to be free 
(mutaʿarri) or mawjūdāt are said to be opposite of. Maʿdūm is indeed a mental 
abstraction. Its wujūd is due to its conceptual existence in the mind (Asfār, v. 1, p. 401). 
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Concept is an intellectual existence and it is one of the individuals of the ultimate 
existence (wujūd muṭlaq).  
Ṣadrā lists the different cases of maʿdūm that the mind can imagine such as the non-
existence per se, non-existence of non-existence, ultimate non-existence (ʿadam muṭlaq), 
ultimate non-existent (maʿdūm muṭlaq), non-existent in the mind, and all the impossibles, 
ultimate unknown (majhūl muṭlaq), and so on. As soon as the mind can imagine or 
estimate these things, it can also make judgements on them. One cannot predicate through 
common predication (ḥaml shāyī) as they are not about natures that are in the mind or in 
the external world, thus the predication is first order (ḥaml awwalī) (Asfār, v. 1, p. 402). 
This evaluation of Mullā Ṣadrā on non-existents as having some share of existence makes 
one think that in reality, Ṣadrā rejects non-existence itself. Non-existence according to 
him is nothing but a concept produced by the mind. And as a concept it has its fair share 
of existence.  
How about ultimate non-existence? Fārābī and Muʿtazila say that non-existence is a thing. 
Avicenna says that the ultimate non-existence is not a thing. How about Mullā Ṣadrā? 
According to Ṣadrā, as his primacy of existence principle implies, the distinction between 
existence and quiddity is a mental construction. The reality is existence, and as existence 
is not content-less, as soon as the mind is directed to things their quiddity is constructed 
by the mind. In this approach quiddity is a secondary universal. All universals as well as 
quiddities are mental constructions which depend on the human for their existence. Non-
existence is a mental construction and, in reality, other than this construction, there is 
nothing to be referred to as non-existence. Thus he rejects non-existence totally, and 
rejects that non-existence is a thing. 
In the next two sub-chapters I will continue to present how Mullā Ṣadrā explains 
universals and quiddities as mental objects with other examples of mental existence. 
5.4.3 Universals as Objects of Mental Existence 
According to Mullā Ṣadrā, universals are creations of the human mind. According to his 
comprehensive concept of wujūd, universals are classified as existence, though a mind-
dependent one.  
In terms of defining universals, Mullā Ṣadrā follows the Peripatetics: the universal is that 
which is not prevented from being predicated on many (Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 
17a38; ShI tr, p. 148; Asfār, v. 2, p. 12). This is mainly a logical approach to the universal 
(ShI tr, p. 149; Tanqīḥ, Ṣadrā, p. 248). Universal can be considered in different ways: 
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universality in as much as it is universal is different from universality in as much as it is 
something to which the universality is attached. In the case that the universal is a horse, 
for example, the universality and horseness are two different meanings. Horseness on its 
own has a meaning that can be thought of without universality. In that sense, horseness is 
neither one nor many. It is neither extra-mental nor mental (ShI tr, pp. 149, 151).  
When a universal is said to have extra-mental presence, what is meant is the universal’s 
attachment to a particular extra-mental thing (ShI tr, p. 156-7; Asfār, v. 2, p. 8). This 
attachment is never a physical one. So according to Avicenna, following Aristotle, 
universals do not subsist externally (McGinnis, 2007, pp. 170-1).  
Mullā Ṣadrā follows the Peripatetic tradition in rejecting the extra-mental subsistence of 
universals. He also repeats Avicenna’s explanation of how a universal can be said to be 
present externally only in terms of being an attachment of a particular thing. However, if 
Ṣadrā accepts that extra-mentals can be attached to universals, he needs to accept the 
essence-existence distinction too. On the other hand, his idea of the primacy of existence 
seems to contradict such a stance. According to Ṣadrā, all that there is, is nothing but 
different levels of a single reality: wujūd. The principle of unity and multiplicity is this 
reality too. So, according to Ṣadrā, what differentiates things from each other are not 
accidents, matter, form, nor configurations of things. Rather, different intensities of 
existence are the real cause of existence of different beings in the universe. As a result, 
Ṣadrā rejects the individuation theory of Suhrawardī as much as he rejects that of 
Avicenna: the principle behind differentiation is not Suhrawardī’s quiddity too. So, on the 
one hand, Ṣadrā rejects any reality apart from existence, and moreover the very idea of 
compound of quiddity and existence. Mullā Ṣadrā’s presentation is not black and white 
in terms of separating his individuation theory from that of the Peripatetics and 
Suhrawardī’s. In the Mashāʿir, he chooses to promote his idea of intensification of 
existence as a principle of plurality, by accepting the compounds of existence and 
quiddity:  
It will become apparent to you also in what way it is true to say that the 
reality of wujūd, while being individualized by itself, is differentiated 
realities according to the differentiation of contingent quiddities, each 
of which is united to one of the degrees among its degrees and one of 
the stages among its stages. Except the primal Reality of wujūd which 
has no quiddity because it is pure Wujūd, of which there is none more 
complete or more intense or more perfect. Neither generality nor 
particularity are mixed in it (wujūd), and no definition defines it nor any 
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name or description renders it precise, and no knowledge comprehends 
it. "All faces will be humbled before the Ever-Living, the Self-
Subsistent Fount of All Being. [Qurʾān, 20:111] (Mashāʿir, p. 9, tr. 
Nasr, p. 10). 
An explanation that does not single out the primacy of existence is that Mullā Ṣadrā talks 
about these compounds in terms of their status intellectually. Thus, apart from the pure 
existence, all existents can be made objects of mentalization and can be turned into 
compounds of existence and wujūd. “Know that in all existents in concreto except wujūd 
there is composition, even if it be only in an intelligible manner, in contrast to pure wujūd” 
(Mashāʿir, p. 12, tr. Nasr, p. 13). 
This is made clearer when Mullā Ṣadrā talks about external realities being beyond the 
grasp of language and mind:  
Know that to all wujūdāt there correspond external realities; however, 
their names are unknown. In order to supply these names, we say ‘the 
existence of this’, ‘the existence of that’. Moreover, the totality of it 
necessitates in the mind a general concept. In contrast, the different 
things and quiddities have names and properties which are known. 
However, it is not possible to express the real wujūd of each thing 
among all the different things, or real wujūd of everything, through a 
name or a qualification because the formation of names and 
qualifications is in correspondence to concepts and universals used in 
logic, not in correspondence to individual ipseities of wujūd nor of 
concrete forms (Mashāʿir, p. 12, tr. Nasr, p. 13). 
Quiddity, for Mullā Ṣadrā, is a product of mind. On the appearance wujūd is attached to 
quiddities and this appearance is intellectual as well. So, for the sake of analysis it is 
acceptable to allow students of philosophy to mention qualification of māhīya with wujūd. 
Thus, Ṣadrā adds a pedagogical dimension to this usage. Yet, this does not mean that the 
implication of this usage - that existence is accidental - is also true for extra-mental world:  
Verily, the qualification of quiddity by wujūd is an intelligible 
qualification, and accidentality based upon the analysis by the mind. In 
this kind of accidentality it is not possible that there be for the 
substratum which receives the accident any degree of existence and any 
ontological reality, either externally or in the mind, that which is named 
not being called by this imposition an accident. As for specific 
difference, if it is said, for example, that it is accidental upon a genus, 
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that does not mean that the genus has in concreto reality whether it be 
external or mental without the specific difference. Rather, it means that 
the concept of specific difference is outside the concept of genus but 
related to it in meaning, even if being united with it existentially. And 
accidentality belongs to the quiddity from the point of view of (mental) 
analysis while being united with it [in concreto]. The same holds true 
for māhīya and wujūd when it is said that wujūd is one of the accidents 
of māhīya (Mashāʿir, p. 16, tr. Nasr, p. 17).  
Māhīya and wujūd are not two entities, and quiddity does not have any reality other than 
its shadowy existence dependent on wujūd. So as a result, although some composition of 
wujūd and quiddity is mentioned in different parts of Sadrian texts, there is not a real 
distinction of quiddity and wujūd apart from a mental production. 
More needs to be said about quiddities, especially about their status as mental beings. 
Accordingly that has been discussed in detail in the previous section. 
In terms of the ontological status of universals, although he denies their extra-mental 
existence, universals have mental existence:  
Universality is the harmony and the correspondence (mutābaqa) of an 
intellectual form to many. In comparison to other things, its existence 
is a shadowy one (Asfār, v. 2, tr. mine, p. 9).130 
As soon as universality emerges extra-mentally it loses its exemplary (mithālī) status, it 
possesses an individuated essence (huwiyya), thus in its new status universality becomes 
no longer applicable to many (Asfār, v. 2, p. 8). 
5.4.4 Quiddity as Objects of Mental Existence 
One would still wonder what the relationship of a common nature or universal and its 
particular examples is. Avicenna, in his Madkhal, talks affirmatively about a tradition of 
classification of universals as before multiplicity, in multiplicity, and after multiplicity. 
The first refers to the intellectual universal, the second to the natural universal, and the 
third to the logical universal (ShMd, p. 65ff). At the example of an actual horse that can 
be pointed to, the quiddity of horseness is found in multiplicity. The universal "horseness" 
in the mind, on the other hand, is in a certain respect logical and in another intellectual.  
The case of the intellectual has different considerations when the human is the starting 
point and when God is. According to the viewpoint of human, some forms are intellectual 
                                                          
130 Translation is mine. 
232 
 
before multiplicity and they cause existence of extra-mental forms, and these are artificial. 
Thus, tableness, for example, takes place in the mind first and then the human produces 
a table and it becomes existent in multiplicity. In the second case, a universal is found in 
multiplicity and human abstracts it, and it becomes intellectual after multiplicity. 
Avicenna leaves aside what kind of existence they have, but describes some universals in 
the mind of God which are before multiplicity (ShMd, p. 67ff).  
Another famous evaluation is Avicenna’s idea of three aspects of quiddity (ShI. V.1). 
Quiddity can be regarded as a universal existing in the mind, as essence existing in a 
concrete individual, and thirdly by itself, as quiddity per se. Quiddity in itself is neither 
universal nor particular. The curious point is whether quiddity with this special aspect is 
ontologically posited or not. It appears to me that it is difficult to consider this as an 
ontological realm. This is because things are present either in mind or external to mind. 
Remember this evaluation is about human mind: It is hard to think a third realm which is 
neither in or outside human mind. Some might claim this is a realm such as God’s mind, 
but then this is still a presence the outside human mind. Mullā Ṣadrā talks about the 
separate intellects in a similar fashion: as being in God’s knowledge. However, he makes 
it very clear that these do not have an independent existence (Tafsīr, v. 3, p. 410) 
Some might claim that if this is only a way of consideration which is not ontological, then 
this aspect must be considered as a special kind of mental existence. That mind abstracts 
universal of its concomitants as well; this kind of a function can be thought of for human 
minds. Izutsu explains that the misunderstandings regarding Avicenna lie in 
misunderstanding the quiddity itself as an ontological mode. Hence, consideration 
denotes a mental analysis: 
He calls these three different aspects of one and the same “quiddity” the 
three ways of viewing a quiddity (iʿtibārāt thalāsah). The word iʿtibār 
means a subjective manner of looking at a thing something produced or 
posited through the analytical work of the reason. It is an aspect of a 
thing which primarily appears in the subject and which, then, projected 
onto the thing itself as if it were an objective aspect of the thing (Izutsu, 
1971, p. 98). 
One can talk about a quiddity in terms of its universality or in terms of its attachment to 
an individual (Asfār, v. 2, pp. 8-9). So when one talks about the universal extra-mentally, 
what he means is the nature that is attached to the extra-mental entity. 
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The relationship of a universal and its particulars, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, is mentally 
constructed and mentally attached to things. Universals are merely common meanings 
which the mind constructs about things. Quiddities (a natural universal) for example, 
when they are present in different minds, or when they are attached to different entities 
extra-mentally; the relation of quiddity to many things it is attached to is not the relation 
of numerical one present in multiplicity. As a realized reality (let’s call it A), every being 
has its own quiddity which is different from all other things. What occurs about A in the 
mind and what it has in common with others’ quiddities is a natural meaning in mind. The 
commonness is then commonness in meaning. So each quiddity is different in terms of 
their reality in individuals, but the same in terms of meaning (Asfār, v. 2, pp. 7-8). One 
would think Avicenna is different from Mullā Ṣadrā as he thinks it is the exact common 
nature that occurs to the mind and for Ṣadrā the nature that is created in the mind is 
different from the extra-mental object. The paragraph from Avicenna, however, shows 
that these two are closer than one would imagine:  
And the soul itself also conceptualizes another universal which unites 
this form with another one in this soul or in another soul; but all of them, 
insofar as they are in the soul, have a single definition. And even if this 
form, in relation to the individuals, is a universal, in relation to the 
particular soul upon which it is impressed, it is an individual, for it is 
one of the forms which are in the intellect. And because individual souls 
are many in number, therefore it is possible for these universal forms to 
be many in number in the respect in which they are individual. And it 
may have another universal intelligible, whose relation to it is like its 
relation to an external. 
[…]―And because it is in the power of the soul to understand and to 
understand that it understands, and to understand that it understands that 
it understands, and to compose relations of relations, and to construct 
many states belonging to one thing from among these relations, 
potentially to infinity, it is necessary that there be no end for these 
intelligible forms ordered to one another (ShI, V.2, p. 210.14–18, tr. 
Black, 1998, p. 55). 
This is mainly because “universal” can be a relative term similar to genus. Just as genus 
can be thought of as a genus for some matter, it can be a matter for some other genus too. 
A similar relation is thinkable for universals and particulars:  
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Insofar as this form is a disposition in a particular soul, it is one of the 
individual sciences or concepts. For just as something may be a genus 
and a species from different perspectives, so too it may be a universal 
and a particular from different perspectives. Thus insofar as this form 
is some form among the forms in some soul, it is particular; but insofar 
as many share in it, ... it is a universal (ShI, V.2, p. 209, tr. Black, 1998, 
p. 54). 
According to Mullā Ṣadrā, things that are common in meaning can be differentiated from 
the others in four ways: in the form they share accidentally, they differentiate by their 
quiddity; in the genus they share, they differentiate by the part that belongs to the essence 
(dhāt); some also differentiate by their accidents which are not concomitant (lāzim); if 
they are common in their species, they differentiate by the wholeness of their nature or in 
terms of the level of deficiency of this wholeness (Asfār, v. 2, pp. 9-10). These cases of 
differentiation are called tamayyuz by Ṣadrā; separating them from what he calls 
tashakhkhuṣ - individuation. Before him, individuation, is explained by some 
philosophers through sense and observation, by others through the identifier ipseity or he-
ness (huwiyyah ʿaynī), or through the analytical parts which are gained through an 
intellectual analysis of the thing (juzz al-tahlīlī), or through the cause of the thing, or 
through the thing’s relation to the real existence (Asfār, v. 2, p. 15). 
For Mullā Ṣadrā, individuation can only take place through existence. Although different 
causes seem to explain the emergence of things extra-mentally, he insists it is wujūd which 
is the real maker. It is also the real cause for individuation as well as for differentiation. 
The process of one thing becoming itself (taʿayyun) is either (1) the essence of the thing 
(dhāt) itself or (2) it is something attached to it (Asfār, v. 2, p. 15). If it is something 
attached to it, it shall be one of these three: (2a) it is due to existence (wujūdī); (2b) it is 
due to the absence of something (ʿadamī); or (2c) it is a compound of the first two. An 
example of (2a) is the necessary existent, possible quiddities in the mind and the mental 
existents. An example of (2b) is differentiation of the “writer” from the "illiterate" by the 
ability “to write”. 
An example of (2c) is “illiterate” differentiating from “writer” by the absence of the 
ability to write. Another group of examples about (2) is human: human being is 
differentiated from horse by itself.  
The cases for the second possibility are due to wujūd, - although they seem to be through 
an attachment - because all those attachments are concomitants of wujūd. Accidents, 
235 
 
attributes, or attachments of things can play a role in differentiation. Despite their active 
role, in order to avoid an unending regression, they need to be of an existent. Thus, even 
in these cases, it is “existence” that causes the differentiation (Asfār, v. 2, pp. 15-16).  
While I was discussing the primacy of wujūd, I mentioned that one of the characteristics 
is that it is simple and it accepts no parts. Quiddity, in contrast, can be analysed into parts 
such as genus and differentia, and form and matter. The nature of the combination of 
genus and differentia on one side is vague and determinate; it is a relative and mental 
situation. In the case of matter and form, its nature is of unification (Asfār, v. 2, p. 18). As 
a result of the entrance of form into matter, one object emerges. Eventually, this too is 
mental and relational. Neither matters nor forms independently exist. Form is always a 
form of something and matter is likewise. Thus, both duos are mental and relational. The 
essence of this examination is that when any of those four are taken as conditioned 
(muqayyad), they are matter and form; when they are taken as unconditioned (muṭlaq) 
they are genus and differentia (Asfār, v. 5, p. 477).  
Mullā Ṣadrā introduces a double-sided understanding of quiddity, form and differentia as 
well. One side of the definitions refer to their nature revealing the reality of things. For 
example, quiddity tells us what makes a thing itself. In this sense, what makes a thing 
itself is only in a loose usage of the word māhiyyā’. As in his theory, what really makes a 
thing itself is nothing but the wujūd itself (Asfār, v. 2, pp. 3-5). Accordingly when quiddity 
is used to mean "what makes a thing itself", then it really means "wujūd". Thus the word 
quiddity has two usages: one is the universal, the quiddity, and the other is the existence. 
These analyses are related to the considerations and analyses of quiddity as well. For 
example, we can talk about the unification of form and matter only when the quiddity is 
conditioned to be something, only something instantiated physical can be thought to be 
composed of matter and form. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I tried to focus on intentionality in terms of the ontological status of 
intentional objects. On the one hand, I presented contemporary Meinongian and 
Russelian/Quineian discussions of intentional objects and on the other medieval 
Avicennan and Sadrian discussions on mental existence. Following Brentano’s indication 
from Aristotle’s inexistence and Aquinas’ inner word (verbum mentis), intentionality in 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is sought in his position on mental existence. The investigation 
showed how Ṣadrā’s theory is internally built. Fortunately, in terms of intentionality we 
face a case which contains object-directedness (though internally), aboutness (mental 
things are not defined merely in relational terms and as being content-less) and 
immateriality. This helps us claim that Ṣadrā talks about intentionality. 
In medieval philosophies, existence is not used only for extended corporeal things. The 
second part of the bipartite separation of mental and extra-mental thus includes intellects 
and God which are pure and immaterial. Existence in the mainstream usage still meant 
that which is differentiated and instantiated.  
In modern discussions, the dominant understanding is a univocal existence which is 
basically actual, determined, instantiated, physical, and extended in space. Due to this 
more restricted definition of existence, intentional objects have been a problematic case 
due to its alleged non-physicality. A detailed investigation of these theories, some of 
which are functionalist, teleological, representational theories, is not given in this chapter 
or in the other chapters. Instead, I chose three representatives hoping to represent three 
different attitudes in the modern era. Quine with his variable dependent reductionist 
approach and Russell with his more linguistic reductionist approach are two cases of 
explaining intentionality totally in relation to extra-mental physical world. For both 
philosophers, as for a majority of analytical philosophers, intentionality is to be accounted 
for in compatible terms with the physical world and language of science. In this attitude, 
existence refers to physical things or things that are explicable through science. Meinong, 
on the other hand, takes intentionality seriously and accepts its ontological implications 
as well. He does not introduce a new definition of existence. However, he discriminates 
between a thing’s existence and “so-sein”. So he introduces a larger category than 
existence which is object. This discrimination reminds one of Avicenna’s quiddity and 
existence. But different from Avicenna’s quiddity, so-sein is a state that includes existent 
and non-existents. In this sense, the so-sein is reminiscent of the “ḥāl” of Muʿtazila more 
than it is of quiddity. 
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Medieval philosophers like Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā accepted a different mode of 
existence as well as the central-meaning which is the actual extra-mental existence: 
mental existence. According to Avicenna, universals and quiddity would be vague and 
common. According to Ṣadrā even universal and common meaning had to share features 
of existence and be differentiated (mushakhkhaṣ).  
Although for Avicenna it is performed by bodily organs at some levels, both philosophers 
talked about abstracted forms in the acquired knowledge process. In Avicenna’s case, it 
seems the correspondence of extra-mental object and object of perception and possibility 
of knowledge is guaranteed by Active Intellect, which is an ontological agent as well as 
an epistemological one. And the soul was kept to one side of the correspondence. 
Knowledge, for Mullā Ṣadrā, is part of the soul, performed by the soul and both the 
faculties and the extra-mental object which play preparatory roles. Soul creates similar 
forms of an extra-mental object and the created object is identical with the knower agent. 
Knowledge is part of the soul and its substantial change. A human being’s ability to create 
forms similar to those in the world gives the human a world of her own: world of the 
mental beings. This world is part of the central existence and shares features of it with 
different manifestations than the extra-mental things. Mullā Ṣadrā and Avicenna both 
expand the application of existence to non-actual things. Intentional objects, according to 
them, fall under the classification of mental existence.  
As for mental existence, Avicenna does not discuss this in detail nor does he try to prove 
it. It is thanks to Fakhr al-dīn Rāzī and Ṭūsī that we see how mental existence starts to be 
part of philosophical discussions on existence. Mullā Ṣadrā, too, is one of the important 
figures in terms of his prioritizing the discussion of mental existence. It is important to 
prove mental existence, because without the differentiation of mental and extra-mental 
existence, proving primacy of existence would be a more difficult mission. Thus, part of 
his argumentation for the primacy of wujūd depends on mental existence. Thanks to the 
difference, the existence in reality is denied to be an abstracted concept. His proofs for 
mental existence are not original, and he mainly repeats the argumentations from 
affirmative true sentences, from generalizations and fictional and non-existent things. The 
originality of his approach lies instead in his understanding of the soul and existence. He 
thinks that human beings are capable of creating a unique world and that wujūd manifests 
itself at various intensifications and stages. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s case, then, intentionality is 
re-creation of a world in the human mind by the creativity of the soul. This world has 
resemblance to the extra-mental world. However, the causal relations in the extra mental 
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world is different as well as the physical nature of things. The existence of this mental 
world is totally dependent on the human being; however, this world still occupies a degree 
in the cycle of beings and things in it are manifestations of wujūd.  
With this expanded approach to existence Mullā Ṣadrā pursues a different path from those 
who introduce “thingness” or those who try to eliminate or reduce intentional objects with 
a univocal understanding of existence which is only extra-mental and in many cases only 
physical. His comprehensive understanding is only possible because of the creative 
capacity of the soul and the principle of tashkīk.  
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CONCLUSION 
Words move, music moves, 
Only in time, but that which is only living 
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach 
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still 
Moves perpetually in its stillness. 
Not the stillness of the violin, while the notes lasts, 
Not that only, but the coexistence,  
Or say that the end precedes the beginning 
And the end and the beginning were always there 
Before the beginning and after the end. 
… the detail in the pattern is movement 
As in the figure of ten stairs 
T. S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton” 
 
THE QUESTION, THE ARGUMENT AND THE FINDINGS 
What if the question of intentionality is discussed with a comprehensive concept of 
existence that includes intentional objects? This was the main question behind my 
research. In this investigation the aim was, on the one hand, to reconstruct the question 
of intentionality around a wider understanding of existence and, on the other, to 
reconstruct Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy concerning the question of intentionality. It has 
been shown in various chapters of this thesis that we can find a fresh understanding of 
intentionality when Ṣadrā’s ontological, psychological, and epistemological principles 
are reconstructed around “intentionality”. The results of my reconstruction of 
intentionality are mainly based on Ṣadrā’s monist ontology and psychology. 
The result can be summarized as such: ontologically, there is only one reality and nothing 
is left outside it; this reality is “existence”. Accordingly, the intentional objects are mental 
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beings that are a lower level of existence called “shadowy existence” (wujūd ẓillī). The 
principles behind the monist ontology are, first, the gradational ontology (tashkīk) that all 
things are determined beings (mutamayyiz) and they are manifestations of a single reality 
at different levels of intensity (mutashakkik), and, second, the simplicity principle (basīṭ 
al-ḥaqīqa) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being 
the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Epistemologically, whole knowledge 
processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal 
effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool. 
Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of 
perception is internally created. The soul is no longer the receiver of forms, but is the 
active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being 
produced. The soul is then no longer a container of forms. It is rather the case that the 
forms themselves construct the soul. The last touch of this extremely internalist 
psychology is the claim that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being 
(knowledge) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. This connects us to the 
psychological situation of Ṣadrā’s intentionality: the soul is neither material nor 
immaterial per se. It is a substance, which is in constant change. The soul starts its journey 
as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through its journey. 
The soul’s journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the perception processes.  
Ṣadrā’s monism is observable at all three of these levels of investigation. In ontology, the 
main idea is that existence is one reality, and that it is differentiated at each and every one 
of the existents. When this notion is reflected at the derived level of language and logic, 
existence is predicated of its instances univocally. The reflection of monism in 
epistemology and psychology is observed in the claims that the soul is a unity that is 
active at all levels of knowledge, and that the soul is capable of creating a world of its 
own which reflects realities in an extra-mental world, and lastly that the soul is identical 
with this world which it creates, so it undergoes change through all of its experiences.  
So what does this reconstructed theory of Ṣadrā say about intentionality? Thanks to 
intentionality, there is a world within the human being. And knowledge and experience 
are ultimately on an expedition of discovery and a process of finding this unique world. 
Whether human beings come to this world with an inner world embedded in them or 
without one as a tabula rasa is not so clear in Ṣadrā’s case. However, by the process of 
knowledge, this inner world is at one and the same time both internally built and explored. 
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One suspects that an internalist theory can claim to explain intentionality. With a radically 
internalist understanding of the cognition and knowledge process, one suspects Ṣadrā’s 
philosophy can do so as well. However, one interesting result of this investigation has 
been that an internalist theory of intentionality is possible together with the assumption 
that there is coherence and correspondence between the mental objects. Moreover, these 
intentional objects reflect features of their source-objects in the extra-mental world. The 
more perfect a soul is the more perfect the replica created becomes. I would not like to 
connect this point to Plato’s theory of anamnesis. The main reason is that Ṣadrā does not 
explicitly try to prove that knowledge is remembering. Moreover, the creative process in 
knowledge is an essential part of the Sadrian notion of knowledge. The discovery or 
remembering or its unveiling is an active process rather than a passive one due to this 
creativity.  
To sum up, intentionality is the human soul’s capacity to create a unique world of its own 
which is different from the extra-mental world. The objects that are internally produced 
populate this inner world. Moreover, this inner world is given an ontological status and 
regarded as a level of existence. These existents are dependent on the human soul in their 
continuity of existence. The more the soul experiences and perceives, the more it becomes 
ready for its own perfection and the forms it creates become more perfect replicas of the 
extra-mental objects. The soul undergoes change and becomes the objects that it 
perceives. Thus, the ontological status of the intentional objects is closely related with 
knowledge being a mode of existence and the soul being the very perceptions of its own 
self. In this picture, intentionality is what happens to the soul and intentional objects are 
what the soul is in its constant state of change. 
Let me explore these points in more and define the ontological and psychological 
questions in a larger context. In the 19th century Brentano introduced the concept of 
intentionality with the main intention of defining the “mental”. Brentano’s intentionality 
claim caused heated debates in the field of ontology. Kriegel, for example, expresses how 
Brentano’s intentionality thesis created a nightmare for naturalist philosophers: 
“Ontology of merely intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological 
commitment to such entities we should” (Kriegel, 2008, p. 79). Brentano opened the way 
to this “nightmare” by claiming that intentional objects are different from physical 
phenomena. However, he did not follow through his immanence claim to its full extent 
to make ontological claims. Ṣadrā’s philosophy, on the other hand, is capable of a fully 
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extended ontological commitment. That is one of the reasons for choosing his theory in 
this thesis.   
Ṣadrā’s theory admits propositional implications as well. He accepts that propositions 
including intentional objects can have truth value. Similar to Avicenna, when the objects 
are not extra-mentally existent, Ṣadrā builds the correspondence aspect of the truth claims 
between inner relations of concepts. Accordingly, we can say not only that mental 
existents are created by the soul but also their coherence is “in the mind” as well. One 
may suspect that this extreme internalism could be vulnerable to solipsism. However, the 
similarity of the human to the cosmos saves Ṣadrā’s theory from being some sort of 
solipsism. Indeed all truths about the universe are potentially already present in the human 
being. The more the human soul experiences these, the closer it gets to her perfection. 
Even after death, the journey to perfection does not end. Human beings are also created 
with the ability to create. This is the reason why they can visualize mental existents that 
are impossible or fictional things absent from the extra-mental world: the mental world 
and imagination is the never-ending realm of man’s creativity (Khamenei, 2006, p. 151). 
Mental existents are dependent on the human soul, especially its faculty of imagination. 
Ṣadrā’s explanations of knowledge of the extra-mental world, the nature of knowledge 
and ontology return back to human beings. The circle starts and ends with the human. 
The only way out of this circular explanation and to avoid solipsism is to relate the human 
to the world by the claim that the human being is a microcosm. A second approach relates 
the human soul and the world through a transcendental connection. All existence in reality 
starts and ends with God. And following Ibn al-ʿArabī’s explanation, the whole universe 
is imagination and has an in-between (barzakhī) status. The world and the mental world 
are alike: mental beings are creations of and the inner world of the human. Similarly, the 
world itself and human beings in it are dependent on God and are merely imaginings of 
God. Ṣadrā’s philosophy avoids scepticism by the postulation that everything is based on 
the idea of God. Thus, only through God can one talk about existence and the reality of 
existence. But simply because one can talk about real existence, all that there is exists. 
The cosmos is open to accounts of different natures because there are different aspects to 
the cosmos. From the human perspective, it is a dynamic reality, and unless the human 
has direct connection to it, this reality is in constant change, it is unnameable and 
unspeakable. 
Existence is a homogenous reality shared by all. Part of my reading focuses on Ṣadrā’s 
idea that every existent is necessarily differentiated from other things that exist. As a 
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result, my interpretation of Ṣadrā’s ontology had made him close to reist approaches and 
radically monist with a univocal understanding of the concept of existence. This is not to 
mean that Ṣadrā is following a concretist and materialist understanding of existence. But 
his approach goes beyond the dichotomy of material and dualist understanding.  
Reism is based on the idea that only “things” exist. Brentano’s later philosophy as well 
as some nominalist medieval philosophies defended this idea. All categories are reduced 
to one category: the thing. In many versions of reism, we find the rejection of abstract 
objects. In relation to intentional objects, it results in a direct realism that the only object 
is the extra-mental thing. The Reist approach has implications for semantics as well: 
“Only singular names, that is, names referring to concrete things, should be used, and 
abstract words avoided. Eventually, one can use sentences with abstract words provided 
that they have translations into statements with singular terms” (Woleński, Jan, (2012)). 
Due to its rejection of abstractness, one would imagine reism is also attractive for some 
materialist explanations. However, these aspects of reism and its strong relation to direct 
realism are not the reasons why I find it close to Ṣadrā’s philosophy.  
The main similarity is that Ṣadrā’s explanations are similarly based on the idea of 
differentiated and determined existents; if not with the thing, the world is filled with 
existents. The existent is not necessarily concrete nor is it three-dimensional. However, it 
is always determined and individuated, and this results in a different approach to 
universals. Universals as well are differentiated and they appear to manifest some sort of 
particularity, if not the same kind of particularity as singular things.  
In Ṣadrā’s approach, everything other than God is unstable and deficient. Still, each 
existent has a share of one reality at different levels of intensities and perfections. Every 
existent (this is to say every existent) is determined. Existents or existence is never vague. 
So my point of analogy between Ṣadrā and reist approaches is mainly about this rejection 
of vagueness about existence. I think my reading is a necessary step to be taken when 
Ṣadrā’s primacy of existence claim is strictly applied to all areas of his thought. Part of 
this is that the primacy of existence entails the idea that existence is never a vague term 
but instantiated and differentiated at all levels and in all samples of its manifestation. 
Another implication of the primacy claim is that as all things share a homogenous reality, 
they also need an entity for their uniqueness: a differentiator. Ṣadrā claims that everything 
that exists does so with its own particular existence, and the particular existence of each 
existent is what causes the differentiation of one from another. What differentiates one 
thing from another then is its own strength and level or manifestation of existence. In 
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terms of thought, our concepts have a similar differentiation: each time we judge a mental 
object, we judge it as such and such. This kind of realism (the realism of relata which I 
mentioned in the Introduction for intentionality) can imply two different results: in 
Meinong’s case, these differentiated things are necessary, because we apparently judge 
not only beings, so-beings, and subsistence, but also non-beings and impossible beings 
(On Assumptions, tr. James Heavenue, p. 243). In order to be able to judge non-existence 
of an impossible object such as a four-edged circle, we need a bearer of the judgment 
(Meinong, “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, 1904, p. 9). Otherwise, we are left with open 
sentences which cannot bear a judgment, a falsity or truth. So Meinong’s developed 
theory is mainly built on this realism and built on Mally’s Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit 
and the result is that we need to assume that there are things that do not exist. This is an 
expanded world of objects. He does not try to expand the notion of existence in order to 
account for intentional objects. Mullā Ṣadrā gives the second reply and expands the notion 
of existence itself. What differentiates him from other medieval philosophers such as 
Avicenna, who also accepts the category of mental existence, is his principle of primacy 
and gradational ontology. There is only one reality that is existence, but it manifests itself 
in different intensities and gradation. The monist nature of his ontology allows him to 
account for all mental existents without overpopulating the cosmos with individual 
monads. 
Bearing in mind Brentano’s claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental, we can 
now pursue the psychological questions related to intentionality. Every mental 
phenomenon is accordingly characterized by reference to content, and direction to an 
object. “Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself”. In this 
account, illusions or fictional beings are not excluded, but rather included, since they are 
mental phenomena. Intentionality can be thought of in three parts: the mental act (as the 
word “direction” would suggest), its content, and its object (most commonly the extra-
mental object which is being referred to by the content). The presence of non-existent 
things in the list implies that the objects in intentionality are not necessarily extra-
mentally existent. Brentano’s explanation further claims: “No physical phenomenon 
exhibits anything like it”. Mental phenomena are different from physical phenomena. 
Thus, when one sees a cat, even when the cat is extra-mentally existent, Brentano claims 
that the intentional directedness towards it creates something different from any physical 
phenomena. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, the trio of mental act, content, and object is 
reduced to the soul’s action alone. This is due to Ṣadrā’s principle of identification of the 
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knower and the known. However, for the sake of investigation we can still talk about the 
object of cognition and the cognizer. Intentional objects are directly translated – 
accordingly – as “mental objects”. Searle lists that the main questions to ask for 
identifying intentionality are: “What is X directed to?”, “What is X about?”, and “What 
is X of?” (Searle, 1983, pp. 1-37). Many analytical philosophers have described 
intentionality in relation to extra-mental reality and some with reference theory. So when 
someone sees a cat, according to these theorists, the agent sees the actual cat which is 
before them. This seems pretty straightforward. The problem for many of them occurs 
when there is no cat but somehow a content or about-ness is built. Kriegel talks about two 
types of intentional objects in a similar context. When the object is not extra-mentally 
existent he names it as a “merely intentional object” (Kriegel, 2008, p. 80). Brentano’s 
claim is stronger in its immanence. According to him, even when there is an actual cat I 
see before me, when I see it, I do not get an ‘experience’ of the vision of the cat. I ‘see’ 
the vision of the cat (Searle, 1983, p. 37).131 
The psychological question then is easily translated to DA literature of sensation after 
Aristotle. Since Aristotle, the processes of cognition starting with sense perception are 
explained dominantly as a process of abstraction. In its basic description, sense perception 
is extraction of forms from the extra-mental objects. The material world is thought to be 
consisting of compounds of matter and form. When we perceive with sense organs, the 
first level of extraction of the sensible form from the compound (of matter and form) 
takes place. Brentano refers to Aristotle’s explanation of sense as the production of 
matter-less form as a statement of intentional inexistence. However, whether there is 
immanence in Aristotle’s original theory is debatable. One way of testing this is through 
looking at how materialist Aristotle’s theory is. The literalist reading of Aristotle’s text 
would result in Aristotle defending a physical change and assimilation in the sense organ 
with the perception. Accordingly, the eye actually becomes red when it sees a red object. 
Even when we assume that Aristotle really means what his actual wording suggests, it 
seems that after him the understanding has been more and more immaterialised by his 
commentators. So much so that we read that the change is “spiritual”: “A natural body 
receives forms in accordance with natural and material existence … but senses and 
                                                          
131 Huemer links Brentano’s immanentism to his intentionality claims as follows: “The passage clearly 
suggests, however, that the intentional object towards which we are directed is part of the psychological 
act. It is something mental rather than physical. Brentano, thus, seems to advocate a form of 
immanentism, according to which the intentional object is “in the head,” as it were.” Huemer, Wolfgang, 
"Franz Brentano", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/brentano/>. 
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intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and materially, according to a certain 
intentional existence” (St. Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato 449a15; 
tr. Pasnau, 1997, p .37). It seems that the discussions on how much an account is 
immaterialist are built around different explanations at different levels of cognition.  
The reason for identifying a particular philosopher who is classified under different 
approaches is how it reveals the differing focus of each scholar’s approach to that 
philosopher. Some focus on the act of cognition itself. Accordingly, when cognition can 
be thought to be operated by a physical body, then they consider it physical and material. 
For example, the inner senses in Avicenna are explained as functions of the brain and 
then, in accordance with this, his account of not only external senses but also inner senses 
is described as material. Some others focused on the process of the event. The literalist 
readings of Aristotle, for example, explained change as happening in the sense organs and 
claimed that the organ literally becomes like the object. As they focus on the event and 
as the change is material, for them immateriality does not occur at the level of the senses. 
Another group of scholars have focused on the object of cognition. So, for example, when 
the sense objects are considered, because the physical presence of the object is a necessary 
condition, sense perception is considered to be material at all times. For this kind of 
approach, Avicenna’s discrimination between form and meaning as two possible object 
types are important. So when meaning (such as in estimation) becomes the object, then it 
is a higher level of immateriality. What makes meanings special is that they can in no 
way be perceived by the external senses (McGinnis, 2010, p. 112). Eventually, even at 
the level of sense perception and even with the most materialist reading of the process, 
the outcome seems to be different from the physical. So going back to Aristotle’s wax 
example, the necessity of the ring does not necessitate that the imprint in the wax is iron 
and white, (and other particularities of it), and so on. The imprint in the wax, by contrast, 
is necessarily different from the ring that causes the imprint.  
Mullā Ṣadrā explains sense perception in an extremely internalist fashion as the aspects 
discussed above. According to him, sense perception is neither the abstraction nor the 
imprinting of forms; instead, it is a process of construction of inner forms that takes place 
with the power given by God. The process is immaterial because even though sense 
perception is the agent is the soul, the bodily organs are the tools of the soul. The extra-
mental object as well is not the object of the sense: “[...] the sensible in essence is the 
form which is present with the soul and not something extra-mental corresponding to it” 
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(Asfār, v. 8, 238; tr. Peerwani, 174-5).132 In this explanation, when I see a cat, the object 
of my vision is the internally created form of the cat. Thus, I see the experience of the cat 
and not the extra-mental cat. The phenomenology is constitutive of the intentional 
content. 
Ṣadrā’s explanation of the world is dynamic. From the start, existence is a dynamic 
reality. As soon as it is frozen into quiddities or stable criteria, its reality becomes 
distorted. Accordingly, all natural things including earthly and celestial beings are in 
constant change. This change does not only occur in the accidental features, but in the 
very substance (Ḥudūth, pp. 59-83). Everything in the world is in constant flux and in 
reality there is only a flow of changing substances: one form changing into another 
(Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 97). This understanding of the constant change affects our 
conception of “thing”, since no stable identity remains in this world. As Fazlurrahman 
expresses it: “Thing is a particular segment of continuous progress regarded as a particular 
event-system for purposes of description (Fazlurrahman, 1975, p. 98)”. The human eye 
or cognition in general cannot capture this reality in its constant flux.  
As mentioned, cognition is – in a sense – “freezing” this flux. So, in cognition the changed 
parts of one segment look like one thing because the constantly changing forms are 
similar. As a result, we imagine the parade of similar substances to be the same or 
subsume it under a stable and static concept (Asfār, v. 3, pp. 74-76; Fazlurrahman, 1975, 
p. 97). Imagination is then one essential part of perception. Not only sense perception, 
but also all the things in our minds and the world we think we live in are products in this 
fashion. There are no things to be captured in their reality of constant change. Another 
point that connects Ṣadrā’s psychology to his ontology is that according to this 
explanation everything is in a movement towards its own perfection. As mentioned 
before, Ṣadrā sees this as a proof that even minerals have consciousness (Asfār, v. 1, pp. 
190-1; v. 9, p. 67ff.). The movement is irreversible and it is only possible in the direction 
towards perfection. 
The importance of the substantial change is not only that the objects of senses in the 
external world are never graspable, but also that the human soul undergoes change. So 
cognition is the way the human soul changes in its substance. Every form created in the 
soul causes change in the human soul for better. Ṣadrā says that the movement is toward 
God, but in its perfected and most observable fashion this change is found in human 
                                                          
132 “اهل قباطملا ىجراخلا رملاا لا سفنلادنعةرضاحلاةروصلاوه تاذلاب سوسحملاف” Asfār,v. 8, p. 238. 
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beings (Asfār, v. 9, pp. 67-9). The soul starts its journey as a corporeal being and with the 
substantial change caused by its experiences it moves into a more immaterial essence. 
Ṣadrā names this as the “principle of the soul’s corporeality in her origin and spirituality 
in her survival”. 
This principle brings out the most important characteristic of his philosophy: monism. In 
terms of intentionality, this monist approach makes him unique for the ontological aspects 
as well as the psychological aspects of his thought. The first aspect of psychological 
monism is explained through the essence of the soul in her journey from corporeal to 
spiritual. A second psychological aspect is observable in the actions of the soul. The soul 
is the active agent in not only the incorporeal actions of the self, but also in physical 
events. The soul is the real perceiver of sensation, it is the real mover when the vegetative 
or animal soul moves, and it is responsible for higher cognition such as intellection and 
so on. To sum up, the soul is all its faculties. This can be interpreted to evolve into a 
bundle theory with the soul being an instable substance. Similar to the result of substantial 
movement constituting the soul in its movement, its experiences also shape the soul. This 
is a very dynamic understanding of the self. As I mentioned before about phenomenology 
being constitutive of intentional content, the soul is constitutive of its content and thus its 
own. The principle that the soul is all its faculties implies that the soul is nothing but what 
it experiences. The soul is not a receiver of data, or a factory that processes them, nor is 
it a container. 
LIMITATIONS 
Finally, a number of limitations need to be considered. The current investigation was 
limited by Brentano’s presentation of intentionality and further discussions are not 
included. Brentano and Mullā Ṣadrā agree with previous philosophers frequently in their 
argumentations. Accordingly, the research has a historical aspect, although this is limited 
to being mentioned briefly. In order to understand Mullā Ṣadrā’s synthesis various aspects 
of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s mysticism, Avicenna’s Aristotelianism and Suhrawardī’s 
illuminationism were necessary ingredients. This resulted in some of the complicated 
philosophical ideas being reduced to brief discussions. Limitations of time also might 
have caused a misreading of these philosophers. I believe one way of expanding this 
research is to place the problem of intentionality in a historical reading that follows the 
lineage of concepts and explore the clusters of discussions within their chronological and 
semantic contexts. However, that kind of a conceptual and historical investigation is of a 
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different nature and thus needs to be pursued with a methodology independent from that 
of the present work.  
In places I deliberately focused on some interpretations over others. For example, in the 
case of Peripatetic tradition, I did not focus on a tradition that finds the idea of ontological 
gradation (tashkīk) in Avicenna’s writings. Neither did I mention more Neoplatonic 
interpretations of him. Instead, I focused more on a literal reading not only of Avicenna, 
but also of other philosophers as well. In a similar fashion, I did not delve into the large 
secondary literature on many sections of the DA and modern interpretations of Aristotle. 
Thus, this simplified approach to important philosophers such as Avicenna, Plotinus, and 
so on can be targeted by expert scholars on these particular philosophers. As I mentioned 
before, this was a deliberate strategy on my part to create a coherent frame to work on the 
related concepts in order to reconstruct the ‘intentionality’ question.  
The strong monism together with internalism is an interesting synthesis that can be used 
to link phenomenological approaches to the monist analytical philosophies such as 
Russellian monism and even Galen Strawson’s panpsychism. This research can serve as 
a base for that kind of further research. 
More important than the already mentioned projects is that a frame that goes beyond 
immaterial-material, ideal-real dichotomies provides an important opportunity for 
ontological and psychological discussions. This research is an attempt to discover this 
framework with a focus on only intentionality. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
I believe this research is a fresh approach to both intentionality discussions and modern 
Ṣadrā studies. On the side of intentionality, whilst this study does not develop a full-
blown theory of intentionality, it provides a new approach different from many modern 
theories of intentionality. On the side of Mullā Ṣadrā scholarship, this research is 
important with its emphasis on the ideas of particularity and the monism of existence.  
As the study makes no claim that Ṣadrā originally had a theory of intentionality, this study 
is also important in its reconstruction of his ideas around a modern question. One last and 
perhaps most apparent contribution this research makes is that it is among a small number 
of works on Ṣadrā in English. This study is important in providing a large-scale evaluation 
of Ṣadrā’s theory of the senses. In terms of its focus on Sadrian psychology in general 
and its reconstruction of intentionality, this research adds to the growing body of literature 
of medieval studies of psychology.   
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